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The thesis is an attempt to examine the Labour Party's 
involvement with the question of Palestine from the time of 
the party's first declaration on the subject in 1917 to the 
de facto recognition by a Labour Government of the State of 
Israel in January 1949. 
It considers the development of attitudes within the 
Labour Party, 
r primarily those of the party leaders and 
policy makers, but also of the wider party membership, on 
the questions of Zionism, the Palestinian Arabs, the role of 
the British Mandatory Government, and the future of 
Palestine. It also discusses the formulation and content of 
official party policy throughout the period, and the part 
played by groups representing Zionists and Arab interests, 
in particular the Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Poale Zion. 
The thesis also assesses the extent to which the Labour 
Party was able to influence the Palestine policies of 
successive British Governments. During two crucial periods, 
between 1929 and 1931, and from 1945 to 1949, Labour 
Governments held office. Both periods are considered 
exclusively with the aim of examining reactions within 
sections of the Labour Party to the policies pursued, and 
the influence such attitudes had on Government policy. 
I 
Introduction 
There has been no detailed account of the British 
Labour Party's involvement with the question of Palestine 
during the Mandatory period. For historians of the Mandate, 
of Zionism and of the Palestinian Arabs the Labour Party 
has chiefly merited attention only, in passing, as the 
source of one of many domestic pressures on British policy 
makers. For historians of the Labour Party the subject of 
Palestine has impinged primarily in relation to the 
troubles experienced by the 1945 Labour Government. 
Concentrating on the one hand on certain party declarations 
and interventions, and on the other almost exclusively on 
Government policy and manifestations of disquiet expressed 
within the PLP, both groups of writers have necessarily 
presented an incomplete, unbalanced and occasionally 
inaccurate picture. This thesis seeks to meet the evident 
need for a coherent and balanced assessment of the 




Furthermore the events of the post war years have cast 
a shadow over the entire period and have in part distorted 
discussion of the earlier years. Thus for many Zionists it 
seemed that they had been 'led down the garden path'2 by 
the Labour Party, and subsequent comments largely relate to 
the alleged betrayal, of Zionism and of traditional party 
policy, by the Attlee Government. In contrast the 
1 In November 1917 the Balfour Declaration was issued; in 
January 1949 Britain recognised de facto the State of 
Israel. 
2 B. Bell, Terror out of Zion (Dublin, 1979) p. 146. 
II 
experiences of several Labour Ministers seemed to prove 
that they had been the victims of an 'overwhelming approach 
by their Zionist friends', 1 and attempts have been made to 
show that the Labour Party was both manipulated and 
misled. 
2 
Party policy prior to 1945 also became the subject of 
considerable disagreement. The Zionist Harry Morris3 
argued in Parliament that 'it is idle to pretend that 
resolutions passed... were irresponsible outbursts of 
enthusiasm... they were serious and considered'. 
4 But 
Richard Stokes commented disparagingly that 'I do not think 
the party had the slightest conception of what it was 
doing', 5 and one historian has argued that events high- 
lighted 'the glib way in which the party could commit 
itself to a position of foreign policy'. 
6 
It is only 
through a detailed examination of the period before 1945 
that an assessment of the various later interpretations 
can be made. 
A major aim of the thesis is to examine attitudes 
within the Labour Party. The principal sources are 
1 J. Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars (London, 1950) p. 157. 
2 See especially D. Watkins, Labour and Palestine (Labour 
Middle East Council, London, 1975). 
3 Throughout this work, following contemporary usage, the 
designation 'Zionist' is used only to describe a Jewish 
supporter of Zionism. 
4 HC Deb. Vol. 426 c. 1030,31 July 1946. 
5 Ibid., Vol. 433 c. 1970,25 Feb. 1947. 
6 C. R. Rose, The Relations of Socialist Principles to 
British Labour Foreign Policy 1945 
- 
1951, PhD Thesis, 
Nuffield College, oxford, 1959, P. 135. 
III 
published writings and records of speeches, though private 
collections of letters and documents, in particular those 
of Arthur Creech Jones and James Middleton, are also used. 
Though such a discussion necessarily concentrates on the 
opinions of party leaders and influential supporters it is 
noticeable that the issue, unlike, for instance, that of 
British policy in India, provoked a significant reaction 
among wider sections of the party, especially when linked 
with the fate of the Jewish communities in Europe. From 
Annual Conference reports, from the resolutions submitted by 
local Labour Parties, and from records of meetings 
- 
often 
held through the initiative of local Zionists 
- 
it is 
possible to piece together a picture of popular attitudes 
within the party. 
It has been argued that such attitudes can only be 
understood with reference to certain ideological 
traditions 
- 
of, for example, Fabian 'efficiency first' in 
international affairs or the contrasting Hobsonian critique 
of Imperialism. 
1 But did support for the self determin- 
ation of peoples necessitate support for Zionism or for the 
rights of Palestinian Arabs? Should 'progressive 
Colonialists' advocate or oppose Jewish development in 
Palestine? In fact it is here argued that feelings within 
the party were shaped, as Rose has suggested, by factors 'as 
much accidental and personal as ideological'. 
2 
It is partly for this reason that, although until at 
1 M. Leifer, Zionism and Palestine in British Opinion a 
Policy 1945 
- 
1949 PhD Thesis, University of London, 19 
pp. 268-268a. 
2 Rose, op. cit., p. 134. 
IV 
least 1945 a basic 'Labour Party attitude' can usefully be 
delineated, just as differences of opinion were to be found 
within almost every established British political grouping, 
l/, 
also there existed throughout the period a number of 
different strands of opinion within the Labour Party which 
challenged party orthodoxy. ((The resulting disagreements 
were rarely concerned with questions of emphasis or degree, 
but often stemmed from a fundamentally different approach 
to the Palestine problem. 11 
A second aim of this work is to provide an understanding 
of the nature and formation of party policy on Palestine. 
But it is necessary to appreciate that 'party policy' is 
necessarily an all embracing designation for something 
which included Annual Conference resolutions, NEC 
declarations, statements contained in official foreign 
policy documents, decisionsof the NEC designed to guide the 




pronouncements of party represen- 
tatives, in Parliament and elsewhere. 
Labour Party records now available' allow for the first 
time a detailed examination to be made both of the various 
processes by which policy emerged, and also of the 
pressures and considerations influencing timing and 
content. In particular it is possible to discuss some of 
the charges later made: 14hat conference resolutions were 
ill considered and little understood, that despite the 
1 These include the records, minutes and correspondence of 
the National Executive Committee, the International Sub 
Committee, the International and Imperial Advisory 
Committees and the International Department. 
V 
availability of a body of 'expert' opinion policy was 
ýI inspired by a minority of narve enthusiasts, and that 
certain programs emanating from the NEC showed signs of 
scant discussion or of 'shallow irresponsibility'. 
1 
It is now also possible to examine the extent to which 
the party was influenced, both in the moulding of opinion, 
and in the formulation of policy, by outside interest 
groups. On the one hand Palestinian Arab representatives 
made sporadic attempts to mobilise support within the 
Labour Party and to intervene in the policy making process. 
But, as foreign supplicants lacking any popular base in 
British political life, their position was in striking 
contrast to that of the Zionists' spokesmen, who could rely 
upon a large body of sympathetic public opinion, and an 
influential domestic Zionist organisation. More particu- 
larly Socialist Zionists were able to develop intimate 
institutional and personal links with the Labour Party 
which their Palestinian rivals could not hope to match. 
Indeed, through the affiliation of a Labour Zionist 
organisation, the Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Poale Zion, 
there existed from 1920 onwards a compact and influential 
Zionist pressure group inside the Labour Party. Though 
small in membership it was to play a vital role in 
providing a further point of access into Labour Party 
politics and policy making for the wider Labour Zionist 
movement, and in inspiring and co-ordinating manifestations 
of popular support for Zionism within the Labour Party. 
1 M. A. Fitzsimons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour 
Government 1945 
- 
1951 (Indiana, 1953) p. 81. 
VI 
Poale Zion records in Britain are scarce but Jewish and 
Zionist publications, in particular the Zionist Review, 
yield a mass of information, and Labour Party documents 
indicate a great deal about the role it was able to play. 
ftor 
most of the inter war period the Labour Party was 
not in office. 1I The Palestine policies of successive 
British Governments are not here discussed beyond what is 
necessary to determine the extent to which the Labour Party 
was able to influence such policies. 1l This has also 
dictated treatment of the two major periods, from 1929 to 
1931 and between 1945 and 1949, when Labour Governments 
were confronted with the problem of Palestine. In both 
cases it is possible to examine reactions within the party 
- 
specifically within the Parliamentary Labour Party, the 
National Executive Committee and the party organisation, 
and the wider 'rank and file' 
- 
towards the policies 
adopted, and the extent to which Labour Government felt 
obliged to shape their policies in the light of such 
opinions. In the later period Cabinet records can also be 
used to assess the level of disagreement within the Labour 
Cabinet. 
In the context of the British Labour Party and Palestine 
the years between 1917 and 1949 fall naturally into five 
distinct periods. Thus, with the exception of chapter four, 
which attempts to analyse certain attitudes within the 
Labour Party and the wider British 'left' mid way through 
the Mandate, one chapter is devoted to each period, though 
within each chapter it is often necessary to abandon a 
VII 
strictly chronological approach and consider in turn 
various significant developments. 
Chapter one therefore deals with the years before 1929, 
chapter two with the Second Labour Government and chapter 
three with the 1930s. During the Second World dar, the 
period covered by chapter five, the Labour Party was in 
certain important respects both an opposition party and a 
party of government. This had a significant bearing on 
developments after July 1945, with which the final chapter 
is concerned. 
For their helpfulness and courtesy in the preparation 
of this work I am indebted to the librarians and staff of 
the following institutions: the Labour Party; the British 
Library; the Public Record Office, Kew; the British 
Library of Political and Economic Science; Nottingham 
University Library; the Bodleian Library, Oxford; St. 
Anthony's College, Oxford; the 13oard of Deputies of 
British Jews. 
I would also like to thank Baron Janner (formerly 
BarnettJanner, MP), Professor R. H. Pear, Professor C. 




Early Enthusiasms 1917 
- 
1929 
A. Some Pre 
- 
War Aspects 
The Labour Party was slow to develop distinctive 
policies before the First World War; this was particularly 
evident in the field of foreign affairs. 
' The party had 
been formed with the aim of promoting the election of work- 
ing men to Parliament and it remained little more than a 
working class pressure group. In the same way the Zionist 
movement in Britain had achieved neither a commanding 
position within the Jewish community nor a significant place 
in the British political scene. For both the Labour Party 
and the Zionist organisation the war proved to be a major 
turning point. But a number of pre war developments may be 
noted, in particular the growth of a working class Zionist 
movement within the Jewish community in Britain. 
Between 1870 and 1914 some 120,000 Jews from Eastern 
Europe emigrated and settled in Great Britain. 2 Most were 
drawn to the poorer Jewish communities in London, Leeds and 
Manchester, and in 1900 an estimated 125,000 Jews were 
living in the crowded streets of the East End of London. 
3 
The immigrants brought with them, particularly to their 
1 See C. Brand, A History of the British ' Lab ur'-P. art (2nd ed. 
Stanford, California, 1974 p. 23) J. F. Naylor, Labour's 
International Policy: The Labour Party in the 19301s 
(London, 1969) P. 3. 
2 L. P. Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870-1914 (London, 1960) p. 49. 
3 V. D. Lipman, Social History of the Jews in England 1850-1950 (London, 1954) p. 164. 
2 
'stetl named Whitechapel' a distinctive religious and 
social pattern and added their own political beliefs and 
experiences to the political life of the area. For radical 
Jews in the East End who sought political debate and 
activity a heady and shifting kaleidoscope of left wing 
groups, movements and ideologies was readily available. 
' 
Many saw concern with the 'Jewish problem' as 
peripheral or irrelevant to their activities and worked in 
the belief that with the development of Trade Unionism, 
Socialism or Anarchism problems of Jewish individuality and 
exclusiveness would decline, and anti semitism and 
persecution disappear. Some Jewish Socialists were quick 
to co-operate with their British colleagues, and as early 
as 1895 an East London (Jewish) branch of the Social 
Democratic Federation had been formed; 
Other radical Jews sought to emphasise their Jewish 
identity together with their Socialist commitment. In 1876 
Aaron Liebermann had formed in London the Hebrew Socialist 
Union, in an attempt 'to synthesise the opposite ideals of 
Socialism and Nationalism, and to amalgamate the struggles 
for working class and Jewish national independence'. 3 His 
group 
- 
the first such Jewish Socialist organisation 
- 
soon disintegrated, but with renewed Tsarist persecution 
came the formation of further such groups in Russia. One 
strand in this development was to lead to Socialist Zionism. 
1 See R. Rocker, The London Years (London,, 1956) and W. J. 
Fishman, East End Jewish Radicals 1875x1914 (London, 1975). 
2 E. Silberner, 'British Socialism and the Jews', Historia 
Judaica, Vol 14,1952, p. 38. 
3 Fishman, op-cit., p. 76. For Liebermann see ibid., 
PP. 98-134 and N. Levin, Jewish Socialist Movement 1871-1917 (London, 1978) pp. 38-46 
3 
In July 1896 Herzl had received an enthusiastic 
reception from working class Jews at a mass meeting in 
Whitechapel, a success he repeated two years later. The 
English Zionist Federation, formed in 1898, nevertheless 
drew most support from prosperous middle class Jews. But 
in the early years of the next decade a number of immig- 
rants brought with them the ideas of a new Russian movement, 
Poale Zion ('Workers of Zion'), whose ideology sought to 
combine Marxist theory with a program which would lead to 
the development of a Jewish State in Palestine. 
The leading ideologists of the new movement were Nahman 
Syrkin, whose Call to Jewish Youth was published in London 
in 1901,1 and Ber Borochov. The latter, who lived in 
England for a short period, was a rigorous and brilliant 
thibker, and strove to outline 'a new theoretical economic 
base and a new revolutionary situation for the Jewish 
masses while keeping the Marxist dialectical framework'. 
2 
He rejected 'mystical and messianic' Zionism but used 
Marxist analytical methods to mount a challenge to the 
theoretical basis of the Socialist but anti Zionist Bünd. 
3 
Later Poale Zionists moved away from a belief in the 
inevitability of the 'stychic' process which would result 
1 The pamphlet was printed in Berlin but published in 
London to avoid trouble with the German police. 
2 Levin, op. cit., p. 4.18. See also A. Perlmutter, 'Dov 
Ber-Borochov: A Marxist-Zionist Ideologist', Middle East 
Studies, Vol 5, No. 1,1969, pp. 32-43, S. Levenberg ed. ), 
Selected Essays in Socialist-Zionism (London, 1948). For 
Poale Zion in. Russia see Levin,, op. cit., PP. 393-419, 
Z. Abramovich, "The Poale Zionist Movement in Russia: Its 
History and Development" in H. F. Infield-(ed. ), Essays in 
Jewish Sociology, Labour and Co-operation (London, 1962) 
pp. 63-72. 
3 The Bund 
- 
The General Jewish Workers League in Russia 
and Poland 
- 
grew rapidly in the early years of the century, 
reaching a peak in 1905. 
4 
in a Jewish Palestine, and drawing in part on Narodnik 
traditions stressed the importance of a regeneration 
through a Jewish 'return to the soil' in Palestine. But 
it was Borochov who first provided working class Zionists 
with the theoretical tools to agure, on equal terms with 
other left wing Jews, the Socialist case for a Zionist 
program. 
Poale Zion groups developed in Russia from 1902 onwards 
and in spite of internal disputes and schisms rapidly 
gained ground. In 1907 at a conference at The Hague the 
'Jewish Socialist Workers, World Confederation Poale Zion' 
was formed. Commitment to the class struggle and the 
socialisation of the means of production was affirmed, but 
this was to complement 'the territorial solution of the 
Jewish question through the establishment of a Jewish 
Commonwealth in Palestine'' Forty seven Socialist Zionist 
delegates had attended the Zionist Congress in 1906, but 
three years later Poale Zion withdrew from the organisation, 
and formed its own Palestine Workers' Fund. 
2 
As early as 1902 two groups 'whose ideology was similar 
to Labour Zionism' had been established in Britain, among 
poor Yiddish speaking Jews in Leeds and East London. 
3 Both 
soon collapsed, but a renewed effort was made in London the 
following year. The new group joined the Zionist 
1. li. JYneman, Yoale Zionism: An Outline of its Aims and 
Institutions (New York, 1918) Appendix C. 
2 Levin, oop. cit., pp. 408-9. 
3 S. Levenburg (ed. ), The Jews and Palestine: 
__A 
Study in 
Labour Zionism (London, 1945) p. 126. 
5 
Federation, though seeing as its role the democratisation 
of the movement and the furtherance of the class struggle. 
A library was established and cultural activities conducted 
'on an extensive scale'. 
l 
The attitude of Jewish trade unionists towards Zionism 
was generally cautious,, and often bitterly hostile. The 
new Poale Zion group was nevertheless based on the existing 
union organisation. The first branch was formed within the 
United Garment Workers (later non union members were 
admitted) and further branches stemmed from the Boots and 
Shoes Union and the hitherto anti Zionist Cabinet Makers 
Union. 2 A number of leading Jewish trade unionists 
declared their support, though resistence to Zionist ideas 
remained strong. 
Although reaction to the Kishinev progrom gave addition- 
al momentum to the Poale Zion movement in both Russia and 
Britain both organisations were soon divided, as was the 
Zionist movement as a whole, over the question of the 
Ugandan offer. 
3 Supporters of the scheme were relatively 
numerous in Britain, but enthusiasm declined as the 
realisation of the plan grew less likely. 'Orthodox' 
Poale Zionism continued to grow, and branches were 
established in Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and Glasgow. 
4 
A leading figure within Poale Zion was Kalman Marmor, 
1 Ibid., p. 126. The Jewish Yearbook (London, 1903-4) 
p. 114 lists 'Poa]ie Zion' as a London Zionist Society. 
2 M. J. Goldfine,, The Growth of Zionism in England 1870-1914, (Unpublished Master's Essay, Columbia University, 1939) 
PP. 53-70. The Jewish Yearbook (London, 1905-6) p. 116 
lists Poabe Zion No. 1& No. la in London and also a Poale 
Zion group in Liverpool. 
3 Many Zionists, including Herzl, looked favourably on the 
suggestion that Jewish colonisation should be encouraged in Uganda. 
4 Levenbergs op. cit., p. 127. In January 1905 Weizmann 
6 
who worked for a time as a chemistry teacher in London. In 
1905 he became editor of the short lived Yiddish publication 
Die Yiddishe Freiheit which appeared as the organ of the 
United Poale Zion. 1 A friend of Chaim Weizmann, Marmor had 
also been active as Secretary of Maarov, a middle class 
group engaged in Zionist cultural activities in the East 
Ehd. 
Though Weizmann was active in Maarov he typified the 
ambivalence of bourgeois Zionists towards the new Socialist 
Zionist movement. Syrkin's Call to Jewish Youth he had 
considered tan outrageous mixture of meaningless phrases 
and sheer stupidity'.? - Though he addressed a meeting of 
Leeds Poale Zion friction evidently arose over an unful- 
filled pledge to write an. article for Die Yiddishe Freiheit. 
In June 1905 Weizmann. was referring to grievances held 
against himi by Poale Zion groups. 
3 A group of his orn. 
'democratic fraction' also became active in. the East End 
with a program combining a revival of Hebrew activity with 
practical work in Palestine4 but relations between 'East 
End' and 'West End' Zionists remained poor. 
At this time Poale Zion lacked both a clear statement 
of its aims and a practical program of action, as the 
manifesto of Leeds Poale Zion indicated: 
referred to the Poale Zion 'Ugandan' wing as remaining 
'completely inert'. C. Weizmann to K. Marmor, 25 Jan, 1905, 
in L. Stein (ed. ) The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, 
Series A. (henceforth LPCW), (London, 1968) Vol. IV, p. 12. 
1 Fishman, op. cit., p. 286. 
2 C. Weizmann to V. Khatzman, 26 June 1901, LPCW, Vol. I, 
p. 137. 
3 C. Weizmann to K. Marmor, 25 June 1905, LPCW, Vol. IV, 
p. 113. Weizmann admitted that the complaints might be 
'partially justified'. 
Gartner, op. cit., p. 207. 
7 
'Poale Zion is a national movement of Jewish workers 
which undertakes the following tasks (1) To create a 
national-political centre in Palestine for the 
Jewish people (2) To lead a struggle for civil and 
national rights in the Diaspora (3) To struggle 
against the present economic ordert equally with 
other proletarian organisations'. 
As Gartner comments 'the second and third points... 
meant little in the English environment... while a 
'National-political centre' is political Zionism at its 
lukewarmest'. 2 
In 1906 disagreements came to a head within Poale Zion 
between the advocates of the existing policy of 'trade 
unionism' and critics who called for a more determined 
Socialist policy. At a conference held in Manchester in 
April a Central Committee was set up, but no agreement could 
be reached between the two factions, though the Socialist 
group was to be allowed to propagandise freely. 
The final victory of the 'Socialists' was not long 
delayed. Following the arrival of new immigrants from. 
Russia a further conference was held in Liverpool on Christ- 
mas Day, which declared itself to be 'the constituent 
conference of the Poale Zion in England'. 
3 A radical 
Socialist Zionist program was adopted, and the following 
year Kalman Marmor represented his party at the establish- 
ment of the World Union in The Hague. 
Despite these developments the momentum of the early 
years could not be maintained. The Russian organisation 
faced severe difficulties and a Jewish State in Palestine 
1 Published in Die Yiddishe Freiheit May-June 1905 and 
quoted in ibid. 
, 
p. 266. 
2 Ibid., p. 266.3 Levenberg, op. cit.,, p. 127. 
8 
seemed as far away as ever. In 1910 the Zionist Banner 
remarked on the low membership of the British Poale Zion, 
which it ascribed to a vague program and lack of organisa- 
tion. 1 Similar problems beset the English Zionist 
Federation, and at no point before the war did Zionist 
membership exceed 6% of the Jewish population. 
2 
Opposition to Zionism amongst the Jewish working class 
remained strong. In May 1905 Weizmann debated with 
Manchester Social Democrats the question of Zionism before 
a large audience; to his wife he claimed a great victory. 
3 
But although the influence of Jewish Social Democrats was 
more significant outside their own community, their outright 
opposition to Zionism in whatever form was a further check 
to the expansion of Poale Zion. The anti Zionist Bund also 
found some support in the years before the war. 
The most vibrant and successful of the Jewish left wing 
factions were the anarchists of the Arbeiter Friend group, 
led by the gentile Rudolf Rocker. He was not unfriendly 
towards Socialist Zionists 
- 
whose creed, he noted, had few 
supporters among Jewish workers4 
- 
and reserved his chief 
enmity for the Social Democrats. Indeed some members of his 
circle combined both Zionist and Anarchist beliefs5 and 
many more moved towards Zionism after 191k. Nevertheless 
1 Goldfine, op. cit., p. 53. 
2 Ibid. x p. 82. See also P. Goodman, Zionism in England: 
A Jubilee Record (London, 1949) PP. 29-31" 
3 C. Weizmann to V. Khatzman, 12 May 1905, LPCW, Vol. IV, 
p. 75. 
4 Rocker, OP-cit.,, pp. 179. See also Fishman, op. cit., 
pp. 267,286. 
5 Rocker, op. cit., pp 32)143. 
9 
the Arbeiter Friend, the most successful radical Jewish 
publication, consistently opposed Zionism, as did the 
majority of anarchist sympathisers. 
Socialist Zionists were small in number and weak in 
influence among the Jewish community before the war. Their 
chief success was in breaking down a little of the hostility 
or apathy shown by working class Jews towards Zionism, 
often seen as an irrelevant or impossible program propag- 
ated by bourgeois English speaking Jews. As working class 
Yiddish speaking Jews, who combined Zionism with a 
Socialist outlook, when wartime opportunities came Poale 
Zionists were at least in a position to take a leading role 
in enlisting support for Zionist aims both from working 
class Jews and from within the wider British Labour 
movement. 
The view of the dominant Jewish Labour and Socialist 
groups that Zionism represented a reactionary nationalist 
creed echoed that of the European Socialist movement as a 
whole. Hostility within the Second International to 
Zionism in the years before the war was an aspect of a more 
general antipathy towards Jewish Socialist movements of any 
kind, which in earlier years had seemed to border on a form 
of anti semitism. 
1 In the 1890's Jewish Socialists from 
New York received unfriendly -receptions at meetings of the 
Second International, and the Bund continually failed to 
1 E. Silberner, 'Anti Semitism and Philo Semitism in the 
Socialist International', Judaism, II, 1953, pp. 117-22. 
For the hostility of German Socialists to Zionism see 
E. Silberner, 'German Social Democracy and the Jewish 
Problem Prior to World War One', Historia Judaica, Vol. 15, 
19532, pp. 3-45. 
10 
gain independent representation. 
1 For Socialists of the 
Second International even the Bund's proposals for cultural 
autonomy were unacceptable. All Socialists should join the 
particular Socialist party of their state, and participate 
in the common struggle of the whole working class. 
In 1906 the International adopted the principle of 
'national' representation. But although, for example,, 
Polish Socialists could now become full members, the change 
did not extend to representation on an extra territorial 
basis, and the Bund still failed to gain acceptance. 
Between-1907 and 1911 Poale Zion sought to challenge their 
own exclusion from the International, but with no success, 
2 
and in this respect the attitude of the Bund provided 
additional support for the position of anti Zionist gentile 
Socialists. Although the general climate of Socialist 
opinion-towards both Jewish Socialism and Zionism was now 
less uncompromisingly hostile3 it was not until the war 
that any practical change of heart was seen. 
In Britain hostility was most clearly manifested by 
the Social Democratic Federation. Silberner has noted that 
'none of the British Social Democrats seems to have liked 
the Jews'k and that. viaw that 'Jews represent capitalisi in 
its worst form'5 was not infrequently expressed. Overt 
hostility declined in the 1900's as a number of Jews became 
1 Levin, op. cit., p. 110. 
2 M. Jarblum, The Socialist International and Zionism (New 
York, 1933) pp. 9-10. 
3 R. Wistrich, 'Marxism and Jewish Nationalism: The 
Theoretical Roots of Conflict', Jewish Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 16,1974, PP. 50-1. 
4 Silberner, 'British Socialism', op. cit., p. 39. 
5 Ibid., P. 42. 
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prominant in the SDF, and a strong campaign was mounted in 
opposition to the anti-alien legislation. 
1 The Jewish 
members of the SDF nevertheless helped ensure that the 
Zionist position was either rejected or ignored and in 1903 
following the Kishinev pogroms the party refused to 
participate in a demonstration in Hyde Park unless Zionists 
were excluded. 
2 Of the SDF leaders only Herbert Burrows 
evinced any sympathy for Zionist aspirations. 
3 
For most Labour leaders the main points of contact with 
the Jewish community were the questions of immigration and 
trade union organisation. In fact the reaction of many 
trade union leaders, and some Socialists, to the issue of 
anti-alien legislation did them little credit. Sympathy for 
persecuted Jews did not often lead to a friendly attitude 
towards Jewish immigrants, and agitation by Socialist 
groups against the anti-alien regulations was generally 
remarkable by its absence. 
4 Gentile suspicions of Jewish 
exclusiveness and allegations of a Jewish inability to work 
within trade union organisations further harmed relations. 
5 
There were nevertheless a few Socialists whose contacts 
with the Jewish working class did lead to a certain 
1 P. Thompson, Soci 1i ' '' ib; er and Labour: The 
Struggle for London 1885-1914 (London, 1967) p. 31. 
2 Rocker, op. cit., pp. 162-3- 
3 Goldfine, op. cit., p. 72. Silberner, 'British Socialism', 
op. cit.,. p. 52. 
4 J. A. Garrard, The English and Immigration 1880-1914 (London, 1971) PP"157-82,193-202- 
5 It is evident that Beatrice Webb's investigation among 
the Jewish community in London did not increase her 
sympathy for the Jews. See Y. Gorni, 'Beatrice Webb's 
Views on Judaism and Zionism', Jewish Social Studies, Vo1. XL, 
1978, pp. 95-116. Silberner, 'British Socialism', op. cit., 
P. 34-6. 
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sympathy for Zionist aspirations. In 1900, replying to 
enquiries from the English Zionist Federation, George 
Lansbury declared his belief that ? Zionism is a movement 
which will contribute not only to the benefit of the Jews, 
but of all nations'1 whilst Philip Snowden answered that he 
was most certainly in favour of Zionism'. 
2 Furthermore it 
is clear that many within the Labour Party were sustained 
in their later support for a Jewish revival in Palestine by 
their memories of the arrival of destitute persecuted 
Jewish immigrants, and by the degradation and poverty of 
much of Jewish life in their new home. 
B. The Memorandum on War Aims 
Although by the end of the First World War the Labour 
Party had formulated a reasonable coherent and distinctive 
set of foreign policy proposals it had, for a long period, 
refrained from taking any initiative; in February 1916, 
for example, the Executive Committee merely declared its 
intention of holding itself 'in readiness to take action 
respecting Peace Terms when the occasion arises'. 
3 Brand 
notes that 'until 1917 the party, with few exceptions, 
accepted the official statements of war aims and the 
necessity of peace through victory'. 
4 
Despite the propagandising of the Union of Democratic 
1 B. Jafee, 'The British Press and Zionism in Herzl's Time', 
Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society, Vol. 24,, 
1970-3, p 97. 
2 New Judea May 1929.3 EC 14 Feb. 1916. 
4 C. Brand,, op. cit., p. 43. See also ibid., pp. 43-54" 
G. D. H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party since 1914 (London, 1948 pp. 31-44, M. Swartz, The Union of Democratic 
Control and British Politics During the First World War (Oxford, PP. 147-69. 
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Control it was not until the party had felt the convulsions 
emanating from the Russian Revolution that serious 
consideration of proposals for the peace settlement began. 
On 10 August 1917 a special conference was held to discuss 
the question of participating in. the 'proposed Stockholm 
Peace Conference, and to consider the first draft of a 
Memorandum on the Issues of the War. 
1 
The Memorandum reserved particular venom for the 
Turkish Empire. 'The whole civilised world', it declared 
'condemns the handing back to the universally execrated 
rule of the Turkish Government any subject people which has 
once been freed from it'. 2 Peoples thus liberated must 
nevertheless be protected from the threat of Imperialist 
exploitation, and 'Armenia, Mesopotamia and Arabia... and 
other territories' should therefore be administered under 
the League of Nations. But special provision had already 
been made for one part of the Turkish Empire, in the 
proceeding section. entitled 'The Jews and Palestine : 
'The Conference demands for Jews of all countries the 
same elementary rights of tolerance, freedom of 
residence and trade, and equal citizenship that 
ought to be extended to all inhabitants of every 
nation. But the Conference further expresses the 
hope that it might be practicable by agreement among 
all the nations to set free Palestine from the harsh 
and oppressive government of the Turk, in order that 
such of the Jewish people as desire to do so may 
return, and may work out their own salvation free 
from interference by those of alien race or 
religion., 
1 Evidently the draft had been seen by few delegates until 
10 August,. and on the previous day MPs had complained that 
copies had not yet been received, see EC 9 Aug. 1917. 
2 The Labour Party, Memorandum on the Issues of the War (London, 1917) Section XIII. 
3. Ibid., Section XII. 
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The document was largely the work of Sidney Webb. 
James Middleton, then Assistant Secretary of the Labour 
Party, was later to confirm that Webb had undoubtedly 
drafted the above paragraph. 
2 Though Webb was later by no 
means as hostile towards Zionism as he has sometimes been 
portrayed in 1917 the inclusion of a pro Zionist paragraph 
in his Memorandum was above all a reflection of the chang- 
ing attitudes towards Zionism in Liberal and Socialist 
circles. 
By 1917 a growing number of influential politicians, 
diplomats and journalists were advocating the break up of 
the Turkish Empire and the Utility, for both Jewry and the 
British Empire, of encouraging Jewish colonisation in 
Palestine. Assiduously fostered by Weizmann and his 
colleagues, these sentiments were particularly prevalent in 
liberal and progressive circles. 
3 Webb would certainly 
have been aware of these developments; as early as 1914 
the New Statesman had published a pro Zionist article. This 
had attracted considerable attention, including that of 
Lloyd George. 4 
In the changed conditions of the war Socialist Zionists 
were now achieving much success in propagating their views 
1 Swartz, op. cit., p. 167. His wife called it 'Sidney's 
Memorandum', see M. Cole (ed. ), The Diaries of Beatrice Webb:, 
Vol. l,, (London, 1952) p. 93, entry dated 12 Aug. 1918. 
2 Private Information, Dr. S. Levenberg. 
3 The cultivation of sympathy among British political 
figures has been described in L. Stein, The Balfour 
Declaration (London, 1961) and I. Friedman, The Question of 
Palestine (London, 1973). 
4 New Statesman 21 Nov. 1915. T. Wilson (ed. ), The 
Political Diaries of C. P. Scott (London, 1970) p. 112. 
C. Weizmann to A. Haam, 30 Nov. 1914, LPCW, Vol. VII, p. 65. 
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within the European Socialist movement. In 1916 a 
Memorandum from the Poale Zion Confederation had been 
successfully submitted to the International Socialist 
Bureau' and in July the following year a delegation to the 
Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee met with great 
cordiality. The Zionists' statement argued a fundamental 
difference between Jewish activity in Palestine and 
colonial exploitation, and demanded 'security for unrestric- 
ted activity in Jewish colonisation, aiming at the creation 
of a Jewish homeland in Palestine'. 
2 The undoubted success 
of Socialist Zionists in presenting their case was 
reflected in the favourable comments of many leading 
European Socialists. 3 
Furthermore there is also evidence of Zionist propagan- 
dising in Britain directed specifically at the Labour Party. 
This involved members of Poale Zion4 but also of Chaim 
Weizmann's circle. Though scathing of the diplomatic 
efforts of the Poale Zion Confederations and indifferent to 
the fortunes of the Labour Party Weizmann was nonetheless 
too skilled a diplomat to ignore the possible significance 
of the party's awakened interest in foreign affairs. 
On 1 June The Times announced that MacDonald, Roberts 
and Jowett would attend the Stockholm Conference. Weizmann 
was prompted to write to his colleage Harry Sacher urging 
1 Jewish Socialist Labour Confederation, Poale Zion, The 
Jews and the War (The Hague, 1916). 
2 Declaration published in Jewish Labour Correspondence (Bulletin issued by the Bureau of the Poale Zion 
Confederation) Oct. 1917. (Henceforth JLC). 
3 See below p. 66 
. 
4 See below p. 27 
. 
5 C. Weizmann to A. Hamm, 16 Aug. 1917, LPCW, Vol. VII, p. 487. 
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that a meeting be arranged with the-delegates to discuss 
the question of Palestine. 
1 He attached little significance 
to the conference but felt that in the changing circumst- 
ances Zionists should be prepared 'for any emergency'. 
Though there is no evidence that a meeting took place 
- 
the 
delegation was prevented from leaving England 
- 
the 
following month the Zionist Review was able to publish a 
message of support from MacDonald, who claimed to have 
'read with great interest the literature issued by the 
Zionist Federation'. 2 
Moreover when, on 11 August, Webb's draft appeared in 
the press,, Sacher was moved to write in triumph that 'this 
is the biggest score of a diplomatic kind we have made 
during the war, and without arrogance,, i t isn't Chaim 
(Weizmann) or Sok(olow) who have won it, but our group in 
Manchester'. 3 Though he doubtless exaggerated the import- 
ance of his group's efforts his letter indicates the 
considerable attention now being paid by Zionists to 
opinion within the Labour Party. 
Webb's draft was the first public expression of support 
for Zionist aspirations from a political party. Although 
by the time the policy was finally ratified much had 
happened to overshadow the importance of the declaration, 
in August it represented a significant breakthrough for 
1 C. Weizmann to H. Sacher; I June 1917, LPCW, Vol. VII9 P-425- 
2 Zionist Review July 1917 (lenceforthLZ). The monthly 
paper first appeared in May 1913, the organ of the English 
Zionist Federation. 
3 H. Sacher to L. Simon, 11 Aug. 1917, quoted in Friedman, 
op. cit., p. 254. The 'Manchester Group' consisted of Sacher 
then a leader writer for the Manchester Guardian) Simon 
Marks and Israel Sieff. 
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for Zionist diplomacy. 
The Memorandum as a whole reflected the influence of 
radical liberal attitudes to foreign affairs 
-e atomised 
during the war by the UDC 
- 
which were to play a major part 
in-shaping Labour Party policy in the years ahead. This 
was true of Sections XII and XIII, despite some earlier 
opposition to the dismemberment of the Turkish E, mpire1 which 
Webb had so unequivocably advocated. The war had now given 
an added urgency to traditional demands for 'elementary 
rights' and 'equal citizenship' for Jews in all countries, 
whilst the linking of Palestine with the 'Jewish Problem' 
reflected, as we have seen, more recent developments in both 
Liberal and Socialist opinion. 
Palestine was to form not a Jewish Commonwealth (as 
Socialist Zionists demanded) nor a Jewish Homeland under 
British protection (as Weizmann and his colleagues wished) 
but, in keeping with the ideals of the Memorandum as a whole, 
a 'Free State under International Guarantee'. Webb clearly 
doubted that immigration to Palestine would appeal to more 
than a fraction of Jewry, but those who did so would be free 
'to work out their own salvation', a phrase which, with its 
Biblical overtones, was later used by Balfour in describing 
his interpretation of a Jewish National Home. 
2 
The ambiguity of the Balfour Declaration, with its 
reference to the rights of 'existing non Jewish communities 
1 In 1916 the UDC published a pamphlet by H. N. Brailsford 
opposing thebreakup of Turkey-in-Asia. See Union of 
Democratic Control, Turkey and the Roads to the East (London, 1916). But Brailsford was later to become a strong 
supporter of the National Home. 
2 At a meeting of the War Cabinet on 31 Oct. 1917, see 
Friedman, op. cit., pp. 278-9. 
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in Palestine' is well known. Webb's draft, which linked 
the future of Palestine solely with the needs of European 
Jewry, and appeared before any mention had been made of the 
Turkish Empire and its inhabitants, simply avoided any 
mention whatsoever of the existing population. The people 
of Armenia, Mesopotamia and Arabia were later mentioned as 
worthy and, at least potentially, able to 'settle their own 
affairs'. But in Palestine Jewish settlement could appar- 
ently take place 'free from interferences by those of alien 
race or religion'. A sympathy for Zionist ambitions was 
thus combined with a complete, though not uncommon ignoring 
of potential dangers and injustices. 
Between August and the end of the year Webb's original 
draft 
- 
'a satisfactory basis for discussion and amendment'1 
was considered by a Sub Committee consisting of Webb, 
MacDonald, Henderson, Jowett, Wardle and Roberts, and also 
by the International Joint Committee and the Parliamentary 
Committee of the TUC. 
2 Interested parties therefore had a 
considerable time in which to voice their opinions. 
The New Statesman, though welcoming the Memorandum, 
warned that 'Zionist Palestine' would do better as a 
'protectorate or Ally of some definite Great Power' than 
placed under international guarantee. 
3 On the other hand 
Palestine (whose sponsors undoubtably shared this view) was 
1 EC 14 Aug. 1917.2 Swartz, op. cit., p. 166. 
3 New Statesman 11 Aug. 1917. 
19 
naturally lavish in praising the 'magnificent common sense' 
and the 'large and statesmanlike grasp of the whole Jewish 
problem' evinced by the Labour Party. 
1 But such approval 
was by no means unanimous among Socialists and working class 
Jews, and in the months that followed considerable efforts 
were made by Socialist Zionists to counter anti Zionist 
criticism and to enlist the support of working class Jews 
for the party's declaration. 
2 
On a more elevated plane Zionists had been careful to 
assure themselves of the support of George Barnes, Labour's 
representative in the War Cabinet. Weizmann met Barnes on 
1 October3 and a week later wrote that Barnes had 'advocated 
our case very stronglyt. 
4 Barnes continued to support the 
Zionist cause, despite the intervention of the anti Zionist 
Sir Mathew Nathan. 5 
The text of the Balfour Declaration was released on 
2 November, and the possibility of the Labour Party 
significantly altering its position, already unlikely, became 
still more remote. Labour politicians were nevertheless 
cautiots in their reactions, which doubtless reflected a more 
general distrust of the Government's intentions. MacDonald 
congratulated the Zionists on their success but hoped that 
'no untoward event will prevent the fulfilment of your 
1 Palestine (the organ of the British Palestine Committee, 
which comprised of Zionists and gentile supporters) 18 Aug. 
1917. 
2 See below pp. 27ff. 
3 C. Weizmann to N. Sokolow, 30 Sept. 1917, LPCW, Vol. VII, 
P. 519. 
if C. Weizmann to L. Brandeis, 7 Oct. 1917, LPCW, Vol. VII, 
P. 525. 
5 C. Weizmann to Lord Rothschild, 2 Nov. 1917, LPCW, Vol. VII, 
P. 544, but see Barnes' later less favourable comments in 
ZR 28 Apr. 1920. 
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desires'. Snowden claimed sympathy with'the idea of a 
Jewish settlement' but declined to comment on the Govern- 
ment's plan until further details became known. l 
A Special Conference of the Labour Party was due to meet 
on 28 December to consider the redrafted Memorandum. An 
indication that the party had not significantly revised its 
declaration on Palestine had come earlier in the month; 
Henderson's message to the Zionist celebratory meeting at 
the Opera House repeated almost exactly the words of VJebb's 
draft. 2 
The final draft of the Memorandum on War Aims was duly 
approved by the Conference. 'The Jews and Palestine' now 
appeared as a section under the heading of 'Territorial 
Adjustments'. Only one slight alteration had taken place. 
Messages of congratulation now included several from 
American organisations. 3 
The previous year representatives of the Allidd 
Socialists had been unable to accept the party's proposals 
for a program of war aims, 
4 but in February 1918 the 
significance of the Memorandum was enhanced when an Inter 
Allied Socialist Conference accepted it as the basis for a 
joint declaration. 5 Though the Poale Zion Confederation 
1 ZR 1917 'Special Supplement on the Balfour Declaration'. 
2 Message quoted in S. Levenberg & J. Podro (eds. ) British 
Labour Policy on Palestine: A Collection of Documents, 
Speeches and Articles 1917-1938 (London, 1938) p. 154. 
3 The Labour Party, Memorandum on War Aims approved by a 
Special Conference of the Labour Movement, 28th December 
1917 (London, 1917). The Movement now 'expressed the 
opinion that Palestine should be set free... '. Internation- 
al Joint Committee Minutes 8 Jan. 1918. 
4 Cole, op. cit., p. 53. 
5 The Labour Party, Inter Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, Memorandum on War Aims (London 
,. 
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evidently had reservations about a part of the declaration, 
it nevertheless telegraphed its appreciation of the policy 
of Jewish settlement in Palestine. 
1 
Later that year the Labour Party published a final 
statement on war aims. It stressed once more that the 
Turkish Empire could not 'without an outrage upon the 
conscience of mankind' be restored in Armenia, Mesopotamia, 
Arabia and Syria. The party was concerned to insist that 
these area should come under the authority of the League of 
Nations, lest they become 'areas of exploitation and rivalry' 
for the Great Powers. There was no mention of Palestine. 
2 
This was the last declaration made by the party on 
foreign affairs before the war ended and the decision was 
made to withdraw from the Coalition and fight the election 
as an independent party. The support given to Jewish 
settlement in Palestine, so welcome to Zionists in August 
1917, had now been overshadowed by political and military 
developments. But for Zionist leaders in Britain, noting 
the development of the Labour Party as a major political 
force, it was clear that such early sympathy might, with 
suitable encouragement and direction, be of considerable 
importance in the future. 
3 Much would depend on the success 
of Socialist Zionists, working at 'ground level' in 
permeating the British Labour movement with Zionist beliefs. 
1 JLC 31 Mar. 1918. The reference to the rights of Jews in 
existing countries 
- 
which had been slightly altered 
- 
was 
described as 'leaving much to be desired in respect of 
clearness'. 
2 The Labour Party, Short Statement of War Aims (London, 1918). 
3 c. f. Palestine 18 Aug. 1917: 'with such formidable backing 
to so just a demand it may be assumed that a Jewish 
Palestine is assured of its place in the peace draft of international democracy'. 
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C. Zionists and Socialists 
For Jewish Socialists and Zionists alike the year 1917 
was the annus mirabilis. On the one hand the Russian 
Revolution promised the abolition of both class and 
national discrimination and the chance tokonstruct a new 
social order. On the other the Balfour Declaration and the 
capture of Jerusalem 'awakened the age old dream of a 
national revival, and provided the opportunity for a Jewish 
national renaissance in their ancient homeland through 
constructive work and a return to the soil'. 
1 In Britain 
these developments provoked a notable upsurge in political 
interest and activity among working class Jews. 
The war had already illustrated the parlous state of 
East European Jewry under existing conditions. The 
destruction of numerous Jewish communities and the 
attrocities perpetrated by the Russian Army drew a 
passionate though unavailing response from the Jewish 
community in Britain. The Jewish Labour League, formed 
'to fight for the emancipation of the Jews in the countries 
where they suffer disabilities' pressed for the active 
support of the British Labour movement. 
2 In September 1915 
a conference of Jewish Labour organisations was held in 
Leeds which repeated the request, noting that the Jewish 
proletariat was 'part of a people which has the most to 
1 S. Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians (London, 1979) 
p. 184" 
2 The Jewish Labour League, To the Workers of Great Britain: (London, 1915). 
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lose through this war'. 
1 
Among the numerous Jewish refugees in Britain there was 
a continual fear of deportation or compulsory enlistment. 
Suggestions of voluntary industrial recruitment were also 
strenuously opposed; in October 1917 the proposal, 
emanating from a group of wealthy Zionists, that Jewish 
Labour Battalions be formed from. refugees in the East End 
met with a campaign of resistance, orchestrated by the 
Jewish Social-Democratic Organisation 
The JSDO had grown rapidly during the war, lead by a 
number of talented Jewish refugees and working closely with 
exiled Russian Social Democrats. In December 1916 the 
organisation, bringing with it branches in East and West 
London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Leeds, 
affiliated to the British Socialist Party, and this 
indirectly to the Labour Party. 3 In the New Year, as the 
threat to refugees mounted and anti alien feeling grew in 
the East End, the JSDO mounted a further campaign to defend 
the right of asylum. 
4 The issue served temporarily to 
unite left wing Jewish groups, and a committee formed to 
1 Poale Zion Confederation, 1917 ibid., pp. 88-9. The 
final section of the resolution contained the two common 
demands later to appear in the Labour Party's Memorandum: 
'we demand full equality for the Jews in Russia, Rumania 
and of all other lands where they are under disabilities, 
and the abrogation of all restrictions against immigration 
into and settlement in Palestine, as well as in other 
countries. ' 
2 c. f. The Call (the newspaper of the British Socialist 
Party) 12 Oct. 1916. 
3 The BSP, formed from the old SDF now (with the departure 
of Hyndman and his colleagues) took a strongly anti war 
line. It affiliated to the Labour Party in January 1916; 
thus for over four years the only Jewish Socialist group 




was an anti Zionist one. For the affiliation of the JSDO 
see The Call 7 Dec. 1916 and British Socialist Party, 
Annual Conference Report (London, 1917) p. 17. 
4 See ibid., p. 13 for the resolution. See also The 
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protect Russian citizens in Britain drew support from the 
JSDO, the Jbwish Socialist Party, the Jewish Socialist 
Territorialasts and Poale Zion. 
l 
There was no such unanimity on the question of Jewish 
nationalism, for the Social Democrats: firmly rejected both 
Zionism and any scheme of territorial independence or 
national autonomy in Eastern. Europe, 
2 
and the hostility 
between the various groups often threatened the success of 
their joint campaigns. The Jewish Workers' War Emergency 
Relief Fund, established in March 1915, was particularly 
bedevilled by disputes between nationalist and 
'internationalist' groups. 
3 
The outbreak of the Russian Revolution appeared to 
confirm the analysis of the anti Zionist Socialists and in 
the ensuing enthusiasm the campaigns of working class 
Zionists were naturally overshadowed. Seven thousand 
people filled the Assembly Rooms in Mile End Road to 
welcome the revolution4 and in the months that followed 
many Jewish Socialists returned to Russia. Later, when 
faced with the choice of repatriation or enlistment in the 
Jewish Legion the vast majority of refugees chose the 
Committee of Delegates of the Russian Socihlist Groups in 
London and the Jewish-Social Democratic Organisation, The 
Rights of Aliens (London, 1917), The Labour Leader 1 Mar. 
1917, The Call 15 Mar. 1917. 
1 The Labour Leader 26 Apr. 1917. 
2 BSP. op. cit., p. 12 for resolution on 'Oppressed 
Nationalities'. The Call 31 May 1917: Special Supplement 
of the JSDO, 'The Problem of Nationalities and Socialism'. 
3 See the differing views of S. Himmelforb (JSDO) and 
I. Pomerantz (Poale Zion) in The Jewish Workers' War 
Emergency Relief Fund Bulletin (London, 1917). 
4 The Labour Leader 29 Mar. 1917. See also The Call 29 
Mar. 1917 or meeting. 
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former. 1 
Among those returning were a number of Poale Zion 
members. 
2 Some doubtless wished to join their colleagues 
or families in Russia; others may have shed their Zionist 
convictions at the prospect of immediate social transform- 
ation. Those who remained faced a double challenge 
- 
to 
build up Zionist sympathy among the Jewish working class,, 
and to persuade British Socialists that Zionism was not a 
bourgeois distraction from the common Socialist struggle. 
Zionists had nevertheless benefitted from the revival of 
interest in Jewish problems that had taken place during the 
war and one manifestation of this, the Labour Party's 
declaration, provided both a focus for the activity of 
Poale Zion and a target for sceptics and anti Zionists. 
Opposition was naturally strongest within the BSP and 
its affiliate the JSDO. Its own statement of war aims 
ignored the question of Palestine3 but there could be no 
doubt of its hostility towards Zionism. On 23 August The 
Call published an interview with Erlich, a member of the 
Russian Socialist Delegation4 in which he attacked the 
Labour Party's plan as a threat to the liberty of East 
European Jews. This was duly noted by the Morning Post, and 
1 20,000 chose repatriation, a few hundred enlistment. 
Flapan, o 
. 
cit., p. 102 but see M. Gilbert, Exile and Return (London, 1978) P. 95 for Jabotinsky's recruiting campaign 
in East London. Membership figures for the Workers' Circle 
(a Jewish secular mutual aid organisation) illustrate the 
exodus at this time: 1915 831, E 1916 800,1917 734,1918 511. Figures in The Workert' Circle Friendly Society, The Circle: 
Golden Jubilee 1909-59 (London, 1959). 
2 Levenburg, op. cit., p. 128.3 The Times 27 Aug. 1917. 
4A delegation appointed by the Russian Council of Workers 
and Soldiers Deputies arrived in London on 24 July, The 
Call 26 July 1917. 
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Poale Zion hastened to claim that Erlich, a leader of the 
Bund spoke only for himself. 
1 
The view of the ILP were potentially of much greater 
importance. It remained uneasy at the prospect of the dis- 
memberment of the Turkish Empire and, in a 'Note on the 
Labour Party's Memorandum', warned of the danger of allowing 
'a natural abhorance of the misdeeds of the Turkish Govern- 
ment to lead us into a policy which would create new inter- 
national problems of the gravest character, and would do 
2 injustice to the Moslem population'. 
In 1915, in its search for support among British 
Socialists, Poale Zion had applied for affiliation to the 
ILP. Discussions took place, but in January 1916 the 
National Administrative Council, having heard from the Bund 
that the Russian Social Democratic Party had repudiated 
Poale Zion, rejected the request. 3 By 1917 the attitude of 
the ILP, as a major component of the Labour Party, was 
causing concern not only to left wing Zionists; to Sir 
Mark Sykes Weizmann confided that $the more I think of the 
documents which you read to me, the more I am convinced 
that they must be given to the LP if one desires to keep 
this party in order'. 
At this stage Poale Zion was having greater success 
1 The Call 23 Aug. 1917, Morning Post 25 Aug. 1917, JLC 
Oct. 1917- 
2 The Labour Leader 30 Aug. 1917. 
3 National Administrative Council Minutes, 22 Oct. 1915, 
6 Jan. 1916. See also No. 6 (London and Southern Counties) 
Divisional Council Minutes, 28 Oct. 1915,25 Nov. 1915. 
If C. Aeizmann to M. Sykes, 22 Sept. 1918, LPCVJ, Vol. VII, 
p. 519. Stein suggests that 'LP' refers not to the Labour 
Party, but to the ILP. 
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within the Jewish Labour movement. In October a National 
Committee of Jewish Trade Unions was formed which mounted 
a campaign, with the Central Committee of Poale Zion 'to 
give proper expression to the claims of the Jewish 
proletariat'. 
1 Poale Zion could now boast several 
prominent new recruits including Sam Dreen, a former 
follower of Rocker, and Morris Myer, editor of The Jewish 
Times who, with the Secretary J. Pomerantz, was a leading 
figure in the new initiative. 
2 
On 28 October, in an impressive indication of the 
interest that had been aroused among Jewish workers, Jewish 
Labour Conferences were held in London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, 
Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool. Organised by Poale Zion, 
each conference passed unanimous resolutions of support and 
appreciation for the Labour Party's declaration. 
3 
In December a large meeting of Jewish workers took place 
in. Leeds to welcome the Balfour Declaration. Poale Zion 
leaders and representatives of Jewish Trade Unions were 
joined in addressing the gathering by two Liberal MPs' and 
by the Labour MP, W. C. Anderson. 'All speeches pointed out 
that the declaration of the English Government meets a just 
claim of the Jewish people supported not only by the English 
working masses but also by the International Labour 
Democracy'. The list of Labour Party and Trade Union 
1 JLC Oct. 1918.2 Levenberg, op. cit., p. 128. 
3 JLC ibid. 
4 J. D. Kiley (Whitechapel) and J. C. Wedgwood (Newcastle 
under Lyme). 
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leaders who sent messages of support was presented as an 
indication of the growing support Zionists were receiving. 
l 
Though-such manifestations of popular support helped 
ensure the Labour Party's declaration remained unaltered in 
the final draft, they failed to overcome the hesitancy 
within the ILP. After the capture of Jerusalem,, The Labour 
Leader noted sadly that 'the joy of the Zionist Jews is 
pathetic in-its appeal to our memory of the old free 
England, the asylum of the oppressed political refugees of 
every kind. Where is that England now...? '2 
The ILP continued to criticise the Memorandum's advocacy 
of the break up of the Turkish Empire. The Labour Leader 
argued that the Palestine paragraph fitted uneasily with 
the bold opening assertion of the right of self determinat- 
ion, and again warned of the danger of future conflict. 
3 
If some questioned the compatibility of Zionism with self 
determination in Palestine others lamented the intrusion of 
'narrow nationalizm' in Jewish life; for Lansbury 'the fact 
that Jews are cosmopolitan is to me a great thing in their 
favourt. 4 But such criticisms did not prevent the final 
adoption of the Memorandum. 
Jewish Labour rallies continued in the New Year. In 
January Manchester Poale Zion and the National Committee of 
1 These included Henderson, Purdy, Barnes, Roberts, Smillie, 
MacDonald, Snowden, Appleton, Shaw, Jowett, Thorn, Mann, 
Williams, King and Lansbury. 
2 The Labour Leader 13 Dec. 1917. 
3 Ibid., 20 Dec. 1917,3 Mar. 1918. See also The Call 
20 Dec. 1917. 
4 ZR Dec. 1917. Lansbury did note that if it were 
possible to re-establish the Jewish people in. Palestine, 
and if they really wished it, he would be in favour. 
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Jewish Trade Unions held a mass meeting, and a resolution 
'while thanking the British Government' continued: 
'we sincerely hope the Labour Party, the first 
political party to declare itself through its 
Executive in favour of a satisfactory national 
solution of the Jewish Question= will work towards 
the realisation of this policy, which should bring 
back the Jewish nation to their, homeland and will 
create a Jewish national life'. 
The growing vitality of the Labour Zionist movement2 
was evident at the Annual Conference of Poale Zion, which 
took place in Manchester at the end of April. Delegates 
came from London, Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, Glasgow, 
Edinburgh, Birmingham 'and many other towns'. 
3 One source 
speaks of a tenfold increase in membership from the party's 
pre war total of only one hundred. 
k 
Organisational changes emphasised the growth of the 
party, special committees being established for 'Palestine 
action', for trade union work, and for historical research. 
A propaganda office would be opened in Scotland, and a 
press bureau in England. The party also aimed to publish 
two monthly papers, in English and Yiddish. 
5 
Conference rejected the idea of Palestine becoming a 
British crown land, as this would be 'annexationist in the 
fullest meaning of the word'. Rather the goal must be 'the 
1 JLC 13 May 1918. 
2 During this period the term increasingly replaced that 
of 'Socialist Zionist'. 
3 JLC ibid. 
4 Encyclopaedia Judicae (Jerusalem, 1971) p. 661. 
5 JLC 5 July 1918 reported the press bureau established. 
In November Poale Zion published a pamphlet entitled 
Zionism and Socialism by Lewis Rifkind, and the Yiddish. 
fortnightly Unser Veg (Our Road) appeared between May and 
December 1919. 
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creation. of a free state for the Jewish people in 
Palestine' and the immediate removal of obstacles to Jewish 
colonisation. The Zionist Review found it necessary to 
deny foreign press reports that the policy amounted to a 
repudiation of British trusteeship, but nonetheless 
criticised the party for proposing that America might act 
as 'plenipotentiary' for the new state. 
1 The party also 
decided to maintain its independence from the Zionist 
Federation and that 'the relations between the party and the 
English Labour Movement will be developed in the same spirit 
as before'. 
2 Further demands included the legalisations of 
the Palestine Labour fund and official representation on the 
Zionist Palestine Commission. 
The Zionists further strengthened their position within 
the Jewish Labour movement with the formation the following 
month of the Jewish National Labour Council. 3 At a 
conference arranged by Poale Zion and the National Committee 
for Jewish Trade Unions there took place 'the unification 
of practically all the Anglo Jewish Labour Organisation'. 
Twenty two trade unions, political and co-operative 
societies from seven cities were represented. 
4 
Poale Zion provided not only the Secretary, Treasurer 
and Vice Chairman for the new organisation, but also much of 
1 ZR Nov. 1918. 
2 Messages of support came from MacDonald, Henderson, 
Barnes and Roberts. 
3 JLC 5 July 1918. See Goodman, o 
. 
cit., pp. 46-7. 
4 Delegates came from London, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, 
Glasgow, Edinburgh and Sheffield. Participating groups 
included Poale Zion, Socialist Territorialists, branches of the Workers' irc e, and unions representing tailors, shoe- 
makers, hatters, bakers and cigarmakers, JLC o 
. 
cit. Goodman, ýo 
. 
cit., refers to 25 groups including 16 trade 
unions and 6 branches of Poale Zion. 
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its program, including support for the Jewish National Home. 
Zionists were naturally delighted with the new body which, 
they claimed, would 'practically lead the entire Jewish 
Labour Movement of the country'. 
1 
These developments took place despite the continuing 
hostility of the JSDO. The annual conference of the BSP in 
April saw the adoption. of a resolution condemning Zionism 
which 'by raising false hopes and unrealisable aspirations 
amongst the Jewish workers, obscures the real issue of their 
class interests and makes the struggle doubly hard'. The 
Balfour Declaration was simply a veiled attempt at annex- 
ation. Although 'in conformity with the general principles 
of internationalism' restriction on immigration and 
colonisation 
- 
'of the Jews as of all peoples, in Palestine 
as in all countries' 
- 
should be removed, the fate of 
Palestine should be decided by its existing inhabitants. 
J. Wolfe (Glasgow, Jewish Branch) in proposing the 
resolution noted that it was 'well known' that the Jewish 
question had been solved by the Russian Revolution. 
Curiously the seconder doubted whether racial hatred would 
entirely disappear in Russia, and urged Jews to seek 
autonomy in Palestine under the Sultan. For this he was 
suitably chastised by Fineberg and the resolution was 
carried unanimously. 
2 
The dispute between Zionist and Social Democrats 
spilled over onto the pages of The Call. The JSDO 
1 Goodman, ibid., notes that the 'JNLC was instrumental in 
bringing the great majority of organised Jewish workers 
into line with Poale Zion demands'. The Secretary of the 
new organisation was Morris Myer. 
2 BSP, op., p. 14-15. The Call 3 Apr. 1918. 
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denounced Poale Zion as representing only themselves 
- 
'a 
body as small in number as they are in influence oxthe 
Jewish labouring population'. Furthermore, the JSDO argued, 
'they have never been authorised by the Jewish Trade Unions 
to speak on their behalf and if anything these Unions are 
indifferent and even hostile to Zionism'. 
1 
The formation of the JNLC the following month appeared 
to give the lie to these charges and soon the JSDO came 
under considerable pressure from the British Government. 
In October the Secretary, together with the Secretary of 
the Manchester branch, were arrested and subsequently 
deported, 2 and a number of other prominent members volun- 
tarily returned to Russia. Furthermore Poale Zion was now 
able to enlist the support of several leading Socialists 
from outside the Labour Party. Of these the most active 
was Tom Mann, soon to participate in the formation of the 
Communist Party, but who nevertheless spoke at many Poale 
Zion meetings and argued the case within the British Labour 
movement for Socialist Zionism. 
3 
The tide was now running strongly against the Jewish 
Social Democrats. 4 Though many Jews were later found 
within the Communist Party, its creation in 1920 
- 
largely 
1 Ibid., 22 June 1918.2 Ibid., 31 Oct. 1917,7 Nov. 1918. 
3 See obituary in ZR 21 Mar. 1941: 'In the years after the 
Balfour Declaration he used to mention in his address in 
various parts of England the significance of the Zionist 
Socialist Movement. He kept in close touch with the Poale 
Zion office in Whitechapel and wrote for Socialist Zionism 
as part of his work on behalf of the working class'. See 
also The Labour Leader 9 May 1918, The Call 9 May 1918, 
ZR Feb. 1918 for Mann at the annual conference of Poale 
Zion. 
4 One sign of this was the advertisement placed by Poale 
Zion in The Call (17. Oct. 1918) announcing a meeting to-be 
addressed by Camille Huysmans, the Secretary of the 
International Socialist Bureau. 
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from the ranks of the BSP 
- 
nevertheless helped ensure that 
no longer would there be any significant Socialist anti 
Zionist Jewish organisation in Britain. Symbolic of the 
success of the Zionists was the fact that the new head- 
quarters of Poale Zion had once belonged to the Bund. 
1 
Moreover many Jewish radicals and anarchists now shed their 
pre war indifference or hostility towards Zionism, and 
several took a 'prominent part in the Labour Zionist 
movement. 
The growing strength of Poale Zion was underlined at the 
Annual Conference in April 1919 when it was announced that 
membership had again risen rapidly, and delegates pressed 
for the establishment of Youth Sections and branches for 
English speakers. The 45 delegates were addressed by Schlom 
Kaplansky, Secretary of the World Union of Poale Zion, who 
outlined the party's program in Palestine: nationalisation 
of land, railways, trams, telephones and water, a minimum 
wage, and the creation of co-operative banks and colonies. 
2 
Conference agreed with its European colleagues that the 
use of Yiddish in Palestine should be encouraged 
- 
which 
Palestinian Poale Zionists opposed 
- 
and as a result drew 
criticism from The Zionist Review. The paper had been 
outraged by the decision to hold the conference during 
Passover week 
- 
an indication of a continuing radicalism 
within the party. 'A broader view', declared the paper, 
'would have sacrificed the advantage (of a bank holiday 
1 M. Edelman, Ben Gurion: A Biography (London, 1964) p. 76. 
2 ZR June 1919. Membership of the Zionist Federation was 
also rising rapidly, see Goodman, OP-cit., p. k6. 
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weekend) in deference to the susceptabilities of the great 
body of Zionists'. It reminded Poale Zion that the Bund 
had indulged in a similar scorning of Jewish traditions. 
l 
During the previous year a slow change had been evident 
in the opinions of the ILP, as manifested in The Labour: 
Leader. In April 1918, from 'many long official and 
occasionally conflicting documents from various Jewish 
organisations (that) have reached our office', the paper 
chose to publish with its full support a statement from 
Poale Zion which repudiated the use of force in pursuance 
of its policy, stressing 'mutual benevolence and peaceful 
co-operation among peoples'. 
2 Since the paper continued 
to manifest considerable suspicion of the Imperialist 
implications of Britain's support for Zionism, such 
statements from Socialist Zionists were particularly 
welcomed. 
3 
In June 1918 the paper introduced its readers to the 
work of Poale Zion, urging them to combat anti semitism and, 
more ambiguously, 'to seek to learn from the Jewish 
Socialists what special part an actively pacifist Zion 
might play in the building of a new world after the war. 
4 
But when the JSDO, perhaps prompted by this article, 
complained to the ILP, the National Administrative Council 
nonetheless resolved to reply that the party 'was not 
1 ZR May 1919. 
2 The Labour Leader 25 Aug. 1918. 
3 Ibid., 3 Oct. 1918. Following the Easter Day riots in 
1920 the paper commented: 'the attempt is being made to 
build a new Zionist civibsation on a soil poisoned by the 
bitterness and hatred which war and conquest have sown. Is 
it to be wondered at that the attempt should meet with 
opposition from a conquered people? We do not believe that 
a new Jerusalem any more than a new Social order, can be built by the methods of war'. Ibid., 6 Apr. 1920. 
4 IbId., 23 June 1918. 
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definitely committed to all details of the Labour Party's 
Memorandum'. 1 
But in the growing polarisation between Socialists and 
Communists the ILP was clearly warming towards Poale Zion. 
In the General Election, which according to The Labour 
Leader gave 'evidence of the loyal labour sympathies of the 
Jews in this country', 
2 Labour Zionists were active in 
campaigning for the Labour Party. As Jewish anti Zionism 
in labour circles came increasingly to be identified with 
extreme left wing parties, and as the divergence between 
the ILP and its left wing critics became more apparent, so 
the ILP came to look more favourably upon Labour Zionists. 
Furthermore the renewal in the immediate post war 
months of Jewish persecution in Eastern Europe appears to 
have encouraged the reappraisal of Zionist aspirations. 
The Labour Leader, often at the instigation of Poale Zion, 
carried many reports of the pogroms, and'in°December 
published with evident approval a long article entitled 
'Poalei Zionism: The Dream of Jewish Labour'. 
3 
The following year Zionism received little attention in 
the paper and, though the affiliation of Poale Zion to the 
Labour Party was cordially welcomed4 it was not until late 
in 1920 that it became fully evident that Poale Zion could 
now boast the full support of the ILP. In September the 
paper noted, albeit in retrospect, that Poale Zion had 
1 NAC Minutes 24-5 June 1918. 
2 The Labour Leader 5 Dec. 1918. 
3 Ibid. See also L. Tobias, Jewish Flomen in Palestine, 
the Socialist Review, Vol. 16, No. 88, Jan. 
-March 1919, 
pp. 61-7. The Journal was published by the ILP, and 
edited by Ramsey MacDonald. For reports of the pogroms 
see ibid., 7 Nov. 1918,5 June 1919. 
4 Ibid. 11 Feb. 1920. 
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'taken the ILP line in the war', and declared that 'the 
British Labour movement is still far too insular, and we 
hope that the enthusiasm of Poale Zion may win its full 
sympathy. A British Labour Government should play a big 
part in helping to form a Socialist Commonwealth in Zion') 
It was clear that the growing support for Zionism 
within the ILP stemmed from the conviction, fostered by 
Labour Zionists, that the creation of a Socialist state in 
Palestine demanded the support of Poale Zion. The Zionists 
were eager to stress that their goal was 'to save Palestine 
from Capitalism',, and that 'Poale Zionism means to prevent 
a reproduction. of the doomed European system in Palestine'. 
2 
In December, an interview by Fanner Brockway of Berl 
Katznelson, editor of the Palestine Labour paper Kuntres, 
was published under the headline 'Making Palestine a 
Socialist State'. 3 
Katznelson argued that the Palestine Labour movement 
sought the enfranchisement of the Arab working class through 
friendly co-operation and by altering them to their own 
exploitation. This explanation apparently satisfied The 
Labour Leader, which commented that only 'Capitalism' was 
endangered by 'those keen Trade Unionists, Socialist 
Pacifist Jews of Poale Zion who despise the gains of 
1 Ibid. 9 Sept. 1920. Ibid. 5 Dec. 1918. 
3 Ibid. 23 Dec. 1920. Brockway has mentioned a statement 
he wrote for the ILP after the war on the subject of 
Palestine, but it is not clear to what he refers, see 
F. Brockway, Towards Tomorrow (London, 1977) p. 175. 
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oppression and work for genuine self determination and 
freedom on International Socialist lines'. Answering a 
critic from within the Labour Party the paper unequivocably 
declared that 'Po ale Zion has hard and difficult work before 
it but we believe it to be one of the highest in the world 
today, and destined to play no small part in the establish- 
ment of a new world order'. 
1 
The final public identification of the ILP with the aims 
of Poale Zion came at the Zionists' annual conference in 
December, at which a powerful delegation led by R. C. 
Wallhead (Chairman), J. Hudson (National Organiser) and 
Mrs. Bruce Glazier (editor of The Labour Leader) attended 
'to express the identification of the British working class 
as a whole with the aims of Jewish labour'. 
2 
'On Monday evening a banquet was held in the 
Maccebean Hall, when the Conference was greeted in 
the name of the ILP by the Party's National 
Chairman, Mr. R. C. Wallhead, who remarked on the 
desire of the Party to aid all nations, whether 
large or small, in their endeavour to rid themselves 
of the fetters of capitalism and establish a 
Socialist Commonwealth. 
Dr. Kaplansky, rising to reply, said that there 
existed a very real unity of identity 
- 
the outlook 
of both parties 
- 
Socialistically and Internation- 
ally. Special responsibility was laid on the ILP, 
the most idealistic of all Socialist parties, since 
Great Britain possessed the Mandate over the future 
Jewish homeland. Jewish Socialists were determined 
to construct in Palestine a Socialist Commonwealth, 
but such was only possible through the aid of the 
whole of the International Proletariat'. 
By December 1920 Poale Zion had achieved a double 
triumph. In the excitement generated by the Balfour 
1 The Labour Leader 30 Dec. 1920. 
2 Ibid. 23 Dec. 1920,30 Dec. 1920, ZR Jan. 1921, JLC Jan. 
1921. See Zionist Bulletin 16 June 1920 for a conference 
in London earlier that year. 
3 The Labour Leader 30 Dec. 1920. 
- 
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Declaration and the conquest of Palestine the support of 
much of the Jewish Labour movement had been successfully 
mobilised, despite the opposition of some Jewish Socialists. 
The influence of Poale Zion had increased markedly, 
1 
and 
support for Zionism was now a significant factor among the 
Jewish working class. 
Furthermore the case for Socialist Zionism had been 
successfully argued within the ILP, and for many years to 
come left wing criticism of Zionism was to emanate almost 
entirely from the Communist Party. These two factors help 
account for the striking success of Poale Zion within the 
Labour Party in the years after 1918. 
D. Poale Zion and the Labour Party 
The inaugural program of the Jewish National Labour 
Council, whose formation had been so conspicuous a triumph 
for the Zionists, had included a call 'to come into closer 
'relationship with the British Labour Party and whenever 
possible call into life a Jewish section of the British 
Labour Party which should embrace all Jewish Labour 
Organisationl. 2 At the General Election in November the 
Council urged Jewish workers to vote for the Labour Party, 
one reason given being the party's declaration on 
Palestine. 3 Nevertheless over the next two years formal 
1 For instance within the Workers' Circle organisation. 
In 1922 a branch (No. 15) was set up in London under Poale 
Zion control. Disagreements between Zionists and Communists 
took early root within the Circle; Branch 9 became 
Communist controlled after the war, breaking away from 
Branch 1. See Workers'_ Circle Friendly Society, op. cit., 
The Circle (The organ of the Workers' Circle) Oct. 1935. 
2 JLC 5 July 1918. 
3 Manifesto 'To the Jewish Electors, Men and Women of Great Britain' in Levenb-erg & Podro (eds. ), OP-cit., p. 155-6. 
See alsorethe editorial of The Jewish Times edited by Morris Myer) printed in The Labour Leader 5 Dec. 1918. 
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links with the Labour Party were developed not by the JNLC, 
but by its smaller more exclusive godparent, Poale Zion. 
Links between the Labour Party and Poale Zion were 
initially furthered, not by developments in Palestine, but 
as a consequence of the wave of pogroms in Poland and else- 
where, which afflicted East European Jews at the close of 
the First World War. One of the first actions of the JNLC 
had been to protest to the Labour Party, and in July a 
letter from the Secretary,, Morris Myer, was considered by 
the Policy and Program Sub Committee. 
1 In November, as 
part of a larger campaign within the Socialist Internat- 
ional, the Poale Zion Confederation made contact with the 
Labour Party to seek assistance. 
2 
In October 1919 a report from the Central Committee of 
Poale Zion noted that much of the party's efforts during 
the previous year had been concerned with mobilising 
support against the persecutions. This had involved the 
organisation of a large scale Pogrom Protest Demonstration, 
3 
and on 4 June the Executive Committee of the Labour Party 
considered a report from Poale Zion. The following day a 
request was discussed which asked that a delegate might 
address the annual conference about the persistence of 
pogroms in Poland. 4 
Though agreeing that Poale Zion might circulate 
documents at the Conference the Executive Committee decided 
to reject the Zionists' application. Nonetheless such 
1 Policy and Program Sub Committee Minutes, 24 July 1918. 
2 Zionist Bulletin 20 Nov. 1918. 
3 JLC 1 Jan. 1920.4 EC If June 1919. 
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interventions may well have prompted the moving of an 
emergency resolution, unanimously adopted without 
discussion, which protested against the atrocities and 
called for the intervention of the allied sponsors of the 
Polish Government. 1 
Later that year Poale Zion welcomed colleagues from 
abroad, who had participated in the first post war 
conference of the World Union. Whilst in London the 
delegates, representing Achduth Haavodah2 and the American 
Poale Zion, made contact with the Labour Party. For 
Zionists the pogroms came as further confirmation of the 
urgent need to develop the National Home. Aption against 
the persecutions and the promotion of colonisation in 
Palestine were seen as natural concomitants, and to Labour 
Party spokesmen the links between the two were continually 
stressed. 
On 25 October a delegation met Arthur Henderson, 
Secretary of the Labour Party, and emphasised both the 
difficulties placed in the way of Jewish immigration and 
the non-departure of the Commission, agreed upon by the 
Lucerne Conference, which was due to investigate the 
pogroms. 
3 Two days later a deputation raised the same 
points at a meeting with the Advisory Committee on Inter- 
1 Labour Party Annual Conference Report henceforth LPACR) 
1919, P. 138. 
2 The party had been formed in 1919, uniting most 
Palestine Labour Zionist groups. One of the delegates was 
Berl Katznelson, a leading theoretician of the new party. 
3 JLC Jan. 1920. The delegates were Efraim Blumenfield 





which resolved to draw the attention of 
' the Executive to the fact that the Commission had not yet 
departed, though the pogroms continued, and also of'the 
need to investigate the restrictions on Jewish immigrat- 
ion. 
Whilst in London the delegation was able to conduct 
some useful propagandising, and met a number of Labour 
leaders. 3 These links were strengthened the following 
year with the establishment by the Poale Zion Confederation 
of a political bureau in London, under the direction of 
Kaplansky. He was assisted by David Ben Gurion, 
representing Achduth Haavodah, who arrived in London in 
the Spring with the aim of developing contacts with the 
Labour Party. 4 He and his colleagues evidently had 
considerable success. 
When the Organisation Sub Committee of the Labour Party 
met on 5 February 1920 one item on the agenda was a request 
from Pople, Zion for affiliation. 
5 For the Zionists this 
was a logical step to take, building on existing links and 
1 The Advisory Committee had been set up in March 1918, 
with Leonard Woolf as Secretary, to consibt of party 
members and sympathetic experts who would submit memoranda 
and recommendations to the Executive. On this occasion 
Norman Angell, Arnold Toynbee, Palme Dutt, G. D. H. Cole, 
Haden Guest and Woolf were present. 
2 With this prompting the party contacted Huysmans, and 
on 12 November the Executive Committee heard that the 
Commission was being formed, LP/'IAC/l/81 24 Nov. 1919, JLC 
Jan 1920, EC 12 Nov. 1919. For the Commission see LPACR 
1920, P. 197, Zionist Bulletin 19 Aug. 1919. 
3A particularly warm tribute was paid by Robert Williams, 
General Secretary of the National Federation of Transport 
Workers, see JLC ibid. 
4 M. Bar Zohar, Ben Gurion: A Biography (London, 1973) 
P. 43. Kaplansky had helped form the World Union of Poale 
Zion and had been Secretary of the Jewish National Fund 
head Office in The Hague between 1913 and 1919. 
5 Organisation Sub Committee Minutes 5 Feb. 1920. 
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the growing sympathy for Zionist ideas, and stimulated no 
doubt by the failure of their representatives to gain a 
hearing at the previous annual conference. 
There was little likelihood that the party would follow 
the decision of the ILP five years before and reject the 
request. Nevertheless the decision of the Sub Committee to 
recommend affiliation was not unanimous, Tom Shaw register- 
ing his opposition. 
1 His decision may have been influenced 
by his visit to Russia earlier that year 
- 
though his two 
colleagues2 on the Labour Party delegation did not alter 
their pro Zionist views 
- 
or by his experiences as the 
party's representative on the Socialist Commission sent to 
investigate the pogroms. 





to the affiliation of Poale Zion was to no avail, 
and on 9 February the Executive Committee approved the 
recommendation without comment. 
4 Poale Zion could now look 
forward to wider and more formalised consideration of their 
views within the party, and a hearing at Conference. 
Later that year, evidently wishing to consolidate their 
position still further, Poale Zion applied for direct 
representation on the International Advisory Committee. 
On 10 September the Committee considered 'the proposed 
appointment of Mr. Kaplansky, or some other member of the 
Poale Zion Confederation', 5 but though in the case of other 
1 On the Sub Committee were Mrs. C. Crane (Chairman), Tom 
Shaw, J. Wignall, Sidney Webb,, W. Harris, Mrs. Snowden, 
Dr. Ethel Bentham, J. S. Middleton and Egerton P. Wake. 
2 Robert Williams and Ethel Snowden. 
3 LPACR 1920, p. 4. If EC 9 Feb. 1920. 
5 See agenda LP/IAC/1/107. 
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applicants it resolved to make further enquiries, it was 
firm in its decision not to recommend Kaplansky as a membex 
This was the first clear attempt within the Labour Party 
to limit Zionist influence. Attendance at the meeting was 
higher than usual2 and included at least three members we 
may assume opposed Kaplansky's membership: E. N. Bennett 
and Captain Stokes, both later known as 'pro Arabs' and 
the Communist Palme Dutt. Though the decision was only a 
minor setback for Pople Zion, non representation on the 
Committee was to be a recurring irritation throughout the 
Mandate period, and was one reason why the Advisory 
Committee was consistently to manifest less sympathy for 
Zionist aspirations than its parent body, the NEC. 
In all other respects Poale Zion must have viewed their 
new links with the Labour Party with considerable satis- 
faction. A resolution passed at their annual conference in 
December indicated the quid pro quo Poale Zion was hoping 
to achieve: 
'The Conference calls upon the various branches to 
affiliate with their local Labour Parties and to 
take an active part in their work, particularly in 
the Parliamentary and Municipal elections. The 
Conference expects that the British Labour Party 
will continue as hitherto to support, in accordance 
with its program of international solidarity, the 
Jewish working class in its campaigns, particularly 
for the establishment of a Jewish Socialist Labour 
Palestine'. 
To cement the new relationship the Executive of the 
Labour Party sent the Chairman, A. G. Cameron, to the 
1 LP/IAC/108 10 Sept. 1920. 
2 At the meeting were Cole, Bevin, Lawrence, Burns, Scurr, 
Presbury, Dutt, Haden-Guest, Bennett, Stokes and Woolf. 
3 JLC Jan. 1921. 
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Conference. In a 'striking address', he pledged the 'whole 
hearted support of the Labour Party to Jewish national 
aspirations and the Poale Zion policy'. 
1 Such support had 
already been manifested earlier in the year. 
In April 1920 Allied-leaders had met in San Remo, and 
one question discussed was the Palestine Mandate. 
2 Zionist 
leaders were particularly concerned lest the persistence of 
French claims in the area might weaken British resolve to 
adopt the Mandate, and engaged in energetic lobbying. On 
20 April the Executive Committee heard an appeal from Poale 
Zion and the English Zionist Federation, and as a result 
resolved to reaffirm its policy of 'Palestine becoming a 
Jewish Homeland'. 3 Accordingly a telegram, over the names 
of the Chairmen and Secretaries of the EC, the TUG and the 
PLP, was sent to the Prime Minister, and copies distributed 
to the press. The telegram reminded the Prime Minister of 
the Labour Party's declaration on Palestine, and concluded: 
'The National Committees desire to associate them- 
selves with the many similar representations made 
to the Government urging the settlement of this 
question with the utmost despatch both in the 
interests of Palestine itself a4 s well as in the 
interests of the Jewish people'. 
For Lloyd George the telegram probably represented yet 
another ponderous kick by the Labour movement against an 
open door. The pages of The Zionist Review nevertheless 
1 Ibid., and see EC 15 Dec. 1920. 
2 H. Sachar, The Emergency of the Middle East 1914-24 (New 
York, 1969) pp. 260 ff. 
3 EC 20 Apr. 1920. 
4 Telegram in EC minutes. (Curiously ten years later 
Gillies assured Zionist Revisionists that 'no official 
appeal was made to San Remo' LP/WG/11(b) 26 May 1932). 
Many Labour MPs signed a petition organised by the Zionist Federation urging the Government to accept the Mandate,, 
see Zionist Bulletin 30 Apr. 1920. 
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reveal the considerable gratitude of the Zionists for the 
message, and also indicate the realisation among non 
Socialist Zionists that, in their search for support, the 
Labour Party remained a useful ally. 
The Executive of the Zionist Federation had decided on 
13 April that prompt action was necessary, 
l 
and the 
following day established a Political Committee to co- 
ordinate action. At one of its first meetings it decided 
to approach the Labour Party, which was found 'ready and 
willing'. Poale Zion, though not affiliated to the 
Federation, was fully involved, and The Zionist Review 
acknowledged that 'in this connection a word of apprecia- 
tion is due to J. L. Cohen2 and J. Pomerantz, Secretary of 
Poale Zion. 'The Labour leaders', the paper solemnly 
declared, 'have stood by us in our crisis and have earned 
our gratitude'. 
The following month Cohen described the event more 
flamboyantly: 
'every section of the Labour Party in this country 
was mobilised by experienced and skillful Labour 
leaders to flash across to San Remo the unshakable 
decision g3f Labour to hold the Government to their 
promise'. 
Poale Zion backed up their appeal with a statement to 
the Executive Committee and a memorandum to the Advisory 
Committee, which as a result primed C. Edwards to ask in 
the House whether 'the pledge to restore Palestine to the 
1 ZR June 1920. 
2 Cohen, now a member of Poale Zion, had edited The 
Zionist Banner before the war, and was a friend of Weizmann. 
3 ZR July 1920. For the Memorandum Poale Zion submitted 
to the Executive Committee, which also dealt with the 
recent disorders in Jerusalem, see Zionist Bulletin 5 May 
1920. 
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Jewish nation' had been agreed to, and whether Britain was 
to become the Mandatory power. 
l, 
A further intervention was made by Poale Zion in 
November. A Memorandum, written by Ben Gurion, was 
submitted to Henderson and the Advisory Committee, arguing 
for the largest possible deliniation of the new territory: 
'the frontiers must therefore be regarded... exclusively 
from the standpoint of the future of the Jewish people in 
Palestine'. 2 On this occasion Poale Zion was too late. 
The Advisory Committee reported that the question had been 
settled, though it prompted a further question to make 
certain. 
3 
During 1920 Poale Zion also participated for the first 
time in a Labour Party Conference. A resolution urging the 
Government to remove restrictions on Jewish immigration and 
to allow 'immediate entry to the large number of suffering 
Jews in Eastern Europe anxiously waiting to settle in 
Palestine' was proposed by Pomerantz of Poale Zion,, and 
seconded by Oscar Tobin of Stepney Central Labour Party. 
4 
On the recommendation of the Standing Orders Committee the 
resolution was passed unanimously without discussion. 
In May 1921 violence broke out in Jaffa, and in a 
1 LP/IAC/1/100 18 June 1920, HC Deb Vol. 128 c. 392 27 June 
1920. 
2 Memorandum 'On the Boundaries of Palestine' (LP/IAC/2/169) 
and meeting LP/IAC/1/129 15 Dec. 1920. See D. Ben Gurion 
My Talks With Arab Leaders (Jerusalem, 1972) p. 9. 
3 HC Deb Vol. 136 c. 1290 20 Dec. 1920. 
4 LPACR 1920, p. 177. Poale Zion had affiliated with a 
membership of 3,000 see ibid., p. 92. Their resolution 
appeared under the heading of "Palestine for the Jews". 
47 
number of other towns. In Britain Poale Zion responded by 
publishing a pamphlet which stressed the weakness and bias 
of the Palestine administration and the culpability of the 
Arab leaders: 'there is no doubt at all that this was a 
carefully prepared and formed part of a definite plan for 
a general attack on the Jews in Jaffa and the colonies'. 
' 
The Memorandum concluded with an appeal to the Labour 
Party, and was probably printed with an eye to the Annual 
Conference, which took place at the end of June. Kaplansky 
represented Poale Zion and was able to move a long 
resolution. While noting the assumption by Britain of the 
Mandate 'with the object of assuring the development of a 
Jewish Autonomous Commonwealth' it condemned the constrict- 
ing boundaries and the separation of Transjordan. It also 
demanded, for both Jews and Arabs 'full autonomy, democra- 
tically organised, in their respective internal affairs'. 
For the first time a Zionist was able to address 
Conference. Kaplansky expounded the Zionist theory of the 
necessity of a Jewish Homeland. Though stressing Jewish 
sensitivity to the rights of self determination of 
Palestinian Arabs he argued that Palestine could become a 
centre for 'national and social regeneration for millions 
of Jews'. Kaplansky emphasised that the support of the 
British Labour movement, 'rightly listened to with great 
confidence in the Orient', was of the greatest importance. 
There was no need, he said 'to think in terms of generations 
1 From a memorandum on the troubles from Achduth Haavodah 
published in Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Poale Zion 
Palestine and Jewish Labour: Two Documents (London, 1921). 
The second was the Memorandum of the Poale Zion 
Confederation on the Mandate). 
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to see an autonomous Jewish Society in Palestine under the 
protection and guidance of British Labour'. 
' The Zionists 
had been able to persuade Neil MacLean. 
2 
a prominent 
Clydeside ILP MP, to second the motion and once again, when 
the resolution was put to Conference, it was carried 
unanimously. 
After the 1921 Conference contacts at the higher levels 
between Poale Zion and the Labour Party declined. In 
Palestine the 1920's were years of slow and unspectacular 
Jewish colonisation, and though many friendships and 
contacts between Zionists and Labour Party members 
developed there was an absence of specific issues on which 
Zionists sought to enlist the aid of the Labour Party. 
Similarly, though Jewish Labour had shown, and would 
show again, that in times of high excitement or crisis 
support for Zionism was considerable, in years of quiet 
progress enthusiasm waned. As early as 1920 the East 
London Zionist Association reported that, although member- 
ship remained at arounä 500, few would take part in 
propaganda work. 
3 Poale Zion activity decreased, and 
membership showed a steady decline.. 
4 
Nevertheless the position of Poale Zion within the 
1 LPACR 1921, pp. 198-9. The local newspaper, the Sussex 
Daily News, commented 'he apologised for his 'very 
imperfect' English, but it was good, and his argument, 
although somewhat too academic for the Conference, was 
excellently expressed' 
- 
clipping in EC minutes. 
2 See also the question asked by MacLean in the Commons, 
which was clearly inspired by the Zionists, HC Deb Vol. 142 
c. 1069-70,1 June 1921. 
3 ZR March 1920. 
4 2,000 (1922), 1,740 (1925), 980 (1926), 600 (1927) 
Source: LPACR. 
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Labour Party had been secured. Though Zionism might have 
its critics within the party, Poale Zion could apeak with 
the authority of a group both Zionist and Socialist,, and 
one with intimate links with Palestinian Jewish Labour 
organisations. As the only group within the Labour Party 
whose primary interest wis'Palestine it was accepted as 
the chief political spokesman on all questions affecting 
that country. 
Labour Party leaders were now becoming accustomed to 
campaigning with Labour Zionists, speaking at or sending 
messages to their gatherings, and defending their views in 
public. Labour Zionists in their turn were quick to 
express their gratitude and stress that the support of the 
Labour Party was the utmost significance. From a vague 
affirmation of the rights of Jewish colonisation by 1921 a 
resolution had referred to a 'Jewish Autonomous Common- 
wealth', and the resolution had typically met with no 
opposition. As significant as the content of resolutions 
and messages was the fact that there was already developing, 
thanks largely to the efforts of Poale Zion, a history of 
pledges affirming support for Zionism which would provide 
the basis for the party's attitude in later years. 
E. The Labour Party and Palestine in the 1920s 
Within the House of Commons the Labour Party's 
developing sympathy for Zionism did not find expression. 
until 1920, the year of the affiliation of Poale Zion. The 
first MP to raise the subject was C. H. Stitch, who asked in 
March about alleged Bedouin attacks in Jewish colonies. ' 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 127 c. 1048-9,30 Mar. 1920. 
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The following month Ben Spoor enquired about the 'lack of 
sympathy on the part of the British military establishment 
in Palestine with the Government's declared policy of 
establishing a Jewish National Home', whilst William Lunn 
echoed the demand of Labour Zionists that representatives 
of Jewis Labour organisations should be included in the new 
administration. 
l 
Such questions, though few in number, did indicate that 
in general Labour MPs had sympathy with Zionist endeavors 
in Palestine. Nevertheless the enthusiastic claim-later 
made by J. L. Cohen that Labour members had 'pelted the 
Government with questions on the Jerusalem riots, and the 
imprisonment of Jabotinsky'2 was a considerable exaggera- 
tion. That year, of the half dozen questions concerned in 
any way with Palestine asked by orthodox Labour MPs, two 
were prompted in the Advisory Committee and two others 
came from indefatigable questioners. But there was one MP, 
until the previous year a Liberal but now theoretically in 
receipt of the Labour whip, who did 'pelt' the Government 
with questions, as he was to do for the rest of his life. 
This was the MP for Newcastle under Lyme, Josiah Wedgwood. 
Wedgwood was a member of the famous pottery family. He 
was considered a radical, and was an enthusiastic 
'progressive' Imperialist. 3 He was also a passionate 
supporter of Zionism. Having served at Gallipoli alongside 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 128 c. 1397-1400,29 Apr. 1920, Vol. 130 
c. 898,14 June 1920. 
2 ZR July 1920. 
3 See C. V. Wedgwood, The Last of the Radicals (London,. 1951), 
J. Wedgwood Memoirs of a Fighting Life (London, 1941) Passim. 
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the Zionist Mule Corps he later joined Weizmann's circle of 
friends who furthered the cause of Zionism within British 
political life. 
l In 1920 from the Labour benches he asked 
a variety of critical questions on Palestine - twice the 
number asked by his new colleagues. 
2 
Wedgwood was only one of a number of politicians with 
Zionist sympathies, hitherto Liberals, whose recruitment 
to the Labour Party during this period significantly 
augmented pro Zionist opinion within their new party. Among 
their number 
- 
including Norman Angell, Pethick Lawrence and 
Philip Noel Baker 
- 
were several former Liberal MPs, such 
as Commander Kentiworthy, Dr. Spero and C. L'Estrange Malone. 
3 
Many such erstwhile Liberals, whose sympathies were often 
with the humanitarian and regenerative features of the 
Zionist philosophy, were prominent within the party's 
Advisory Committees. Although the Liberal influx included 
two strong opponents of Zionism 
- 
E. N. Bennett and T. S. B. 
Williams 
- 
pro Zionist sympathy was dominant within the 
group. 
If the Liberal influx was one reason for the strengthen- 
ing of Zionist sentiment within the party during the 1920s 
equally important was the development of contacts between 
prominent Labour politicians and Palestine Labour Zionists. 
1 Meinerzhagen, though himself a committed Zionist, had 
little patience with Wedgwood's approach, see eg. 
R. Meinerzhagen, Middle East Diary (London, 1959) PP. 99,138" 
Wedgwood himself noted that 'The Labour Leader was by no 
means so pleased with my Zionist views on Palestine', 
J. Wedgwood, op. cit., p. 177. 
2 On the Jerusalem riots see HC Deb. Vol. 127 c. 1834, 
Vol. 228 c. 394,841,1021 and concerning Jabotinsky Vol. 128 
c. 1022,1272, Vol. 131 c. 223, and many others on different 
aspects. 
3 See especially C. Cline, Recruits to Labour (New York, 
1963) pp. 149-78. The most prominent Zionist defection 
from ýie Liberal Party 
- 
many years later 
- 
was that of 
arne J anner. 
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Particularly significant were the visits to Palestine 
made by party members. Such visits were frequent during 
the 1930s, but began in the previous decade. Josiah 
Wedgwood was naturally an early visitor1 and so, in 1922,, 
was the party leader Ramsey MacDonald. 
2 Accounts of the 
experiences were published in The Labour Leader and 
Forward; Poale Zion subsequently printed a special 
pamphlet by MacDonald entitled 'A Socialist in Palestine'. 
3 
MacDonald evidently enjoyed his trip. Arriving in 
Nazareth he was moved to write that 'after far wanderings 
I seem to have come home. I feel as familiar with this 
of 
place as I do with the beautiful hills,, Lossiemouth'. The 
Dome of the Rock was, for MacDonald, beyond compare, and 
the deeds of the Zionists impressed him little less: 
'they will fail, the man of practical intelligence will 
say. I hope he is wrong, but if they do and are scattered 
they will have clothed the northern sides of Mount Gilboa, 
made rich the waste lands at its fell, and cheered and 
refreshed everyone who will come into contact with their 
work. They are believers'! Such was his enthusiasm that 
to Norman Bentwich he subsequently ascribed his election 
to Parliament later that year as in no small part due to 
the picture he presented to his Welsh constituents of 
1 New Judea 12 Nov. 1926,26 Nov. 1926,24 Dec. 1926. 
See also C. Wedgwood, op. cit., p. 186, J. Wedgwood, op. cit., 
P. 194. 
2 The visit is not mentioned in David Marquand's lengthy 
biography of MacDonald,, nor is his role in the crisis of 
1929-31. 
3 Forward 11 & 18 Mar. 1922, published in R. MacDonald, 
Wanderings and Excursions (London, 1925) pp. 185-9, 
Jewish Socialist Labour Party,, Poale Zion, A Socialist in 
Palestine (London, 1922) The Labour Leader 23 Feb. 1922, 
6 Apr. 1922,29 April 1922. MacDona -M so contributed 
articles to the paper of the Zionist Organisation of 
America, see New Palestine 5 Apr. 1922,23 Aug. 1922, 
24 Jan. 1924. 
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developments in Palestine. ' 
MacDonald had been entertained by Jewish Socialists, 
whom he had assured that 'the British worker will be 
interested in Palestine when he knows that from it he can 
learn how land is nationalised' 
.2 He advised the Histradut3 
that a description of actual achievements was the way to 
win the-support of British Labour. 4 
This only confirmed Labour Zionists in their determi- 
nation to propagandise their work and to make full use of 
the visits of British Labour representatives. The 
following year Achduth Haavodah sent Ben Gurion to Egypt 
to invite the Labour MPs on the Parliamentary Egyptian 
Committee to visit Palestine; though forced to decline, 
the MPs questioned Ben Gurion closely on Labour activity 
in Palestine. 5 Throughout the decade visitors from the 
British Labour movement were welcomed by Labour Zionists 
and proudly shown the evidence of Zionist achievement. A 
typical reaction was that of R. H. Tawney who on his 
return 'characterised the success of Jewish Labour in 
Palestine as very remarkable' and gave his support to 
4 MacDonald, op. cit., p. 189. 
1 N. Bentwich, A Wanderer Between Two Worlds (London, 
1941) pp. 125-6. 
2 ER April 1922. 
3 'The General Federation of Jewish Labour in Palestine$ 
was the Palestinian Jewish Trade Union organisation, 
formed in 1920. 




Such contacts were strengthened by the participation 
of Palestine Labour Zionists in a variety of international 
Labour and Socialist organisations2 and by the presence in 
Britain of Palestinian Socialists. Some, like Kaplansky 
and Ben Gurion, were official Zionist representatives, 
whilst many others came as visitors or students. A 
surprisingly large number of Palestinian Jews, including 
Maurice Shertok and David Ha Cohen studied at the London 
School of Economics. 
3 
Zionist influence, when allied with the natural 
sympathy within the Labour Party, was sufficient to parry 
the first faltering interventions of Palestinian Arab 
representatives. In 1922 a delegation visited London as 
part of its campaign-successfully requested an interview 
with the Advisory Committee 
. 
'4 In 1920 the Zionist 
Federation, concerned lest the Committee be over anxious 
about the position. of the Arab population had submitted 
a memorandum on the subject. 5 Now, through William Gillies,. 
1 At a meeting organised by Poale Zion and Chaired by 
Herbert Morrison, see New Judea May 1929. A particularly 
enthusiastic visitor was Ethel Snowden,, see G. Meir, My Life (London, 1975) p. 73-4,, and F. Kische, Palestine Diary (London, 1938) P. 49. See also eg New Judea 26 Sept. 1924 
for the visit of three Labour MPs and Kische, op. cit., 
pp. 286-7,336-7, for the visits in 1930 of Daniel Hopkin 
and Richard Denman. 
2 See below pp. 64-74. 
3 H. Dalton, Call Back Yesterday (London, 1953) pp. 111-2. 
Dalton was then an economics lecturer at the School. 
4 LP/IAC/1/156 18 Jan. 1922. There is no record of the 
meeting, but see the documents brought by the delegation 
in LP/IAC/2/234. 
5 'The Arab Population of Palestine: Memorandum submitted 
by the Zionist Organisation, 5 August 1920' LP/IAC/2/157. 
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the Secretary of the International Department, the 
Secretary of the Zionist Federation heard of the Arabs' 
request and accordingly requested Woolf's help in ensuring 
that 'should the Arabs present their case... the Zionist 
Organisation is heard in reply otherwise it is feared the 
Committee will obtain a very imperfect picture of the 
situation'. 
1 
The request was considered on the day the Committee 
met the Arab delegation and a fortnight later a group of 
senior Zionists were received. 
2 From subsequent 
communications it is clear that the main charge levelled 
by the Arabs, which the Zionists were very concerned to 
denyx was that eviction of Arab tenants had been caused by 
Jewish land purchase in the Esdraelon Valley. This the 
Zionists hotly contested and later supplied evidence to 
refute the charges. 
3 
Later that year the Labour Party was called upon for 
the first time unequivocably to demonstrate its sympathies 
in Parliament. Considerable anti Zionist sympathy had been 
mobilised in Conservative circles, which focused on the 
proposed 'Rutenberg Concessiont. 4 In June a motion 
opposing the concession had been passed by the House of 
Lords, and the following month the Commons debated the issue. 
1 L. Stein to L. Woolf, 12 Jan. 1922, LP/IAC/2/231. 
2 Weizmann, Dr. & Mrs. Eder, Stein, Shertok and Kaplansky, 
see LP/IAC/1/157 1 Jan. 1922. Dr. Eder, a member of the 
Executive of the Zionist Organisation, had as a non 
Zionist before the war been a member of the ILP and the 
Fabian Society, and had helped found the London Labour 
Party, see J. B. Hobman, 'An Introductory Sketch' in 
J. B. Hobman (ed. ) David Eder: Memoirs of a Modern Pioneer (London, 1945) p"13" 
3 L. Stein to L. Woolf 12 Jan. 1922, LP/IAC/2/237. 
4 Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 141-6. A monopoly had been 
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The Labour Party spokesman was Morgan Jones. He 
affirmed his belief in the determination of both sides 'to 
do all they can to live in peace, and to agree together', 
and ascribed the agitation in the press to the jealousy of 
British firms to the proposed concession. Though he 
admitted to a slight misgiving about the monopolistic 
aspects of the arrangement he ended by noting that 'on 
sentimental grounds, as well as on the grounds of good 
statemanship good policy and good politics, I entirely 
support-the mandate in Palestine and, incidentally, this 
Rutenberg concession'. ' When the House divided 41 MPs 
assisted the Government in gaining an overwhelming 
victory over its critics. 
During his speech Jones poured scorn on Conservatives 
who, though doughty opponents on Indian and Egyptian 
independence, now appeared to discover 'that there is such 
a principle in the world as self determination'. 
2 This was 
a potentially dangerous line of attack for a number of 
critics, including some within the party, had begun to 
question the compatability of the commitment to Zionism 
granted to the Zionists to develop the electrical resources 
of Palestine, based on Pinhas., Rutenberg's scheme to harness 
the waters of the country. For various meetings of MPs see 
The Times 21 & 22 Apr. 1920 (the formation of a pro Zionist 
committee),, 11 Apr. 1922 (meetings with the Arab Delegation), 
30 Apr. 1922 (meeting with the High Commissioner). 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 156 c. 327,4 July 1922. Jones remained a 
strong supporter of Zionism till his death, see ZR 4 May 
1939. Later that year a message from Arthur Henderson was 
published which affirmed the Labour Party's support for 
the Palestine Mandate, see Levenberg & Podro (eds. ) 
op. cit., p. 12. 
2 HC ibid, c. 320-1. 
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with an overall policy of support for self determination. 
Some official policy statements blandly ignored poltht- 
iIx contradictions, 
l 
others only served to highlight a 
certain ambiguity. In 1921 Tom Shaw declared that: 
'So far as the party to which I belong is concerned, 
we want to be out of Mesopotamia at the earliest 
moment. So far as Palestine is concerned we desire, 
without any excuse for doing otherwise that we 
should leave the management of Palestine to the 
people who live in it. That is our desire with 
regard both to Palestine and Mesopotamia'. 
2 
Shaw's vague opposition to Zionism, evident in his 
disagreement with the affiliation of Poale Zion, was never 
clearly stated. But some made their hostility plain. In 
December 1920 a correspondent to The Labour Leader attacked 
the Mandate as a flagrant breach of the principle of self 
determination for which the party stood. 'The Mandate', 
he believed 'appears to be one of the maddest results of 
that strange blend of Imperialism and non conformist 
conscience'. To express support for Poale Zion, he felt, 
would be 'simply to play a sordid game of the Jingoes and 
Capitalists who framed the Treaties of Verseilles and 
Servres'. 3 
The writer was Ernest Bennett, a former Liberal MP, who 
1 For instance A. Henderson, The Aims of Labour (London, 
1917): 'There will have to be certain restorations and 
reconstitutions. Such necessary changed will be covered by 
the application of the principle of the right of self 
determination. The question of... Palestine (is) capable of 
being settled on this basis'. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 144 c. 1543,14 July 1921- 
3 The Labour Leader 30 Dec. 1920. 
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had travelled widely in the Middle East and had even worked 
for a time as. a press censor in the Ottoman army. In 1916 
he had joined the ILP and had fought unsuccessfully in 
subsequent elections. In 1920 he joined the International 
Advisory Committee and on a number of occasions raised the 
question of Palestine. Early in 1923 the Committee 
discussed a letter from Bennett on the subject, and also 
one from Colonel T. S. B. Williams, an ex Indian Army doctor, 
and, like Bennett, an unsuccessful Parliamentary candidate. 
Williams had been moved to write to the Fabian Society 
by the pro Zionist declaration of Josiah Wedgwood. He too 
considered the Palestine Mandate a serious mistake which 
'if persisted in will inevitably lead the Labour Party into 
serious difficulties'. He therefore urged the Fabian 
Society and the Advisory Committee to take action. 
1 
Williams characterised the Mandate policy as 'one 
designed to control Palestine in the interests of the Jews, 
as long as they are in a minority; when they reach a 
majority control is to be relaxed and Palestine will be run 
as an indepdndent state'. The Labour Party was thus acting 
in contradiction to its own fundamental principles by 
supporting a policy of running Palestine in the interests 
of a privileged minority. He protested strongly against 
the argument that Britain was aiding the Arabs by raising 
their standard of living, that 'we think we know better for 
them than they do themselves'. Moreover the Jews who 
desired to 'return' to Palestine had in most cases no direct 
1 Copy of letter from Lt. Col. T. S. B. Williams dated 17 Oct. 
1922 in LP/IAC/2/267. 
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ancestral ties at all. 
His view of the future was in. stark contrast to the 
blandly optimistic views of the official Labour spokesmen. 
He foresaw massacres of Jews throughout the Moslem world; 
the feeling was that which had led to the massacre of 
Armenians in Turkey. The Labour Party must therefore be 
deflected from its present policy which 'if they get into 
power, will hang like a'fnillstone round their necks'. 
The efforts of Bennett and Williams had no obvious 
result'. Moderate ex Liberals, their views on Palestine 
were those of no significant section, within the party. 
Their analysis shared some ground with the left wing 
critique of Zionism but, with the disaffilation. of the 
BSP in 1920, this was not heard again inside the party 
until the 1930s. 





posed any threat to the Arab inhabitants, or that 
hostility between the two peoples was either deep rooted or 
inevitable. Public statements stressed that the conflict 
in Palestine lay solely between Socialism and Capitalism, 
but in doing so accepted exclusively the definition of 
Socialism proferred by Labour Zionists. 
Thus the thrust of the resolution adopted by the 1921 
Conference was that Palestine should be developed 'not upon 
the foundations of capitalist exploitation, but in the 
interests of Labour, ' whilst simply asserting in passing 
1 The Committee merely resolved to reconsider the question 
at a later date; see LP/IAC/l/185. 
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that the object of the Mandate was the establishment of a 
'Jewish Autonomous Commonwealth'. 1 Similarly Cameron had 
the previous year expressed the apparent choice before the 
Labour Party in the following terms: 'The British Labour 
Party has no interest in; a Palestine based on capitalist 
exploitation, but sticks solid for a Jewish Labour Common- 
wealth. 
2 
Labour Zionist literature emphasised the unity of 
interest of the two work forces. A memorandum published 
in 1921 is worth quoting at length as it clearly expressed 
the picture Labour Zionists successfully presented to the 
Labour movement during this period: 
'Therefore we appeal to the British Labour Party. Our 
road is the road of International Labour, economic, 
political and cultural action, and the development 
of the creative powers of the working class. The 
natural upbringing of the land that was once Jewish 
is in no way opposed to the interests of its present 
working population. On the contrary, the interests 
of Arab workers and peasants are closely linked up 
with our development of the country which will bring 
about the advancement and the progress of all its 
inhabitants. The strengthening of the Jewish workers 
in Palestine will bring about the strengthening also 
of the native workers for one watchword brings us 
together: we seek the goal of the international 
working class of Palestine. We believe that the day 
is not far distant when the Arab worker and peasant 
will recognise his own essential interests which 
unite him to the Jewish worker, and he will break 
the chains which held him enslaved for generations 
at the mercy of hiRs feudal co-nationals who oppress 
and exploit him'. 
To meet the arguments of left wing critics an article 
1 LPACR 1921, p. 198. 
2 ZR Jan. 1921. 
3 Poale Zion, 1921 op. cit. 
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by Kaplanskky was published in The Socialist Review. 
1 Thoir 
case, he argued, was based on a 'misleading vulgar ation 
of the idea of the right of self determination'. Jewish 
rights were not historical, but those of a landless people 
seeking 'constructive creative work'. Labour democracy 
should regulate immigration and colonisation of a sparsely 
occupied land; 'the proletariat must put forward its own 
Socialist colonisation policy'. From this standpoint 'a 
hundred thousand Arabs have no right of possession in 
Palestine. They have a right to work the lands on which 
they are settled. They cannot, however, prohibit the 
approach of other land and work seeking people to soil 
which is lying idle'. This policy might threaten the 
great landowners, but the interests of the Arab working 
classes lay in co-operation with the Jewish proletariat. 
Such arguments provided intellectual justification for 
the support given by most interested Labour Party members. 
Nevertheless theoretical arguments were of comparatively 
little importance in shaping party attitudes; as we have 
seen, sympathy for the sufferings of Jewry, admiration for 
Zionist achievements and friendships with Labour Zionists, 
a history of Labour Party support and the fact that anti 
Zionism in Britain was chiefly to be found among opponents 
of the Labour Party on both right and extreme left, all 
played an important part in moulding party opinion. 
1 S. Kaplansky, 'Jews and Arabs in Palestine', The Socialist 
Review, Vol. 16, No. 102,1922. Also published as Jewish 
Socialist Labour Party, Poale Zion Jews and Arabs in 
Palestine (London, 1922). 
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It was therefore of no surprise that early in 1924, 
with the formation of the first Labour Government, a 
question elicited from Thomas, the Colonial Secretary,, the 
announcement that, after careful consideration of all the 
circumstances, the new Government had decided to adhere to 
the policy of giving effect to the Balfour Declaration. 
' 
Even so the announcement came as a great disappointment to 
some sections of Palestinian Arab opinion, who had placed 
great hope on a change of Government. 
2 
Among those elected in 1923 was T. S. B. Williazns who did 
attempt during his short period in Parliament to make known 
his views on Palestine. 
3 In July he raised the question 
during a debate on Supply. He was not opposed in general to 
British activity in the Middle East: 'if you look at the 
Near and Middle East one may truthfully say that in general 
we have now come round to the policy of consulting, and 
trying to pursue a policy in accordance with the wishes of 
the inhabitants (but) there is one exception, and that 
exception is Palestine'. 
Williams maintained that 'the idea behind political 
Zionism is unsound, unworkable and against the best 
interests of the Jews themselves'. He concluded: 'if I am 
right in my contention, it is obvious you are acting most 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 170 c. 63,25 Feb. 1924. Josiah Wedgwood had 
apparently hoped to become Colonial Secretary, see Dalton, 
op. cit., p. 144. 
2 Y. Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National 
Movement Vol. 1 1918-29-ýLondon, 1977) p. 211.1. 
3 Williams became Parliamentary Private Secretary to Sidney 
Webb, the President of the Board of Trade. 
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unjustly in subordinating the wishes of these people who 
are in their national home to the wishes of people whose 
national home it never was'. 
l 
Williams and Bennett made a further half hearted attempt 
to raise the question once again within the Advisory 
Committee. In June a letter from the pair was discussed 
but since neither were present consideration was deferred. 
2 
Later that month, with an even smaller attendance, the 
Committee agreed to consider a memorandum from Williams, 
should he care to submit one. 
3 There is no evidence that 
Williams did so, and Palestine was absent from the agenda 
for the next five years. 
4 
In fact affairs in Palestine had fallen very much into 
the background. Though The Jewish Times urged its readers 
to vote for the Labour Party because of the sympathy shown 
by the Labour Government, the Palestine issue received no 
attention in the ensuing election, prompting New Judea to 
announce that the issue had 'fortunately passed beyond the 
range of party'. 
5 
The following years saw mounting economic difficulties 
in Palestine, and a falling off of Jewish immigration. 
Labour Party involvement amounted to little more than 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 176 c. 195-6,29 July 1924. 
2 LP/IAC/1/228 11 June 1924.3 LP/IAC/1/229 26 June 1924. 
4 Williams lost his seat in the following election, and 
died in 1927. 
5 New Judea 7 Nov. 1924. 
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ensuring the inclusion of a 'fair conditions of labour' 
clause in the 1929 Palestine Loan Bill1 
- 
later the TUC 
" responded to a request from the Histiadtut to investigate 
labour conditions in work arcs 
sending of occasional messages 
membership of party leaders of 
organisations. In 1926 Labour 
formed Pro Palestine Committee 
Lng from the loan? - 
- 
the 
of support, and in the 
certain pro Zionist 
members joining the newly 
of the House of Commons 
included MacDonald and Snowden; and the two leaders also 
lent their names to the Palestine Mandate Society, founded 
two years later by Ethel Snowden and Blanche Dugdale. 
4 But 
such activity was no preparation for the storm that was to 
break on the morrow of Labour's triumph in the subsequent 
election. 
F. British Labour, Zionism and International Socialism 
Before the war the Second International remained 
hostile to the claims of Zionism,, whether 'bourgeois' 
Zionism or in the form of the Socialist synthesis propounded 
by Ber Borochov and adopted by Poale Zionists. 
5 
Nationalistic territorial claims made by Jews were unaccep- 
table, whatever socialistic interpretation was placed upon 
1 See ibid., 10 Dec. 1926t 24 Dec. 1926. 
2 See below p. 77 Trade Union Congress Reports 1929, pp. 
229-30,1930 pp. 187-8,1931 p. 227. 
3 New Judea 29 Oct. 1926. The instigator was S. Finburgh, 
Conservative MP for North Salford. Snowden had not his 
wife's passionate enthusiasm but see eg ibidn7 Oct. 1927: 
'one of the outstanding achievements of modern time, (and) 
an unsurpassed example of sacrifice for a great ideal'. 
4 New Judea 30 Mar. 1928, N. Bentwich, Mandate Memories 
(London, 1965) p. 128. 
5 See above p. 9. 
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them. Since the road to salvation lay through individual 
participation in the wider Socialist movement even the anti- 
Zionist Bund was suspect. Nevertheless in the years before 
the war the beginnings of a change in attitude were 
discernable. 'The decision that each nation should be 
master of its own house gradually came to dominate Socialist 
thought. The failure. 
- 
of the Second International and the 
First World War gave this trend an irresistible impulse'. 
1 
The Poale Zion Confederation maintained its central 
organisation during the war in neutral countries, first in 
The Hague (1915-16) and then in Stockholm (1917-19), 2"'' 
In the changed conditions of wartime Europe Poale Zionists 
were markedly more successful in presenting their view of 
the particular condition of Jewry, and in gathering support 
for a Socialist Zionist solution. In 1916 a memorandum 
entitled The Jews and the War was submitted to the Inter- 
national Socialist Bureau and attracted considerable 
attention. When, the following year, the Dutch Scandinavian 
Socialist Committee began its work of reconstructing the 
International and searching for acceptable peace terms, 
among the 22 Labour and Socialist groups contacted was the 
Poale Zion Confederation 3 
The Zionists were invited by the Committee to present 
their case and, led by their Secretary Schlomo Kaplansky, 
1 4Vistrich, op. cit., p. 50. 
2 Encyclopaedia Judica, op-cit., p. 600. 
3 Levenberg, op. cit., p. 113. 
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were evidently well received. Weizmann later poured scorn 
on the wisdom of 'comrade' Kaplansky in 'demanding' a Jewish 
State in Palestine, l but although the Committee's subsequent 
peace proposals merely called for the 'protection of Jewish 
colonisation in Palestine'2 Zionists had gained their first 
real success in seeking the acceptance of 'International 
Socialism'. Similarly, although in August 1917 an Inter 
Allied Socialist Conference'rejected the Labour Party's 
proposals for a statement on War Aims, in February 1918 the 
amended memorandum was accepted, together with the reference 
to Jewish colonisation in Palestine. 
3 
Moderate Socialists throughout Europe could now be found 
supporting Zionist demands. The Belgian Socialists Emile 
Vandervelde and Camille Huysmans 
- 
Secretary of the Dutch- 
Scandinavian Committee 
- 
were particularly enthusiastic. 
4 
In France Leon Blum and Jules Guesde gave Zionists 
encouragement. 
5 Support was often linked to perceived 
national needs. Noske, Schiedemann, Quessel and Cohen-Reiss 
of the SPD became members of the German 'Pro Palestine 
Committee' which sought a Jewish Palestine under German 
protection. 
6 
The French. Socialist Gustav Herve had earlier 
1 C. Weizmann to A. Haam, 16 Aug. 1917, LPCR, Vol. VII, p. 487. 
2 Manifesto of the Delegates of Neutral Countries, reprinted 
in The Labour Party, Labour and the Peace Treaty: Handbook 
for Speakers (London, 1918). See above p. 15 and Jarblum, 
op. cit., p. 11-13. 
3 See above p. 20 When the Allied Socialists met for the 
last time in. September Morris Myer asked that the JNLC be 
allowed to participate, though this does not seem to have 
been granted, see LP/LSI/8/1-k. 
4 See interview with Huysmans in ZR January 1921 and 
obituary of Vandervelde, ibid., 14 Dec. 1938. 
5 Stein, op. cit., p. 396. For Eugene Debs, the American 
Socialist,, see Zionist Bulletin 31 May 1918. 
6 I. Friedman, 'Germany, Turkey and Zionism (Oxford, 1977) 
p. 240. 
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called for the restoration of the Jews in Palestine under 
the aegis of France. 
1 
Poale Zion consolidated its position at the first post 
war conference of the Second International, in February 
1919. For the first time 'Palestine' was directly 
represented. On 7 February Berl Locker addressed the 
Congress and as he spoke Huysmans chalked the words 'Labour- 
Zionist' as a sign that he spoke not simply for Jewish 
Socialists in Palestine. 2 When. the Permanent Commission 
met later that month in Amsterdam to consider its attitude 
to the Peace Treaty-3 the Zionist representative, 
Chasanovich, successfully canvassed for a reference to 
Palestine, and in April the Commission accordingly adg ted 
a resolution on 'The Jewish Question' which included the 
demand for: 
'the recognition of the right of the Jewish people to 
create a National-Centre in Palestine, under 
conditions determined by the League of Nations. The 
League of Nations will be responsible for the 
protection of thn interests of the other inhabitants 
of the country'. 
With a specific reference to Jewish rights and a more 
casual mention of the 'other inhabitants' the resolution 
seemed to echo the Balfour Declarations but although for 
Zionists the reference to a 'National Centre' was a 
1 Stein, op. cit. 
2 ZR 8 Jan. 1940. Text of Locker's speech in LP/LSI/Box 6. 
3 For Poale Zion's submission see Poale Zion, 1921 op. cit. 
4 The Labour Party, The International at Lucerne, 1919 (London, 1919). Zionist Bulletin July 1919. 
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disappointingly vague definition of their aims it never- 
theless constituted a major breakthrough. 
But consolidation of the Zionists' position within the 
International was soon placed in jeopardy by the involve- 
ment of Socialist Zionists in the developing split between 
left and right wing Socialists which culminated in the 
formation of the 3rd (Communist) International. At the 
fifth conference of the Poale Zion Confederation, held in 
Vienna in the summer of 1920 Socialist Zionists were utterly 
divided over the question of joining the new international: " 
178 delegates voting in favour, 179 abstaining. 
1 Left wing 
Zionists now sought affiliation to the Communist Internatio- 
nal, and denounced the Zionist Organisation. Believing that 
only through participation in the world revolution would 
Zionists have any chance of success they accepted the 21 
rules for admission to Comintern and adopted the name 
Jewish Communist Union Poale Zion. 
In fact there was no likelihood that any definition of 
Zionism would prove acceptable. The Comintern soon demanded 
that Poale Zion members join their respective Communist 
Parties, and thereafter denounced Zionism, maintaining that 
'the theme of Palestine, the attempt to divert the Jewish 
working masses from the class struggle by propaganda in 
favour of large scale Jewish settlement in Palestine is not 
only nationalist and petty-bourgeois but is counter 
revolutionary in its effect... 
1 Encyclopaedia Judica op. cit., p. 662. 
2 To the Communists of all Countries: To the Jewish 
Proletariat ; Extracts from the ECCI statement of 29 July 
1922 reprinted in J. Degras (ed) The Communist Inter- 
national 1919-1913 Vol. I (London, 195 P" 3 5. 
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On the other hand the 'right wing' Poale Zionists, led 
by Kaplansky and Locker, which included the British and 
Palestinian parties,. 
1 
also resolved to leave the Second 
International. With the backing of the ILP2 they partici- 
pated in the formation, in February 1921, of the Viennese 
'Two and a Half' International. 
3 
Reunification of the non Communist International did 
not take place until the Hamburg Conference in 1923 but 
Poale Zion, now representing the main body of Socialist 
Zionists, was able to participate, and ffaplansky was 
appointed to the Executive. 
4 As the new Labour and 
Socialist International was to be exclusively territorially 
organised the status of Poale Zion caused some controversy, 
but finally in June 1924 the Executive decided that 'as the 
special conditions of the Jewish people constituted a unique 
problem, Palestine will be considered as the main country of 
the Federation and the groups in other countries... will be 
regarded as sections'. 
5 With this announcement Labour 
Zionists again became an integral part of the mainstream 
Socialist fraternity, 'Palestine' being accredited with a 
membership of 13,200. 
For the Zionists participation in the LSI was an 
enormous gain. Labour Zionism was thereby accepted by the 
1 See Manifesto in Zionist Bulletin 1 Oct. 1920 signed by 
I. Traub and J. Pomerantz of Great Britain. 
2 ZR Jan. 1921. 
3 J. Braunthal, History of the International 1914-43 Vol. II 
(London, 1967) p. 233. 
4 Report of the LSI Congress in Hamburg, 21-5 May 1923. 
5 Report of the Second Congress of the LSI, 1925, p. 174. 
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leaders of the non Communist Socialist world as progressive 
and truly Socialist. By contrast those who opposed Labour 
Zionisi-were, in the east, feudal and reactionary, and in 
the west either Capitalist and Imperialist, or Communist and 
non democratic. Furthermore as the divisions in the 
Socialist world grew so did the value Democratic Socialists 
placed on the support of Socialist Zionists. 
On the other hand the LSI appears to have avoided making 
a detailed examination of the problem of Palestine. In 1928 
Sidney Olivier, reporting on the findings of the Colonial 
Commission, informed the Congress that the question of 
Palestine had been raised, but with regard to 'a difference 
of point of view between various sections of the population 
the Commission felt that it was quite unable to deal'. 
He added, somewhat disingenously, that 'there was a 
suggestion that, as a matter of fact, the rights of the 
various sections of the population are properly and 
sufficiently guaranteed by Mandate rule under the League of 
Nations. At any rate we felt we could not express any 
opinion... '. 
' 
Representatives of Labour Zionists and of the British 
Labour Party were naturally drawn together in the formation 
of the LSI and in its later development. This, and the 
international sanction given to Labour Zionism, was an 
important factor in the binding of the Labour Party to the 
cause of a Jewish Palestine. 
This was strengthened in 1928 when Poale Zion, 
1 Report of the Third Congress of the LSI, 1928 Item 3. 
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encouraged by the enthusiasm shown by leading European 
Socialists on visiting Palestine, took the initiative in 
forming a 'Socialist Committee for a Workers' Palestine'*' 
Henderson, Blum, Vandervelde and Bernstein were persuaded 
to lend their names to a call for an inaugural meeting, 
which took place in Brussels, immediately preceding the 
3rd Congress. Forty delegates were present, Britain being 
represented by Henderson, Susan Lawrence and Harry Snell. 
2 
After speeches from Vandervelde, Kaplansky and Jarblum 
the meeting resolved (in language appreciably stronger than 
any yet used by the LSI) that 'the effect of Jewish Labour 
in Palestine and its striving to build the new Jewish 
Commonwealth in Palestine on the principle of work and 
Socialist forms of living, imbued with the spirit of inter- 
national solidarity, deserves the active support of the 
Socialists of all countries'. A bureau was established to 
carry on the work of the committee; Labour Party 
representatives were initially Wedgwood, Lansbury and the 
Secretary of the International Department, William Gillies. 
On procedural grounds there had been some objection to 
the formation of the Committee3 and in fact the success of 
Poale Zion caused a considerable stir among both supporters 
and opponents of Zionism. Two years later the Bund 
1 %Vistrich, op. cit., p. 51, Levenberg, op. cit., pp. 118-9, 
Jarblum op. cit., pp. 18-24. 
2 It is surprising to find that Snell was a delegate, 
since he was chosen in 1929 as an uncomitted 'reasonable man' 
for the Shaw Commission. Kenworthy and Tawney were also 
invited. 
3 New Judea 31 Aug. 1928. 
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successfully applied for affiliation to the LZI, and at the 
Congress of 1931, as Golda Meir has recounted, 'as far as we 
were concerned, the atmosphere was very charged'. 
1 But 
although Vandervelde was to maintain that 'the International, 
and 
as such, takes no sidesAdoes not have to take sides between 
Socialist Zionists and, say Bundisn'2 the prevailing pro 
Zionist sympathy of the LSI was in no doubt, and the 
Committee for a Workers' Palestine3 continued its task of 
defending and propagandising Zionist activity throughout the 
1930s. 
Links between the British and the Zionist Labour 
movements were established in a number of other areas. At 
its Second General Convention the Histadrut resolved to join 
the International Federation of Trade Unions; 'the starting 
point for repeated meetings of representatives of Palestine 
Jewish Labour with International Labour'. 
' Several 
Histadrut trade unions (including railwaymen'and textile 
workers) joined international trade secretariats5 and 
Hevrat Ovdim, the Histadrut's co-operative organisation, 
joined the International Co-operative Alliance in 1925. 
Similarly Ben Gurion, attending a conference in Oxford on 
workers' education, was able to note in his diary: 
'yesterday we talked to some of the delegates from Britain, 
1 Meir, op. cit., p. 92. 
2 Introduction to Jarblum, o 
. 
cit., p. 4. 
3 The Committee was also known as the Socialist Pro 
Palestine Committee. 
4 W. Preuss, The Labour Movement in Israel (Jerusalem, 1965) 
p. 96. 
5 eg see CO 733/190 77186 for the intervention of Cramp, 
as President of the-International Transport Workers 
Federation. 
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America and Australia about the Labour Movement in 
Palestine. They were extremely impressed and were 
surprised to hear about our achievements'. 
' 
Of particular importance was the participation of 
Zionists in British Commonwealth Labour Conferences, 
'Palestine' being represented by Achduth Haavodah and the 
Histadrut. To the first conference in the summer of 1924 
the Histadrut seit three senior officials 
- 
Ben Gurion, 
Chiam Arlosoroff and Ben Zvi 
- 
and one full day wasEset 
aside for a discussion of employment, migration and Labour 
legislation in relation to Palestine. 
Ben Gurion emphasised the need for freer immigration 
for Jews, which would benefit the whole country, and for 
adequate Labour legislation. He admitted that 'the Jews 
had their national aspirations and the Arabs had theirs', 
but there was no need for conflict: 'they were associated 
as Labour men and wanted to help each other? 
The views of the Zionists were well received by the 
large British delegation, though several Indian delegates 
expressed concern at the Zionists' constitutional recommen- 
dations. George Lansbury also indicated some doubt: 'was 
Mr. Ben Gurion claiming that the white minority should 
have equal power with the majority, or was he saying that 
they would determine the rule at the centre by democratic 
methods, which meant that the Arabs would have the 
1 D. Ben Gurion, Letters to Paula (London, 1971) p. 53. 
2 Report of the First British Commonwealth Labour 
Conference held at the House of Commons, 27th July 
- 
ist 
August, 1925 p. 40. 
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preponderant influence? '. In reply he deprecated the idea 
of a 'white minority' in Palestine, and stressed the need 
for immigration to develop the whole country for the benefit 
of all. The Zionists were equally successful in arguing 
their case at the second conference, held three years 
later. 1 
The Zionists' success within the British Labour Party 
was mirrored and reinforced by their success inside the 
wider International Socialist movement 
-a success all the 
greater when compared to the hostility exhibited by the 
Second International before the First World War. The 
enthusiasm shown by European Socialists for Jewish work in 
Palestine 
- 
especially when combined with a disinclination 
to examine 'the difference in point of view between various 
sections of the population' = and joint participation in 
numerous international organisations could not but 
reinforce the Zionist sympathies of the British Labour 
representatives. As Chaim Arlosoroff noted: 'on the whole 
we have been able to entrench ourselves in the inter- 
national councils, from the Geneva League to the Socialist 
International before the Arabs ever entered the scene'. 
2 
1 Report of the Second British Commonwealth Labour 
Conference held in London, 2nd 
- 
6th July, 1927. See also 
agenda, and reply to questionnaire, pp. 18-233,44-5. Dov 
Hos was the leader of the delegation. 
2 Quoted in S. Hattis, The Bi National Idea in Palestine, 
(Haifa, 1970)p. 86. 
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CHAPTER II 
The First Crisis 1929 
- 
1931 
Three months after the formation of the Second Labour 
Government serious communal disturbances took place in 
Palestine, which ended the longest period of peace that 
Palestine was to know under the Mandate. The main 
disorders took place between 23 and 29 August, and the 
Royal Commission later reported that casualties had 
amounted to 472 Jews and 268 Arabs killed or wounded. 
' 
The reaction of Zionists, and of their British 
sympathisers, was swift. Weizmann hurriedly returned from 
Switzerland to co-ordinate Zionist activity is London, and 
in the next few weeks Jewish protests reached the Govern- 
went from 14 countries. 
2 As early as 26 August Wedgwood 
had written to the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, 
suggesting that a parliamentary commission be sent to 
Palestine, to investigate the causes of the disturbances 
and the working of the Mandate. 
3 Wedgwood volunteered his 
services, but his suggestion was rejected. 
On 3 September the Government announced that a Royal 
Commission would be sent to Palestine, to be chaired by Sir 
Walter Shaw. In an attempt to avoid party controversy his 
three colleagues were drawn from each of the three major 
1 Cmd. 3530, The Shaw Report on the Disturbances of August 
1929 (1930) p. 65. When the War Office contacted Tom Shaw, 
now Secretary of State for War, his Secretary apparently 
reported that 'Mr. Tom Shaw says he is a pacifist and does 
not wish to have anything to do with war or military 
operation'. Quoted in D. Carlton, MacDonald Versus 
Henderson: The Foreign Policy of the Second Labour 
Government (London 1970) p. 18. 
2 G. Sheffer, Policy Making and British Policies Towards 
Palestine 1929-1939 Unpublished thesis, Oxford University, 
970 p. 88. 
3 N. Rose, The Gentile Zionists (London, 1973) p. 2. 
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parties, the Labour representative being Harry Snell, MP 
for Woolwich East. Snell was surprised to be chosen, and 
very nearly withdrew when he discovered that, contrary to 
assurances, the Commission's investigations would be of a 
judicial character: 'I afterwards sincerely regretted that 
I had not done so'. 
l To the disappointment of the Zionists, 
the terms of the Commission directed it to examine the 
immediate causes of the troubles, and not questions of 
major policy or the operation of the Mandate, though in 
practice it was by no means clear how this distinction 
could be preserved. 
Inside the Labour movement reactions to the 
disturbances were immediately felt, for the TUC was then 
meeting in Belfast and was an obvious target for protests. 
On 31 August a letter was read to the General Council from 
Rabbi J. Shachter asking that a resolution be passed 
deploring the Arab attack on the Jewish population in 
Palestine. 2 After some discussion Ben Tillet was 
instructed to explain that 'it was not a matter in which 
the General Council could express an opinion, and they 
believed the Government would take the necessary steps to 
deal with the situation'. 
This decision, to leave the question in the hands of 
the Labour Government, guided the General Council during 
the next few days, when messages from a number of Jewish 
1 H. Snell, Men'Monements and Myself (London, 1936) 
pp. 236-7. Alone of the Commission Snell had no legal 
training. 
2 GC 31 Aug. 1929. ' Shachter was a local Rabbi and 
minor Zionist leader in Northern Ireland. 
77 
and Zionist bodies were noted and forwarded to the Labour 
Party. ' There was also a communication from an Arab 
organisation 
- 
one of the very few ever noted either by 
the General Council,, or by the NEC of the Labour Party. 
The Secretary's minutes read: 
'Telegram from Palestine Committee (Mr. Eljabri of 
the Syrio-Palestine Delegation) dated 4 September 
1929 was read beseeching the intervention of the 
English Laýour Movement on behalf of the Arabs in 
Palestine'. 
It too was referred without comment to the Labour 
Party. 
Although recent events in Palestine were not mentioned 
during Congress the attention of delegates was drawn to 
conditions of trade unionists working on the construction 
of Haifa harbour. Until now this had been a major concern 
of Zionist Labour organisations in Britain; on 5 July, 
for example, Poale Zion had submitted a survey to the 
Labour Party on labour legislation and the problems in 
Haifa. The Colonial Office had earlier received a TUC 
delegation on the subject, and during Congress anJemergency 
resolution was passed. 
3 Nevertheless the subject of 
Palestine was not to be brought to the attention of the 
General Council for another seven years. 
1 GC 4 Sept. 1929. Messages came from the Jewish National 
Labour Council, the Jewish Agency and Kaplansky, who wrote 
as an Executive member of the LSI. 
2 Ihsan al-Jabri was a leader of the Syrian-Palestinian 
Congress. See Y. Porath, o 
. 
cit., pp. 116-21, Y. Porath, 
The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to 
Rebellion, Vol. II (London, 1977) p. 65. 
3 See 'Survey of Questions to be Discussed with Rt. Hon. 
Lord Passfield, Submitted by the Jewish Socialist Labour 
Party, Poale Zion, 5 July 1929' (JSM 210/6 and TUC Annual Conference, 1929, pp. 229-30. 
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By now communications had begun to reach the Labour 
Party. 1 From the Central Committee of Poale Zion came an 
emergency resolution for the forthcoming Annual Conference. 
The messages were considered by the NEC on 27 September but 
the resolution 
- 
it was not in fact submitted to Conference- 
was remitted to the Standing Orders Committee. The NEC 
clearly felt that the Government should be given a chance 
to deal with the situation, and that a critical resolution 
should not disturb what was to be, in part, a celebration 
of the party's recent electoral victory. 
Poale Zion nonetheless published its resolution, 
together with a message from the Histadrut to the British 
Labour movement, in the form of a pamphlet. 
2 It described 
the 'well planned, premeditated, determined attempt to 
exploit religious feelings and fantasies of Moslem Arabs', 
castigated the Palestine Government, and called for a 
complete change in the administration of Palestine, both in 
detail and spirit. Included in the pamphlet were various 
past pledges made by the Labour Party. 
Although the New Statesman urged that 'we shall have to 
abandon both the appearance and the reality of that pro 
Jewish bias which inspired our original acceptance of the 
Mandate'3 Labour MPs and officials hastened to reassure 
1 Correspondence from Palestine Labour Party and Poale 
Zion in JSM 210/3&4. For the Histadrut and branches of 
Poale Zion see NEC 27 Sept. 1929. 
2 Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Poale Zion, Palestine 
Events 1929 (London, 1929). 
3 New Statesman 7 Sept. 1929. The paper also commented 
that the Balfour Declaration had been 'itself a dangerous 
leap in the dark. Moreover it cut across other pledges 
which we had previously given to the Arabs. It was a 
blunder, perhaps the worst blunder that Lord Balfour ever 
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Zionist opinion. Daniel Hopkin felt certain that 'this 
Parliament will confirm the policy set forth in the Balfour 
Declaration', ' whilst a letter from the Socialist Pro 
Palestine Committee 
- 
which included Wedgwood and William. 
Gillies, the Secretary of the International Department 
- 
assured the Histadrut that 'the British Government is 
determined to remain true to the traditions of the Labour 
Party and to the pledges of its leaders regarding the 
Jewish National Home'. 2 
In fact within the Labour Party organisation the 
thoroughness of Zionist lobbying caused a certain amount of 
irritation. In a letter to Gillies, James Middleton, 
Assistant Secretary, noted: 
'I have no comment to make upon this letter. During 
a personal interview and two telephone conversations,, 
which seemed interminable, I have explained the 
whole situation to SK (Kaplansky) until I am sick of 
the whole subject. I also recall what Mr. Henderson 
promised to do yesterday. I think you or I should 
simply acknowledge this letter, stating that it will 
be submitted to the EC. ' 
At the Brighton Conference Henderson referred to 
Palestine in order to reaffirm the Government's adherence 
made in his political life... In short, the historical case 
of Jewish rights in Palestine, with all its religious, 
political, financial and sentimental backing, is in truth 
no case at all'. 
1 New Judea Nov. 1929. Hopkin's enthusiasm for Zionism 
appears to have stemmed from his experiences commanding 
Jewish troops in the war. 
2 Socialist Pro-Palestine Committee to Histadrut, 19 Sept. 
1929 printed in Jarblum, op. cit., pp. 25-7. 
3 J. S. Middleton to W. Gillies,, n. d., (JSM 210/7). (Between 
1929 and 1931 Kaplansky directed the London Political 
Office of Poale Zion. ) For Beatrice Webb's comments of 
the insistent lobbying of the Zionists see M. Cole (ed. ), 
op. cit., Vol. II, p. 219, entry dated 2 Sept. 1929. 
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to the Mandate, and to give details of the Shaw Commission. 
1 
A note of dissent was nevertheless struck by Alex Gossip of 
the Furnishing Trades Association who asked why the Govern- 
ment gave its support to a capitalist organisation 'which 
includes Lord Melchett and people of that kind, against 
Arab and Jewish members of the working class'. 
2 
Gossip's view found little support. Dov Hos, represnn- 
ting Poale Zion and the Palestine Labour organisations, 
congratulated Henderson on his 'wonderful statement'3 and 
stressed the religious nature of the conflict, the 
achievements of Jewish Labour, the evil of the Arab 
'notables', and the failings of the Palestine 
administration. Earlier Herbert Morrison had expressed, 
in his Chairman's address, the traditional view of the 
party: 'no enduring divergence of interests exists between 
Jewish and Arab working populations in Palestine. There is 
room for them all. 
4 
The Shaw report was not due to be published until 
March, but in the meantime Zionists and their friends 
continued vigorously to press their case. This was mainly 
through direct contact with the Government, and by 
1 LPACR 1929, p. 206. 
2 Ibid., p. 211. Gossip was a well known Communist 
sympathiser, though he remained within the Labour Party 
for much of the 1930s. 
3 Ibid., p. 212. 
4 Ibid., p. 153. During the Conference Hos had spent much 
time describing to delegates Jewish achievements in 
Palestine. Beatrice Webb, however, was little impressed, 
see Gorni, op. cit., pn. 97-8,111. 
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extracting declarations of support from Opposition leaders 
and non party figures. 
l But a number of Labour MPs did take 
active steps to influence Governmental thinking. 
On 21 the Parliamentary Palestine Committee was reformed 
to be, once again, a 'watch-dog' for Zionist interests. 
2 
Josiah Wedgwood took a leading part in forming the new 
Committee, and of the 21 MPs who attended the initial 
meeting over half were from the Labour Party. 3 Wedgwood 
was chosen as Chairman, and Dr. Spero as Secretary. 
Through its leading members (including Amery, Samuel and 
James de Rothschild) and also with the help of Nrs. Snowden4 
the group maintained contacts with Zionist leaders and 
sought to co-ordinate activity in the House. 
5 
On the other hand there was a small handful of Labour 
MPs who, although wielding little influence inside the 
Labour Party, were able to do no small service to the Arab 
1 In particular General Smuts, see The Times 20 Dec. 1929, 
Rose, op. cit.,, p. 27. 
2 See above p. 64, ýSheffer, op. cit.,, pp. 100-1, Rose, 
o 
. 
cit.,, p. 26, B. Janner,, 'Zionism in Parliament' in 
P. Goodman (ed. ), The Jewish National Home (London, 1943) 
pp. 106-10. Selig Brodetsky also claimed the credit for 
reforming the group, see S. Brodetsky, Memoirs: From Ghetto 
to Israel (London, 1960) p. 151. The group was also 
variously known as the 'Pro Palestine Committee' and the 
'Parliamentary Pro Palestine Committee'. 
3 J. Wedgwood, Dr. Spero, Capt. Hudson, N. Day, Dr. H. B. 
Morgan, A. Smith, F. Messer, D. Hopkin, Lt. Col. Malone, 
H. Knight and N. Angell; for the last named see N. Angell, 
'A Non-Jew's Defence of Zionism' in New Judea March-April 
1930. 
4 For Mrs. Snowden's enthusiasm for Zionism see above p. 64, 
Brodetsky, op. cit., p. 133, C. Weizmann, Trial and Error (London, 1949) p. 410. 
5 For a meeting with Weizmann which included Wedgwood, 
Hopkin and Spero see Rose, op. cit., p. 30 note 38. 
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cause. These MPs, led by Seymour Cocks1 and J. McShane 
were able, with certain Conservative MPs, to suggest with 
considerable success that the Government was keeping some- 
thing rather nasty in the woodshed. 
This concerned the so-called 'MacMahon-Hussein 
Correspondence' in which, it was suggested, the British 
Government had promised an independent Palestine after the 
First World War. Though the correspondence did no such 
thing2 the refusal of successive Governments to publish 
the documents did nothing to still the allegations and 
accusations of bad faith. In a series of Parliamentary 
Questions Cocks and Howard Bury (Conservative) urged 
publication. This the Government steadily refused to do,, 
and on 7 May Cocks raised the matter on the Adjournment. 
Cocks, Bury and McShane argued powerfully for 
publication. Cocks maintained that 'if the pledges are as 
I think they are, then they are absolutely opposed to the 
extreme Zionist claim to make Palestine as Jewish as 
England is English'. 3 From the Labour side Lang, Hudson 
and Brockway, though Zionist sympathisers, joined in the 
demand,, admitting that promises made should be a4knowlt4L9ed 
and taken into consideration. For the Government Drummond 
1 Jeffries appears to suggest that Cocks had links with 
the pro Arab 'National League', but throughout his book 
confuses Seymour Cocks, MP, with Somers Cocks. For the 
'National League' see J. M. N. Jeffries, Palestine: The 
Reality (London, 1939) p. IVII-XIX, Porath, Vol. II, op. cit., 
pp. 23-4,224. 
2 See E. Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth (London, 1976) 
Passim. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 238 c. 1089-1100 7 May 1930. 
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Shiels, the Colonial Under Secretary, again claimed that 
publication was not in the public interest, but did promise 
a departmental review of the situation. But, after a 
series of questions throughout the summer, a Private Notice 
Question in Cock's name brought the final decision against 
publication. 
1 
Although such publicity was welcomed by Arab supporters, 
they may have underestimated the effect of the campaign. 
The Foreign Office had already instigated a reappraisal of 
the correspondence; this had also been urged by Sir John 
Chancellor, the High Commissioner for Palestine, who was 
feeling qualms about the moral position of his rule. 
2 
Though the examination,. by W. J. Childs, was the most 
thorough yet, and showed to his satisfaction that no such 
pledges had been made, many officials were far from 
convinced, and the corroding feeling of guilt and 
uncertainty lingered on. 
3 The correspondence was finally 
published in 1939, in what was seen as a major concession 
to the Arabs. Shiels' statement on 1 August 
- 
drafted by 
Passfield and approved by the Cabinet on 30 July 
- 
did 
little to still the uncertainty: 
'The ambiguous and inconclusive nature of the 
correspondence may well, however, have left an 
impression among those who were aware of the 
correspondence that HMG had such an intention' (to include Palestine in the projected Arab state). 
In the months before the publication of the Shaw 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 242 c. 900-2,1 Aug. 1930. 
2 Sheffer, op. cit., p. 9. 
3 Kedourie, op. cit., p. 252-8. 
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Commission Poale Zion maintained contact with the Labour 
Party. On 26 November Gillies reported to the Inter- 
national Sub Committee a request that action be taken 
concerning the suspension of the Palestine Labour paper 
Davar. Gillies had written to Passfield and Hopkin had 
asked a question in the House, but by the time of the Sub 
Committee's meeting the suspension had been lifted. 
1 
Early in the New Year Poale Zion asked the NEC 'to 
undertake whatever steps it may think fit with a view to 
restoring full freedom for the left wing Poale Zion in 
Palestine'. On Henderson's suggestion the letter was sent 
to Passfield. This forced the Colonial Secretary to order 
an investigation, but the reply stated that the party in 
question was an extreme Communist splinter group and the 
matter was dropped. 2 
The Government had hoped that the Shaw Report would be 
unanimous, but Snell, the Labour member, submitted a 
minority report expressing certain important reservations. 
3 
The majority report had agreed that the trouble had 
consisted of unjustified Arab attacks upon Jews, but 
severely criticised Zionist activity in Palestine, 
particularly in the spheres of immigration and land 
1 International Sub Committee Minutes (henceforth Int Sub) 
26 Nov. 1929. 
2 Int Sub 26 Feb. 1930 and see correspondence in CO 733/ 
190/771 
3 Cmd 3530, op. cit., pp. 172-6. See also New Judea June 
1930. Norman Bentwich commented that 'the member of the 
Commission who took his function with supreme 
conscientiousness was Mr. Snell. As I walked to my office 
every morning I would see him walking and meditating, 
almost visibly wrestling with the problem', N. Bentwich, 
Wanderer Between Two Worlds (London, 1941) p. 154. 
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purchase, arguing that a discontented class of landless 
Arabs was thereby being created. 
Snell disagreed in part with these conclusions, and 
also criticised the activities of the Arab leaders, in 
particular the Mufti. Snell later explained that 'my 
colleagues knew far more about legal casuistry than I did, 
but I was at least able to recognise a political manoeuvre 
when I met one face to face'. 
1 Nor, unlike his colleague, 
did he absolve the Palestine administration entirely from 
blame. Indeed, he alone of the Commission did not form a 
warm friendship with the High Commissioner and Snell was 
certainly the least receptive to his opinions and 
prejudices. 2 Snell signed the report with 'great 
reluctance and misgiving'3 and for the rest of his life was 
an active supporter of the Zionist cause. 
Rightly predicting a Jewish uproar over the report the 
Prime Minister decided to intervene. Despite his apparent 
enthusiasm in the recent past for Zionist achievements his 
concern was now chiefly with the probability of clashes 
with the Opposition, and within his own party. The 
position of his Government was uncertain. Mosley and the 
ILP were causing concern, trade union relations were 
uneasy4 and as yet no parliamentary agreement had been 
1 Snell, op. cit., p. 239. 
2 P. Offer, The Role of the High Commissioner in British 
Policy in Palestine: Sir John Chancellor 1928-31 
Unpublished thesis, London University, 1971 pp. 178-85. 
3 Snell, op-cit., p. 240. 
4 R. Bassett, Nineteen Thirty One: Political Crisis (London, 
1958) pp. 35-6. 
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reached with the Liberal Party. His intervention was to 
lead to a year of unhappy negotiations and changes of 
course which did little for the-prestige of his Government 
or for his own peace of mine. 
MacDonald had hoped that a White Paper could be issued 
at once, and thus curtail debate. But deliberation with 
Passfield and with Henderson, the latter both as Foreign 
Secretary and Secretary of the Labour Party1 resulted in 
meetings both with Jewish leaders and leaders of the 
Opposition on 28 March. On 2 April, in answer to a pre- 
arranged question from Baldwin, the Prime Minister announced 
that a further, one man, commission would be sent to 
Palestine to study the key questions of land purchase, 
immigration and development. The Government would continue 
to abide by its dual obligations. Inter and intra party 
trouble had been averted for a time. 
Throughout this period, leading up to the publication 
of the Shaw Report and the negotiations resulting in a fresh 
commission, the Zionists had been active in Labour Party 
circles. Weizmann and his friends maintained their contacts 
with sympathetic Labour MPs and supporters2 and pressure was 
maintained inside the party organisation. On 9 April 
Weizmann addressed the Advisory Committee on Imperial 
Questions at the House of Commons, which 'received his 
See Rose, op. cit., p. 23 note 48 for a meeting on 17 
March with Parliamentary friends including Wedgwood, Malcolm 
MacDonald and Ethel Snowden. 
Z Scheffer, op. cit., p. 25. 
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statements favourably'. 
1 But though such contacts undoubt- 
ably helped the Zionists maintain pressure on the Govern- 
ment, according to Beatrice Webb 'as for the PLP and the 
House of Commons as a whole neither one nor the other comes 
into the picture... 1.2 
Among the large membership of the Advisory Committee 
were to be found several Zionist supporters, including 
Harry Snell, but also a number of Arab sympathisers, in 
particular Sir John Maynaf. d, Ernest Bennett and Philip 
Price. Thus at the following meeting, when the question of 
Palestine was again discussed it was decided 'to ask Captain 
Bennett whether there is an Arab representative who would 
attend the Committee'. But despite the presence in London 
3 
of a Palestinian Arab Delegationk nothing appears to have 
come of the suggestidn. Zionists, on the other hand, were 
well aware of the need to keep their case clearly before the 
Committee, and when next month Maynard submitted a 
memorandum on the subject of Arab landlessness, which 
stressed the dangers of creating a landless proletariat, 
Kaplansky was quick to respond with a memorandum of his own 
1 Rose,. op. cit., p. 23, LP/ImpAC/1/20 9 Apr. 1930. During 
1930 responsibility for Palestine was transferred from the 
International to the Imperial Advisory Committee. The 
Committee had sought to meet Weizmann. earlier in the year, 
see LP/ImpAC/l/8 & 10 11 Dec. 1929,29 Jan. 1930. 
2 M. Cole (ed), Vol. II, op. cit., p. 239 entry for 30 Mar. 
1930. 
3 LP/ImpAC/1/28 25 June 1930. Bennett entered Parliament 
in 1929, having defeated BarnettJanner, a prominent Zionist (see below p. 105), in Cardiff Central. 
4 See 'Arab Statement on Palestine to Members of the House 
of Commons by Jamal Hussein, May 1931' (Kings Cross, London, 
1930). 
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refuting Maynard's arguments. 
' 
A few days after Weizmann had addressed the Committee 
the NEC was circulated with a document on the Shaw 
Commission Report from his left wing colleagues in Poale 
Zion. The Committee also heard of the discussions Gillies 
had been conducting with Lord Passfield. 
2 
Negotiations continued between the Government and the 
two sides, but a new crisis was not long in coming; on 15 
May, as a concession to the Arabs, the labour immigration 
schedule was suspended. This sparked off a fresh wave of 
Jewish protests. The Conservative Party was beset with 
difficulties and could not be expected to intervene to any 
great extent, but the Liberal Party at this juncture was a 
useful source of pressure. 
3 Of particular concern to 
MacDonald was the potential threat to Anglo-American 
relations, and in the months that followed an important 
role in transmitting American-Jewish pressure was played by 
k Harold Laski. 
Since the crisis concerned labour immigration, the 
Labour Party itself was a particularly appropriate focus 
for Zionist activity. At a meeting of the NEC on 25 June 
1 Arab Landlessness in Palestine, Memo. by Sir John 
Maynard, ditto S. Kaplansky (LP/ImpAC/2/77&8). The Committee 
postponed consideration of the document until 5 November, 
and then decided to take no further action. 
2 NEC 22 July 1930. See also Jewish Socialist Labour 
Party, Poale Zion Statement on the Report of the Palestine 
Enquiry Commission London, 1930). 
3 The Liberal-Labour rapproachment had now taken place. 
y Laski affected impatience with both Government and 
Zionists, but he clearly enjoyed his role as a go between, 
see M. de Wolfe Howe (ed), The Holmes-Laski Correspondence,, 
Vol. II, (Cambridge, 
- 
Mass., 1953) pp. 1296-9,1301-3. At 
the height of the crisis MacDonald asked Laski to try to 
calm American opinion,, Laski refused; 'the PM had the 
shock of his life',, he boasted, see V. Weizmann, The 
Impossible Takes Longer (London, 1967) p. 113. 
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Gillies reported that protests had been received from 17 
organisations throughout the world. 
1 Passfield, in a 
letter to the committee sought to justify the ban, but the 
NEC also heard from Snell, now recognised as a party expert 
on the subject. 
It was clear that the NEC was now becoming seriously 
concerned with the Government's handling of the problem. 
The minutes record that 
'after discussion the suspensions were considered to 
be unfortunate, and it was suggested that, assuming 
it were possible for the Colonial Office to take 
action, they should give the matter attention'. 
Once again Henderson, whose own Foreign Office was not 
as yet directly involved in the problem, was chosen to 
represent the party and, on Lansbury's suggestion, was 
invited to inform Passfield of the NEC's criticism. The 
result was further discussion involving Passfield, 
Henderson and Gillies, and a further letter of explanation 
from Passfield to the NEC. 2 Similar unease was felt within 
the Parliamentary Party, and on 26 June Passfield appeared 
before a party meeting to answer what his wife described as 
the 'Jewish complaints'. 
3 
Two days later the Zionist were able further to press 
their case on Labour Party and TUC members at the afternoon 
session of the Commonwealth Labour Conference, then being 
1 NEC 25 June 1930. 
2 NEC 22 July 1930. 
3 Passfield to B. Webb, 26 June 1930, N. & J. MacKenzie (eds. ), 
The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Vo1. III. Pi1 rimage 
1912-47 (Cambridge, 1978) p. 329. 
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held in London. Ben Gurion referred to the great dis- 
appointment caused by the check in immigration and insisted 
that there was 'no question of supplanting the Arabs... the 
Jews in Palestine regard the Arab working men as their 
fellow citizens and workers'. 
1 Goldie Myerson referred to 
the effect the suspension had on the minds of the Jewish 
population in Palestine, and Dov Hos made the not unreason- 
able claim that 'the impression had been created that it 
was better to have a Labour Party in opposition to compel 
a Tory Government to do things'. It was left to Shiels to 
defend the Government's policy and the suspension of labour 
immigration: 'there must be periods for assimilation... '. 
'The Government was now caught between conflicting 
pressures of equal persistence emanating from the Arabs, 
through Chancellor on the one hand, and from the Jews on 
the other12 and it should be added that a significant 
portion of this Jewish pressure was channelled through the 
Labour Party. MacDonald in particular was fast becoming 
tired of Jewish lobbying. To Michael Marcus, Labour MP for 
Dundee and an enthusiastic Zionist, he wrote that 'I do not 
want to lose my patience with the Zionists, but they try it 
greatly'. 
3 
1 Report of the Third British Commonwealth Labour 
Conference, 1930 (London, 1930) p. 25. 
2 'Sheffer, o 
. 
city°53Chancellor was attempting to rectify 
what he saw as anti Arab bias. 
3 Rose, o 
. 
cit., p. 13. Marcus, an energetic Zionist, was 
the most vociferous of the Government's back bench critics. 
See also M. Marcus to D. Shiels, 15 May 1930 (CO 733/191/ 
77253). Marcus was defeated in 1931. In November 1938 he joined the National Labour Party and characterised the 
Labour Party's criticism of Chamberlain's foreign policy as 
a 'menace to world peace', see The Times 24 Nov. 1938. 
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On 20 October the Government published the Hope Simpson 
Report, and its own. White Paper (the 'Passfield White 
Paper'). 1 The former, of questionable accuracy in part, 
had seemed to pose the choice of massive investment or the 
stoppage of immigration. Although Snowden, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, agreed to recommend a loan of Z2-22 
million for agricultural development and the resettlement 
of evicted Arabs there could be no question, he said, of 
large scale expenditure; this partly explains the nature 
of the White Paper, for in tone and detail it was decidedly 
hostile to the Zionists, severely limiting Jewish 
. 
immigration and land purchase,, and particularly criticising 
a number of the Histadrut's activities. 
Zionists in London, including Labour Zionists, 2 had 
sought to delay the publication of the White Paper, but 
without success, whereupon Weinmann resigned as President 
of the Jewish Agency and of the Zionist Organisation,, and 
the 'Jewish hurricane' Passfield had predicted3 was soon 
raging. For MacDonald American Jewish pressure was 
particularly worrying, with threats of political and 
economic pressure, and helped propel him and his colleagues 
towards the final de facto repudiation of the White Paper in 
1 Cmd. 3692, Palestine, Statement of Policy by HMG (1930). 
2 S. Kaplansky to J. Middleton, n. d., (JSM 210/26). A copy 
of the letter was sent to Lord Passfield. 
3 Passfield to B. Webb, 28 Oct. 1930 quoted in Rose, 
op. cit., p. 17. 
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February of the next year. 
1 
The hectic events of the next few weeks can best be 
understood by examining three aspects of the pressure that 
emanated from within the Labour Party for a change in 
policy; the activities of the NEC and the party 
organisation, the pressure exerted by Labour MPs, and the 
circumstances of the by-election of Whitechapel St. George. 
The White Paper had left the Labour Party in a highly 
embarassing position, and one which further highlighted the 
divergence between Party and Government. For less than two 
weeks before the Labour Party Conference had taken place in 
Llandudno. A resolution from Poale Zion condemning the 
Government's recent suspension of labour immigration was 
not accepted2 but Conference had passed, without dissent 
and with the approval of Hugh Dalton for the NEC, a long 
resolution from the same organisation which included a 
demand for 'the development of the economic possibilities 
of the whole of the Mandated Territory and thus (the 
encouragement of) Jewish immigration and the close 
settlement of the land to its utmost capacity'. 
3 In case 
anyone could miss the contradictions between the resolution 
and the White Paper, Commander Kenworthy, now Labour MP for 
Hull Central, wrote to The Times to point them out. 
4 As 
1 Mrs. Snowden assured Weizmann 
- 
quite inaccurately 
- that Passfield had been instructed by the Cabinet not to 
publish the White Paper without the Zionist's approval, see 
V. Weizmann, op. cit., P. 113. 
2 See resolution in JSM 210/77 and New Judea Oct. 1930. 
3 LPACR 1930, pp. 220-3. 
L. The Times 28 Oct. 1930. 
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Kaplansky commented, in a lengthy letter to Henderson at 
the end of the month, 'the voice of Downing Street is not 
the voice of Llandudno'. 
l 
When the NEC met on 27 October 'Palestine' was therefore 
high on the agenda. Protests had already begun to pour in, 
and the Committee was read a sample. 
2 Susan Lawrence, an 
NEC member, had also submitted a letter proposing that a 
Round Table Conference be called 
- 
this had been proposed by 
3 
Weizmann and echoed by a number of Zionist supporters. 
'Considerable discussion ensued'. Henderson urged 
caution, 
, atanning that any action taken should be in line 
with the wishes of the Permanent Mandates Commission, but 
his colleagues resolved to take immediate action. A 
Palestine Sub Committee was set up, consisting of Stanley 
Hirst, Barbara Ayrton Gould,, George Latham and Ethel 
Bentham, which would confer with Snell and then interview 
the Prime Minister. It met at the conclusion of the NEC 
meeting's and arranged to meet Kaplansky the following day 
in the House of Commons. 
The meeting with Kaplansky 
- 
and Dov Hos 
- 
on 28 
October was the first of many. 
5 Events surrounding the 
Whitechapel By-Election were now causing much concern, and 
1 S. Kaplansky to A. Henderson, 31 Oct. 1930, copy in 
JSM 210/34. 
2 NEC 27 Oct. 1930. These included several from Poale Zion. 
3 Ibid. 
4 J. Middleton to G. Latham, 27 Oct. 1930 (JSM 201/37). 
5 NEC 25-6 Nov. 1930, LPACR 1931, p. 43. 
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the following day the Sub Committee met Passfield. The 
Colonial Secretary was pressed to arrange for a 
Parliamentary debate, but when he merely indicated that he 
had arranged for 'some sort of reassuring statement to 
appear in Reynolds's News on Sunday', his colleagues reacted 
strongly: this would be a very limited and altogether 
inadequate way in which to overtake the opposition, world 
wide as it is in character'. The Sub Committee pressed 
Passfield to issue a statement 'elucidating' some of the 
main points of the White Paper, which they tactfully 
referred to as being misunderstood and misinterpreted. 
l 
Middleton, in a letter to the Prime Minister, 
emphasised the need for some such statement: 
'we all feel very strongly that with the present 
electoral vacancy to consider, apart from the real 
need for a clearer and more definite pronouncement 
on the merits of the Government's policy, such a 
statement can hardly be issued at too early a stage. 
For another full week to elapse before an authoriti- 
tive and more detailed explanation is given to the 
public at large will render a position already 2 
particularly awkward almost beyond recovery... '. 
Middleton then contacted Kaplansky once more to describe 
his various efforts and those of his colleagues. The 
fiction that the White Paper had merely been misunderstood 
and needed 'elucidation' was maintained: 'we are hopeful 
that steps will be taken to clear away many of these mis- 
conceptions at a very early stage'. 
3 His mollifications 
1 J. Middleton to R. MacDonald, 30 Oct. 1930 (JSM 210/45). 
2 Ibid. 
3 J. Middleton to S. Kaplansky, 31 Oct. 1930 (JSM210/k6). 
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had little effect. 
Although Middleton saw his duty as urging the Govern- 
ment to modify its policy in the light of Zionist protests, 
party opinion and electoral exigencies, 
1 
and although he 
had much sympathy for Zionist aspirations, he nevertheless 
believed with some feeling that much of the protest evoked 
was unjustified. At the NEC meeting on 25 November, no 
doubt echoing the feelings of a number of senior party 
colleagues, he complained that 'the situation had not 
warranted the world wide publicity it had received'. 
2 A 
stronger statement of his views, which bore a close 
resemblance to those of Passfield, is to be found in a 
letter written in December, to answer a critic of the 
Government's policy: 
'I am not necessarily defending the draughtsmanship 
of the White Paper but I have held from the beginning 
that there is nothing in the actual text or intent to 
justify the row that has been proceeding throughout 
Jewry ever since, indeed before, publication... my 
opinion remains unshaken that the real origin of all 
the criticism lies in internal Jewish politics 
rather than misgivings or failur3es in policy on the 
part of the Labour Government. ' 
By the time the NEC next met the picture had changed 
considerably. Its members heard a statement from Henderson, 
who believed that 'some of the misunderstandings had been 
cleared away', and once again recommended strict attention 
to the wishes of the Mandates Commission. 
1 See below p. 103 If. 
2 NEC 25-6 Nov. 1930. 
3 J. Middleton to H. NeyinsQn, 3 Dec. 1930 (JSM 210/73), see 
also ibid, 51+, 71. For Passfield see Passfield to H. Laski, 
1 Nov. 1930, in N. & J. MacKenzie, OP-cit., p. 337. 
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The intervention of Henderson was significant. There 
was by now a widespread feeling that the Government's 
performance, and in particular that of Passfield, had been 
less than competent. Although Henderson was already over- 
burdened with work, he began to take an active part in the 
problem, and Passfield, even MacDonald, were increasingly 
pushed into the background. 
1 At the Cabinet meeting of 
6 November Henderson raised 'as a matter of urgency' the 
Government's policy in Palestine 'as bearing on the PMC in 
Geneva 
... 
as well as on the home domestic political 
situation'. 
2 A 'quasi formal' transference of the Palestine 
problem from the Colonial to the Foreign Office took place. 
3 
Henderson was fully alive to the international aspects 
of the Government's predicament 
- 
through Laski he was kept 
informed of the American Jewish aspect 
- 
but as Party 
Secretary and Party Manager par excellence he took 
particular notice of the concern inside the party and the 
dangers these might pose to the Government. During the next 
few months his concern was to extract the Government from an 
embarrassing situation which was damaging both the inter- 
national and domestic standing of the Government. 
The second source of pressure centred upon a group of 
Labour MPs. On 27 October Marcus was invited to Downing 
I The Foreign Office tended to take an irritated, somewhat 
superior view of the crisis, see the Minute of G. Rendel; 
'it is unfortunate that neither the statement in its final 
form nor the result of Lord Passfield's interview with Dr. 
Weizmann were communicated to the F0, since this might 
have enabled us to anticipate, and possibly forestall, 
some of the difficulties (Henderson Papers, FO 800/282). 
2 CAB 66(30) 6 Nov. 1930. 
3 Sheffer, OP-cit.; p. 72ff. 
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Street to indicate to Passfield and MacDonald Jewish 





that many Labour members would vote 
with the Opposition should the House divide on the new 
policy, a claim which, however wild, MacDonald could not 
ignore. Indeed, his own son was evidently among the 
potential rebels. 
1 Later that evening Marcus informed 
Weizmann that MacDonald had said 'Passfield and Chancellor 
must go'. According to Vera Weizmann Marcus had reported 
that MacDonald proposed to invite 'Marcus, Hopkin and a few 
parliamentary friends' and Passfield to a meeting. The 
latter was to be criticised in such a way that he should be 
compelled to resign. 
2 
On the following day Passfield, having offered to meet 
interested Labour MPs, addressed the PLP, and then a smaller 
group of members 'who are better informed and more keenly 
interested in Palestine conditions, more particularly from 
the Jewish point of view'. 
3 Passfield attended for 90 
minutes and did his best to meet the various criticisms. 
'There was no intention whatsoever', he said, 'on the part 
of the Government to diverge from the policy carried out by 
successive Governments', and he repeated the assertion that 
'the agitation which has been created must be due entirely 
to misconception'. 
4 
1 Rose, op. cit., p. 20. 
2 V. Weizmann, op. cit., p. 113. Though her story is 
certainly overdrawn 
- 
and no such meeting took place 
- 
it 
does indicate the Confusion and disarray the Government now 
manifested. 
3 Middleton to Kaplansky, op. cit. 
4 Manchester Guardian 30 Oct. 1930, Rose, op. cit., p. 19. 
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The help of Labour MPs was appreciated in Jewish 
circles. A resolution of the Board of Deputies welcoming 
the support of Labour Party members was defeated, but. only 
because of the desire of the Board to avoid any entanglement 
with party politics. The Secretary nevertheless paid 
tribute to the work Marcus had done for Jewry 'in the 
present crisis" and indeed Marcus, though a Labour MP,, 
had been particularly violent in his attacks on the 
Government. To a conference convened by the Jewish Agency 
he had announced that 
'although it was an unpleasant thing for a Labour 
member to associate himself with a protest against 
the present Government... I believe the Jewish 
people will sweep past this Government, or any 
Government, which dares to stand in the way of 
Zionist achievement. ' 
Various members of all parties pressed for a debate, 
which on a Liberal motion was scheduled for 17 November. 
The Government was clearly going to come under severe 
attack, but it could at least take comfort that both 
Baldwin and Lloyd George had difficulties inside their own 
parties and would, it was hoped, be unlikely to force a 
vote. In fact the Government's retreat began well before 
the Debate, with Passfield's letter to The Times on 6 
November attempting to remove 'misconceptions' and 
defending the Government from the charges of Hailsham and 
Simon that on legal grounds the restrictions on land sales 
1 Board of Deputies of British Jews, Minute Book No. 24, 
16 Nov. 1930, Jewish Chronicle 21 Nov. 1930. (Marcus was a 
member of the Board). 
2 New Judea July-August 1930,. Kische, op. cit., pp. 324-5,, 
entry dated 20 July, 1930. 
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and immigration were a violation of the terms of the 
Mandate. ' On the same day the Cabinet, with Henderson. now 
playing a leading role, decided to renew labour immigration. 
MacDonald was now in a particularly black mood, 'cross' 
about the handling of the problem and increasingly worried 
about American reactions. 
3 On 9 November he confided in 
his diary that 'even if the present clouds were to roll by 
(and the most they can do however is not to break) the 
position of the Government is steadily becoming worse. 
With blunders like Palestine... I can do nothing'. 
4 On the 
18th The Times carried a report of rumours that MacDonald 
was considering resignation, and of the possibility of a 
5 
coalitions 
Another man feeling the strain was Passfield. Although 
in general 'Sidney's inability to worry... reached a 
Buddhistic level of serenity'6 his composure was certainly 
threatened by the Palestine crisis. Accordingly to one 
observer Webb became 'as nearly ruffled as I have ever seen 
him following a heated argument with Wedgwood.? Beatrice, 
admittedly not a neutral observer8 noted that 'Sidney 
1 The Times 4 Nov. 1930- 
2 Unpublished diary of Beatrice Webb, 4 Oct. 1930. 
3 See eg R. MacDonald to L. Wald, 29 Oct. 1930, MacDonald 
Papers, PRO 30/69 579. 
L. D. Marquand, Ramsey MacDonald (London, 1977) P. 577. 
5 The Times 18 Nov. 1930. 
6 J. Vincent in The Times Literary Supplement 19 May 1978. 
7 K. Martin, 'The Webbs in Retirement' in M. Cole (ed), 
The Webbs and Their Work (London, 1949) p. 287. 
8 Gorni, op. cit., passim. The policy of the Jewish 
National Home she considered one of the biggest mistakes of 
the Versailles Treaty, see B. Webb to A. Carr-Saunders, 
8 Oct. 1938, N. & J. MacKenzie, op. cit., p. 424. 
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started with a great admiration for the Jews and contempt 
for the Arab', but then came to ask 'why is it that every- 
one who has dealings with Jews ends by being prejudiced 
against them? '1 Her husband had predicted a 'shriek of 
anguish' from world Jewry2 and when the protests began 
considered them hysterical, misplaced and inspired by 
suspect motives. He was depressed by his 'failure' as 
3 
Minister4 and disagreed with Henderson's handling of the 
negotiations. He considered resignation, but decided that 
'it would have aggravated the Government's troubles; and 
I don't do that sort of thing'. 
5 
The Governrent's policy also tried the patience of 
Government Ministers, like George Lansbury6 forced, against 
his will, to support the White Paper in public. On the 
other hand Mrs. Snowden had few inhibitions in associating 
with Zionist leaders and in publicly denouncing the 
Government's policy.? 
Before looking at the debate on 17 November it is worth 
1 Diary of Beatrice Webb, 30 Oct. 1930- 
2 Passfield to B. Webb, 22 Oct. 1930, N. & J. MacKenzie, 
op. cit., p. 334. 
3 'I have my suspicions that the misunderstandings are 
deliberate and intentional on the part of the original 
disteminätorst.. °.,. He:: bU3ieVesii: that Weitmann was driven by a 
wish to boost the contributions of Jewry during a period of 
economic stagnation. in Palestine. See Passfield to H. Laski 
1 Nov. 1930, op. cit.,, P. 337. 
4 'People will say that your husband has not been a success 
as minister'. M. Cole (ed), Diaries, Vol. 11, op. cit., 
p. 260, entry dated 14 Dec. 1930. 
5 Passfield to Amuiree, 10 Feb. 1931, N. & J. MacKenzie, 
op. cit., p. 424. 
6 'The one occasion I recall seeing George Lansbury really 
ill at ease with himself was when he was called upon... to 
justify Lord Passfield's Palestine policy. It was at a 
meeting of a Jewish Friendly Society Order in the East End 
of London and he was quite unable to proceed with the 
matter in hand',, Obituary in ZR 16 May, 1940. 
7 Brodetsky, op. cit., p. 139 for speech in the Albert Hall. 
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r 
considering those Labour members we know to have been 
active in some way over the Palestine issue. Although 
Shiels' later claimed that 'the Labour Party (had) perhaps 
more Jewish members than any other'1 Jewish MPs were in 
fact evenly distributed between the three parties, and in 
the PLP only three could be considered Zionists. 
2 Of the 
non Jewish members a number of different groups can be 
identified. 
Firstly there was the tiny but vocal group of pro Arab 
Labour members: Seymour Cocks, J. McShane and Ernest 
Bennett. By their very scarcity they could perhaps be 
dismissed as mild eccentrics, as indeed could Wedgwood and 
Kenworthy, former Liberals, whose passionate attachment to 
the Zionist cause was coupled with a lively belief in the 
service a Jewish Palestine might do for the cause of Empire. 
Both had been active in promoting the 'Seventh Dominion 
League' which, based on a book by Wedgwood, pressed for 
Dominion Home Rule for Palestine. 3 
There was a further group of Labour MPs, sufficiently 
large in number to form a significant faction, who could 
also be considered strong pro Zionists. These numbered 
1 D. Shiels, 'Sidney Webb as Minister', in M. Cole (ed), 
'Webbs', OP-cit., 213. 
2 Sixteen Jewish MPs were elected in 1939, six Conservativ- 
es, six Labour and four Liberal. Of the Labour MPs Harry 
Day, Marcus and Spero were Zionists. The others - Shinwell, 
Strauss and Marion Phillips - had little interest in 
Palestine, though Dictionary of Labour Biography,, (J. H. Bellarq 
& J. Saville (eds. ) Vol. 5, (London 1979) p. 177) notes that 
Phillips had been'co-operative with local Zionists'. 
3 J. Wedgwood, The Seventh Dominion (London, 1928). See 
Rose, op-cit., pp. 71-94. The League was formed at a 
meeting in the Central Hall, Westminster in February 1929, 
with the support of, among others, Sinclair, Hore Belisha 
and Mrs. Snowden. Shiels also sent his support The 
crisis of August 1929 broke up the League, but 
It was 
reformed in the 1930s, see below p. 210. 
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perhaps 25 to 30. Many, like Daniel Hopkin, Norman Angell 
and Richard Denman' by membership of PPC, by personal 
contacts with Zionist leaders and by friendships with 
Opposition leaders were active in co-ordinating pro Zionist 
pressure inside and outside the House. 
Some further 25 Labour MPs, including a number of left 
wing members like Brockway and Kirkwood, can be found in 
Hansard taking an active interest in the affairs of 
Palestine. This was generally expressed in Parliamentary 
Questions on social or humanitarian aspects: prison 
conditions,, hunger strikes, labour legislation and 
immigration. A number of these were doubtless pro Zionists; 
many more would have been likely to side with the Zionists 
if the matter came to a head. 
In fact the debate of 17 November was relatively 
unimportant in that the Government had already decided to 
retreat from its position, though anticipation of the 
debate had no doubt helped cause the retreat. Parliamentary 
pressure had done all that it could do, though there was 
still considerable Zionist lobbying2 and discussion of 
tactics by Zionist supporters. MacDonald had hoped 
3 
Henderson would reply for the Government, but his Foreign 
Secretary politely declined. 4 The Government's performance, 
1 See articles by Angell and Denman in New Judea November 
1930- 
2 For instance, a copy of the Labour Zionist paper Davar 
was. sent to every member, see HC Deb. Vol. 245 c. 146, 
17 Nov. 1930. 
3 According to Kische 'the success of the debate from our 
point of view was largely due to the personal efforts of 
Walter Elliot who,, a. few days previously, had arranged a 
private meeting in the House for Members interested in 
Zionism, to which Mrs. Dugdale, Namier and I were invited in order to answer questions',, see Kische, OP-cit., p. 360-1. 
4 Henderson did not want to disrupt his talks with Jewish 
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and especially that of MacDonald, was an uneasy one and 
strong, if predictable attacks were made by Lloyd George, 
Amery and Samuel. It was clear that, as a number of 
speakers pointed out, the Whitechapel By-election loomed 
large over the debate and many saw the announcement that 
92.5 million would be spent on development in Palestine in 
this light. 
Only three backbench Labour MPs participated, and their 
arguments were unsurprising: Snell defended his minority 
report, Hopkin attacked the White Paper from the Zionist 
standpoint, and Cocks the Zionist movement from the stand- 
point of the White Paper. The House did not divide at the 
conclusion of the debate. 
1 
Though the Government could feel aggrieved that the 
crisis in Palestine had exploded almost as soon as it had 
come to office, from that point onwards the problem was 
largely of their own making. But the fates could still 
conspire to compound their misery. 
2 In the late summer 
Harry Gosling MP, first and only President of the TGWU died, 
thus leaving vacant the seat of Whitechapel St. George. 
The official notification of the resulting by-election came 
on 25 October, some five days after the publication of the 
White Paper. 
leaders, and wished to 'reserve' himself for Geneva, 
A. Henderson to J. R. MacDonald, 14 Nov. 1930, Henderson Papers, 
op. cit. 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 245 c. 77-210,17 Nov. 1930. Wedgwood, 
unable to speak due to illness, sent his views to The Times 
30 Nov. 1930. 
2 MacDonald complained that 'our luck as a Government has 
been simply attrocious... ', 31 Dec. 1930, R. MacDonald to 
Mrs. Gordon, (MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69 1440). 
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For the Government this. was-: a fiendish misfortune, for 
the timing and location of the impending by-election 
combined to make it the first, and probably the last 
electoral contest to be crucially influenced by the 
Palestine issue. Whitechapel, in the heart of the East End, 
included a large number of dockland workers 
- 
but it was 
estimated that as many as 40% of the electorate were 
Jewish. I 
Events leading up to the election suggested that most 
were also Zionists. On 27 October some 4,000 Jews crowded 
into the Pavillion Theatre, Whitechapel, to hear Weizmanng. 
Sokolow and Brodetsky denounce the White Paper, and to pass 
a resolution condemning the Labour Government. 2 A Palestine 
Protest Committee was formed, which posted bills throughout 
the East End: 'Scrap the White Paper' and 'Palestine 
Betrayed by the Labour Government'. At the first meeting 
listeners heard Rabbi Rabinovitz urge all Jews to unite 
against the White Paper. 
3 
Government and party were well aware of the electoral 
dangers, which provided an extra spur to party and Cabinet 
deliberations. Shiels confessed to Henderson that 'I am 
rather doubtful about the electoral help we shall get as 
Amery, Lloyd George and Co. are heavily in with Weizmann'. 
k 
There were even difficulties over the non Jewish electorate, 
since many were Cathhlic, and the Chief Agent reported that 
1 The Times 18 Oct. 1930- 
2 Ibid., 28 Oct. 1930- (V. VWeizmann, op. cit.,, p. 113. ) 
3 The Times 28 Nov. 1930. 





'while (the Jews) are affected by the White Paper on 
Palestine, we may expect some polling difficulties with the 
Catholics owing to the school question'. 
' 
Opposition candidates were not slow to take advantage. 
Guiness, the Tory candidate, appeared on the platform at 
the Pavillion Theatre rally, and stressed his agreement with 
the views of Baldwin, Chamberlain and Amery as expressed in 
their critical letter to The Times on 23 October. The 
Liberals went one better. Having approached Selig Brodetsky 
(a member of the Zionist Executive) they finally chose as 
their candidate BarnettJanner, President of the North West 
London Zionist Executive. 2 Brodetsky later wrote that 'my 
position would have made it a Zionist election' but the 
choice of Janner was certainly not designed to avoid what 
was already extremely likely. The only shred of comfort 
for the Labour Party was the certainty that the views of 
Harry Pollitt, the Communist candidate, would appeal to 
few Zionists on the Palestine question, though even he 
seemed to find much support for other reasons. 
3 
For the Labour Party one of the many imponderables was 
the attitude of Poale Zion. From the highwater of 1920 
1 By-Election Report, NEC 25-6 Nov. 1930. 
2 The Times 25 Nov. 1930, Brodetsky, op. cit., p. 139. 
Within the local Labour Party Janner's career as a Liberal 
candidate, and later MP, did not stand in his way twelve 
years later when he sought nomination as Labour candidate. 
However, he was forced to complain to the NEC that certain 
wards had been prevented from nominating him, and he 
subsequently entered Parliament for Leicester, West. See 
NEC Election Sub Committee Minutes, 28 Nov. 1942. 
3 J. Mahon, Harry Pollitt: A Biography (London, 1976) 
pp. 164-5, The Times 21 Nov. 1930. 
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membership had fallen to 600 and the number of Branches had 
declined' but Poale Zion still claimed considerable member- 
ship in the East End. 
There are indications that the organisation itself was 
divided over the tactics it should adopt, 
2 but on 29 October 
Middleton received from Maurice Rosette, Secretary of Poale 
Zion, a communication that could leave Middleton with few 
misapprehensions and which gave further urgency to the talks 
he and his colleagues were then conducting with the 
Government: 
'The sympathy of British Labour with the natural 
aspirations of the Jewish people... was a powerful 
argument in our hands which we used to win over the 
Jewish masses to the cause of Labour. The success 
of Labour candidates in Jewish areas was a practical 
manifestation of the confidence of the Jewish in 
British Labour. (It is now) hard to go to the masses 
as hitherto. The Executive Committee of Poale Zion 
has therefore de. ded to request the Executive of 
the British Labour Party to use its influence for 
securing the withdrawal of the White Paper, even if 
this involved the resignation of the Minister 
responsible. We would urge upon you the necessity 
for an early decision and reply with a view to the 
imminence of a by-election in an area which has a 
substantial Jewish vote. We feel bound to add that 
your reply will larSely influence the Jewish vote in 
that constituency. ' 
A later Poale Zion report summarised the possibilities 
of the by-election: 
'we should not allow the anti White Paper campaign to 
become an anti socialist campaign... at the same 
time the party was alive to the fact that the 
Whitechapel by-election gave us an opportunity to 
push forward our demand for the withdrawal of the 
1 The Jewish Yearbook (London, 1930 lists the central 
headquarters at Great Alie-Street, Branch 15 Worker's 
Circle, Young Poale Zion and Leeds Poale Zion. But there 
must have been further branches in London, and for the 
resolutions from Glasgow and Manchester branches see 
JSM 210/55 & 70. 
2 Poale Zion By-Election Report p. 10,14 in JSM 210/79. 
3 M. Rosette to A. Henderson, 28 Oct. 1930 (JSM210/79. 
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White Paper, to draw the attention of the Labour 
Party to the injustices of that document, and to 
secure the co-operation of members of the Labour 
Party in our fight against the Palestine policy of 
the Government'. 
Whatever the truth of the claims that the Jewish vote 
would be determined by the Palestine issue, and that the 
role of Poale Zion would be crucial 
- 
and the former at 
least seemed likely 
- 
Middleton could take no chances. He 
replied the same day listing the efforts he and his 
colleagues had made, and promised to show Henderson the 
letter. 2 
The Government had hoped that Whitechapel might provide 
Stafford Cripps, the Solicitor General, with the seat he 
needed. After the White Papers and the flat refusal of 
Poale Zion to support any member of the Government as 
candidate3 the idea was dropped. If the seat might be lost 
through the Jewish vote, it would have to be won with the 
dockers. So Henderson turned to Ernest Bevin. 4 
Bevin would not stand as candidate himself, but would 
not see Gosling's old seat lost to the party or, for that 
matter, to the Union. James Hall,, a union organiser from 
Wapping, was suggested by the TGWU,, and adopted by the 
constituency party. Bevin then set about to still Jewish 
fears, for amidst rising unemployment in the Port of London, 
with the danger of apathy, or support for Pollitt, among 
1 JSM 210/79 op. cit. 
2 J. Middleton to M. Rosette, 29 Oct. 1930 (JSM 210/42). 
3 JSM 210/79 op. cit. 
4 See A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, 
Vol. 1 (London, 1960) pp. 455-7. 
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the dockers, it was clear that the Jewish vote would still 
be crucial. 
In a conference with Dov Hos Bevin told the Poale Zion 
organiser that he would 'instruct my boys' to vote against 
the Government if the White Paper was not amended. 
1 This 
pledge he was later to repeat at a public meeting on 28 
November: 
'Mr. Bevin, who delivered a forceful speech in spite 
of continuous interruptions, said that the transport 
workers had 26 members in the House of Commons. If 
the White Paper came up before the House they would 
all vote against it, as would Mr. Hall when he got 
there. ' 
Bevin's threats came as one more blow to an already 
battered Government. After submitting a memorandum to the 
Labour Party and holding further talks with Henderson, in 
which he threatened to withdraw union support if assurances 
were not forthcoming, on 4 November a public statement was 
released over Bevin's name. 
3 It told of the representations 
made by the union to the Government, and of the latter's 
assurances that Jewish protests had been founded on complete 
misconception. Then came a definite pledge: 'they neither 
enact or intend any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish 
immigration, and they expressly provide for the continuation 
of colonisation operations without a break'. The Govern- 
ment's new developb ent plans were mentioned, sind the 
document concluded by describing the Government's replies 
to three questions concerning immigration and the use of 
1 Rose, op. cit., p. 37. 
2 JSM 210/79 op. cit. 
3 Document 'Palestine' in JSM 210/51. 
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Jewish labour. 
Bevin's biographer ascribes considerable importance to 
his intervention. Bevin himself took great pride in his 
achievement. 
1 Years later he reminisced to a Labour Party 
Conference how he had 'got MacDonald to make Arthur 
Henderson the Chairman of a Committee. This Committee 
amended the White Paper and the Jews were very pleased... '. 
2 
But, though he may not have realised it, his intervention 
by no means ended the immediate problem for the Labour 
Party. 
Despite the efforts of Bevin, Henderson and Middleton, 
and despite the obvious signs of the Government's change 
of course, Poale Zion remained unsatisfied. At a joint 
meeting of London Poale Zion branch committees it had been 
decided that the party would take no part in the election 
unless 'a clear and unequivocal statement (is issued) by 
the Labour Party Executive regarding its attitude to the 
White Paper, as requested in the letter to the Executive 
on 28 October'. 
3 Nor was this all. Three days later a 
letter was received from the Jewish National Labour 
Council. 4 Though, perhaps due to Bevin's intervention, 
the Council was prepared to campaign energetically for 
James Hall, the letter added that 'the JNLC would, however, 
1 Rose, op-cit., p. 40.2 LPACR 1946, p. 166. 
3 M. Rosette to J. Middleton, 7 Nov. 1930 (JSM 210/4? ). 
4 The JNLC (see above p. 30 ) was evidently reformed by 
Poale Zion in 1929 to give support to the Labour Party 
in the forthcoming election, see Manifesto in JSM 210/78. 
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in the circumstances, be glad if you sent a message to the 
Jewish electorate of VJhitechapel, clarifying the position 
and assuring them of the sympathy of the party on this 
specifically Jewish question'. 
' 
At the NEC's next meeting the party duly obliged. 2 
Taking advantage of an invitation from an American Jewish 
organisation3 to send a fraternal delegate to its annual 
conference a statement was prepared 
- 
probably by Middleton- 
and issued to the press: 'we are profoundly disturbed that 
our Jewish friends in Palestine and their colleagues abroad 
should even for a moment doubt our sympathy with their 
ideals or suspect the British Government of putting 
obstacles in the way of their practical realisation within 
the Mandate' 
.4 
James Hall had also been obliged to define his position, 
which he did in a letter to the Central Committee of Poale 
Zion of 20 November. 
5 He found 'certain inferences in the 
White Paper which I cannot reconcile with the declaration 
of the last Annual Conference' and vowed to vote against 
any attempt to deviate from the Llandudno declaration. 
With this assurance Poale Zion finally resolved to enter 
the contest 'keeping, however, in the forefront of all our 
election propaganda the demand for the withdrawal of the 
White Paper and the fulfilment of the Palestine program of 
1 L. Liff to J. S. Middleton, 10 Nov. 1930 (JSM 210/48). 
2 NEC 25-6 Nov. 1930. 
3 The National Labour Committee for 0rganis$d. 
.. Jewish Workers of Palestine. 
4 NEC ibid and LPACR 1931, P. 43" 
5 JSM 210/79 op. cit. 
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the Labour Party in letter and spirit'. At last the Labour 
Party could mobilise all resources to save a seat that was 
now regarded as highly marginal. 
It proved a difficult campaign. 
' MacDonald wrote to 
The Times in support of Hall, again stressing that 
colonisation and immigration would continue, and referring 
to the discussions taking place with the Jewish Agency. 
Hall's manifesto restated his 'determined opposition' to 
the White Paper policy2 and the Labour Party approved and 
circulated to all Jewish electors a message in Yiddish. 
3 
Hall had been having a hard time campaigning; addressing 
Jewish electors on 17 November he had been shouted down, 
and the meeting broke up in confusion. 
4 
Several Labour leaders, including Bevin, were active as 
speakers. The most interesting incident came when Poale 
Zion arranged a meeting in support of Hall on 28 November. 
Again the meeting became chaotic. Harry Snell, addressing 
the meeting, claimed that the hecklers, both Liberal and 
Communist, had not the true interests of Zion at heart, but 
there were immediate cries of 'No, we are anti Labour. We 
are true Zionists'. 
5 At one stage police were called in, 
1 After the election Bevin complained to MacDonald of 'the 
Cross purposes existing during the campaign. (which had) 
made our task extremely difficult' and asked that certain 
Ministers might have 'a little more regard to these cross 
currents of opinion with which we are faced in the 
constituencies', E. Bevin to R. MacDonald,, 8 Dec. 1930 (MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69 1175). 
2 The Times 24 Oct. 1930. 
3 Ibid., NEC 26 Nov. 1930. 
4 The Times ibid. 
5 JM 210/79 op. cit., The Times 18 Nov. 1930. 
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but Bevin in the chair was able to restore order enough to 
speak, and for Marcus to announce that 'I have already seen 
last night a document, a copy of which is being sent to Dr. 
Weizmann by the British Government, which contains 
proposals which will materially influence the present 
position in favour of the Zionist movement'. 
According to Rose this letter, written by Henderson, 
had not yet reached WWeizmann, and he believes that Marcus 
was probably acting after a deliberate leak by the Govern- 
ment. 
l But a letter from Alexander to Henderson reveals 
the embarrassment Marcus' statement had caused: 'I am of 
course a little anxious about this sudden demand for a 
rushed reply... our hands are being forced by Vleizmann on a 
statement alleged to have been made by Marcus, which cannot 
be soundly based as we have not finished the drafting of our 
reply... '2 Weizmann was also concerned, and through Laski 
sought to obtain a copy of the letter as soon as possible; 
it was delivered the following day. 
The result of the election was declared on 4 December. 
3 
Gosling's majority had been over 7,000; now Hall was the 
victor by a mere 1,088 over Barnet Janner. The failure of 
the Conservative candidate and the near victory of the 
Liberal, which ran clean against the national trend4 left 
little doubt of the influence of the Palestine issue. Bevin 
saw the result as a victory5 and perhaps it was a triumph 
1 Rose, op. cit., p. 39. 
2 A. Alexander to A. Henderson 28 Nov. 1930 (Henderson Papers, 
op. cit. ) 
3 J. Hall 8,554, B. Janner 7,445, L. Guiness 3,735, 
H. Pollitt 2,106. 
4. J. Stevenson and C. Cook, The Slump (London, 1977) PP. 95-6. 
k. JSM 210/79 OP-cit., for celebration tea for 
oale Zion and Gil officials. 
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of sorts. But the unwelcome by-election had seriously 
worried the Government and the Party, and Zionist pressure 
of the most direct kind, channelled and amplified by the 
Labour Party and the trade union movement, had helped 
modify the Government's policy,, and rather more obviously 
than it might have wished. 
I 
The Government was now in full flight from the White 
Paper. The Zionists' attention could now be turned away 
from the mobilising of pressure2 to the business of direct 
negotiation with the Government. The first formal meeting 
took place as early-as 17 November, with Henderson in the 
Chair, and continued until 11 February. The Government was 
concerned to secure a speedy end to the talks; 1Veizmann 
sensed it was on the run and continually raised his demands. 
The talks were finally wound up thanks in part to efforts 
of Malcolm MacDonald, who played an important role as 
intermediary. 3 
1 There was naturally much comment on the influence of the 
by-election. Officials in the Colonial Office were partic- 
ularly bitter. Sir John Campbell,. Economic Adjriser, wrote 
that 'the Government has treated the whole thing in a most 
deplorably rotten way... and in my private opinion the PM 
was prepared to abandon the White Paper holus bolus if it 
should seem necessary to gain Whitechapel',, quoted in 
Offer, op. cit., p. 320 note 82. Many Labour Party members 
were critical, see eg G. T. Garratt: 'the Colonial Office 
appears to be like a reed blown hither and thither by 
every wind which may blow from New York, from Delhi, or 
even from Whitechapel (Political Quarterly, Jan-March 
1931 p. 53). 
2 The Socialist Pro-Palestine Committee issued a resolution 
condemning the White Paper. It was not, however, signed by 
any of the British members of the Committee, see resolution 
dated 13 Dec. 1930 in Jarblum, op. cit., pp. 27-8. 
3 Weizmann had written to the Prime Minister on 12 November 
asking if his son could have some official capacity at the 
forthcoming conference: the has our complete confidence, 
and if you will allow me to say so, our most sincere 
affection and respect... ' (Henderson Papers, op. cit. ). 
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Among those who took part in the negotiations were 
Kaplansky and Laski. The latter was not yet a Zionist - 
'His interest in Palestine was the result of his friendship 
with American Zionists rather than of his own Jewish 
parentage or political outlook' - but he still contrived 
to render useful service to the Zionist cause. His final 
contribution came on 11 February when, with Weizmann, he 
successfully insisted that the Government publish its 
forthcoming letter on Palestine in the form of a 
Parliamentary Paper. 
On 14 February, in answer to a question from Kenworthy, 
the Prime Minister read to the House his letter to 
Weizmann. 2 Maintaining the traditional diplomatic language 
employed since the White Paper, and which could scarcely 
have deceived a soul, he insisted that the White Paper 
still stood, and that the letter represented merely an 
'authorititive interpretation'. In fact, the only 
promulgations that now remained concerned security and the 
proposals for a Legislative Council. The Government 'did 
not contemplate any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish 
immigration, land transfers were only temporarily to be 
controlled, and the economic conditions of the country were 
not to be 'crystallized'. By strenuous effort the Govern- 
ment had returned to its initial position. 
1 K. Martin, Harold Laski (London, 1953) P. 210. 
2 The so called 'Black Letter, HC Deb. Vol. 248 c. 599, 






Labour and Palestine in the Thirties 
A. 'A Socialist Utopia' 
The years between 1931 and 1936 were a time of 
comparative tranquility in Palestine. They were also years 
of large scale Jewish immigration. 61,81+4 Jews reached 
Palestine in 1935, the highest annual total for the Mandate 
period. In 1936 the population consisted of 370,000 Jews 
and 940,000 Arabs. 
1 
Jewish development and prosperity in Palestine, the 
absence of serious disorders and the weakness and intro- 
spection of the Labour Party following the debRcle of 1931 
combined to reduce official contacts between Zionists and 
the Labour Party to a low level. 
2 Poale Zion declined in 
membership still further, and between 1931 and 1936 did not 
even appear on the Labour Party's list of affiliated 
societies. The London Political Office closed down in 
1932, not to reopen until 1938,3 although sporadic visits 
by Labour Zionists, in particular Dov Hos, ensured that 
contacts were maintained. In 1933 an official statement on 
foreign policy issued by the Labour Party made no mention 
of Palestine. 
4 The diminutive Parliamentary Labour Party 
now contained few members interested in Palestine; many 
had lost their seats, others, including Denman and Bennett,, 
1 N. Bethell, The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle Between 
the British, the Jews and the Arabs 1935-48 (London, 1979) 
P. 25, Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 159,165. 
2 There were occasional requests and invitations from. 
Zionist bodies (eg NEC 10 Nov. 1931) and messages of support 
continued to be sent, see eg. J. L. Cohen to G. Lansbury, 3 Jan. 
1934 (Lansbury Papers 15/39). 
3 Levenberg, op. cit., p. 129. 
4 A. Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy (London, 1933). 
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joined the National Labour Party. There was nevertheless 
one significant development during this period,, namely the 
visits of a number of prominent Labour Party figures to 
Palestine. 
An early visitor was Arthur Creech Jones, the future 
Colonial Secretary. A former National Secretary of the 
TGWU, Creech Jones was now parliamentary candidate for 
Shipley, and developing a particular interest in Colonial 
matters. In the spring of 1933 he led a tour to Palestine 
under the auspices of the Workers' Travel Association, of 
which he was Organising Secretary. 
l He and his party were 
entertained by Dov Hos, and by members of the Histadrut, 
and on his return Creech Jones reported to J. L. Cohen that 
'all of us have returned enthusiastic about what we have 
seen and what is being done, and with our views on Zionism 
revised and events in the Near East seen in quite a new 
perspective'. 
2 
'We shall', he promised Hos, 'now do our 
best to encourage people to see Palestine for themselves, 
and particularly to see what is being done by the Jewish 
people'. 
3 
Creech Jones admitted that 'before my visit to 
Palestine I was somewhat speptical about Zionist achieve- 
meats, 
4 
and he later claimed that 'if I had any prejudices 
1 For an earlier tour organised by Poale Zion in 
conjunction with the WTA see New Judea Dec-Jan 1931-2. 
2 Creech Jones to J. L. Coherm, 19 May 1933 (CJ 30/1/2). 
3 Creech Jones to D. Hos, 18 May 1933 (CJ 30/1/10-1). 
4 'A Few Impressions by a Gentile Socialist after a Short Visit to Palestine' in CJ 30/1/27. See also A. Creech Jones, 
'Prosperity and Strife in Palestine' in New Statesman & 
Nation 18 Aug. 1934. 
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at all they were certainly in favour of the Arabs'. 
1 
Nevertheless 'I returned impressed and enthusiastic that 
the utmost encouragement should be given to the Jewish 
people in developing in Palestine a national home'. 
Creech Jones made considerable efforts to interest 
other unionists in visiting Palestine, though he seems to 
have had little success. In July 1935 he confessed to Hos 
that none of the larger unions would send an official to 
Palestine. Plans for a special tour had been curtailed. 
Creech Jones felt his failure keenly, but assured the 
Zionists that 'this failure should not be regarded as any 
lagging of interest in Palestine I. 
2 
One who did visit Palestine was Frederick Pethick 
Lawrence, who made a leisurely tour of the Eastern 
Mediterranean in the winter of 1931. He sent detailed 
reports to his friends and on arrival in Palestine, where 
he met Weizniann, he reported that 'it would be difficult to 
exaggerate the wonderful achievements that (the Jews) have 
effected in Palestine both in the natural field of 
cultivation. of the land and in the social realm of human 
relations'. 
3 
A more significant visit was that of Herbert Morrison, 
who led a further WTA party to Palestine in 1935" He 
brought back glowing reports of Zionist work and evinced a 
lively interest in Palestine from thenceforth. With Dov 
1 ZR 30 May 1941. 
2 Creech Jones to D. Hos, 1 May 1935 (CJ 30/1/45-6). 
3 Notes dated 31 Jan. 1935 in CJ 30/4/6-11. 
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Hos he struck up a particularly warm friendship. 
1 In the 
Daily Herald he told of his enthusiasm for the Jewish 
pioneers: 
'Most of them are young men and women 
- 
some were, 
until recently, the victims of Nazi persecutions in 
Germany; some belong to the interesting new 
generation that has been born in Palestine 
- 
all 
surely among the most splendid types to be found 
anywhere in the world... the new Jew to be found in 
Palestine was a revelation to e. Go and see him 
if the chance comes your way'. 
Some of his colleagues were surprised at the enthusiasm 
now displayed by the practical, unsentimental Morrison. He 
later told the House of Commons that, following his tour of 
agricultural settlements 'I came back with the humble 
feeling that I should like to give up this business of the 
House of Commons and politics and join them in the clean 
healthy life they are leading... it is one of the most 
wonderful manifestations in the world'. 
3 
Colleagues were equally impressed, Tour Williams, MP 
for the Don Valley, travelled to Palestine with fellow 
members of the Parliamentary Palestine Committee. 
4 He 
felt that 'rarely in the history of the world have human 
beings shown such faith and devotion or thrown themselves 
5 
into a task so wholeheartedly as the Jews in Palestine'. 
1 'They liked each other from the start; both were 
practical, common sense able men', B. Donoughue & G. W. Jones, 
Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London, 1973) 
p. 255. Hos was also deputy mayor of Tel Aviv between 1935 
and 1940. Zionists did, however, make use of Morrison in 
another way - by smuggling weapons in with his luggage, ibid. 
2 Daily Herald 12 Nov. 1935. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 313 c. 1380-90,19 June 1936. 
4 T. Williams, Digging For Victory (London, 1965) pp. 95-6. 
The tour was organised by Barne Danner, since 1931 Liberal 
MP for Whitechapel, see B. Janner in. P. Goodmau (ed. ) op. cit., 
P. 107. The PPC had been reformed in November 1931 with Buchan. Chairman, Wedgwood Vice Chairman and Janner Secretary, 
see New Judea Nov. 1931. 
5 HC Deb. Vol. 310 c. 1131,24 Mar. 1936. Williams recalls 
122 
Susan Lawrence was similarly moved, and told the 1936 
Conference of her experiences: 
'I cannot tell you with what an uplift of spirit I 
saw our old Utopia in 'News for Nowhere' actually 
practised. It seemed so beautiful, it seemed so 
impossible but there it was, and I felt that in 
that experiment in those colonies there is something, 
to inspire western democracies and western socialiser. 
The succession of visits from representatives of the 
Labour Party and the trade union movement2 did much to 
restore relations between the British and Zionist labour 
organisations, strained during the troubles of the previous 
Labour Government. Helen Bentwich, though feeling that 
'the labour masses in Palestine are still not quite sure 
how they stand in regard to the Labour movement in Great 
Britain' noted that 'the visits recently of influential 
persons in the Labour and Co-operative movements are doing 
much to stimulate a proper friendship and understanding'. 
3 
And in contrast to the 1920s there were now a considerable 
number of men and women in senior positions within the 
Labour Party eager to speak on Palestine and to defend the 
Zionist position spurred on by admiration for achievements 
that 'as a result I was invited by the party to intervene in 
many debates on the Palestine question between 1935 and 1939. 
So carefully did we exploit any direct personal experience 




ght: ', see Williams, 
op. cit., p. 95. See also LP/ImpAC/1/170,15 May 1935, 
'matters raised by Mr. Williams after his visit: the draining 
of malarial swamps, education of Arab children, education 
grants, transport, roads, railways, Arab standpoint'. 
1 LPACR 1936 p. 217. See S. Lawrence, 'Jewish Colonies in 
Palestine', in Labour Vol. XI, No. 11, July 1935. 
2 See especially George Isaacs (see TUC Annual Conference 
report 1936, PP. 393-6. ) Another enthusiastic visitor was 
Rhys Davies MP, see articles in ZR April 1934 and New Judea 
March 1934. For ILP visitors see below p. 196. 
3 H. Bentwich to Creech Jones, August 1935, (CJ 30/2/4-8). 
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they had themselves witnessed. 
The effects of the visits were complimented by the 
informal contacts Zionists maintained within the Labour 
Party. In this connection J. L. Cohen was particularly active. 
Cohen, now an economics lecturer at Cambridge University was 
a protege of Weizmann but had become a leading member of 
Poale Zion and had for a time directed the London Political 
Office. ' He had been, according to Middleton, 'exceedingly 
helpful to the party, together with other colleagues, during 
the VJhitechapel by-election'2 and had stood unsuccessfully 
as Labour candidate for Wandsworth Central. 
3 
Cohen developed cordial relations with a number of 
influential members of the Labour Party. He was particularly 
friendly with William Gillies, the International Secretary, 
whilst James Middleton later noted that 'to J. L. Cohen 
belongs my interest in Zionism'. 
4 Both officials appear to 
have used Cohen as an unofficial adviser on questions 
relating to Zionism and Palestine5 and Cohen was an 
important link between the Labour Zionists and Transport 
House until his death in the blitz. New Judea commented: 
'through his connections with the Labour Party he was able 
1 See above p. 41 Levenberg, op. cit., p. 129. Of Cohen's 
many articles see esp. 'Labour Zionism: Its Principles and 
Practices',. Jewish Chronicle Supplement 28 Oct. 1932. 
2 J. Middleton to D. Shiels, 10 Aug. 1931 (JSM 210/94). 
3 In 1937 the seat was won for the Labour Party by another 
Jew, Harry Nathan, and in 1940 provided Bevin with a seat 
in Parliament. 
4 ZR 22 Nov. 1941. 
5 See eg JSM 210/97-8, correspondence in LP/WG/11(b). 
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to win the active sympathy of its leaders for the Zionist 
ideal; and the consistently pro Zionist attitude of British 
Labour is in no small measure due to his influence', 
Of the two party officials Middleton showed the greater 
enthusiasm for Zionism, and soon forgot his irritation at 
Zionist pressure during 1930. He was always willing to 
contribute an article encouraging Jewish immigration and 
colonisation, 
2 
and his commitment to Zionism was to 
blossom in later years. Gillies' feelings were less 
pronounced, despite his friendship with Cohen, though he 
dutifully reflected the pro Zionist bias of his party. 
Though a member of the Socialist Pro Palestine Committee he 
nevertheless told Jarblum in December 1935 that 'he did not 
see his way to writing an article at the moment upon the 
necessity of a great increase in immigration into 
Palestine' 
.3 
Social contacts were maintained at a modest level. In 
December 1935 for instance Creech Jones arranged a dinner 
for Labour MPs and supporters with an interest in Palestine 
at which speeches were made by Wedgwood, Pethick Lawrence= 
Morrison, Norman Bentwich and Dov Hos. 
4 Several Labour MPs 
1 New Judea Dec. 1940. See also ZR 22 Nov. 1940, LPACR 
1941) P. 43. 
2 For example, see article written for the National Labour 
Committee for Palestine, 25 Apr. 1936 (JSM 210/129). 
3 Correspondence with Jarblum in LP/WG/11(b). 
4 It is not clear at whose instigation the dinner was 
arranged; Creech Jones had earlier written to Morrison 
that 'I am being pressed by our Palestine friends to 
arrange a dinner... ' (CJ 30/1/47-9,19 Nov. 1935). 
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were persuaded to join the Paladin Club1 and in April 1936 
Gillies was Cohen's guest at a meeting addressed by Sir 
Herbert Samuel, and by Dr. Levenberg of Poale Zion. 
2 
Sometimes, however, party leaders did show some reluctance 
to speak in public about Palestine. Norman Bentwich could 
persuade neither Morrison nor Creech Jones to address the 
Club; surprisingly Creech Jones claimed to be 'bankrupt in 
saying anything worth while'. 
3 But the good relations 
between Labour Zionists and the Labour Party 
- 
occasionally 
furthered by gifts of Palestine citrus fruit4- were fully 
in evidence during the election of November 1935. 
The Zionist Review sought the opinion of prospective 
candidates, and was able to print messages of sympathy and 
support from over 50 Labour candidated. 
5 From Attlee came 
a clear statement of party views, which were published in 
the Daily Herald: 
'The British Labour Party recalls with pride that in 
the dark days of the great war they associated 
themselves with the ideal of a National Home in 
Palestine for the Jewish people... they have never 
faltered, and will never falter in their active and 
sympathetic co-operation with the work of political 
and economic reconstruction... we are proud of our 
close association with the organisation of Palestine 
Labour who have fulfilled their responsibilities in 
the rebuilding of Palestine in a manner which has 
1A dining club for those interested in Palestine; half of 
the 60 members were gentile, half Jewish, see Bentwich, 
'Wanderer', op. cit., pp. 213-4. Among Labour members were 
Daniel Hopkin and Lewis Silkin. 
2 J. Cohen to W. Gillies, 14 Apr. 1936 (LP/WG/9(a)). 
3 Creech Jones to N. Bentwich, 9 Jan. 1936 (CJ 30/1/58). 
4 See letters from Middleton, 14 Mar. 1933 (JSM 210/100), 
Creech Jones, 1 May 1935 (CJ 30/1/46) and Gillies, 25 Jan. 
1937 'Iz-assure you that I will be a more energetic publicity 
agent for the products of your Jewish co-operatives' (LP/WG/9(b)). 
5 ZR 1935, including messages from Attlee Alexander, 
Bon31ield, Angell, Gaitskell, Adamson and &reech Jones. 
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earned wide admiration. ' 
Poale Zion responded with a manifesto which urged full 
support for the Labour Party, the party with 'a real under- 
standing and profound sympathy for a Jewish National Home 
in Palestine'. Zionists arranged a number of meetings in. 
support of Labour candidates. On 12 November Morrison 
spoke at a meeting called by Poale Zion in support of the 
three Hackney candidates. In Whitechapel James Hall, 2 
mounting a successful challenge to Barnett Janner, stressed 
his own previous services to the Zionist causes: preventing 
the deportation of two Jewish workers, and helping regain 
the six day week for Jewish workers in the Athlit quarries 
and the Haifa construction works. 
3 
The election saw a partial recovery for the Labour Party 
from the ruin of 1931. Of a total of 154 Labour MPs, five 
were now Jewish. 
4 More importantly, Tom Williams was now 
joined on the Labour benches by a number of enthusiastic 
gentile supporters of Zionism. 
5 
1 Daily Herald 11 Nov. 1935. Meinertzhagen castigates 
Attlee for shameless vote buying and duplicity. Had the 
declaration been issued in November 1945, as Meinertzhagen 
believed, he might have had a point, Meinertzhagen, op. cit., 
p. 198. 
2 Leaflets in LP/WG/11(b). 
3 ZR Nov. 1935. The results were: 
1931 Janner (Lib) 11,013 Hall (Lab) 9,964 
Pollitt (Com) 2,658 Lewis (NP) 154 
1935 Hall (Lab) 13,374 Janner (Lib) 
11,093 
4 David Frankel, Harry Day, George Strauss, Emanuel 
Shinwell and Sidney Silverman. In the following years they 
were joined by Lewis Silkin (1936) and Harry Nathan (1937). 
5 In particular Morrison and Creech Jones. The Parliamen- 
tary Palestine Committee was reconstituted following the 
election; Labour members included Wedgwood, Creech Jones, 
Hopkin, Williams and Smith. 
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B. Policy Making in the Advisory Committee 1934 
- 
1936 
It is perhaps surprising to find that the process of 
formulating a party policy for Palestine began well in 
advance of the troubles which began in Palestine in 1936. 
This took place within the Advisory Committee on Imperial 
Affairs which, less concerned with immediate political 
considerations, had the responsibility of advising the NEC 
on developments and problems in the field of colonial 
affairs. It is not clear, however, what prompted this 
renewed consideration of the Palestine question, but the 
subject appeared on the agenda on two occasions in 1933 and 
was finally discussed in May 1931+. 1 
The minutes of the meeting. simply record that Sir John 
Maynard was requested to invite an Arab representative 'Mr. 
Shahia', to address the committee. 2 It is possible that, as 
on previous occasions, the concern to hear from an Arab 
spokesman was prompted by the knowledge that a Zionist 
approach to the Committee was forthcoming. Certainly not 
long afterwards a long memorandum was received from Berl 
3 Locker. 
Locker admitted that it might come as a surprise to 
1 LP/ImpAC/1/120 & 124,22 Nov. 1934 & 20 Dec. 1933. The 
Jewish Chairman, Leonard Woolf, was no Zionist. 'All the 
eloquence of Lewis Namier and Chaim Weizmann, however, 
could not shake Woolf's view that tb introduce a racial and 
religious minority into the Middle East was to court 
trouble. ' F. Gottlieb, 'Leonard Woolf's Attitude to his 
Jewish Background and to Judaism', Transactions of the 
Jewish Historical Society of England, Vol. XXV, 1977, p. 36. 
See also D. Wilson & J. Eisenberg, Leonard Woolf: A Political 
Biography (London, 1978) passim. 
2 LP/ImpAC/1/134,16 May 1934. I have not been able to 
trace this person. 
3 B. Locker, 'The Present Position in Palestine''in 
LP/ImpAC/2/139. Locker was then on the executive of the Jewith-Agency', in London. 
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learn that great dissatisfaction existed among Jews in 
Palestine for, he claimed, 'the possibilities for 
immigration have never been so restricted'. There was an 
acute shortage of Jewish labour,, and as a result the 
balance in wage levels was being destroyed and Jews 
diverted from agriculture to industry. Locker appealed 
for the help of the British labour movement in attempting 
to secure 'a fair and full application of the principles of 
absorptive capacity'. 
Labour Zionists were aware that their policy with 
regard to Arab workers was, as Locker put it, 'misunderstood 
and misrepresented as anti Arab or as contrary to the 
principle of the solidarity of labour'. In an additional 
note he sought to refute the charges: it was only in the 
field of employment created by Jewish enterprise that, in 
order to create a Jewish working class, Arab workers had to 
be excluded. Solidarity of labour did not require the 
disappearance of Jewish labour in these areas. In fact 
there was much co-operation between workers in public and 
semi public workers, and the Histadrut was actively 
encouraging the organisation of Arab workers. 
1 
'We cannot agree, however, that the basic aim of creating 
a Jewish working population, especially in agriculture, 
should be emasculated by an artificial check on Jewish 
immigration and replacement of present and prospective 
Jewish workers by means of the vast reserves of Arab labour, 
inside and outside Palestine'. 
1 But see A. Shapiro, 'The Ideology and Practice of the 
Joint Jewish-Arab Labour Union in Palestine 1920-39', 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 12,1977, pp. 669-92, 
N. Caplan, Palestine Jewry and the Arab question 1917-25 (London 1976) 1p 8-9,13 4 Flapan, op. cit., pp. 199- 207 G. Mansur, Tie Ara ýYorier under the awn ate (Je salem 193f1) passim. For labour immigration see especially heffer, 
op. cit., pp. 160-93. 
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On 20 June a well attended meeting of the Advisory 
Committee considered Locker's memorandum. At 5 o'clock 
Shahla attended to make a statement but this was immediately 
followed by the appearance of another Zionist, Selig 
Bordetsky, who answered various questions. 
1 
Shahla had agreed to write his own memorandum and this 
was presented the following month though not, it seems, 
considered formally by the Committee. 2 It told of the 
unhappy relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, in 
contrast to the peaceful pre war conditions. 
3 Shahla out- 
lined the threat posed to the Arab population by Zionist 
immigration and colonisation policies: 'is there any 
wonder that Arabs are apprehensive and in a state of great 
national tension? 
... 
It (is) a case of a weak individual 
struggling against a powerful and rich organisation... '. 
The Advisory Committee, however, felt no need for haste. 
In November it considered appointing a sub committee to 
draft a policy for Palestine, but it was not until the 
summer of the following year that work began. 
4 On the sub 
committee were Drummond Shiels, the former Colonial Under 
Secretary, ' G. T. Garratt and Thomas Reid. Garratt, a 
1 LP/ImpAC/1/138,20 June 1934. 
2 Shahla, 'Jews and Arabs in Palestine', July 1935 (LP/ImpAC/2/139). 
3 But see N. Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism in Palestine 
Before World War One Berkley, California, 19767 passim. 
4 LP/ImpAC/1/147,, 14 Nov. 1934. 
5 'There was nothing of the wxild revolutionary about him; 
he was a hard headed liberal minded unsentimental Scot, and 
he was a convinced believer in the necessity for putting 
into practice the colonial policies worked out by the 
Advisory Committee', L. Woolf, Downhill All the Way (London 
1969) pp. 236-7. 
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prospective Labour candidate and expert on Indian affairs, 
had written occasional articles on Palestine and took a 
moderate line. Reid on the other hand, like Woolf a former 
member of the Ceylon Civil Service, was soon to be known as 
a staunch opponent of Zionism. 
1 
Dov Hos, learning of the sub committee, offered to 
submit recommendations on behalf of the Histadrut. Both 
sub committee and the Advisory Committee therefore post- 
poned their deliberations but Hos, who planned to visit 
Britain, was delayed in Palestine and the sub committee 
finally went ahead without him on 6 August. 
2 Neither 
Shiels or Garratt were present, but the sub committee now 
3 had a Zionist member in Norman Bentwich. 
Two further meetings took place, the latter being held 
1 There was one notable absentee from the Committee, one 
who would doubtless have staked his claim to a seat on the 
sub committee; when the Committee had been reconstructed 
in December 1931 all names had been approved by NEC with 
the exception of Josiah Wedgwood, NEC 16 Dec. 1931. 
2 B. Locker to W. Gillies, 6 July 1935 (LP/WG/11(b)), 
LP/ImpAC/l/174 19 May 1935, T. Reid to W. Gillies, 10 July 
1935 (LP op. cit. ). Sub Committee meeting in LP/ImpAC/3/4, 
6 Aug. 1935. 
3 Though later seriously at odds over the question of 
Zionism, Vera Weizmann noted the friendship of Bentwich 
and Reid during this period, V. Weizmann, op. cit., p. 165. 
Bentwich was the son of a distinguished British Zionist and 
had served as Attorney-General in Palestine from 1920 to 
1931, when complaints from the High Commissioner led to his 
early retirement (see Passfield to A. Henderson, 9 Dec. 1930, 
Henderson Papers). From 1932 to 1951 he was Professor of 
International Relations at the Hebrew University. A 
moderate Zionist) he often faced considerable criticism 
from his more extreme colleagues. See his numerous books, 
C. Bermant, The Cousinhood (London, 1971) p. 274, A. Kayyali, 
Palestine: A Modern History (London, 1978) p. 146. 
S. Brodetsky, op. cit. ) pp. 132-3 comments that 'many Jews 
considered him excessively liberal in his approach to the 
Arabs'. For Bentwich's advocacy of bi-nationalism see 
Hattis, 6 
. 
cit., pp. 195-8. 
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in Brighton during the Labour Party Conference. ' Although 
the report was now complete the sub committee hesitated to 
submit it until the arrival of Host memorandum. Some 
sections arrived shortly before Christmas. There was still 
no particular urgency, and even when Has arrived in Britain 
the sub committee apparently ignored Gillies' suggestion 
that the Zionist be given an interview. Nor indeed was his 
submission ever considered by the sub committee, though it 
was not entirely wasted. 
2 On 12 February the Advisory 
Committee passed the report, with certain minor amendmsnts. 
Wending its way through the party's committee system the 
report was accepted by the International Sub Committee, 
circulated among PLP executive and was finally received by 
the NEC on 26 February. 
3 
The memorandum4 was the first attempt within the party 
to formulate its own considered policy on Palestine, which 
until then had consisted of an assortment of conference 
resolutions and party declarations. Though prompted by 
Locker's submission, the memorandum ignored both his plea 
for increased immigration and protection for Jewish labour, 
and the claims of Shahla that Arab peasants were the 
victims of Jewish development. Given the wide spread of 
opinion on the Advisory Committee, the final result was 
1 See LP/ImpAC/3/7 for meetings attended by Bentwich, 
Garratt and Reid on 26 July 1935 & 30 Sept. 1935. Mrs. 
Bentwich, a member of the London County Council, decided to 
submit her own memorandum. Woolf found it 'reasonable', 
but did not distribute it, (CJ 30/2/2-8). 
2 See below p. 136. 
3 LP/ImpAC/1/184,12 Feb. 1936. Four Zionist sympathisers from the PLP 
- 
Creech Jones, Williams, Adams and Lawrence 
- 
were present. Int Sub 19 Feb. 1936, NEC 26 Feb. 1936. 
4 'A Long Term Policy for Palestine' Feb. 1936 (LP/ImpAC/ 2/160). For the initial version submitted by the sub 
committee, see FCB 176/1/File 1. 
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evidently very much of a common denominator. 
The objective of the party's long term policy would be 
'as stated in Article 2 of the Mandate" which would con- 
tinue in operation until 'such time as Arabs and Jews can 
live in tolerable harmony, political and economic'. The 
Mandate should only be given up if desired 'by the clearly 
expressed wish of the leading communities', in other words 
by both Jews and Arabs. The only reference to Jewish 
immigration and settlement was, rather curiously, in rela- 
tion to Transjordan. 2 Apart from some comments on the con- 
stitution3 the program concluded with some suggestions for 
'raising the standard of living of all races'. This would 
include increased state activity in the fields of education, 
labour organisation, public works and social insurance. 
In fact the report was so much of a compromise as to be 
almost worthless. Certainly it failed to provide any useful 
guidance for the party's leaders and although it might have 
stood as an unobjectionable statement it singularly failed 
to provoke the kind of discussion and reappraisal a more 
detailed or controversial report might have prompted. In 
future years the pressure of events were to bring disagree- 
meats within the Advisory Committee into sharper reiief. 4 
T Article 2 referred to the establishment of the Jewish 
national home, and the 'safeguarding (of) the civil and 
religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, 
irrespective of race and religion'. 
2 The National Home should not be extended to Transjordan, 
but efforts should be made to withdraw restrictions on 
Jewish settlement. The Advisory Committee added: 'subject 
to the precaution being taken to safeguard the rights of the indigenous population in land'. 
3 See below pp. 135-6. 
4 The leading subjects for consideration by the Committee 
between 1935 and 1939 were West Indies (23), Palestine (19),, 
Gold C ast (12) and Keny (9). As Gupta comments (op 
. 
cit. p. 2303 'the regions most cllscussed were those where social 
and political tensions resulted in serious violence #. 
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This did ensure more specific and thus more controversial 
recommendations. But those of February 1936 did represent 
the first and only attempt within the Labour Party to 
formulate a policy for Palestine at a time when the 
pressure of events did not compel it to do so. 
C. Labour and the Legislative Council 
An important section of the Advisory Committee's 
program concerned the party's attitude to the proposed. 
Legislative Council for Palestine. Because this was a 
specific, controversial problem and because the attitude of 
the Labour Party had some effect in influencing Government 
policy, it is necessary to consider this issue separately. 
Proposals for a Legislative Council had been discussed 
between 1921 and 1923, and the Passfield White Paper 
contained a pledge to establish 'a measure of self govern- 
ing institutions' and 'to encourage the widest measure of 
self government for localities consistent with prevailing 
conditions'. Palestinian Arabs demanded majority rule and 
self determination through an elected legislative assembly. 
Zionists feared the 'crystedlisatiora' of the National Home 
should an Arab dominated council be established. Zionists 
were less uniform in their opinions, and Weizmann had been 
strongly criticised for conceding too much in this area 
during negotiations leading to the MacDonald letter. 1 The 
1 Rose, op. cit., pp. 50-1. For the Legislative Council see ibid., PP. 41-71, Kayyali:, op. cit., pp. 187-9, Porath Vol. II,, 
op. cit., Pp. 143-58, 'Sheffer, op. cit., pp. 255-65. See 
also Bentwich's letter to The Times (22 Aug. 1935) 
advocating parity. 
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National Government, urged on by Sir Arthur Wauchope, the 
new High Commissioners reopened discussions and in November 
1933 the Colonial Secretary announced to Parliament the 
Government's intention of setting up a Council. 
1 
The Zionists' main concern was to delay the Govern- 
ment's decision and to convince their supporters that any 
wovid 
significant development in this field^be ill advised. 
Concern over the proposals doubtless prompted Brodetsky to 
ask to meet the Advisory Committee; 
2 later that year he 
sent Gillies a copy of a confidential memorandum submitted 
to the Colonial Secretary on the subject. 3 This argued the 
case for 'parity' 
- 
equal representation for Jews and Arabs- 
and the need for a Round Table Conference to discuss the 
proposals. One result was that 'Palestine: New 
4 Constitution' appeared on the agenda for 14 November. 
The meeting was addressed by Dov Hos, who had at last 
arrived in Britain. Clearly his main concern was the 
Legislative Council for as a result, as well as setting up 
the sub committee, the Advisory Committee instructed Woolf 
to draft a resolution for the party on the subject. This 
was considered at the next meeting and accepted by the NEC 
on 19 December. 
5 
1 HC Deb. vol. 233 c. 259,23 Nov. 1933. 
2 See p. 129 above. S. Brodetsky to W. Gilliest 7 June, 31934, 
confirming meeting with Advisory Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (sic) (LP/AVG/11(b)). 
3 S. Brodetsky to W. Gillies, 16 Nov. 1934 (LP/WG/11(b)). 
4 LP/ImpAC/2/14a (agenda), LP/ImpAC/1/147,14 Nov. 1934. 
5 LP/ImpAC/2/142 28 Nov. 1934, NEC 19 Dec. 1934. 
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The memorandum drew the attention of the NEC to recent 
Government statements. It argued that the improving inter 
communal relations could only be jeopardised by the 
publicity surrounding the establishment of a Legislative 
Council, which should therefore be opposed by the Labour 
Party 'whether composed of nominated or elected members,, at 
the present time'. 
1 
Woolf's suggestions were clearly in stark opposition to 
the Arabs' demands. Indeed, by opposing the idea of a 
Council of whatever composition or powers, the party 
offered a policy more intransigent than that espoused by 
most Zionists. But for the Labour Party to oppose a move 
towards representative self government a convincing reason 
had to be found, and Woolf therefore stressed his view that 
'opposition should be based solely on the contention that 
the moment is inopportune'. 
At this stage the party was not called upon publicly to 
state its views, but the following year great consideration 
was given to the question by the Advisory Committee's Sub 
Committee, and Reid and Bentwich had several discussions 
with Dov Hos. Their final proposals, adopted by the NEC in 
February 1936 included support for self government is local 
affairs, but again 'a Legislative Council wholly or 
partially elected, without Ministerial or executive 
responsibility' was opposed on the grounds that 'such a 
body would be likely to promote irresponsibility and 
discord without satisfying Jews or Arabs or facilitating 
1 'Palestine: Proposed Legislative Council', Nov. 1934 
CL'/ImpAC/2/143). 
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good government'. The Advisory Committee did nevertheless 
amend the sub committee's report by stressing that only the 
immediate establishment of a Legislative Council should be 
opposed. The Committee also adopted the Zionist's 
suggestion-that a Royal Commission should investigate the 
whole problem. l 
On 27 November Host chapter on self governing 
institutions reached Transport House. Copies were also sent 
to sympathetic MPs, 
2 
and indeed members of the PLP were now 
beginning to stir themselves. On 17 December Wedgwood 
chaired a meeting of the PPC, which was attended by some 50 
members. One result was a delegation to Thomas, the 
Colonial Secretary, which included Wedgwood and Williams. 
The latter also saw Thomas individually. 
3 
Creech Jones also active. On entering the House he had 
offered his services to J. L. Cohen and to Arthur Lourie of 
the Jewish Agency, and early in the New Year he wrote to 
Lourie that 'I think the question of the Legislative 
Council for Palestine is very much in the newspapers. Do 
you want any questions put in the House? I expect you have 
already considered the matter, but if I can be of any help 
in this direction will you let me know? tk On 10 February 
1 The sub committee had suggested that the Royal Commission 
'which should not be a Parliamentary one' ought to include 
representatives of the Opposition 'and one Jew and one 
Arab', but this was omitted. 
2 see A. Lourie to Creech Jones, 29 Nov. 1935 (cJ 30/1/52). 
3 Rose, op. cit., pp. 59,67-8 note 89. For another meeting 
of the PPC at which Blanche Dugdale spoke see N. Rose (ed), 
Baffy: The Diaries of Blanche Dug-dale (London, 1973) 
PP. 4-6, diary entries 10 Feb. 1936,17 Feb. 1936, cited henceforth as 'Dugdale Diaries'. 
4 Creech Jones to J. L. Cohen, 13 Dec. 1935 (CJ 30/1/49), Creech Jones to A. Lourie, 4 Dec. 1935 (CJ 30/1/53), Creech Jones to A. Lourie, 3 Jan. 1936 (CJ 30/1/54. In reply 
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Tom Smith, a friend of Williams, asked Thomas whether 'in 
view of the protests made' he would make a statement on the 
matter. 
1 
Labour peers had already gone one step further. On 6 
February Namier learnt that Lord Snell, now Opposition 
leader in the House of Lords, had put down, with a number of 
colleagues, resolutions on the Legislative Council, and that 
a debate was likely. 
2 In fact Labour peers were forcing the 
pace more than the Zionist leadership would have wished. 
Weizmann, indeed, had 'envisaged fighting the Government 
through the medium of parliamentary questions, not a full 
3 
scale debate'. 
The party's initiative, which startled Weizmann's 
circle, was partly the result of the efforts of Labour 
Zionists. Hos had persuaded Williams and Snell to work for 
a debate; 
4 Poale Zion had already joined in a delegation 
to Thomas protesting about the proposals, 
5 
and on 19 
February the International Sub Committee discussed a memor- 
anduni it had submitted. The Council, Poale Zion argued, 
Creech Jones was asked to table a question concerning the 
Immigration Amendment Act (see CJ 30/1/55,63,64-7,68-70 & 
HC Deb. Vol. 309 c. 431-2,26 Feb. 1936). 
1 HC Deb. Vol. C. 552,10 Feb. 1936. See Brodetsky, op. cit., 
p. 170 for a Congress of Anglo Jewry against the Legislative 
Council. 
2 Rose, OP-cit., p. 61. Namier at first believed that the 
debate would consider the Palestine situation in general. (Later Namier commented that Snell was the best informed 
person on the subject of Palestine in the Labour Party, 
Dalton Diaries, 18 June 1937. ) 
3 Sheffer, op. cit., p. 264. 
4 Ibid. 
5 The Times 1 Feb. 1936. 
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'would merely be a tool of vociferous Arab agitators... the 
mouthpiece of Arab vested interests'. A Legislative Council 
could only succeed if Jews ceased to be a minority,, and when 
all members accepted the terms of the Mandatel In Parlia- 
ment this argument was taken up by Tom Williams, 
2 
and the 
International Sub Committee evidently concurred, as it 
circulated copies of Poale Zion's memorandum to the PLP,, 
and resolved to support the opposition of the Advisory 
Committee. 
Labour Zionists' arguments were expanded in an article 
sent to Stafford Cripps by Dov Hoe, entitled 'Is this 
Democracy?: Palestine Labour and the New Legislature. 
3 
Arab labour, Hos wrote, would be unrepresented on the 
Council, 'although agitators and feudal landlords would 
not'. In fact since 'up to date no Arab labour representa- 
tive has found a place in a municipality,, local council or 
advisory committee of the Government except one, the result 
of Jewish efforts' the Labour Party must, for the good of 
both Jewish and Arab labour, fight against the proposals. 
On 26 February the House of Lords debated the Legisla- 
tive Council. On behalf of the Labour Party Snell opened 
the debate on a motion urging the Government to defer the 
proposals until greater experience of local government had 
been gained. Snell argued that his motion was not designed 
1 Int Sub 19 Feb. 1936, see copy of memorandum in 
LP/WG 9t5. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 309 c. 136k, 4 Mar. 1936. Williams, following 
the Advisory Committee, recommended 'greater development of 
municipal government to qualify people for democratic 
institutions'. 
3 Copy in CJ 30/2/9-18. D. Hos to S. Cripps, 5 Mar. 1936 (CJ 30/2/20-1). 
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to 'prejudice the legitimate interests of the Arab people', 
and indeed, he said, his party had the interests of the 
Arabs close at heart. But the proposals could only arrest 
the development of friendly relations between the two 
peoples. The Mandate required the reconstruction of the 
National Home. Self determination, since it conflicted 
with this obligation, must be deferred. 
' 
Though Lord Mansfield found some amusement in the 
position of the Labour Party in the light of 'what I may 
perhaps be pardoned for describing as a pathetic belief in 
the value of representative institutions'2 all speakers, 
with the exception of the Government spokesman, joined with 
Snell in-opposing the Government's proposals. Snell was 
clearly tempted to ask for a vote, but decided not to 
jeopardise his considerable success. 3 
Weinmann and his colleagues were not inclined to press 
for a debate in-the Commons4 but the Labour Party evidently 
saw no reason to let the Government off lightly. On 20 
March Mrs. Dugdale noted 'the sudden resolve of the Labour 
Party to have a Palestine debate next week. Rather tire- 
some, but if it is to be, then we must organise some 
speakerst. 
5 
On 11 March William Mathers unsuccessfully suggested to 
1 HL Deb. Vol. 99 c. 750,26 Feb. 1936. 
2 Ibid., c. 769. 
3 Ibid., c-795- 
4 Rose, op. cit., p. 62. A desultory suggestion was made during a Zionist meeting that 'it might be possible to 
arrange in advance between the Leader of the Opposition and Thomas for a debate which would be moderate in tone'. 
5 'Dugdale Diaries': 20 Mar. 1936. 
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the Colonial Secretary that a Royal Commission examine the 
problem. 
I The rejection of this proposal, which represen- 
ted Labour Party policy, probably set the seal on the 
party's determination to press for a debate. There was a 
chance, clearly too good to be missed, to attack the 
Government with some effect, as the proposals were evidently 
unpopular on both sides of the House. Dov Hos, pursuing a 
line at variance with Weizmann's wishes2 encouraged the 
Labour Party in its intentions, and at a meeting with Snell 
and Williams stressed the usefulness of such a debate. 
When the debate finally took place on 25 March Wedgwood- 
who later claimed the credit for persuading Churchill, Amery 
and Sinclair to speak 
- 
opened for the Labour Party. ' He 
violently defended the rights of Jews to develop Palestine 
and to immigrate in large numbers, but spent little time on 
the actual proposals. In his view they would 'ruin any 
chance of developing Palestine in the future, as it had 
been developed in the past, supported by English justice, 
financed by Jewish capital, and inspired by the desire of a 
great people for freedom'. 
3 
If for the Labour Party the debate was an opportunity to 
enjoy a mild revenge for Conservative attacks in 1930,, for 
the Government there was the chance to pin the blame for the 
project on the last Labour Government, and at one stage 
Mathers was moved to intervene to defend the reputation of 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 309 c. 2111-2,11 Mar. 1936. 
2 : Sheffer comments 'that Mapai (the Palestine Labour 
Party) should operate on its own in promoting such a policy 
is plausible... ', op. cit., p. 264. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 310 c. 1090,25 Mar. 1936. 
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Shiels, whose PPS he had been. 
1 Nevertheless the tide was 
in the party's favour. After contributions from Hopkin and 
Silverman the attack was concluded by Tom Williams, who 
argued that only with great co-operation and experience of 
local democracy could such an assembly be set up. 
2 
The debate was a considerable setback for the Govern- 
went. Thomas' speech was unconvincing, and subject to 
continuous interruption. Wedgwood later wrote to his 
daughter in exultation that 'I have had a successful 
week... actually slain the Palestine Constitution... leaving 
the Rt. Hon. J. H. Dress Shirt in tears'. 
3 
Several speakers, including Churchill and Melchett, had 
urged the party to raise the matter again in a Colonial 
Office debate, where the question could be taken to a vote, 
k 
but there was no need. Two weeks later an answer from 
Thomas indicated that the whole matter would quietly be 
dropped. 5 Soon afterwards violence again broke out in 
Palestine and the question became irrelevant. 
If for Arab sympathisers the debate revealed once again 
the incorrigible influence of Zionism within the House of 
1 Ibid., c. 1116-7. 
2 Ibid., c. 1140-47. 
3 C. Wedgwood, op. cit., p. 191. His aggression was not 
always admired even by Zionists. See Meinertzhagen's 
description of a speech by Wedgwood at the Anglo Palestine 
Club: 'his platitudinal catchphrases, his intense desire 
for cheap applause, his vulgar parliamentary delivery, 
disgusted me so much that I left before he had finished', 
Meinertzhagen, op. cit., p. 138, diary entry 11 Nov. 1927. 
4 The debate was during the second reading of the 
Consolidated Fund Bill, where no votes could be taken. 
5 HC Deb. Vol. 310 c. 2760,8 Apr. 1936. 
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Commons, ' for Zionists the result was a triumph for 
parliamentary democracy through the defeat of an unpopular 
and unreasonable proposal. 
2 Nevertheless the Jewish Agency 
had perhaps been right to view the prospect of a full scale 
debate on the subject with some scepticism, for they were 
to be one factor leading to the appointment of a Royal 
Commission later that year, in the face of the Agency's 
objections. 3 
For the Labour Party the question of the Legislative 
Council developed into an excellent opportunity to attack 
the National Government, already weakened by the revelation 
of the Hoare-Laval Pact. If on the one hand the party 
moved faster than the Jewish Agency had wished, on the 
other it had been propelled by the verbal and written 
encouragements of Labour Zionists and 
- 
notwithstanding 
being seen to oppose a move towards Colonial self govern- 
ment 
- 
by its own instinctive dislike of the scheme. 
Though the party could boast a pleasing if minor victory, 
which further helped restore relations between the Zionists 
and the Labour Party, it stemmed from the happy coincidence 
of an unpopular proposal, a weak Colonial Secretary,, and 
the existence of a vocal group of Conservative dissidents. 
D. The Rejection of Partition 1936 
- 
1938 
On 15 April 1936 two Jewish immigrants were killed by 
1 Porath, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 155,158-9, Kayyali, op. cit., 
pp. 187-8. 
2 eg B. Janner in P. Goodman (ed), op. cit., pp. 109-10. 
3 Sheffer, op. cit., p. 265. 
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Arabs on the road to Nablus. The following day an Arab was 
murdered, and on the 19th Arab riots began in Jaffa. On 25 
April a Supreme Arab Committee was set up and a General 
Strike declared with the aim of achieving an end to Jewish 
immigration, a ban on Jewish land purchase and Arab majority 
government. 
1 Until the end of May disorder was general 
throughout the country, and what became known as the 'Arab 
rebellion' was to continue until the outbreak of the 
European War. On 18 May Thomas announced that a Royal 
Commission would be sent to investigate the troubles and 
the 'alleged grievances'. 
The Jewish Agency, with bitter memories of the Shaw 
Commission, had made strenuous efforts to prevent a 
repetition. 2 As part of their campaign Hos met Clement 
Attlee and other Labour leaders3 and on 14 May Melchett 
discussed with his colleagues 'whether Attlee should move 
a Private Notice Question, adjourn the House and try to 
defeat the Government that very night, 
4 but Attlee, it 
seems, strongly opposed the idea. Attlee, who as early as 
22 April had answered questions on the subject at a meeting 
of the NEC, took a similarly cautious line when at a later 
S 
1 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Palestine 
1915-39 (London, 1939) pp. 73-4: 76. 
2 Weizmann called the Commission 'a foolish and useless 
thing'. Rose, op. cit., p. 124. Ben Gurion 'was more 
frightened of the British than the Arabs',. Bar Zohar, 
op. cit., p. 86. 
3 Sheffer, op. cit., p. 265. 
4 'Dugdale Diaries', 14 Mar. 1936. 
5 Attlee was questioned by Susan Lawrence, NEC 22 Apr-1936. 
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meeting he advised the Zionists to drop their idea of boy- 
cotting the Commission. 
1 
On 27 May Lawrence again brought the disturbances to 
the attention of the NEC but evidently aroused little 
interest, for her colleagues ignored the subject for another 
four months. Lawrence was not to be diverted, and two days 
later submitted to the International Sub Committee a memo- 
randum which drew attention to 'the real danger of leaving 
the Mufti with complete control of large funds of which no 
account is ever published'. 
2 
By now protests had arrived from Palestine. A telegram 
from the Arab Labour Federation complained of Jewish 
outrages and asked the party to demand that the Government 
change its pro Jewish policy. 
3 A much larger letter from 
Berl Locker on behalf of the Histadrut told of crimes 
perpetrated by Arab agitators, of the 'unclear, contradic- 
tory and weak' actions of the Palestine Government, and of 
the bitterness and suspicion of the Jewish population. 
Though, he said, debates in Parliament had strengthened 
Jewish faith in British public opinion, the fear remained 
1 M. J. Cohen,, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate. (London 
1978) p. 14, note 16, for meeting between Zionists and 
Labour leaders. On 19 May Mrs. Dugdale noted: 'invented 
one or two questions for Attlee and Sinclair to put 
tomorrow', but there is no sign that Attlee responded to 
her promptings, 'Dugdale Diaries 
= 
19 May 1936. 
2 S. Lawrence to W. GilSies, 29 May 1936 (LP/WG/9(a)), 
'Palestine' by Mits A. Susan Lawrence in ibid., Int Sub 
8 June 1936. The memorandum was forwarded to the PLP. 
3 Telegram, Arab Labour Federation, 24 May 1936 (LP/WG/ 
9(a)). The Federation was based in Jaffa and claimed 
membership of 7,000, see Mansur, op. cit., p. 7. 
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that the Government contemplated abandoning the Balfour 
Declaration. ' Locker's letter was circulated to all NEC 
members; Arab telegrams were merely noted. 
Though Locker's message doubtless contributed to the 
PLP's decision to raise the matter in Parliament, for the 
second time that year Zionists were taken by surprise. To 
his wife Ben Gurion noted that 'the actual decision to 
hold a debate was not inspired by us. The Labour Party 
demanded it of its own accord'. 
2 
The Jewish Agency nevertheless hurried to make the most 
of the debate. Ben Gurion and Weizmann visited Lloyd George 
and persuaded him to speak, 
3 
and the Agency prepared 
information for potential participants in the debate; Ben 
Gurion claimed that 'the speeches by Lloyd George, Leopold 
Amery, Creech Jones, Herbert Morrison, James de Rothschild, 
Victor Cazalet and Tom Williams were wholly or partly 
prepared by us'4 and indeed the Labour members mentioned 
were the only ones to speak during the debate. 
1 B. Locker to W. Gillies, 14 May 1936, (copy in EEC minutes). 
Between 1936 & 1938 Locker was a member of the Histadrut 
Executive. In Britin Poale Zion was concerned to argue 
that the strike was no such thing: 'instigated by Arab 
capitalists, the landlords and the notables, who exploit 
the Arab workers the more brazenly as the workers are 
backward and unorganised and so at the mercy of their 
masters', see Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Poale Zion, 
Palestine Jewish Labour and the Arab 'Strike' (London,, 1936). 
2 Ben Gurion, 'Letters', op. cit., p. 100, letter dated 
21 June 1936. 
3 Ibid., p. 96-7,14 June 1936. During this period he and 
Weizmann 'launched a campaign of unprecedented intensity to 
mobilise support for the Zionist view. They met the 
Colonial Secretary... the senior officials at the Colonial 
Office, lectured to political and public bodies, conferred 
with Zionist sympathisers in Parliament and briefed pro 
Zionist journalists',. Bar Zohar, op. cit., p. 86. 
4 Ben Gurion, op. cit. 
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The Advisory Committee took some notice of the forth- 
coming debate and asked Susan Lawrence to submit a 
memorandum suggesting ways of improving social services in 
Palestine and raising the Arab standard of living. No 
memorandum was submitted before the debate, though the 
request may have prompted Lawrence's later submissions. 
Making full use of statistics and information from the 
Jewish Agency Tom Williams, who opened for the Labour Party, 
denied that a 'land hunger' was being created by Jewish 
immigration, and told of large scale Arab immigration. He 
was also concerned to argue that the strike was simply a 
stoppage instigated by the Arab leaders, and condemned the 
fact that the Mufti was in receipt of Government funds. All 
three Labour speakers were recent visitors to Palestine and 
felt strongly that Jewish work should be protected and 
encouraged. Creech Jones saw the conflict as 'a clash 
between the centuries' 
.2 Herbert Morrison was particularly 
fluent and Ben Gurion believed that this remarks on the 
workers' settlements and the human material which is build- 
ing these settlements, and the spirit prevailing among them 
made a tremendous impression on his hearers'. 
3 
1 LP/ImpAC/1/187,10 June 1936. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 313 c. 1354,19 June 1936. 
3 He had himself prepared much of Morrison's draft, see 
Hen Gurion, op. cit., p. 99,18 June 1936. Morrison was 
also 'very doubtful' about the Royal Commission. 
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Zionists naturally saw the debate as a victory. 
' 
Arthur Lourie, in thanking Creech Jones for his contribution, 
felt that the debate had been useful in urging the Palestine 
administration 'to execute the Mandate more positively' and 
in showing the Arabs that the authorities would not give in 
to violence. 
2 In raising the question the party had 
certäinly been prompted by legitimate concern, and Williams 
repudiated any notion of party political conflict, 
3 but the 
Labour Party cannot have been sorry to have the Palestine 
question provide yet another chance for a telling if minor 
attack on the Government. 
In the following weeks Labour MPs had the chance of 
hearing from both Arab and Jewish leaders. On 24 July 
Jabotinsky addressed the Parliamentary Palestine Committee4 
and early the following month 100 MPs from all parties 
heard a statement from the Arab delegation then in 
London. 5 Weizmann spoke at a similar gathering on 22 July 
to refute the Arab claims: 'apart from 2 or 3 friends of 
1 The only speeches unfavourable to the Zionist were from 
Clifton Brown, Crossley and the former Labour MP, Ernest 
Bennett, though Ben Gurion complained that, partly because 
it was held on a Friday, the debate had been ill attended. 
2 A. Lourie to Creech Jones, 22 June 1936 (CJ 30/1/75). 
3 'I want to say here that this is not a party question, 
and we have no desire to turn it into any form of party 
question, it is purely a Palestine question, and we want it 
to remain on that level', c. 1326. 
4 See CJ 30/1/75- 
5 The Times 3 Mar. 1936 comments: 'all parties were 
represented and a large number of questions representing 
different points of view were put to and answered by the 
delegation... it was clear that very divergent views were held by those who were present'. 
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the Arabs, the meeting was on our side... '. 
1 Jewish 
communities throughout Britain made their protests known,, 
and Labour MPs met several deputations at the House of 
Commons. 2 
Zionists were now worried that, as in 1930, immigration 
might be suspended during the unrest. 
3 As a precaution 
'friends of all parties in the House and elsewhere' were 
sounded about their attitude'4 and following Weizmann's 
meeting with MPs on, 22 July a resolution was passed opposing 
any cessation of Jewish immigration. 
' Labour Zionists in the Yishuv were particularly worried. 
On 31 August an urgent telegram from the Histadrut warned 
that the Cabinet was thought to have agreed to a suspen- 
sion. 
5 Personal messages were sent to Labour leaders6 and, 
with an eye to the forthcoming Congress, a telegram was 
sent to the TUC. Again it was Attlee who took action, 
visiting the Colonial Secretary to threaten a debate on the 
question of immigration and suggesting the immediate recall 
of Parliament in view of the critical situation in 
Palestine.? When the NEC and the General Council met on 
4 September Attlee had the satisfaction of informing his 
1 Ben Gurion, 'Letters', op. cit., p. 106,23 July 1936. 
2 eg for a deputation of Yorkshire Jewry see CJ 30/1/76-7, 
for Manchester and Salford Jewry see N. Laski to J. Compton, a 24 Aug. 1936 in LP/WG/9(a). 
3 Rose, op. cit., p. 125, 'Dugdale Diaries' 1 July 1936, 
20 July 1936. 
4 Ibid., 1 July 1936. 
5 Telegram dated 31 Aug. 1936 in LP/WG/9(a). 
6 eg D. Hos to H. Morrison, 31 Aug. 1936 (LP/WG/9(a)). See 
also Leeds Labour Party asking for permission to send a telegram to the Colonial Offices, as urged by Leeds Poale 
Zion, (ibid) 
7 Cabinet minutes, quoted in Kayyali,, op. cit., p. 200. 
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colleagues that the Government had decided immigration 
would not after all be curtailed. Hos cabled his 'heart- 
felt appreciation'. 
1 
The Government's decision did not end the TUC's 
interest in the matter. On 7 September the General Council 
was read a telegram from nine American union leaders asking 
for assistance, and the Council decided to submit an 
emergency resolution to Congress. 2 On 10 September, 
following a long and heated debate on Spain the resolution 
was successfully proposed by George Isaacs in an equally 
passionate speech. The Government was urged to bring the 
disorders to an end, since they threatened to destroy 'this 
great humanitarian project, and to deprive the Jewish 
people of the opportunity of developing their own political, 
social and cultural interests'. 
3 
The Labour movement had responded quickly-to what 
proved to be a false alarm. The Government's decision 
stemmed chiefly from a desire not to be seen to be surren- 
dering to violence, but the opinions of Opposition leaders 
were undoubtably a contributory factor. On 30 September 
Attlee and Greenwood had a further meeting with Ormsby-Gore, 
and the following month the Colonial Secretary recommended 
that immigration should continue during the investigations 
of the Royal Commission. 4 
In October the Annual Conference of the Labour Party 
took place in Edinburgh, and for the first time since 1931 
1 GC & NEC 4 Sept. 1936, W. Gil'lies to D. Hos,, 4 Sept. 193 
, D. Hos to W. Gillies 7 Sept. 1936 (LP/WG/9(a)). For a further letter from the Histadrut and a meeting between Greenwood 
and the Colonial Secretary, see NEC 5 Sept. 1936. 
2 GC 7 Aug. 1936, The Times 11 Aug. 1936. 
3 Report of the Annual Congress of the TUC, 1936 pp. 393-6. 
4 Rose, op. cit., p. 125. 
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Poale Zion sent a delegate. The Histadrut telegraphed 
their 'deep appreciation for the prompt effective response 
to approaches in this time of stress' and sent as a 
representative Berl Katznelson, editor of the Palestine 
labour newspaper Davar. The Thursday session began with a 
debate on Palestine. 
The NEC had decided to present an emergency resolution, 
and this was introduced by Susan Lawrence. It was predomi- 
nantly a duplication of the TUC's resolution but there was 
a significant addition: conference was to recognise the 
vital strategic importance of Palestine 'and as such an 
object for rival imperialist interests'. Nevertheless- the 
Mandate should continue to be held by Britain 'to ensure 
equal economic opportunities to all countries and a proper 
protection of minorities'. 
2 
Conference had been dominated by an acrimonious debate 
on Spain, and now Lawrence drew the connection with her own 
topic: both Spain and Palestine were in vital strategic 
positions in the Mediterranean, and each was inflamed by 
arms and propaganda from 'a western power'. Thus, though 
the administration in Palestine could be criticised, the 
principle of 'international control' had to be maintained. 
3 
Maurice Rosette seconded the resolution for Poale Zion, 
and spoke of the appreciation felt by Jews throughout the 
world of the TUC's resolution. Though a speaker from 
1 Telegram dated 30 Sept. 1936 in LP/WG/9(a). 
2 Tý,, EC 4 Oct. 1936, LPACR 1936, p. 217. 
3 Ibid., p. 218. Lawrence also spoke of Jewish achievements 
in Palestine, and of the need to improve Arab life. 
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Lewisham criticised the Mandate policy and the implication, 
as he saw it, that efforts towards reconciliation would 
begin only after force had quelled the disorders, after a 
speech in support from Helen Bentwich the resolution 
secured an overwhelming majority. 
1 
There was a further resolution, proposed by Alex Gossip 
of the Furnishing Trades Association. This offered a left 
wing critique of the problem: the interests of Jewish and 
Arab workers were identical, and the enemy the capitalist 
and landlord of both races. Gossip argued that British rule 
in Palestine 'is one that in no sense whatever any real 
Socialist can defend' 
.2 His seconder, Lester Hutchinson, 
felt that Zionism was profoundly reactionary. Arabs were 
fighting Jews 'not as Jews, but because the Jews have 
allowed themselves to become the unconscious tools of 
British imperialism'. The sponsors of the resolution could 
expect nothing more than a hearing. Rosette had denounced 
their line, and after Lawrence replied for the NEC the 
resolution was rejected. 
The following month the Peel Commission began its 
enquiries, but the final report was not published until 7 
July 1937.3 It nevertheless soon became evident that the 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid., p. 220, see below p. 194. 
3 In the upsurge of interest in Palestine during this 
period party members were often found addressing Zionist 
meetings, whilst the Creech Jones papers indicate the 
approaches being made to Labour MPs with an interest in the 
subject. In the latter half of 1936, for example, he was 
asked to the Parliamentary Council of ORT (an international 
organisation concerned with the training and settlement of 
Jewish refugees), the Palestine Crown Colony Association and 
the Freeland Committee (see CJ 30/1/78,88-9,91-100). Also 
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Commission was considering the possibility of partition as 
a solution. On 8 January Professor Coupland had questioned 
Weizmann on his attitude to such a scheme. Early the 
following month the two men discussed the subject in private, 
and on leaving Weizmann was moved to remark that 'today we 
laid the basis for the Jewish State'. I But many other 
Zionists reacted with caution if not hostility to the idea, 
and in this they were encouraged by the majority of Zionist 
sympathisers in Britain. 
Yet one of the first British politicians who did 
advocate partition was a member of the Labour Party, though 
not,, it is true an orthodox one. In July 1936 Stafford 
Cripps had written to the Manchester Guardian suggesting a 
compromise in the form of two independent states within a 
Palestine Federation. Immigration would be limited to the 
level of 1925-29 
- 
that is, to a very low limit 
- 
and land 
settlement temporarily halted. Both immigration and land 
sales would restart if negotiations broke down; this, 
Cripps believed, would encourage Arab co-operation. 
2 
Another maverick, Josiah Wedgwood, hurried to deride the 
scheme as 'the wisdom of Solomon'3 but it became evident the 
following year that more representative members of his party 
shared his instinctive hostility to such a scheme. When 
during this period came the reconstruction of Wddgwood's 
'Seventh Dominion League, see below p. 211. 
1 J. L. Melzer, 'Towards the Precipice' in M. Weisgal & 
J. Carmichael (eds. ), Chaim Weizmann: A Biography by 
Several Hands (London, 1963) p. 241. 
2 Manchester Guardian 8 July 1936. 
3 Ibid.,, 11 July 1936. 
153 
invited by Victor Cazalet to sign a statement advocating 
partition Creech Jones declined, and his reaction was 
typical of many Zionist supporters within the party: 
'Does it represent a considerable volume of opinion 
among Jews? I have grave doubts as to Sts practica- 
bility and I do not know whether at this stage it 
would be wise for those who have supported the 
establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine 
to make such a proposal which is a considerable 
limitation and might prove to be a big modifi1ation 
in the conception of the Balfour Declaration: 
On 26 April Weizmann heard from Coupland that the 
Commission would unanimously recommend a scheme of 
partition. 2 With the help of Sinclair he arranged a dinner 
to assess the reaction of political friends. Churchill 
roundly condemned the idea, as did Wedgwood. Clement 
Attlee, who had also been invited, was 'shocked at the idea 
of partition. It was, he felt, a concession to violence, a 
confession of failure, and a triumph for Fascism'.. 
3 Dalton 
later warned Namier, who had outlined a scheme acceptable 
to the Jewish Agency, that 'many of my colleagues who were 
very friendly to the Jews would be inclined to oppose 
partition in the interests of the Jews themselves'. 
4 
In the light of the disturbances and the investigations 
of the Peel Commission the Advisory Committee again involved 
1 V. Cazalet to Creech Jones, 8 Apr. 1937 (CJ 30/3/1)%. 
Creech Jones to Cazalet (CJ 30/3/5), see R. Rhodes James, 
Victor Cazalet: A Portrait (London, 1976) pp. 174-8. 
2 Rose, op. cit., p. 130. Several of Coupland's colleagues 
were sceptical of the plan but agreed to make the report 
unanimous, see M. Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold: Portrait 
of a Diplomat (London, 1973) p. 427. 
3 'Dugdale Diaries', 9 June 1937, Dalton Diaries 18 June 
1937,. Rose, op. cit., p. 132. 
4 Dalton Diaries op. cit., for Bentwich's hostility to 
partition see Hattis, o 
. 
cit., p. 196, Martin, 'Rumbold', 
OP-cit., P. 439. 
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itself in the problem, prompted yet again by Susan Lawrence. 
In October she presented a memorandum arguing the need for 
further education and social provisions for the Arab 
population. 
1 To this Helen Bentwich took great exception: 
'I don't think it touches the problem at all'. She 
believed the real problem was the lack of sympathy of the 
Palestine administration. 
2 
Conscious that events had overtaken the usefulness of 
their earlier work the Committee resolved tb re-establish 
the sub. committee, which was to proffer another long term 
report. 3 This was presented in January 1937, the work 
chiefly of Lawrence' and dwelt again. on what she saw as the 
'Arab case' 
- 
the need for Governmemt action to raise the 
standard of living. But the Committee clearly considered 
the report insufficient. Thomas Reid and Lord Snell were 
added to the Sub Committee, which was instructed to prepare 
a comprehensive report, to deal with immigration, land and 
the constitution. 
5 
The sub committee met twice in early February and again 
a week later to consider yet another submission from 
Lawrence. On this occasion she proffered a plan for 
1 'Palestine',. Memorandum by S. Lawrence, October 1937 
(LP/ImpAC/2/169), meeting 14 Oct. 1936 (LP/ImpAC/1/195). 
2 H. Bentwich to Creech Jones(? ), 25 Oct. 1936 (CJ 30/2/23). 
She again- unsuccessfully 
- 
asked to address the Committee. 
3 LP/ImpAC/1/198,11 Nov. 1936. 
4 The other sub committee members were Shiels and Maynard, 
though the report simply stood over Lawrence's name, see 
'Palestine' (LP/ImpAC/2/178). 
5 LP/ImpAC/1/2-4,27 Jan. 1937. 
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proportional representation, an idea incorporated in the 
final report for use in municipal elections. 
' 
The recommendations clearly reflected the divided 
opinions of its members. Two, Snell and Lawrence, were 
well known as supporters of Zionism whilst their three 
colleagues 
- 
Reid, Maynard and Shiels 
- 
were cautiously 
neutral or hostile. Thus, although the sub committee 
advocated the building: of a Jewish National Home and the 
adherence of 'economic absorptive capacity' as a guide to 
Jewish immigration, such capacity should be 'carefully 
guaged', and Transjordan closed to Jewish development. 
There could not be 'complete self government' but, in 
contrast to the recommendations of the previous year, there 
should be an elected legislature with 'genuine executive 
responsibility'. 
One recommendation completely divided the sub committee 
and was included only through the casting vote of the 
Secretary, Reid. For a period of ten years the immigration 
of Jews should be governed by the proviso that 'the present 
relative proportions of Jews and Arabs in Palestine should 
be preserved approximately'. This was a condition no 
Zionist could accept. 
2 
In a series of meetings the Advisory Committee discussed 
the report, now expanded by the addition of a long historical 
1 LP ImpAC/3 29,30,35 3,10,17 Feb. 1937, 'Palestine: A 
Note on Proportional Representation',, S. Lawrence (LP/ImpAC/2, /181). 
2 Memorandum adopted a meeting held at House of Commons on February 10th 1937 by Palestine Sub Committee (LP/ImpAC/3/ 
32). 
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introduction by Reid. l In the course of amendation it 
became clear that, despite the presence on the full 
committee of further Zionist supporters 
- 
including Creech 
Jones and Noel Baker 
- 
the Advisory Committee echoed its 
sub committee in giving only qualified approval to Zionist 
aims. Though on one occasion the Chairman's casting vote 
was needed the main thrust of the memorandum remained, and 
the suggestion that Dov Hos be called in for consultation 
was rejected. 2 At a packed meeting on 7 April the document 
was passed for consideration by the NEC. 
The final report dwelt on the pan Arab and pan Jewish 
aspects of the problem, and on the strategic interests 
involved. 3 In most respects its recommendations were those 
of the sub committee, but on the vital question of the 
limitation to be placed on Jewish immigration the Advisory 
Committee had been more specific. The Arabs were to be 
assured of a permanent, substantial majority 
- 
'something 
like 60% of the whole population'. 
This was potentially the most serious check the Zionists 
had received inside the Labour Party. The suggestion of 
limiting the Jewish population to 4.0% of the total had 
already formed part of a compromise scheme suggested by 
Lords Samuel and Winterton the previous year. Their efforts 
had met with no real success' and by 1937 no Zionist could 
1 LP/ImpAC/1/208,10,12,14,24 Feb., 10 & 24 Mar.,. 7 Apr. 
1937, see revised report LP/ImpAC/21179B. 
2 LP/ImpAC/l/212,24 Mar. 1937. 
3 'Report of Proposed Long Term Policy for Palestine', 
April 1937 (LP/ImpAC/l/179C). 
4 See Cohen, o 
. 
cit., p. 27, Hattie, o 
. 
cit., pp. 194-5. 
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possibly have agreed to such a limitation which, the 
Committee suggested, should last for a decade. 
But the battle was by no means lost. Just as Zionists 
during this period gained accurate information of Cabinet 
decisions from sympathetic Ministers1 so contacts within 
the Labour Party were sufficient to provide an early warning 
of the Advisory Committee's proposals. On 5 May NEC members 
reported that several approaches had been made by 'prominent 
Jews'. Several complaints reached Middleton. One corres- 
pondent cited the proposal to fix the population ratio, and 
named the authors of the report. 
2 
Middleton tried to reassure complainants3 but was 
considerably annoyed at the disclosures. His irritation 
was shared by the NEC, which instructed him to admonish the 
Advisory Committee. Someone had been culpably indiscreet; 
as Middleton pointed out to Gillies, the names of the sub 
committee members had not even appeared on the documents. 
4 
But it was nonetheless immediately clear that the 
sympathies of the NEC remained overwhelmingly pro Zionist 
despite the irritation caused by the leaks, and indeed the 
interventions may have influenced the NEC in its decision 
to delay taking action until Dov Hos had been interviewed 
- 
this the Advisory Committee had declined to do. Only after 
contacting Zionist spokesmen would the NEC consider the 
1 In particular Walter Elliot, see 'Dugdale Diaries', 
passim. 
2 Letter forwarded by Lord Mayor of Manchester, 21 May 
1937 (JSM 210/137. 
3 'Apart from the betrayal of confidence in respect to 
the... 11emorandum you and your friends can rest assured that the NEC... 'tirill remember the party's previous Palestine 
policy', J. Middleton to W. Chadwick, 26 May 1937 (JSM 210/138). 
4 NEC 25-6 May 1937, J. Middleton to W. Gillies, 7 June 1937 JSM 210/139). 
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matter again. On 24 May the International Sub Committee 
met Dov Hos, Ben Gurion and Berl Katznelson and 'a useful 
exchange of views took place'. 
1 
The Peel Report which, as expected, recommended a scheme 
of partition, was published in. July. During the previous 
months the Jewish Agency had taken care to keep Labour MPs 
informed of the case it was presenting to the Commission2 
and now it was decided that consideration of the report was 
to be by a Joint Committee of the International Sub 
Committee and the PLP. 
Though the Advisory Committee's memorandum was never 
specifically rejected this decision was the clearest 
possible indication that its advice was being ignored. Not 
only did the Joint Committee begin by hearing a statement 
from Ben Gurion. and Dov Hos, but the composition of the 
Committee was virtually a roll call of Zionist supporters 
within the party. From the International Sub Committee 
came Lawrence and Morrison, whilst Williams, Grenfeli, 
Frankel, Hopkin, Wedgwood, Creech Jones and Greenwood 
represented the PLP. 3 
The NEC had every right to ignore the recommendations 
and opinions of the Advisory Committee but the episode 
clearly showed the limitations of such a system. Though 
backed up by considerable experience and study the opinions 
of the Committee clearly carried less weight with the NEC 
1 Report in NEC ibid. 
2 eg A. Lourie to Creech Jones, 22 Jan, 1937 (CJ 30/1/10). 
3 Int Sub 15 July 1937. The remaining PLP representative 
was D. N. Pritt. 
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than did the views of Labour Zionists. It is not surprising 
that after this incident the Advisory Committee showed 
little inclination to involve itself in the Palestine 
problem for some considerable time and ignored its own 
earlier resolve to take further action in light of the Peel 
Report. I 
Ben Gurion had initially shown some enthusiasm for the 
idea of partition. Cripps' proposal had apparently (fired 
his enthusiasm' Z It was nonetheless only after consider- 
able persuasion from his colleagues that he agreed, in June 
1937, to support the Agency's plan of partition. 3 The 
policy of Weizmann, despite the opposition of many Jews and 
the scepticism of gentile friends, was tentatively to accept 
the idea whilst demanding drastic revisions of the practical 
details. On 13 July Jabotinsky addressed a group of 40 MPs 
at the House of Commons and attacked the proposals as unfair 
to the Jews and unwise for the British Empire: 'all hopes of 
a National Home will disappear if (the Peel proposals) are 
carried out'. 
4 
Attlee had assured Weizmann that although he personally 
disliked the idea of partition he would not oppose it 
against the wishes of the Zionists. But it was not 
entirely clear just what the Zionist did want. Ben Gurion 
had been confidentially asked on 15 July what reaction he 
would like from the Labour Party, for the Government had 
1 LP/ImpAC/1/227 14 July 1937. 
2 Bar Zohar, op. cit., p. 87. 
3 'Dugdale Diaries' 9 June 1937. 
4 Zionews (the organ of the New Zionist Organisation., 
the right wing Zionist Revisionist movement led by Vladimir 
Jabotinsky) 15 July 19 
, 
37, and see copy of Jabotinsky's 
address in CJ 30/2/29-41. 
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announced a debate on the subject the following week. His 
reply was that, although an alteration of the plan was 
needed, the continuation of the Mandate administered in 
such an unpopular way would prove at least as dangerous as 
partition. 
1 Yet Hos, in a summary of the Zionist's case 
submitted the following day laid most stress on the dangers 
of the Peel proposals: 'it was greatly to be regretted that 
the Commission should have proposed that the Mandate should 
be submitted and the country be partitioned'. 
2 Labour 
politicians were instinctively drawn to the drawbacks and 
disadvantages 
- 
from the Zionist point of view 
- 
of 
partition, which the Revisionists incessantly pointed out. 
Labour Zionists failed, if such was their aim, in prevent- 
ing the Labour Party from mounting a full scale attack on 
the Peel Report. 3 
A curious situation was emerging. The Cabinets nervous 
of parliamentary reaction, instructed the Colonial Secretary 
to discuss with Opposition leaders their reaction to the 
plan. 
4 It became evident that whilst the Jewish Agency in 
London were still prepared to give qualified approval to 
the scheme the Labour Party 
- 
and many Conservative critics- 
were not. On the other hand pro Arabs in the House had 
1 Cohen, op. cit., p. 35. He errs in describing it as a 
meeting of the NEC. 
2 'Note on the Report of the Royal Commission by Dov Hos, 
16 July 1937' PP. 35-6, in LP/WG/9(f). 
3 Zionist tactics were somewhat confused and inept. 
'Whether the Zionists could have exerted sufficient pressure 
on the Opposition to restrain it from 'overdoing' its 
attack on partition must remain a matter for speculation',, 
Cohen, op. cit., pp. 35-6. 
4 `Sheffer, op. cit., p. 490. 
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resolved to support partition as 'the only possibility of a 
permanent solution of the problem'1 even though Jamal 
Husseini, the leader of the Palestinian Arab delegation 
stressed his 'irrevocable opposition' to the scheme. 
2 
The House of Lords debated the report on 21 July. Lord 
Snell, who opened for the Labour Party, regretted that the 
Commissioners had 'given up their patient before they tried 
to cure him'. The Labour Partys he said, could not support 
the scheme. He pleaded for delay and 'a breathing time to 
try again'. His colleague Lord Strabolgi was particularly 
concerned to spell out the strategic dangers of the plan. 
3 
The following day it was the turn of the Commons. At a 
meeting of the PLP the party had decided to press for the 
appointment of a Joint Select Committee and to carry the 
matter to a division; this had been preceded by a private 
meeting of Zionist supporters from all parties to co-ordin- 
ate their plans for the debate. 
4 Ormsby-Gore's private 
talks had clearly failed, and he warned the Cabinet that 
the Opposition's amendment would have to be resisted, but 
when the debate began the Prime Minister insisted that, at 
whatever cost, a party vote must be avoided. Although it 
5 
1 The Times 21 July 1937 for meeting of pro Arab politicians 
2 Ibid. 3 HL Deb. Vol. 106 c. 599-674,. 21-2 July 1937. 
4 The Times 21 July 19372, Zionews 1 Aug. 1937. 
5 See FO 371/20809 E4290. Chamberlain had apparently told 
Ormsby-Gore 'I will not have a party vote on Palestine 
- you must get out of it as best you can', Rose,, o 
. 
cit., 
p. 140. Zionews 1 Aug. 1937 records that 'immediately 
before the opening of the debate a list bearing the names 
of a considerable number of Conservative MPs who had decided to vote against the Government's partition motion 
was handed to Mr. Ormsby-Gore'. 
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has been argued that the Government's retreat from accep- 
tance of the plan was due to factors outside the parlia- 
mentary arena, pressure from the Labour Party and its 
temporary allies was clearly responsible for the Govern- 
ment's seemingly spineless retreat thring the debate,, and 
the crushing rejection of its plans. 
Morgan Jones had been chosen to lead for the Labour 
Party and duly moved that a Joint Committee be established. 
He and Tom Williams, the other Labour front bench speaker, 
concentrated on two aspects: that Parliament was being 
asked to approve a policy it had not been able to consider, 
and that the plan itself was unsound. Williams told the 
House his party believed the proposals to be 'ill considered, 
hopelessly inconclusive, tremendously speculative and 
hazardous, and may even create less peace in the future than 
there has been in the past 15 years'. 
I 
Dan Frankel2 and Josiah Wedgwood spoke from the Labour 
back benches. and were joined in their attack by Campbell 
Stephen (ILP) and Willie Gallacher (Communist). A major 
assault was launched by Churchills who moved that the policy 
be brought before the League of Nations 'with a view to 
enabling HMG, after adequate inquiry, to present to 
Parliament a definite scheme in accordance with the policy 
as set out (in the White Paper)'. Amidst considerable 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 326 c. 2341,22 July 1937. 
2 Frankel, MP for Mile End, explained that he had never 
been officially connected with the Zionist movement, or with 
any organisation concerned with Palestine, but felt his 
'responsibility as a Jew in the House', ibid., c. 2285. 
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procedural wrangling, gleefully pursued by ILP members 
Attlee, though protesting that he did not desire a party 
vote, rejected Churchill's amendment as still committing 
the House to the Government's policy. With Morrison's help 
a compromise was finally reached and Churchill accepted a 
modification to his amendment. Ormsby-Gore could only 
accept it with good grace. 
1 
If the Government was highly embarrassed, Arab 
sympathisers were disgusted, seeing the debate as proof 
that the friends of Zionism in Parliament could always undo 
the good intentions of Government and High Commissioner. 
2 
It seemed a repeat of the debate on the Legislative Council 
the previous year. In fact the parallel was close,, for 
again a superficial Zionist success had had serious 
repercussions. As Blanche Dugdale immediately realised, 
the debate had jeopardised the very principle of partition3 
1 The final resolution read 'that the proposals contained 
in CMD 5513 relating to Palestine should be brought before 
the League of Nations with a view to enabling 11MG after 
adequate inquiry, to present to Parliament a definite 
scheme taking into full account all the recommendations of 
the White Paper'. It was opposed by Maxton, Stephan and 
Buchanan of the ILP. 
2 Kenneth Pickthorn later referred bitterly to 'a most 
elaborate and multiangular manouever between Ealing (Churchill) and Carnarvon (Lloyd George) and South Hackney (Morrison) and the rules of order and the back of the 
Speaker's chair and other parts of the world', (HC Deb. 
Vol. 341 c. 2012,24 Nov. 1938). For a description of the 
incident see Zionews 1 Aug. 1937. 
3 'Dugdale Diaries' 21 July 1937. Tribune (23 July 1937) 
still believed that 'the plan is likely to go through. It 
is too good a thing for the British Imperialist'. 
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This was of what the Zionists had wanted. As Rose 
comments 'the debate... offers the most striking example of 
the way the Zionists would often overstate their case then, 
as a result, find themselves outpaced by their gentile 
supporters'. 
I The doubts felt by the Labour leaders 
concerning partition had been nurtured and encouraged, but 
the result was an attack far more wholesale and devastating 
than suited the Zionists' purpose, for the alternative to 
partition was potentially far less agreeable. 
The Labour Party could take a less unqualified 
satisfaction at the result. 
2 A dislike of partition and a 
desire, as the party saw it, to assist the Zionist cause 
again combined with the political capital to be gained by 
a successful attack on the National Government. 
The annual conference was a time for self congratula- 
tion. Rosette described the debate as 'not only a victory 
for the cause in which I am particularly interested, but by 
its procedure and its determination to check the attempt of 
the Conservative Party in the House of Commons to impose 
something against the wish of the people'of this country, 
it was also a victory for democracy'. 
3 Williams, who 
replied for the Executive, promised that the party would 
'always be watchful with regard to the interests of those 
Jews who have gone to Palestine to earn their own liveli- 
hood in their own way', 
4 
and this was echoed by Clement 
I Rose, op. cit., p. 222. 
2 See eg LPACR 1937,, Parliamentary Report, p. 95: 'the 
party, therefore, scored a distinct success, and it was 
good to see the desires of the House prevail over what in 
this particular case was a somewhat precipitate decision 
of the Government. 
3 Ibid., p. 217. 
4 Ibid., p. 218. Both Williams and Rosette noted that the 
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Attlee. 1 
On 21 October the Colonial Secretary announced that a 
further Commission would be sent to Palestine to examine, 
specific proposals for partition. 
2 One of the Commissioners 
was to be Thomas Reid, a man of undoubted experience in 
colonial and middle eastern affairs, though one whose views 
on the subject were certainly not those of his party. On 
the other hand the Foreign Office, opposed to partition and 
critical of the Colonial Secretary's other nominees, 
welcomed Reid's appointment wholeheartedly, Rendel applaud- 
ing his 'sound judgement and independence of outlook+. 
3 On 
his journey home Reid made known his views to a member of 
the Jewish Agency. Zionism, he argued, was an unwise move- 
ment to foster, for the real solution was assimilation. 
Above all Jews 'had no right to displace the Arabs of 
Palestine... the 450,000 Jews is Palestine could stay but 
they could not expect to establish a state in other 
people's territoryt. 4 
Ministers were now extremely doubtful about a policy of 
partition, and it was announced on 23 December that the 
Commission had been instructed to include as few Arabs as 
possible in the Jewish State. For Zionists this was par- 
ticularly ominous, as their proposed state would necessar-' 
ily be small, and intensive propagandising and lobbying 
Government had at last taken action against the Mufti, as 
demanded by the party. 
1 'I assure our comrades that this matter is one of contin- 
uing anxiety to us... we shall keep in close touch with our 
Labour friends in Palestine... and take whatever action is 
necessary as soon as we get back to the House of Commons', 
ibid., p. 218. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 327 c. 23-38,21 Oct. 1938. 
3 FO 371/21362 E1135,1 Mar. 1938. 
4 Cohen, op. cit., p. 48. 
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activities began again. 
Within the Labour Party such activity was immediate and 
effective. When the NEC met on 7 January 1938 the question 
of the Government's White Paper was raised. 
1 Members spoke 
of the number of letters and telegrams received from 
'important Jewish organisations and individuals'. 
2 As a 
result the NEC decided to submit a resolution to a Joint 
Meeting that afternoon. The resolution, which was duly 
passed, 'profoundly regretted' that there would be further 
delay in reaching a decision. This was to 'put a premium 
on terrorism and increase the degree of disturbances'. The 
Government must reach a decision and submit it to 
Parliament. 3 
Even after the resolution was made public telegrams, 
letters and resolutions continued to reach MPs and Executive 
members. Contacts with leading Zionists were particularly 
close though Attlee, who dined with Brodetsky on the 
evening before the NEC meeting, caused some alarm by 
suggesting that 'supplementary territories' might be con- 
sidered. 
k 
The International Sub Committee took up the question on 
28 January and resolved that another joint meeting with 
PLP members should be held, to which Ben Gurion would be 
invited. The Zionists, doubtless remembering previous 
1 Cmd. 5634, Policy on Palestine: A Despatch of 2 
December, 1937 (1938). See also D. Ben Gurion, Mr. Ormsby- 
Gore's Despatch Analysed (Palestine Labour Studies No. 8, 
London, 1938). 
2 NEC 7 Jan. 1938.3 Minutes in NEC ibid. 
4 S. Brodetsky to J. Middleton, 10 Jan. 1938. The former 
claimed Attlee's suggestion had given him 'many sleepless 
nights' (JSM 210/141). 
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occasions when the party's call for a debate had taken the 
Jewish Agency by surprise, let it be known that on this 
occasion a debate would not be desirable. 
1 On 10 February 
he addressed the meeting. Again the membership was over- 
whelmingly pro Zionist. 
2 There was a general agreement 
that the party should continue in its critical attitude 
towards the Government for its 'abandonment' of the Mandate. 
Party policy would be to press for an announcement of 
policy, and to raise the question of Jewish immigration. 
Despite the strong feelings previously expressed on the 
subject, the meeting also resolved that a 'non commital' 
attitude should be continued with regard to partition. 
3 In 
fact several leading Zionist sympathisers in the party now 
had considerably more sympathy with the idea. Susan 
Lawrence now felt that although what she termed a 'properly 
administered' Mandate would have been the best solution the 
time had come that 'some scheme of partition would be in 
the best interests of the country'. 
4 As a result,, claimed 
the Zionist Revisionists, of 'the machinations of the 
Jewish Agency' the PPC now abandoned its near unanimous 
hostility to the idea of partition, and in February 
Morrison and Wedgwood joined a delegation which urged upon 
1 W. Gillies to L. Scott (Secretary of the PLP), 31 Jan-1938 
(LP/WG/9(c)). On 9 February Ben Gurion addressed the PPC 
(see CJ 30/6/20). 
2 For the Sub Committee: Dallas, Attlee, Latham, Lawrence, 
Morrison, Noel Baker, Prain, Walker, Wilkinson. For the 
PLP: Creech Jones, Frankel, Pritt, M. Jones, Williams. 
3 Any suggested plan for a Jewish State should be examined 
'from the standpoint of its practicability as a unit of 
Government, its security, and the possibility of growth 
within its frontiers'. 
4 'Notes on a Policy for Palestine' by S. Lawrence, Int Sub 
28 Jan. 1938. 
I 
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the Prime Minister that, although it was not an ideal 
solution, the plan could not be abandoned having received 
Government support. 
1 Later that year Stafford Cripps urged 
partition as a temporary expedient to enable immediate help 
to be given to Jewish refugees. 
2 There was clearly now a 
fear that partition, which the party had so roundly 
condemned, now represented a lesser evil than giving the 
Government a free hand. Namier's assertion that the party's 
opposition to partition 'would do no harm'3 was clearly now 
being reassessed. 
It was now becoming evident that the Government was 
contemplating an abandonment of partition and a continua- 
tion of the Mandate in terms highly unfavourable to the 
Zionists. But party involvement with Palestine dwindled in 
the summer of 1938, as tensions mounted in Europe and the 
Woodhead Commission continued its work. Zionist contacts 
with the Labour movement were not resumed at any important 
level until the TUC met in September 
.4 Again the object 
was a favourable reference during Congress. On 1 September 
the General Council considered a memorandum from Locker 
asking for a declaration on the need for large scale 
immigration. After further pleas from Kos Sir Walter 
Citrine met Locker and agreed that some reference might be 
made. A resolution was finally presented at a joint 
meeting with the NEC. It referred to developments in 
Europe which had made it imperative for Britain to carry 
1 Zionews 28 Feb. 1958, Jeffries, op. cit., p. 694. 
2 Tribune 21 Oct. 1938.3 Dalton Diaries 18 June 1937. 
4 There was no Labour Party conference in 1938. 
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out her Mandate obligations 
- 
Jewish refugees must have 
every opportunity to enter Palestine. 
1 
The Woodhead Report was presented to the House of 
Commons on 9 November. The best partition plan the 
Commissioners felt able to recommend consisted of a small 
Jewish state on the coastal plain. Zionists naturally 
condemned the report. For Weizmann it was 'a piece of 
bare-faced cynicism'. A Government statement of policy declared 
that partition was impracticable and proposed a conference 
to consider future policy. 
3 
On 21 November members of the International Sub 
Committee discussed the report. 
4 On previous occasions it 
had met with pro Zionist members of the PLP,, but on this 
occasion it joined with colleagues from the Advisory 
Committee. Unanimity was therefore less likely, and the 
minutes of the meeting record no conclusions or resolutions. 
The discussion was opened by Thomas Reid. He had not felt 
able to sign the majority Woodhead Report without a note of 
reservation, arguing that no form of partition whatsoever 
would be possible without 'a grave departure from justice. 
5 
The Commons debated the report on 24 November. Morrison 
was the leading spokesman for the Labour Party, and in a 
long and rambling speech he condemned the Government's 
attitude as 'we have a policy for dealing with this matter 
1 GC 1&7 Sept. 1938, GC NEC & EC of PLP 7 Sept. 1938. 
2 Rose, OP-cit., p. 171. 
3 Cmd. 5854, The Palestine Partition Report (Oct. 1938), 
Cmd. 5893 A Statement of Policy by HMG Nov. 1938). 
4 Int Sub 21 Nov. 1938. See also J. Cohen to W. Gillies, 
17 Nov. 1938 sending, at Gillies' request, an article on 
the report (LP/WG/9(c)). 
Cmd. 85k, ibid., 'A Note of Reservation by Mr. Reid',, 5 
pp. 263- 1. 
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and this policy is discussion'. 
I With Wedgwood, Williams 
and McGovern (ILP) he attacked the Government for maladmin- 
istration in Palestine and procrastination in formulating 
a policy. All emphasised the desperate need for 
immigration facilities for European Jews. The Woodhead 
Report and the question of partition were given scarcely a 
mention. The idea was dead. But Zionist supporters were 
now grimly aware that the Government was contemplating the 
introduction of a unilateral policy of its own. Wedgwood 
had no hesitation in perceiving 'the prospect of another 
appeasement'. 
2 
Though the Government moved away from partition for 
reasons other than opposition in the House of Commons it 
was, through this period, particularly sensitive to 
Parliamentary opinion on the question of Palestine. The 
willingness of the Labour Party to serve as a focus of 
Zionist activity and as an ally for pro Zionists in other 
parties embarassed the Government, and on one occasion 
humiliated it. The Labour Party's reaction, of immediate 
suspicion of the idea of partition, was representative of 
the majority of gentile sympathisers, and fitted agreeably 
into a general campaign of parliamentary activity against 
the National Government. There was also a particular 
satisfaction to be had in paying back the Conservative 
Party for the indignities suffered by the previous Labour 
Government on the same subject. 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 341 c. 1997,24 Nov. 1938. 
2 Ibid.,, c. 2044. 
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Zionist requests when directed at the Labour Party or 
the TUC were almost invariably answered, by resolutions, 
parliamentary activity or meetings with Ministers. Zionist 
embarrassment was caused less by occasional anti Zionist 
resolutions proposed at Conference, or by opposing views 
in thö: Advisory Committee, than by the eagerness of their 
friends in Parliament. 
E. The Revival of Poale Zion and the Activities of the 
Arab Centre 
Between 1936 and the outbreak of the European War, as 
violence mounted in Palestine and the future of the Mandate 
was increasingly called into question, there was a consider- 
able resurgence in the work of Poale Zion. There was also, 
for the first time, a systematic attempt by Arab spokesmen 
in London to present their case. Each group, with differ- 
ing success, sought to influence Labour Party members and 
to impress their views upon the party leadership. 
The years between 1931 and 1936 had seen little activity 
by Poale Zion in Britain. In 1936, when the party reappear- 
ed as an affiliate and participated at the Labour Party 
conference it was credited with only 450 members. 
1 Accord- 
ing to Labour Party records membership remained at this 
level until 1943, but all other indications are that after 
1936 membership and activity increased considerably. 
A number of new branches were formed, including one 
founded by Sidney Silverman in Liverpool, so that by 1940 
there appear to have been some eight branches, and a 
1 LPACR 1936, p. 7 6. 
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separate London Council. 1 The party also sought to consol- 
idate its position within the Worker-t' Circle mutual aid 
organisation, which allowed separate branches to conduct 
independent political activity. Though many branches 
remained under non-Zionist or Communist control, in 1936 
Poale Zion was able to double the number under its control 
with the establishment of branches in Glasgow and North 
London. 2 
This increase was prompted both by the growing concern 
over developments in Europe and Palestine and by the 
arrival of many refugees from Europe. In 1938 junior 
branches of Poale Zion were formed in London and elsewhere, 
3 
and a number of training farms were established. Among 
the new recruits to the party was Abba Eban, who became 
active in political work at the Zionist Office. ' 
On the other hand the party still experienced consider- 
able difficulty in propagating Zionism among working class 
Jews in the East End. An article in the Zionist Review in 
1935 lamented the weakness of organised Zionism in the area 
and urged that a determined effort be made to make it again 
the strong force it had once been. 
5 
1 The Jewish Yearbook (London, 1940) pp. 81-2, lists 
branches in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Manchester, Liverpool,, Leeds 
and North, North West and East London. 
2 The Circle Oct. 1936, Feb. 1937. Under Poale Zion control 
were Leeds Branch 12), Glasgow (18) 
- 
both cities also had 
non-Zionist branches 
- 
London (15) and North London (19). 
Among the branches under Communist control were 1,9 & 10, 
see The Circle Passim. 
3 Levenberg, o 
. 
cit., p. 331. Dr. Levenberg, a Labour 
Zionist editor, arrived from Poland in 1936 and thenceforth 
played a leading part in the party's work. 
4 A. Eban, An Autobiography (London, 1977) pp. 19,22. 
5 ZR Jan- 1935, Oct. 1935. 
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In part this lack of success was due to the strong 
opposition of the Communist Party, many of whose members 
were Jewish. Joe Jacobs, then a leading Stepney Communist, 
has written of a visit by Jabotinsky to the East End: 
'We had made our intentions quite clear. It was like 
preparing to attack a Fascist meeting without having 
to deal with opposition from the police. It turned 
out to be more difficult to heckle Jabotinsky than 
Mosley. His stewards were well org nixed for dealing 
with opposition without police aid. 
Though Jacobs also comments that 'the social democratic 
Zionists were much more effective and enjoyed wide support 
among working class Jews' in October 1938 Poale Zion found 
it necessary to form a special committee 'to approach the 
Jewish workers and Jewish working class organisations of 
London to enlist their support'. 
2 Strong opposition was 
expected from the Communists but it was felt that the 
party's views on Palestine were not popular: 'an individual 
appeal to Jewish trade unions on the basis of the right of 
free immigration was certain of success'. This was by no 
means the last of the many attempts made by Poale Zion to 
enlist the support of East End Jews for the National Home. 
Another sign of the growth of Labour Zionist activity 
was the series of fresh attempts to publicise their case 
among the wider British labour movement. Poale Zion had 
published occasional pamphlets since the war but now, at 
the instigation of Berl Katznelson, a Palestine Labour 
Studies Group was formed to co-ordinate a more concerted 
1 J. Jacobs, Out of (London, 1978) p. 18 
2 ZR 21 Oct. 1938. 
(Chairman),, Locker, 
unions and Workers' 
the Ghetto: My Youth in the East 
At the meeting were Levenberg 




1 It was significant that the first 
publication was a reprint of a pamphlet answering Communist 
criticisms of Zionism. 
2 In all there were twelve different 
publications between 1937 and 1938, inc. uding contributions 
from Ben Gurion and Berl Katznelson. The last was a 
compilation of speeches, resolutions and articles in support 
of Zionism made by Labour Party speakers and organisations 
since 1917, to which James Middleton contributed an intro- 
duction. 3 
Poale Zion naturally worked closely with the leaders of 
the Histadrut and Mapai, the Palestine Labour Party. Though 
the London Office closed down in 1932 representatives of 
Palestine Labour 
- 
in particular Dov Hos 
- 
continued to 
visit Britain, but in 1938 it was decided that a further 
body was needed to co-ordinate all Labour Zionist activity 
in Britain and to liaise with British labour, trade union 
and co-operative organisations. This was named the 
Palestine Labour Political Committee. 
The Chairman of the new body was Berl Locker, who had 
arrived in England in 1938 to head the political bureau of 
the Jewish Agency in London. A close friend and follower 
of Weizmannr for the next ten years Locker was an indefatig- 
able speaker and propagandiser for Labour Zionism, building 
on the friendly links he had developed during his earlier 
stay in London. The remainder of the Committee were leading 
1 New Judea May 1937, Levenberg, OP-cit., pp. 129-30 
2 S. Levi, An Open Letter to Comrade Gallacher (Palestine 
Labour Studies, No. 1, London, 1937). 
3 S. Levenberg and J. Podro (eds), British Labour Policy on 
Palestine (Palestine Labour Studies, No. 12, London, 1938). 
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members of Poale Zion. 
1 
The function of these new groups, together with the 
regular Poale Zion organisation, was as much to mobilise 
support as to convert. At the 1939 Southport Conference, 
for example, Locker and Hos attended on behalf of the PLPC 
and joined Levenberg and Rosette in lobbying delegates. A 
film entitled 'Land of Promise' was shown to a large 
audience, including MPs and NEC members, who according to 
the Zionist Review 'watched with evident sympathy and 
appreciation the presentation of Jewish activity and 
progress in Palestine'. 2 
Joining with local Labour groups the Zionists were able 
to arrange a number of regional conferences. In August 1938 
a large Poale Zion rally was held in Manchester, and includ- 
ed on the platform were leading representatives of the local 
Labour movement. 
3 A later meeting in Whitechapel drew a 
crowd of over 1,000, and many hundreds were turned away. 
4 
Such joint Labour Party Zionist conferences were 
evidently successful. In January 1939 a conference at 
Liverpool was attended by over 100 Labour and trade union 
representatives. Berl Locker and Goldie Myerson were the 
main speakers, and from many Labour leaders came messages 
of support. At a similar conference in Manchester Tom 
Williams told the audience that the Histadrut was 'the best 
workers organisation in existence', whilst Clynes admitted 
that he was 'very proud of the work in Palestine for there 
1 Levenberg, Cohen, Pearlman and Jackson Secretary), 
Levenberg, o 
. 
cit., p. 130. 
2 ZR 26 May 1939.3 Ibid., 5 Aug. 1938- 
4 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1938. 
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could be no question that it was a great contribution 
towards making the world a better place'. 
1 
On October 1938 the Zionist Federation organised a 
Palestine Fortnight. Meetings and exhibitions were 
arranged throughout the country and the majority of 
speakers appear to have been Labour MPs. 
2 In the East End, 
where John McGovern spoke, there was for once a particu- 
larly active response. Indeed a reading of the Zionist 
Review and the Jewish Chronicle for this period reveals 
numerous instances of Labour MPs and NEC members, and local 
party and trade union figures, speaking at Zionist functions. 
The number of events and the variety of speakers indicates 
the extent to which the Zionist cause was now embraced by 
the Labour movement. 
Finally mention should be made of the Petition Campaign 
conducted by Poale Zion. Copies of the petition, which 
demanded greatly increased Jewish immigration, were circu- 
lated to party, union and co-operative branches. By March 
1939 over, 250,000 signatures had been collected, and one 
report states that the total finally reached more than a 
million. 
3 
Zionist articles featured prominently in the Labour 
press. A. L. Easterman of the Zionist Federation contributed 
a number of well informed articles in the Daily Herald, 
which occasionally broke fresh news and caused considerable 
comment. 
4 
1 Ibid., 19 Jan., 16 Feb. 1939. 
2 Ibid., 21 & 27 Oct., 3 Nov. 1938. 
3 Ibid., 12 Jan., 2 Mar., 8 June 1939. 
4 eg see 'Dugdale Diaries' 30 Dec. 1937. 
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On the other hand an article published in March 1939 
entitled 'Palestine Plan Hitch Explained, Statements to 
Arabs were not Clear' provoked a swift reaction. 
Bakstansky, General Secretary of the Zionist Federation, 
successfully requested Middleton to raise the matter with 
Greenwood, and the mediation of Tom Williams sufficed to 
arrange a meeting with Francis Williams, the Herald's 
editor,, for Bakstansky to present Zionist objections. 1 
Such close and friendly relations contrasted markedly 
with the reception given to interventions from Arab spokes- 
men. It was not until 1936 that Palestinian Arab national- 
ists belatedly acknowledged the importance of cultivating 
support in non Arab countries. In that year a Palestine 
Information Centre was opened in. London. There already 
existed an 'Arab Centre', but in the years its activity 
increased markedly with the arrival of Izzet Tannous, an 
Arab Christian, as director. Working from the Centre was 
George Mansur, a former secretary of the Arab Federation of 
Labour, who now attempted to enlist support within the 
British labour movement. 
2 
In September 1938 Mansur requested a meeting with the 
Imperial Advisory Committee and from then until May 1939 
numerous letters, memoranda and appeals were dispatched to 
Transport House and Labour MPs known to be interested in 
1 Correspondence in JSM 210/151-1f. 
2. J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York, 1950) 
p. 86. For the Arab Centre see Jeffries, op. cit., p. XIX,, 
Gilbert, o 
. 
cit.,, p. 206 Bethell, op. cit., pp. 55,68, see' 
also Mansur, op. cit.,,. ap ssim. 
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Palestine. 1 As well as striving to present the Arab case 
as a whole Mansur was concerned to draw attention to alleg- 
ations of 'military terrorism'. There was certainly concern 
within the party about the harsh military measures 
- 
includ- 
ing house blowing 
- 
now being practised against Arabs in 
Palestine. A number of MPs were active in Parliament2 but 
the success of Mansur's efforts can be accounted as slight. 
Gillies was particularly dismissive: 'in my opinion it is 
not very objective propaganda. It overdoes the Arab case 
by gross exaggeration'. 3 
Though representatives of the Arab Centre had a number 
of meetings with party spokesmen4 very few of Mansur's 
communications or statements emanating from the Centre were 
formally considered within the Labour Party. One reason for 
this, and for Gillies' scepticism, can be ascribed to the 
Secretary's habit of submitting Arab material to Zionist 
friends for interpretation and comment. 
5 When asked to 
comment on a communication from an Arab labour group Locker 
replied that it was 'obviously,... one of the numerous groups 
1 W. Gillies to G. Mansur, 29 Aug. 1938 (LP/WG/9(e)) and see 
Labour Party and Creech Jones papers Passim. 
2 See for example the memorandum from the Arab Centre 'The 
Arrest of Hanna Asfour', 8 Nov. 1938 (CJ 30/2/48) and 
questions asked by J. Parker (HC Deb. Vol. 341 c. 1743) 28 
Oct. 1938), D. Freeman (NCCL) to J. Parker, 28 Oct. 1938 (CJ 30/2/47) leading to a question on House blowing (He Deb. 
Vol. 341 c. 1061,14 Nov. 1938). 
3 W. Gillies to M. Fogerty, 23 June 1939 (LP/WG/9(e)). 
4 Op. cit., see also Lansbury's comments in Parliament (HC 
Deb. Vol. 350 c. 831-2,20 July 1939). 
5 eg W. Gillies to J. Cohen, 19 Apr. 1938,21 Apr. 1939, 
W. Gillies to B. Locker, 15 July 1939 (LP/WG/9(e)). 
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established by the Mufti's party with the object of hitch- 
ing the Arab workers to its wagon and of spoiling attempts 
of co-operation between Jewish and Arab workers'. He also 
volunteered information on Mansur: the represents himself 
in London to be an Arab Labour leader with distinctly left 
sympathies. He has been successful on several occasions in 
obtaining a hearing in various Labour groups, and I under- 
stand that for a time he was taken seriously, especially by 
the ILP'. 1 
It is possible that Mansur was involved in the appeal 
launched by the ILP in 1939; 2 certainly Brockway had 
apparently been in contact with 'an Arab Socialist from 
Palestine'. It is certainly true that in Parliament Maxton 
raised allegations of brutality made by the Arab Centre. 
3 
On the other hand McGovern urged the Government to ensure 
that the originator of the documents containing such alleg- 
ations was not a Nazi agent. In Parliament Stephen had 
derided Mansur as representing 'nobody but himself', whilst 
the latter complained that the ILP delegation in Palestine 
had refused all his requests for a meeting and had been 
prevented by their Zionist hosts from any contacts with 
genuine Arab labour representatives. 
4 
In November 1938 Mansur submitted a memorandum to the 
1 B. Locker to W. Gillies, 31 July 1939 (ibid. ). 
2 See below pp. 19 7- S. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 349 c. 401-2,28 June 1939, Vol. 349 c. 896-7,, 
3 July 1939, Vol. 350 c. 385-6,19 July 1939. 
4 Mansur, OP-cit., pp. 4-5. 
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Advisory Committee and asked for a meeting. 
1 The only 
reaction appears to have been the placing of Palestine on 
the agenda, where it remained unconsidered until May 1939. 
This only illustrated the near total failure of Arab 
propagandising activities directed at the Labour Party. 
Even a long communication from the Palestine Arab Workers 
Society, the largest Arab labour organisation, received no 
attention, in striking contrast to those from the 
Histadrut; 2 whilst the Zionist labour movement was widely 
respected and firmly established within the organisations 
of European labour the weakr fragmented Arab groups were 
generally ignored or dismissed as creatures of the Mufti. 
The failure of Mansur and his colleagues to influence the 
Labour Party was not primarily due to the unsophistication 
of their propaganda or the disparaging comments it drew from 
Zionist spokesmen. 
3 Rather the circumstances of the pre war 
years made their failure inevitable, whilst the commanding 
position of Zionists in their dealings with the Labour Party 
served to make the failure absolute. 
F. White Paper and War 
On 7 February the Prime Minister opened the conference 
1 G. Mansur 'Memorandum, Criticism and Recommendations on 
the Palestine Problems, Nov. 1938 (LP/ImpAC/2/200, )". 
2 Letter dated 27 June 1939 in LP/WG/9(e). 
3 See the comment of Edward Atiyah, a British educated 
left wing Arab, on the rejection of his arguments by 
British Socialists, E. Atiyah, An Arab Tells His Story 
(London, 1946) pp. 204-5. 
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at St. James' Palace. No agreed solution was reached, and 
the Government finally announced its own proposals on 17 
May. 1 Palestine would become an independent state within 
10 years. 75,000 Jewish immigrants would be admitted 
during the next five years, after which further immigration 
would continue only with Arab consent. Jewish settlement 
would be prohibited or restricted in large areas of 
Palestine. 
During the negotiations Locker had kept the NEC 
informed of their development. 
2 Urgent appeals began to 
arrive in April, in a series of telegrams to the NEC and to 
individual party members. 
3 Typical was this telegram from 
Dov Hos: 'make supreme effort to avert imminent calamity. 
Contemplated Government policy intends to turn the Jewish 
National Home into a ghetto and Palestine Jewry into bond- 
servants of the Arabs'. 
4 In London Berl Locker kept in 
close touch with party officials. In one letter he urged 
that the Government's proposals be delayed for at least six 
months. He warned that the Yishuv might be driven to a 
policy of active resistance. 
5 
The main focus of activity was now the Parliamentary 
Party. Jewish appeals to MPs of all parties were numerous 
1 Cmd 6019, Palestine: A Statement of Policy (tay, 1939). 
2 NEC 22 Mar. 1939. 
3 eg D. Hos to J. Middleton, 19 Apr. 1939: 'urge you 
personally on behalf of my executive to make supreme effort 
to avert calamity' (LP/WG/9(d)). 
4 Telegram dated 19 Apr. 1939 (LP/WG/9(d)). 
5 Letter from PLPC, see Int Sub 21 Apr. 1939. 
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and insistent, and deputations from many parts of the 
country visited the Houses of Parliament. 
1 Already Labour 
members had been voicing their concern through Parliament- 
ary questions and through contacts with Ministers. 
2 Follow- 
ing publication of the White Paper the party demanded a two 
day debate. Blanche Dugdale retained some optimism: 'if 
we can keep it up all the time we may wear MacDonald down. 
The great thing is to break his nerve before and during. '3 
The only discordant note was struck by Richard Stokes, 
whose by-election victory in 1938 had provided the PLP for 
the first time in over seven years with an active opponent 
of Zionism. He now circulated to his colleagues a memo- 
randum giving his reasons why the Government's policy 
should be approved; on moral, practical and legal grounds, 
he argued, the Arab case must be defended. Furthermore 'if 
not settled immediately on the lines proposed by the Govern- 
ment (the dispute) may lead to the persecution of the Jews 
in all the bazaars of the Near and Middle East'. The only 
solution was 'to make room for the Jews in the British 
Empire by giving them a substantial area in which to 
1 The Times (25 May 1939) commented that 'the opposition 
of Jews to the Government's policy was organised and 
impressed upon members with unusual diligence, both in the 
constituencies and in Westminster'. 
A survey conducted in March by the British Institute of 
Public Opinion reported that 60% of respondents were in 
favour of continued Jewish immigration, S. Levenberg in 
P. Goodman (ed. ) gp. cit., p. 115. 
2 For a PPC delegation to MacDonald, which included 
Wedgwood and Williams, see ZR 16 Mar. 1939. 
3 'Dugdale Diaries' 15 May 1939. 
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establish their National Home'. 
I His advocacy had no 
noticeable effect on his colleagues. 
Zionist spokesmen discussed with Tom Williams whether 
the party should press for reference to a select committee? 
This Williams opposed, and the party eventually resolved to 
move an amendment declaring the White Paper to be 'incon- 
sistent with the spirit and letter of the Mandate' and 
calling for delay pending examination by the PMC. The 
Government spokesmen, especially Sir Thomas Inskip, were 
less than impressive in the debate. Labour speakers argued 
that the White Paper represented a betrayal of the Jews and 
a flagrant breach of Britain's obligations. Morrison 
warned that: 
'I think it ought to be known by the House that this 
breach of faith, which we regret, this breach of 
British honour, with its policy, with which we have 
no sympathy, is such that the least that can be said 
is that the Government must not expect that this is 
going to be automatically binding upon their 
successors. They must not expect I will go further 
than that, but they must understand that this docu- 
ment will not automatically be binding upon their 
successors in this affaýr, whatever the circumstan- 
ces of the time may be. 
On a three line whip the Government struggled to a 
majority of 89. The Times estimated that 15 Conservatives 
had voted with the Opposition and that 21 
- 
including two 
1 Memorandum in Stokes Papers, Box 51. 
2 Rose,, op. cit., p. 204. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 347 c. 2143,23 May 1939. Five other Labour 
speakers took part: Williams, Wedgwood, MacLaren, Cripps 





1 Many Labour 
members had been unable to speak, 
2 though Tom Williams was 
able to continue his party's criticisms on the radio that 
evening. 3 But the debate could do no more than give 
evidence of the manifest unpopularity of the Government's 
proposals. 
At its conference at Southport the Labour Party was able 
to continue in its condemnation of the White Paper. Ayrton 
Gould moved an NEC resolution denouncing the White Paper as 
a violation of solemn pledges, a surrender to violence, and 
a setback to the progressive forces inside both communities. 
Above all, it placed intolerable restrictions on Jewish 
immigration at a time when 'racial persecution increasingly 
divides the other countries of the world into thosewhich 
Jews are forbidden to enter and those in which they find it 
impossible to live'. 4 The NEC reaffirmed its support for 
1A number of writers have noted that the majority was only 
eight more than in the debate of May 1940, which led to 
Chamberlain's resignation. The Times (op. cit. ) commented 
that 'some of the most loyal supporters of the Government 
found themselves unable to vote on this matter for reasons 
of conscience and taste'. Many who did vote with the 
Government were angered by the abstentions of Elliot and 
Hore-Belisha, and some estimates give a higher figure for 
the number of abstainers. 
2 Including Creech Jones and Stokes. Stokes apparently 





followed the party line with evident distaste. 
3 On a radio debate with MacDonald, Lloyd George and 
Inskip, Williams, op. cit., p. 95, 'Dugdale Diaries' 23 May 
1939. Williams was in close touch with the Zionists 
throughout this period, and in September he addressed the 
21st Zionist Congress, declaring that 'he was convinced 
that they would win in the end, and the Zionist cause 
would yet be triumphant', New Judea Nov-Dea. 1939" 
4 LPACR 1939, p. 253. 
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the National Home and its belief that, with the Arab masses 
benefiting from Jewish immigration co-operation was 
possible. The White Paper should be rescinded at once. 
Only three speeches were heard, from Ayrton Gould, 
Maurice Rosette and Creech Jones. The tone was set by 
Gould's opening remark: 'betrayal should be the watchword 
of this Government. Wherever there is a fine and democratic 
people it is betrayed by the British Government'. 
' The 
resolution was carried by a show of hands, with only two 
dissentients. Though it undoubtably reflected the opinions 
of the overwhelming body of delegates there was some 
criticism reported that the Arab case had not been heard, 
and no speaker called to put an alternative viewpoint. 
2 
The Advisory Committee had played little part in the 
controversy since the abrupt rejection of its proposals two 
years earlier. George Mansur had however been requesting a 
hearing for some considerable time and finally, two days 
after the White Paper debate, he succeeded in addressing 
the Committee. 3 The only apparent effect was to stimulate 
the Zionists to ensure that the Committee remained fully 
aware of their own case. 
On 14 June Brodetsky and Locker appeared before the 
Committee. Locker once again outlined the policy of the 
Histadrut towards Arab workers, whilst Brodetsky stated in 
detail his objections to the White Paper. To condemn the 
Jews to remain permanently in the minority was contrary to 
1 Ibid., p. 254. 
2 M. Fogerty to W. Gillies, 17 June 1939 (LP/WG/9(e)). 




it was the curse of the Jews everywhere to be 
in a minority. The proposed land regulations would make 
Palestine a Jewish ghetto. 
1 
In July the PMC decided, by a small majority, that the 
White Paper policy was not in accordance with their inter- 
pretation of the Mandate. On 12 July the Government 
announced the cancellation of the immigration quota for the 
six months after October. The following day the Labour 
Party decided to raise the matter on the Colonial Office 
vote the following Thursday. Curiously the Zionists were 
yet again taken by surprise, and unsuccessfully asked the 
party not to press its claims. 
2 Seven Labour MPs took part 
in the debate, though unanimity was impaired by the partic- 
ipation of Stokes. 
3 
The determination of the Government to adhere to the 
White Paper, and of the Labour Party to oppose it, were 
only strengthened by the outbreak of war, though now the 
Government took somewhat greater trouble to consider the 
views of the Opposition. On 1 December Attlee and Greenwood 
discussed the situation with the Prime Minister and three 
days later Locker learned that an assurance had been given 
that legislation on land purchase would be fully considered 
by the War Cabinet before enactment, and that Chamberlain 
had promised further consultation before any action was 
taken. In February it was reported that a similar 
4 
1 LP/ImpAC/l/288,14 June 1939. 
2 'Dugdale Diaries' 13 July 1939 (see 19 July 1939 for 
meeting of PPC). She also commented that 'I am not surprimd 
from their party point of view, but consider it very 
unfortunate from ours. How can Walter (Elliot) and others 
abstain from a Vote of Supply? ', Rose, op. cit., p. 215. 
3 Labour speakers were Williams, Stokes, Silverman, 
L. ansbury, Fletcher, Hopkin and Noel Baker, HC Deb. Vol-350 
c. 761-888,20 July 1939. 
4 New Judea Dec. 1939, 'Dugdale Diaries' 4 Dec. 1939. 
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assurance had been given by MacDonald. Yet the Zionists 
had good reason to believe that such regulations were 
imminent. Locker was dispatched to meet Tom Williams to 
persuade him 'that we are not panic stricken for no cause'. 
On the advice of Locker and Shertok Attlee was 
persuaded to write to Chamberlain requesting clarification, 
yet on 26 February MacDonald informed the Zionists that the 
regulations would be promulgated in Palestine the following 
day. Williams reported that Attlee, normally a mild man, 
was 'furious' at the way he and his colleagues had been 
tricked into believing that nothing was imminent. He and 
Greenwood had seen the Prime Minister at once but 'after an 
hour's hot argument did not prevail'. 
2 
The following day it emerged that the Labour leaders, 
threatening to break the political truce, had extracted from 
the Prime Minister a promise to take the matter back to the 
War Cabinet. This was only a small concession for the 
Government was determined to introduce the regulations. 
MacDonald was roundly accused by his former colleagues of 
deliberate deception3 and in an acrimonious parliamentary 
debate that followed Attlee showed his irritation, interrup- 
ting MacDonald to attack his 'lack of honesty'. 
4 The 
Government had shown considerable ineptitude in arousing 
the ire of the Labour leaders so thoroughly, and the Prime 
1 Ibid., 22 Feb. 1940. 
2 Greenwood commented to Locker that 'there had been 
nothing like it since Munich'. 
3 Ibid., 27 Feb. 1940. 
4 HC Deb. Vol. 358 c. 448,6 Mar. 1940. 
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Minister cannot have endeared himself to the men who, two 
months later, were to play a major part in his downfall. 
But in the short term the Government could not be prevented 
from securing a large majority for its proposals. 
1 
The Labour Party was now considering the publication of 
an initial statement on war aims, and several Zionists were 
eager that this should include some reference to Palestine 
.2 
An initial draft by Noel Baker referred only to the right 
of Jews to 'a place in the world and (a) share in the 
bounty of nature'. Middleton urged that something more 
than this was needed, but the final version showed no 
alteration. 
3 It was nevertheless reported that the state- 
ment had received considerable publicity in the Yishuv. 
4 
Greater attention was given to the subject when the 
party met for its annual conference. Although overshadowed 
by news of the recent German offensive in the west, and by 
the decision to enter a Coalition Government under Churchil], 
Conference contrived to devote a significant portion of its 
time to the topic. 
On 15 May Nathan Jackson, representing Poale Zion, 
moved a huge', 
-'resolution of some 500 words which, 
to the 
satisfaction of the Zionists, later took its place in a 
publication entitled Labour's Aims in War and Peace. 
5 
I The Labour Party's motion was defeated 292 to 129. There 
were a few supporters of the regulations within the party, 
see JSM 210/166-7 and also Stokes' notes for a discussion 
with MacDonald in which he urged their immediate implement- 
ation, (Stokes Papers Box 51). See also Poale Zion 
resolution (ZR 7 Mar. 1940) and memorandum (JSM 215/172). 
The day before the debate Locker and Bakstansky had attended 
a Labour Party dinner. 
2 B. Locker to J. Middleton, 5 Sept. 1939 (JSM 210/163). 
Locker admitted that not all his colleagues were in agreemat. 
3 J. Middleton to C. Attlee, 6 Noy. 1939 (JSM 210/163). C. R. Attlee, Labour's Peace Aims (London, 1939). 
4 N. Jackson to J. Middleton, 3 Jan. 1940 (JSM 210/164. 
5 LPACR 1940, p. 172-4, C. Attleey A. Greenwood, H. Dalton and 
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I 
It summarised Zionist demands for extensive immigration and 
the abandonment of the White Paper, and reiterated earlier 
party declarations on the subject. There were also demands 
for safeguards for Jews after the war, and for adequate 
representations at any Peace Conference. Jackson concluded 
his speech by urging that, in passing the resolution, 'you 
will send not only a message of encouragement to the Jewish 
Labour movement in Palestine, but you will kindle a spark of 
hope in the depressed hearts and minds of the Jewish people 
who are now being exploited in the German Reich territories 
today'. 1 
There was an amendment moved by a delegate from 
Withington. 2 It saw the White Paper as a cynical attempt 
to persue imperialist aims by the traditional methods of 
divide and rule, and concluded: 
'This conference, whilst sympathising with the Jews 
in their persecution, is of the opinion that the 
Je*±bh National Home in Palestine cannot provide a 
satisfactory solution to the Jewish problem and at 
the same time give recognition to Arab rights. ' 
The amengnent stood no chance of acceptance. Jackson 
had called for its total rejection and BarnettJanner, now 
Labour candidate for Leicester West, rounded off the debate 
with a similar plea. The amQndment was accordingly defeated, 
and the resolution carried, by a large majority. 
others, Labour's Aims in Peace and War (London, 1940) 
1 LPACR 1940s p. 173. The resolution was seconded by 
James Hall, MP for W'hitechapel, a delegate of the TOM. 
2 C. Hammersley. The seconder, Lester Hutchinson, had 
supported a similar intervention in 1936, ibid., p. 174. 
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The Conference was the last during the Mandate period 
when the Labour Party could consider the Palestine question 
from the unfettered perspective of an opposition party. 
Until the abandonment by the Government of partition the 
party could congratulate itself on a certain influence on 
Government thinking and on a vigilant and not ineffective 
defence of the interests of Jewish labour. From November 
1938 however Labour Party influence, and that of all 
'gentile Zionists', 1 sank to its lowest point in the face 
of a determined Government and a predominantly acquiescent 
if unenthusiastic Conservative Party. 
1 See Rose, op. cit., p. 223. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The 'Left' and Palestine 
During the 1930s the question of Palestine became an 
increasingly important political issue in left wing circles. 
Rebellion and conflict in Palestine, Jewish persecution in 
Europe and the struggle against Fascism at home and abroad 
helped sharpen attitudes towards Zionism and the future of 
Palestine. The question ceased to be the preserve of a 
small minority of enthusiasts. 
Despite the events of the Second Labour Government by 
the late 1930s the Labour Party was rightly seen as over- 
whelmingly pro Zionist. There was nevertheless a wide 
variety of opinion within the party, and even more so within 
the wider British 'left'. Indeed across the whole spectrum 
of British politics party allegiance could be no sure guide 
to attitudes on the subject of Palestine. Within the Con- 
servative Party Zionism had belligerent spokesmen in 
Churchill and Amery but remained more than simply a cause 
espoused by dissidents and critics of the National Govern- 
ment. The pro Arab faction had no such illustrious leaders, 
but commanded wider support within the party and the Govern- 
ment. The Liberal Party, though its leadership was strongly 
pro Zionist, naturally contained conflicting points of view, 
and even within the National Labour Party were found such 
contrasting spokesmen as Richard Denman and Ernest Bennett. 
The party which showed the most unanimity was, not 
surprisingly, the Communist Party, and though its achieve- 
ments during the seemingly propitious years of the 1930s 
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were slight its views on Palestine constituted a clear 
challenge to those of the Labour Party leadership and found 
some support in other left wing circles inside and outside 
the Labour Party. 
For the Communist Party British support for Zionism and 
for the National Home was at best hypocritical and at worst, 
as exemplified by Churchill, naked Imperialist opportunism. 
In 1929 Comintern declared that 'the Zionist colonising 
bourgeoisie and their lackeys play the part of outright 
agents of English Imperialism'. 
1 In Parliament Gallacher 
asked: 'is not the real holy place the interest of British 
Imperialism? Is not the interest of private property and 
profit the only concern? 12 
Zionism was a false creed, for Jewish security could 
only be found in a society which had surpassed the epoch of 
the class struggle, and the only valid territorial solution 
was that of the Biro-Bidzhan project in Soviet Russia. 3 In 
the words of one East End Communist: 
'We fought Zionism as a nationalist reactionary creed, 
based on religious aspirations, which could only act 
as a means of dividing workers and eventually doing 
harm to the best interests of Jews and non Jews 
alike. 
' 
1 Degras, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 81. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 313 c. 1365,19 June 1936. See also 
Gallacher's opposition to partition, Vol. 326 c. 2358-9, 
21 July 1937. 
3 See C. Abramsky, 'The Biro-Bidzhan Project 1927-1959', in 
L. Kochan (ed. ), The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917 (London, 
1970) pp. 62-75. 
4 Jacobs, op. cit., p. 187, W. Gallacher, Rise Like Lions (London, 1951) pp. 189-90, G. Lebzelter, Political Anti 
Semitism in England 1918-1939 (London, 1978) p. 160. 
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This view was elaborated by Thomas Hodgkin, writing as 
'British Resident' in a pamphlet published by the 
(Communist) Labour Monthly. In Palestine, he argued, 
following the intrusion of British control and Jewish colon- 
isation both Jews and Arabs were becoming impoverished and 
increasingly exploited. The unity of all workers was the 
only solution but was being artificially blocked. Zionist 
claims that Jewish development brought prosperity to the 
Arab population was manifestly false, for Government policy 
resulted in the sale of land by impoverished Arabs. The 
National Home was 
'striking a wedge into Palestine... to suppose that 
having invaded a country and having disintegrated 
the life of its people you can go in, interested 
only in your life and prosperity, without any 
obligation to the people whose life you have disin- 
tegrated is nonsense. But this is the idea of 
politicians and propagandists of the Jewish National 
Home. 1l 
Though George Sacks, in a Left Book Club publication, 
argued that the conflict was a genuine clash of rival 
nationalisms2 for orthodox Communists the problem could 
only be understood in relation to the class divisions in 
Palestine. But though working class unity remained the 
only solution, since the Arabs opposed both British and 
Zionist exploitation their rebellion was therefore 
'thoroughly justifiable'. 3 Following the murder of Lewis 
1 'British Resident', Who is Prosperous in Palestine 
(Labour Monthly Pamphlets, 1936) p. 39. J. L. Cohen 
unsuccessfully tried to get an article of his own 
published in reply (see LP/WG/9(b)). 
2 G. Sacks, The Jewish Question (London, 1937), see Lebzelten, 
op. cit., Pp. 158-9. 
3 Gallacher in HC Deb. Vol. 313 c. 1369,19 June 1936. 
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Andrews, the District Commissioner for Galilee, Hodgkin 
argued that the murder could not simply be denounced as a 
crime, for 
'would any liberal minded person speak in such terms 
of the killing of some prominent Gestapo official by 
an opponent of the Nazi regime? Yet it is exactly 
the light in which the assassination of Mr. Andrews 
would appear to most Palestine Arabs'. 
At the Foreign Office George Bendel, head of the Eastern 
Department,, found himself, rather to his surprise, in broad 
agreement: 'I think this letter has a great deal of sense 
in it... 1.2 
Such arguments were heard on a number of occasions at 
Labour Party Conferences, beginning in 1930.3 In 1936 Alex 
Gossip, who claimed that his resolution had the support of 
the majority of Jewish members of his Furnishing Trades 
Association, argued that the Arabs deserved the full support 
of the British Labour movement in their struggle for 
national independence The resolution failed, as did a 
further attempt four years later when an amendment condemned 
the 'unscrupulous tactics of the British ruling class, which 
having pursued in Palestine a policy detrimental to Arab 
interests now proposed to vary that policy for the purpose 
of ranging the Arab people alongside it for the furtherance 
of its imperialist aims'. 
5 
1 New Statesman and Nation 9 Oct. 1937. 
2 Minute in FO 371/20818 E6313 28 Oct. 1937. 
3 LPACR 1930, p. 211, see above p. 80. 
4 LPACR 1936, pp. 220-1, see above p. 151. 
5 LPACR 1940, p. 173, see above p. 189. 
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If within the Labour Party such an analysis could do 
nothing more than gain an occasional hearing, it did win 
some support within the ILP, although by this time the 
party was in rapid decline and opinions expressed by ILP 
members on the subject of Palestine were characteristically 
diverse. In Parliament speakers attacked the Palestine 
administration and the motives of the British Government, 
but although Maxton noted in 1936 that 'the ILP, in common 
with most other Socialist Parties, is not inclined to 
accept the Zionist view' 
1 his party nonetheless maintained 
links with various left wing Zionist groups, in particular 
the Marxist Left Poale Zion and the bi-nationalist Hashomer 
Hatzair. 2 
Both groups were strong critics of the 'unpardonable 
neglect' of the Palestine Labour Party in organising Arab 
workers. 
3 The ILP, in a policy statement in 1936, urged 
support for their efforts in building a 'United Front' of 
Arab and Jewish workers and promoting a sense of class unity. 
'In a sentence, the aim must be to combine the workers and 
peasants of both races in the struggle against Jewish 
Capitalism, Arab Feudalism and British Imperialism. ' But 
1 Introduction to Z. Abramovich, Whither Palestine? 
(Published by the Foreign Delegation of the Left Poale Zion 
and Marxist Circles in Palestine, London 1936). 
2 For Left Poale Zion see Flapan, op. cit., pp. 178-83. 
For Hashomer Hatzair see ibid., PP. 183-7, Hattie, op. cit., 
pp. 71-3, Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 297-301. 
3 Reports of Hashomer Hatzair and Left Poale Zion in 
Revolutionary Socialist Bulletin 4 June 1936. 
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though the ILP commended the work of Jewish Socialists and 
acknowledged the effect of Jewish immigration in raising 
the standard of living, it nevertheless warned its 
colleagues to 'give up the idea that they have any right to 
establish a predominantly Jewish State. They must face the 
fact that ultimately Palestine will become part of a 
federation including the Arab States of Syria, Transjordan, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia and probably Egypt'. Furthermore left 
wing Jewish Socialists should consider abandoning the call 
for further Jewish immigration. for the sake of promoting 
the 'unity of the workers and peasants of both races'. 
1 
But for at least two ILP leaders, as for so many in the 
Labour Party, a visit to Palestine had a profound effect. 
In February 1937 the Zionist Review, acknowledging that 
'the more advanced sections of the Labour movement have 
hitherto not always been specially sympathetic to Zionism' 
noted 'a complete change of attitude in some quarters'. 
2 
This referred to a visit of an ILP delegation, comprising 
of John McGovern and Campbell Stephen. 
Both returned full of enthusiasm for Zionist achieve- 
ments. McGovern in particular embraced the Zionist cause 
whole heartedly. In a planned broadcast for Palestine radiq 
banned as 'likely to provoke harmful controversy' he called 
for the entry of an unlimited number of Jews and expressed 
his belief that 
, 
Zionism was'bringing civilisation to the 
Arabs'. 3 In the following year he, and to a lesser extent 
1 'View of the ILP' in ibid., and see NAC to branches, 
30 Sept. 1936. 
2 ZR Feb. 1937. 
3 The Times 30 Jan. 1937. 
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Stephen, were active as Zionist propagandists, taking a 
line close to that of orthodox Labour Zionists, though they 
evidently uncountered considerable criticism within their 
party"1 
Though McGovern ridiculed the idea that Jewish 
immigration posed a threat to the Arab population he too 
continued to call for working class unity, 
2 
and in 1939 his 
party launched a campaign to establish a 'Committee for 
Jewish and Arab Workers Unity in Palestine'. This was 
chiefly the work of Fenner Brockway 
- 
another recent 
visitor to Palestine 
- 
who had learnt from 'Arab and Jewish 
sources' that a public appeal for unity might have some 
success. Its manifesto urged workers of both races to free 
themselves from the grip of imperialism and to establish an 
independent workers state. This would have the support of 
the 'revolutionary socialist workers of Britain and the 
world'. 
3 
This unrealistic campaign received a predictably cool 
reception from Labour Party officials. Gillies noted that 
'the appeal does not impress me. It is a slogan rather 
than a solution. It is typical of ILP statements on 
Palestine which according to my recollection always 
1 eg NAC 1 Aug. 1938 for resolution from the Wimbledon 
branch criticising a speech in Parliament by McGovern. An 
emergency resolution moved by Stephen at the 1937 ILP 
Conference which deplored the violence 'committed by 
terrorist groups under the standard of feudal lords' was 
passed only by a smkll majority, see The Times 31 Mar-1937. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 341 c. 2065-6,24 Nov. 1938. 
3 See F. Brockway to Creech Jones, 18 May 1939 (CJ 30/2/71) 
and 'A Call to the Workers and Peasants of Palestine' (ibid., 72-6). 
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describe the Jewish National Home as one of the aspects of 
British Imperialism'. It was not proper, he felt, for the 
Labour Party to make such an appeal to Jewish Socialists'. 
l 
The Labour Party's attitude was naturally guided by 
that of orthodox Labour Zionists. Locker's opinion was 
sought, and Cohen reported that 'there is a little left 
group in (Palestine) who may be behind the movement'. 2 
When Laski brought the appeal to the attention of the NEC 
a critical submission from Poale Zion was enough to prevent 
any further attention being paid to the appeal. 
3 
Similar calls for working class unity were made in the 
pages of Tribune, for whom the chief villain was the 
Imperial Government seeking to impose its will on the 
natives of Palestine. 
k It accepted that the rebellion was 
'a revolt of Arab Nationalism'. 
5 Reginald Bridgeman 
offered one solution: communal equality and increased 
Jewish immigration, 'but the Arabs must not be expected to 
admit Jewish immigrants to a proportion of more than 30% 
of the country's total'. 
6 
Partition was seen as serving only the interests of the 
British Empire, and was thus a proposal 'no Socialist can 
accept'. Since September 19367 this had been the solution 
of the leading figure of the Socialist League, Stafford 
1 Note by W. Gillies, 22 June 1939 in LP/WG/9(d), 
2 Ibid. 3 NEC 28 June 1939. 
4 Tribune 8 Oct. 1938.5 Ibid., 25 Feb. 1938. 
6 'The Way Out for Palestine', ibid., 24 Mar. 1938. 
7 See above p. 152. 
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Cripps, and he repeated his view two years later. Although 
Palestine could only become a spiritual and cultural home, 
at a time of fearful persecution Jews could not be deprived 
of a chance of reaching safety in Palestine. Partition, as 
a temporary expedient, was essential. In return, 'for the 
price of half a battleship', the Arab sector should be 
developed to ensure economic equality. 
1 
Despite his concern for Jewish refugees in a further 
plan the following year he suggested the temporary cessation 
of Jewish land purchase and a severe limitation on immigra- 
tion. These restrictions would be accepted before 
discussions began and removed if the talks broke down; the 
final goal was to be the creation of two independent 
autonomous states, federated into a Palestine Government. 
Once again his proposals had no effect. 
2 
In an editorial in 1941 Tribune referred to 'that little 
piece of ordinary crookedness' by which the British Govern- 
ment had promised Palestine to both Jews and Arabs during 
the First World War'. 3 This belief, that Palestine had in 
some way been 'promised' to the Arabs, was generally a 
point of agreement between 'Socialist' critics of orthodox 
Zionism and what might be called 'Liberal Colonialist' 
critics within the Labour Party. 
4 
The opposition of this small group to the predominant 
1 Tribune 21 Oct. 1938. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 347 c. 2023-6,22 May 1939. 
3 Tribune 19 Sept. 1941. 
4 See above pp. 57-63. For R. Stokes see also Daily Herald 
23 Oct. 1943, Manchester Guardian 18 Oct. 1938,23 Nov. 
1943,30 Nov. 1943. 
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party attitude stemmed from a basic difference of 
perspective. Supporters of Zionism tended to take a 
'European' view of the problem, stressing the restoration 
of Jewry and the introduction of modernising Socialist 
attitudes into Palestine. 'Liberal Colonialist' critics 
based their opposition to party policy, not on. the 
machinations of imperialist exploitation, but on their 
perception of the needs of the native inhabitants of the 
Empire 
- 
of which Palestine now formed a part. Unlike the 
majority of their colleagues such men 
- 
including at various 
times Ernest Bennett, T. S. B. Williams, Thomas Reid, Sir John 
Maynard and Richard Stokes 
- 
had considerable experience of 
work as Colonial administrators or of travel in the Middle 
East. This, of course, was the reason for the presence of 
many of their number on the Advisory Committees. 
Some, like Thomas Reid, opposed Zionism as harmful in 
itself to the best interests of the Jews themselves. All 
concentrated on the harm they saw being inflicted on the 
native race by white European settlers. Though few would 
agree with H. Douglas Norfolk that the Party's support for 
the Mandate was, in itself, support for the exploitation of 
Palestine's native inhabitants1 concern for the welfare of 
the Arab population was often manifest in suggestions 
denounced as anti Zionist by their critics: that land sales 
should be regulated, that Jewish immigration should be 
restricted to prevent Arab unemployment, or that the Jewish 
population should be limited to a proportion of the total. 
1 LPACR 1937 P. 219. 
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Such men were far from agreeing with the left wing view 
that the Arab rebellion was in part an expression of legit- 
imate Arab nationalism. They nevertheless rejected an 
attitude which undoubtably existed within the party of 'we 
know better for them than they do themselves'=1 and what 
one critic characterised as the tendency to look upon the 
Palestinian Arabs as 'silly children misled by capitalist 
agitators into misunderstanding their best interests'. 2 
There was naturally a variety of opinions within this 
group, which included even those with, as G. T. Garratt 
phrased it, no more-than 'a vague feeling that the Asiastic 
should generally be backed against the European'. 
3 Some 
opposed the very idea of Zionism. Others, whilst welcoming 
the creation of a National Home, increasingly questioned the 
manner of its construction. But the chief concern of this 
group of critics was as expressed by M. P. Fogerty, a parlia- 
mentary candidate, who wrote to Gillies to complain of the 
one sided nature of literature distributed by the party and 
warned that 'excellent as the Jewish case is, it will not 
be possible to get a final settlement in Palestine until 
some understanding of the Arab case is shown'. 
4 IM, 
But for the majority within the party, from those 
deeply concerned about events in Palestine to those with 
only an incidental interest, it was an understanding of the 
Zionist case that predominated. Two reasons for this state 
1 Letter from T. S. B. Williams, see above p. 58. 
2 M. Fogerty to W. Gillies, 17 June 1939 (LP/WG/9(e)). 
3 G. T. Garratt, The Mugwumps and the Labour Party (London, 
1932) p. 156. ' 
4 Letter from Fogerty, op. cit. 
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of affairs have already been emphasised. First, there was 
the existence for over twenty years of the closest institu- 
tional and personal links between Zionists and the'Labour 
Party. To this was added the fact that the party had 
developed since 1917 a tradition of support for Zionist 
aspirations, a tradition constantly referred to both by 
Zionist and Labour Party spokesmen, and on which, in a 
curious way, the events of 1929-30 had served only to 
strengthen. By the 1930s only a drastic change in the 
party's perception of Zionism could have threatened its 
development and this was not to occur until the advent of 
the next Labour Government. 
Many of the reasons for the early espousal by Socialists 
within the Labour Party of the cause of Zionism have been 
noted. By the 1930s these had been strengthened, and in a 
sense supplanted, by a widespread and often passionate 
admiration of the personal and collective achievements of 
Labour Zionists in Palestine. Throughout the interwar 
period visitors to Palestine returned with glowing tributes 
for the work of their Jewish Socialist colleagues. 
' Long 
before the Second World War it had been widely accepted 
that a unique and successful Socialist experiment was in 
progress in Palestine. 
If for many party members Russia remained a model for 
Socialist development and an ideal for Socialists to 
aspire2 for an important minority Zionist work in Palestine 
1 See above pp. 119-123. 
2 B. Jones, The Russia Complex: The British Labour Part 
and the Soviety Union (Manchester, 1977 pp. 11-30. 
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became the shining example. Many who recoiled from 
uncritical enthusiasm for the Soviet system were drawn to 
the idealism and practical Socialism they considered mani- 
fest in Palestine. Chief amongst these was Herbert 
Morrison, who declared in Parliament that 'I have been to 
Russia also, but as a moral proposition it is a finer thing 
than is happening in any part of Russia'. 
1 
Admiration was for the Labour and Socialist organisa- 
tions that had been developed, for the 'economic miracle' 
taking place, and for the perceived physical and spiritual 
regeneration of Jewish workers. The Histadrut, which 
Morrison described as 'one of the most ably organised, best 
led, and most efficient trade union organisations to be 
found in the world'2 was repeatedly presented as the 
epitome of successful trade unionism. For men like Lansbury 
and Middleton on the other hand, the success of Zionism was 
to be measured by the transformation wrought on the status 
and self esteem of individual Jews, from the 'grinding toil 
and sweat of the East London workshops' to their new life 
as 'young men and women fired with a holy zeal who have 
found their fate, have shaped their destiny... '3. 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 313 c. 1387,19 June 1936. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 341 c. 2006,24 Nov. 1938. The Histadrut 
was also the biggest employer in Palestine, and engaged in 
agriculture, marketing, building, shipping, banking, 
insurance and civil aviation. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 326 
comments that 'a wide divergence developed between Socialist 
theory and practice, with considerations of efficiency and 
profitability prevailing over time-honoured doctrine'. 
3 Middleton in ZR 25 Dec. 1942. 
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Middleton's rhetoric is also an example of what might 
be termed the religious dimension of his party's commitment 
to Zionism. Grossman later commented that, even before his 
visit, he knew more of the geography of Palestine than he 
did of Britain1 and indeed for many of his colleagues 
religious faith and a deep knowledge of the Bible was an 
undoubted influence in their support for Jewish regener- 
ation in the Promised Land. Amongst these was Rev. G. Lang, 
MP, who believed 'that it is the Divine Will of Almighty 
God that Palestine should be the national home of the Jewish 
people'2 
For some the development of Zionist Socialism assumed a 
quasi religious aspect. To the TUC Isaacs declared that 'it 
seems to me that the new Star of Bethlehem now shining over 
Jerusalem is the Star of Socialism'3 whilst for Middleton 
Socialism, Zionism and Christianity were often inextricably 
mixed: 
'So we realise that our Socialist task here in 
Britain is akin to that of the Histadrut, and our 
mission is akin to that they cherish of a new and 
fairer Jerusalem raised upon the old historical 
sites that have provided the Jewish race wýth the 
deepest inspirations throughout the ages. ' 
Developments during the 1930s served only to strengthen 
support for Zionism within the party. With the increasing 
persecution of European Jews and the growing problem of 
refugees attention was further drawn to the potential haven 
1 R. Crossnian, Palestine Mission (London, 1947) p. 12. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 426 e. 1000 31 July 1946. 
3 Report of the Annual Conference of the TUC, 1936, p. 393. 
4 See article in JSM 210/129. 
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that Palestine offered. As early as 1935 Attlee, in an 
election statement, had declared that the development of 
Palestine was an 'imperative duty' in the light of the 
sufferings of German Jews, and in 1938 Locker successfully 
urged the Labour Party and the TUC to demand greatly 
increased facilities for Jewish refugees. 
1 In the declara- 
tions of party leaders on the position of Jews in Europe 
references were increasingly made to the role that 
Palestine might play. Party members were often involved in 
cases of individual refugees and Zionists naturally made 
every attempt to link such rescue work with the need for 
immigration and the development of the National Home. 
Teddy Kollek, for example, working to help Jewish youths 
reach Britain and train at the newly established David Eder 
Kibbutz, struck up many contacts amongst British Socialists, 
in particular with Michael Foot. 2 
Labour Zionists also sought, with some success, to tap 
the anti Fascist feeling within the party. Poale Zion 
urged members to 'fight Fascism and work for Palestine 
Labour'3 and though for many Socialists Zionism was 
irrelevant or even harmful in their struggle others were 
increasingly inclined to give Zionism their support. In 
October 1938 the Zionist Review noted with pleasure that 
George Latham, NEC member and Chairman of the British Anti 
Nazi League, had been persuaded to make his first appearance 
on the Zionist platform, 
' 
and many others later found as 
1 NEC 7 Sept. 1938. 
2 T. Kollek, For Jerusalem: A Life (London, 1978) p. 28. 
3 Election pamphlet in LP/WG/11(b). 
4 ZR 27 Oct. 1938. 
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strong supporters of Zionism were to trace their support to 
the anti Fascist struggle in the 1930s. 
No similar developments took place during this period 
to provoke greater sympathy with the grievances of the 
Palestinian Arabs. Though events in Palestine had 
confounded the easy optimism which had led Morgan Jones to 
declare that both peoples were 
. 
'determined to do all they 
can to live in peace, and to agree together'1 throughout 
the Arab Rebellion that official attitude of the party 
remained that 'there (is) no fundamental need for conflict 
between Arab and Jew'. 
2 Following their Labour Zionist 
colleagues party spokesmen consistently argued that 
Palestinian Arabs had benefitted from Jewish immigration 
and enterprise. In Parliament John McGovern, though a 
member of the ILP, expressed the prevailing opinion within 
the Labour Party when he declared that 
'the Jew comes into this part of the world and shows 
a higher standard. He gives cultural development 
and places his knowle ge at the service of the Arabs 
as well as the Jews'. 
The conflict in Palestine could not therefore be seen 
as a clash of rival nationalisms but had to be ascribed to 
the jealousy and bigotry of the Arab ruling classes in 
standing in the way of progress. For H. N. Brailsford 
resistance to the Mandate was 'led and financed by the 
feudal landed class. They dread the western civilisation 
that the Jews bring with them. They fear the progressive 
Socialist thought... they resent what the Jews have done to 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 156 c. 322,4 July 1922. 
2 Herbert Morrison, reported in. The Times 26 Oct. 1938. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 341 c. 2065-6,24 Nov. 1938. 
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organise some groups of Arab workers'. 
' Thus the Arab 
masses had tragically misunderstood their own best 
interests for, according to Morrison, 'if (they) were not 
mischievously stirred up and tyrannised by a well to do and 
privileged minority there would have been considerable and 
advantageous co-operation between the Histadrut and the 
Arab workers. 2 
As Italian and German propaganda was increasingly 
directed at the Arabs of Palestine, and as a number of 
their leaders began flirting with the Fascist powers so the 
cause of their followers became increasingly damned in the 
eyes of the Labour Party. Creech Jones now argued that 'it 
was not so much a conflict between Jews and Arabs as a 
conflict between the new order of democracy and faith and 
the other old order of Fascism and feudalism'. 
3 At party 
conferences several speakers drew parallels between the 
struggles in Palestine and Spain. 
4 
Though party spokesmen might criticise the Palestine 
administration for bias or lack of will there was no 
support for the Arab demand for the ending of the Mandate 
and the immediate creation of a unitary state. In 1936 
1 Reynolds's News 24 May 1936. Later that year he argued 
that 'politically, I believe it would be wise to build the 
National Home as rapidly as possible, even by shock tactics. 
So long as the Jewish minority grows slowly, year by yearn 
the Arab will fight against destiny. But when instead of 
the present 28% the Jewish population consists of a clear 
40% or 50% they will bow to accomplished facts', 
Palestine 12 Aug. 1936. 
2 The Times 26 Oct. 1938. 
3 Jewish Chronicle 11 Mar. 1938, see also LPACR 1939, 
p. 256, and Walter Scheverels of the IFTU at the TUC in 
1938 (Report p. 366). 
4 Lawrence, LPACR 1936, p. 218, Gould, LPACR 1939:, P. 254. 
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Wedgwood declared that his party remained confident that 
'so far from injuring the Arabs the access of British rule 
has been the salvation of the Arab. 
1 There was nonetheless 
a feeling that the impoverishment of the Arab population 
lay at the root of the problem. Thus to meet what she 
regarded as the 'real Arab case' Susan Lawrence urged the 
need for large scale programs of social development. 2 For 
Cripps the whole problem was essentially an economic one; 
he felt that rapid development might lessen support for 
'extremist influences'* 
Creech Jones, for whom the conflict was 'a clash between 
the centuries' was later to write that his party 
'failed to appreciate that in the course of things 
Palestinian Arabs (who after all constituted a 
majority of at least two to one in their country) 
would legitimately claim self government... indeed 
when Arab protests flared into violence Labour was 
hard put to harmonise their belief in self 
determination with barriers to political advance. 
4 
In fact there is little sign that Labour leaders 
included Creech Jones 
- 
found any contradiction in their 
beliefs. Rather, despite the jibes from Conservative pro 
Arab MPs and the arguments of Arab spokesmen, the contra- 
diction was simply ignored. Political advance was to be 
found in co-operation with Jewish Socialists, not in mis- 
guided demands for independence and the resulting 
curtailment of Jewish development. The need for both races 
was for increased Jewish immigration. Furthermore in 
contrast to the apparent intransigence and negativism of 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 310 c. 1083,23 Mar. 1936. 
2 eg Memorandum LP/ImpAC/2/178. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 347 c. 2033-4,22 May 1939. 
4 Notes for unpublished book, in CJ 33/2/9-10. 
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most Arab demands this key requirement was seen as practical 
and positive. As one British trade union official remarked; 
'this is the first time that I have heard representatives 
of a Labour movement asking for more immigration into his 
country. It really is a very pleasant change'. 
1 
As'British Resident' Thomas Hodgkin had seen in the 
comments of Susan Lawrence to the 1936 Conference a sign 
that, for the Labour Party as for certain Conservatives, 
support for Zionism and the Palestine Mandate stemmed from 
Imperial considerations. It is certainly true that 
speeches of certain party leaders and the recommendations 
of the Advisory Committee often referred to the importance 
of Palestine in the defence of the Empire against Fascist 
agression. If for the Advisory Committee this necessitated 
a certain moderation and an appreciation of Arab grievances, 
for others this was a further reason to develop the National 
Home with all speed. 
In Parliament Labour speakers generally reiterated the 
Zionist argument that the surest defence of British 
interests in the Middle East lay in a large and prosperous 
Jewish community. The White Paper was dishonourable and 
inhumane, but also strategically misguided. During the 
debate on the White Paper Lt. Commander Fletcher commented 
revealingly, and in a way which epitomised the not uncommon 
contempt for Palestinian Arabs prevalent in all parties: 
'The Jews I saw in Palestine were young, virile, 
vigorous, full of health, whereas many of the young 
Arabs seemed to me to be sickly, stunted and 
diseased... I presume that the Government fear that 
1 New Judea Jan. 1941. 
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during the war the Arabs in Palestine or elsewhere 
might come in against us. I can only say that in 
any case I, personally, from a military point of 
view, would prefer a Jewish to an Arab buffer state 
in Palestine. 
This was undoubtably the view of the small group of 
Labour Imperialist pro Zionists within the party. Their 
leading spokesman was Josiah Wedgwood who, by the violence 
of his advocacy and the persistence of his Parliamentary 
interventions often overshadowed his more orthodox 
colleagues. 2 For Wedgwood Zionism was not only essential 
for the Jewish people but could, if properly encouraged, 
play a crucial part in the civilising mission of the British 
Empire and make secure the 'Clapham Junction of the Common- 
wealth'. In 1928 he expounded his views in a book entitled 
The Seventh Dominion in which he denounced the Palestine 
administration and outlined his solution of Dominion Home 
Rule. 3 
To further this aim the Seventh (Palestine) Dominion 
League was formed in-February 1929. Within the Labour 
Party Wedgwood's leading support was Commander Kenworthy, 
who as Lord Strabolgi was Wedgwood's leading ally 
throughout the 1930s and perpetrated his ideas after the 
4 latter's death during the war. Though the League 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 350 c. 846,20 July 1939. 
2 In the index of Hansard for the years November 1935 
- November 1939 Wedgwood achieved 253 references under the 
heading of 'Palestine'. This compares with. Williams (158),. 
Fletcher (53), Adams (47) and Creech Jones (24). 
3 See below p. 10l Rose, op. cit., pp. 71-92. 
4 See above p. 308. 
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collapsed with the crisis of 1929 it reappeared eight years 
later when the Peel Report seemed once more to have thrown 
the future of the Mandate into question. The idea was in 
fact 'quite impracticable'. I 
There were naturally few within the Labour Party 
willing to follow Wedgwood in his attempt to bind the 
causes of Zionism and Empire. His colleagues also took 
some care to distance themselves from his more extreme 
pronouncements, which included in 1938 a call, for the 
arming of the Jewish community and a campaign of passive 
resistance. 
2 Nonetheless his opinions on the culpability 
of both Arab leaders and the Palestine administration, 
and his enthusiasm for Jewish achievements, were generally 
shared by his colleagues, if less fiercely expressed, and 
his position as a senior Labour Party politician served 
further to publicise his party's commitment to the Zionist 
cause. 
1 Rose, op. cit., p. 92. 
2 The Times 16 Mar. 1938. 
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CHAPTER V 
The War Years 1940 = 1945 
A. Labour and the Jewish Fighting Force 
On 30 August 1939 Weizmann wrote to the Prime Minister 
offering, on behalf of the Jewish Agency, 'to enter into 
immediate arrangements for utilising Jewish manpower, 
technical ability (and) resources'. This marked the 
beginning of Zionist efforts to secure the creation of a 
'Jewish Fighting Force'. 1 The ultimate Zionist aim was the 
formation of an exclusively Jewish army unit, fighting under 
a Jewish flag. Official British reaction varied with the 
military situation, and a Jewish Brigade Group did not see 
action until the last stages of the war in Europe. For 
neither side was it a simple military problem. 'From the 
outset Zionist offers of military assistance were linked to 
political expectations, and treated by the British 
Government accordingly. 12 
The question of the Jewish Fighting Force was a specific 
issue for Zionists to promote within the British political 
arena, and this naturally involved the Labour Party. Senior 
Labour figures had been approached on the subject as early 
as autumn 1939 when Weizmann. explained his case to Attlee, 
Greenwood and Williams. He also spoke to Ernest Bevin. 3 
I C. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (London, 1965) p. 247. The 
best surveys of the long and tortuous series of 
negotiations are ibid., pp. 247-58,74-8, Cohen, op. cit., 
PP- 98-124, B. Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (Oxford, 1979) pp. 272-88. 
2 Cohen, op. cit., p. 98. 
3 Eban, op. cit., pp. 30-1. 
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The fall of the Chamberlain Government seemed to mark a 
significant shift in the Zionists' favour. The new Prime 
Minister's sympathies were well known, and with the entry 
of Attlee and Greenwood into the War Cabinet even Ben Gurion 
acknowledged that 'three of the five members of the War 
Cabinet are friendly to us'. 
1 Labour leaders were eager to 
confirm the change. On 22 May Greenwood and Morrison saw 
Locker and Hos 'and told us to remember that things are 
quite different in the War Cabinet now, they are 'three to 
two' and the Prime Minister (is) on our side in Jewish 
matters'. The gentiles also expressed interest in Zionist 
proposals for the war effort, and asked for further 
information. 2 
At the end of July the Government decided to raise six 
Palestinian companies, three Jewish and three Arab, and to 
recruit in roughly equal numbers from each community, 
3 
a 
limitation Zionists found extremely disappointing. In 
their efforts to circumvent the 'parity' restriction an 
important ally was, rather surprisingly, the new Minister 
of Labour and National Service, Ernest Bevin. 
On the Zionists' behalf Bevin had a number of conversa- 
tions with the Colonial Secretary, Lord Lloyd, and brought 
the subject to the attention of Churchill. He also 
suggested a possible solution to the restriction: Jewish 
1 Memorandum dated 14 May 1940 quoted in A. Eban, 'Tragedy 
and Triumph' in Weisgal & Carmichael (eds. ) op. cit., p. 258. 
2 'Dugdale Diaries' 14 May 1940, see Dalton Diaries 
25 May 1940 for a similar meeting. 
3 Cohen, op. cit., p. 103. 
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volunteers in excess of the Arab number should be sent to 
Egypt as part of the general defence forces in the Middle 
East. 1 This was taken up by Weizmann in talks with the 
Prime Minister on 9 August, and afterwards secured the 
agreement of Lloyd. Bevin was assured that his suggestion 
'riet with a very favourable reception, and seems likely to 
provide a way of settling the difficulties raised by the 
Colonial Office'. 2 
It is clear that at this stage Bevin stood high in 
Vieizmann's estimation. In December 1940 he recommended 
further talks with Bevin as 'the only man who understood 
(our) problem, and was willing to listen to them and take 
action'. 
3 This appreciation found expression in the 
Zionist Review. On 23 August the paper carried an article 
on Bevin, 'a great friend of Labour Zionism'. The same 
month Tribune urged the creation of a Jewish Army 'into 
which any British Jew may apply to be transferred and any 
foreign Jews can be enrolled without restrictiont. 
4 
Other Labour figures were involved in the Zionists' 
efforts. Creech Jone was kept fully informed of their 
negotiations with the overnment, and acted as a link with 
s Bevin. In April, when Zionists were particularly 
concerned to see the establishment of a Palestine Home 
Guard Mrs. Dugdale noted that 'the Labour members of the 
1 Jewish Agency Executive, Minutes 9 Aug. 1940 (L. Stein 
Papers, Box 123). 
2 C. VJeizmann to E. Bevin, 4 Sept. 1940 (ibid. ). 
3 JA Executive, Minutes 30 Dec. 1940 (ibid. ). 
4 Tribune 9 Aug. 1940. 
5 B. Locker to Creech Jones, 
op. cit. ). 
5 Mar. 1941 (L. Stein Papers, 
215 
War Cabinet (are) our best method and Berl (Locker) takes 
that in hand'. 1 
By now there was evidently a desire to supplement 
informal contacts by an official appeal to the Labour Party. 
Dov Hos had planned to present the case in person, but 
following his death in a road accident in Palestine2 the 
Histadrut submitted its suggestions by letter, which were 
considered by the NEC on 23 April. 
3 This told of the desire 
of Jews in Palestine to contribute to the British war effort, 
but also of the inadequate 'Palestinian' formations, for 
which few Arabs had volunteered. The letter concluded: 
'We feel that we have a right to demand the establish- 
ment of a Jewish Force ranking equally with other 
united forces that are fighting shoulder to shoulder 
with the British army. It is only in that form that 
the Jewish effort in this war can attain full 
fruition and become an adequate expression of our 
suffering in the Nazi countries, on the one hand, and 
of our Jewish Zionist education in Palestine on the 
other. ' 
Passing from the NEC to the International Sub Committee, 
the letter was finally submitted to the PLP 'with a request 
1 'Dugdale Diaries' 29 Apr. 1941. Tribune (8 Aug. 194? ) 
later commented that 'it was the Labour Party leaders who 
during the war mobilised thousands of Palestine Jews to 
serve in the British forces'. 
2 Has was killed on 29 December 1940, see obituary in 
LPACR 1941, P. 43. Snell, Creech Jones and Middleton 
spoke at a Memorial Meeting in London, and among many 
messages of sympathy were those from Bevin, and his close 
friend Herbert Morrison, see ZR 10 & 17 Jan. 1941. 
3 NEC 23 Apr. 1941. D. Ramez to Labour Party, 18 Feb. 1941 
circulated to all NEC members, ibid. 
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that the whole problem be examined and particularly, and 
most urgently, in view of the present situation, the 
question of the adequacy of the Armed Jewish Forces in 
Palestine'. ' On the same day Mrs. Dugdale received con- 
firmation from Noel Baker that the party intended to raise 
the question of the Jewish Home Guard in Parliament. 
2 The 
Government, however, could ensure that Labour objections 
were dealt with by a Labour MP, George Hall. 
3 
During 1941 Zionist communications to the Labour Party 
continued to include references to the need for a Jewish 
Fighting Force, and many Labour MPs evinced considerable 
sympathy with their aim. 
4 At the annual conference Zionist 
representatives were able to propagate their views and 
distribute documents to delegates. 5 But it was not until 
the following year, as American pressure mounted and the 
warfare in the Western desert reached a crisis, that the 
Labour Party found itself fully involved in the issue. 
On 10 July Poale Zion passed an emergency resolution 
demanding a Jewish Home Guard and a Jewish Fighting Force 
within the British Army, which it sought to give the widest 
publicity through its newly established newsletter Jewish 
6 Labour News. At the end of the month a conference and 
1 Int Sub 29 Apr. 1941. 
2 'Dugdale Diaries' 29 Apr. 1941. 
3 See eg HC Deb. Vol. 371 c. 1840-1,, 28 May 1941, Vol. 373 
c. 320,10 July 1914.1. Hall was then Colonial Under Secretary. 
4 eg see J. Parker to H. Muggeridge, 30 May 1941 (FCB 176/6/ 
15-6), W. Leach (Bradford Central) in ZR 30 May 1941, and later resolutions from Manchester City Labour Party, 14 
Sept. 1942 (LP/int/, 5(, e)). 
5 ZR 6 June 1941. 
6 Jewish Labour News 10 July 1942. 
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rally were held in Liverpool, organised by the local Labour 
Party, Trades Council and Poale Zion to express support for 
a Jewish Fighting Force which, according to the Zionist 
Review 'was now accepted by the majority of progressive 
opinion and was gathering momentum'. 
' Speakers included 
Locker, Sidney Silverman and Mrs. Braddock. Many Labour 
members sent messages of support. 
2 
In Parliament a systematic campaign was mounted. In 
May a Committee for a Jewish Fighting Force was constituted 
which by July included Wedgwood (Joint Chairman), Janner 
(Joint Secretary), Strabolgi, George Ridley, Creech Jones, 
Tom Williams, David Frankel, Ben Riley, Lady Snowden, Alice 
Bacon and Harold Laski. At a meeting arranged by Adams, 
Creech Jones and Ridley, Labour MPs heard Locker speak on 
the problems of Jewish defence. Nevertheless at a meeting 
the following week chaired by Victor Cazalet at least one 
pro Zionist observer was angered by the caution shown by 
most MPs. 
4 
One Labour peer disdaining the slightest caution was 
1 ZR 31 July 1941. 
2 Including Creech Jones, James Walker and Harold Laski. 
See also Tribune 19 June, 17 & 31 July 1942. 
3 ZR 22 May 1942, Jewish Labour News 17 July 1942. A 
'Jewish Army Committee' was also set up which demanded a 
Jewish Army but opposed Zionist political objectives, see 
New Judea Aug-Sept. 1942. 
4_ '(Cazalet) said that very few MPs would support it but a 
large number would lend it sympathy but not their names. 
How typical!... After much talk it was decided to send a 
delegation to the Prime Minister asking him to adopt a 
Jewish Fighting Force within the British army as a Cabinet decision', Meinertzhagen, op. cit., p. 185, entry for 21 
July 1942. 
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Lord Wedgwood. 1 In a broadcast to America in December he 
had urged the United States to take the responsibility for 
building a Jewish State 'from our enfeebled hands'. It was 
an angry and violent speech: 
'We want the Jews of Palestine armed in the sure and 
certain conviction that once armed, ' they will never 
surrender those arms, save with their lives, either 
to Hitler's Germans or the British Administration in 
Palestine. First arms, then land, then freedom!... 
The whole Administration, from the top to the Irish 
police who masquerade as British, are against the 
half million Jews of Palestine. They will never let 
them have arms, nor land, nor free immigration, nor 
a refuge, nor a home 
- 
never! They don't like Jews. 
And there are enough anti Semites and crypto- 
Fascists still in Great Britain to back up the 
Hitler policy and spirit'. 2 
Anger at his remarks was not confined to Government 
circles, and his speech was seen as a blatant incitement to 
violence. Defending himself in the House of Lords, where he 
had the full support of Strabolgi, 
3 he was perfectly candid 
about his aims: 
'Why did I appeal directly to America? Because I am 
not playing a game, but trying to get arms for the 
Jews. Why did I tell the Americans the ugly truth? 
Because I wish to force the hands of the British 
1 He was one of 'three well known friends of the Zionist 
cause' ennobled at the end of 1941: Wedgwood Benn, Wedgwood 
and Lt. Cmdr. Fletcher, ZR 26 Dec. 1941. Wedgwood had 
previously been pursuing this topic in the Commons, see 
Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 283 for his participation in a 
delegation to the Colonial Secretary on 17 October. 
2 HL Deb. Vol. 123 c. 182,9 June 1942. See also C. Wedgwood 
op. cit., pp. 196-99, and Wedgwood's article 'Appeal to the 
New World' in ZR 4 Apr. 1941. 
3 'I hope my noble friend 
... 
will stick to his guns on this 
question. I hope that he will be ready to broadcast again, 
and that if necessary he will go to America and say those 
sort of things which he said here. I am proud to be assoc- 
iated with him on this question, and I support him through 
thick and thin', c. 195. Tribune (12 June 1943) thought 
Wedgwood's speech 'a breath of fresh air'. 
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Foreign Office. '1 
His party proceeded at a more careful pace. Following 
the resolution of Poale Zion, and communications from other 
Zionist and Jewish bodies Gillies again brought the question 
to the attention of the International Sub Committee, 
2 James 
Walker, who had been active among the PLP, was directed to 
consider the need for a delegation to the Colonial Secretary. 
But although the party's efforts in Parliament3 continued 
the Colonial Secretary eventually received, not a deputation, 
but a letter from. Middleton protesting at his department's 
unhelpful attitude. 
4 
At a meeting of the National Council of Labour it 
emerged that the Histadrut and the Committee for a Jewish 
Fighting Force had asked for the help of the TUC. 
5 A 
statement was heard from Lord Nathan6 and from Greenwood, 
vrho told of discussions with Locker. But the conclusions of 
the meeting indicate that sympathy with Zionist wishes 
1 c. 185. See also HL Deb. Vol. 122 c. 21-15,10 Mar. 1942. 
In 1938 Strabolgi had called for an 100,000 strong Jewish 
army in Palestine, see The Times 28 Nov. 1938. 
2 Int Sub 17 July 1942, telegrams from Histadrut 30 June & 
20 July 1942 (LP/WG/5(e)). 
3 B. Locker to L. Scott, 21 July 1942 leading to a question by 
George Ridley, HC Deb. Vol. 381 c. 193-4,1 Aug. 1942. 
4 In reply the Colonial Secretary complained of the many 
'unhelpful statements' that had been made, Cranborne to J. 
Middleton, 31 July 1942 (LP/4YG/5(e)) 
. 
5 NCL Minutes 21 July 1942. 
6 Standing as a Liberal candidate in Whitechapel in 1924 
Nathan had expressed his strong support for the National Home, 
but though introduced in the Lords by Snell and Strabolgi, he was 
by no means a dedicated Zionists: 'there is no getting over the 
fact that, if the Jews have been out of Palestine for 2,000 years, 
the Arabs have been there for 2,000 years, and the Arab claim to 
Palestine is not one which can be lightly set on ohe side', H. Hyde 
Strong For Service: The Life of Lord Nathan of Churt (London, 19683 (London, 193v) pp. 79,136,157-8. 
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might not be sufficient: 'in view of the complexity of the 
question and the need for a decision to be taken in the 
light of high policy, the matter should be left in the 
hands of the Government'. 
If the demands of 'high policy' was one factor prevent- 
ing the full support of the Labour movement, a meeting of 
the NEC the following day revealed another. The Inter- 
national Sub Committee had been asked to continue to watch 
developments, but it emerged that some members felt that 
there were in fact few obstacles in the way of Jews who 
wished to join the British forces in Palestine. T 
James Griffiths, speaking for the NEC and the NCL, 
showed similar doubts when the matter was debated in the 
House of Commons on 6 August. His organisations, he said 
'understand and fully appreciate how the Jewish people must 
feel in these days when the war gets daily and hourly 
nearer Palestine' but he admitted with some candour that: 
'it is very difficult for MPs and outside bodies: 
like the body with which I am associated, to make a 
definite pronouncement upon. a matter of that kind. 
We have not the requisite knowledge to enable us to 
arrive at a decision as to whether the Government's 
fears about possible political repercussions are 
well grounded'. 
This appears to have ended official Labour Party 
concern with the matter, although two years later, follow- 
ing Weizmann's appeal to Churchill for a Jewish. Force to 
participate in the liberation-of Europe, Labour members 
again made some effort to support Zionist demands. In May 
1 NEC 21 July 1942. The New Statesman similarly would not 
accept fully the Zionist line, arguing that the Jewish 
Fighting Force 'must not be sent to Palestine... or any 
part of the Middle East'. See criticism in ZR 21 Nov. 1941. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 382 c. 1248,6 Aug. 1942. 
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1944 Strabolgi tabled a motion in the House of Lords urging 
the formation of a Jewish Army, and a similar motion in the 
Commons had the support of 63 MPS. 
1 In July Mack and 
Griffiths were among members of a delegation led by 
Strabolgi which met the Secretary of State for War, 2 but 
Tribune now perversely questioned the wisdom of establish- 
ing a Jewish Brigade on the grounds that 'it might lead to 
the under estimation of the Jewish contribution to the war. 
3 
Though there had been evident sympathy for Zionist aims 
within the Labour Party support for a Jewish Fighting Force 
was not sufficiently widely held to make a significant 
impression on Government policy. The issue also suggested 
that the party's new position had drawbacks as well as 
advantages for the Zionists. The positions of power now 
held by sympathetic Labour politicians undoubtably gave the 
Zionists some much needed support inside the Government. 
But war time exigencies made the party less willing 
officially to voice criticism, and led to a greater accept- 
ance of the demands of 'high policy', as perceived by a 
Government which now included the party's own representa- 
tives. 
B. The Jewish Massacres 
The Labour Party entered the war with the strongest 
sympathy for the plight of European Jewry, which augmented 
and strengthened its traditional commitment to Zionism. By 
1 Zit 5 May 1944. 
2 Ibid. ) 14 July 1944. 
3 Tribune 26 May 1944. 
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1944 revelations of the appalling massacres of Jews in 
Europe had confirmed still further the belief of most party 
members that in the development of Palestine lay the main 
hope for the Jewish people in the post war world. 
Proposals accepted by the Annual Conference that year were 
the work of one man, but genuinely reflected majority 
opinion within the party decisively influenced by events of 
the previous years. 
It is, therefore, necessary to consider the reactions 
of the Labour Party to the persecutions of the Jews in 
Europe. This involves consideration of the plight of Jewish 
refugees, including those attempting to reach Palestine 
despite the restrictions of the White Paper. In turn this 
raised the question of the development of the Yishuv and 
the future of Palestine. For Zionists any separation of the 
questions of the Jewish massacres and the future of 
Palestine was absurd and unthinkable. This and later 
sections will attempt to indicate to what extent this 
belief came to be accepted within the Labour Party. 
Throughout the war the Labour Party received requests 
from numerous Zionist and Jewish bodies asking for assist- 
ance in facilitating the escape of Jews from Europe and 
their resettlement in Palestine, but the ones which will be 
particularly noted are those from the organs of Palestine 
Labour 
- 
Mapai and the Histadrut 
- 
and from their sister 
organisations in Britain, Poale Zion and the Palestine 
Labour Political Committee. Partly because of the close 
links between Labour Zionists and the Jewish Agency certain 
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activities of this organisation will also be noted. 
1 
It should be noted in passing that the Labour Party 
remained willing during these years to intervene at the 
Zionists' request on a variety of questions concerning the 
Yishuv; for example in the summer of 1941 the Histadrut 
twice asked for help in modifying legislation proposed by 
the Palestine Government. On both topics Labour MPs were 
later found asking questions in the House of Commons. 
2 
Throughout the war Zionists brought to the attention of 
party spokesmen the plight of refugees reaching Palestine 
but there refused admission under the White Paper regula- 
tions, and it is evident that among party members as a 
whole (with the exception of certain Labour members of the 
Government)the harsh treatment meeted out to aspiring 
immigrants aroused great concern and sympathy. In 
September 1939 Locker discussed with Dalton the question of 
the refugee ship Tiger Hill and urged that Greenwood raise 
the matter with the Colonial Secretary. 
3 Yet it seems that 
when the Labour Party joined the Coalition Government once 
again the Minister most active on the Zionists' behalf was 
Ernest Bevin. Thus in November, when Jewish refugees 
arriving in Haifa were threatened with deportation, Dov Hos 
1 Berl Locker headed the political bureau of the Agency in 
London from 1938. Maurice Rosette, a London born leader of 
Poale Zion, was in charge of the Information Department 
between 1942 and 1948. 
2 For the Palestine Trades Dispute Act see Histadrut to 
Labour Party, 22 July 1941 (JSM 210/188), 18 Feb. 1941 
(LP/WG/5(a)), HC Deb. Vol. 385, c. 1709,10 Dec. 1942. For 
the Surface Water Bill see Histadrut to Labour Party & 
W. Gillies to Lindsay Scott,. 3 July 1942 (ibid., ) HC Deb. 
Vol. 380 c. 1231t 15 July 1942. 
3 Meeting 12 Sept. 1939 (HEN/18/7). On 2 September the 
Tier Hill, landing 1,400 illegal immigrants on a Tel Aviv beach, a been fired on by a British patrol. 
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hastened to contact Bevin, who also received complaints 
from American Trade Unionists forwarded by the Internation- 
al Sub Committee. As a result Bevin, so the Jewish Agency 
believed, went 'straight to the Prime Minister who ordered 
Lloyd not to send the (refugee) ships away'. I 
Nevertheless refugees were transferred to the 
S. S. Patria and preparations made for their deportation. 
But following the arrival of a third ship the Haganah 
placed an explosive charge in the engine room which,, 
although designed to disable the ship resulted in the 
sinking of the Patria with great loss of life. The 
incident outraged the Yishuv, and set the temper of the 
distrustful and bitter relationship between it and the 
Palestine Government which was to persist throughout the 
war. Zionist complaints soon reached the NEC, whilst in 
the Commons Wedgwood took the offensive. 
2 In the Cabinet 
there was a strong feeling that the survivors should be 
allowed to remain in Palestine, despite the opposition of 
the Colonial Office, and of General Wavell. Churchill 
later commented that 'I overruled the General... all went 
well and not a dog barked'. 
3 Yet the Jewish Agency 
ascribed the cancellation of the deportation order to the 
4 
intervention of Bevin. 
1 lnt Sub 25 Nov. 1940, 'Dugdale Diaries' 22 Nov. 1940. 
2 NEC 27 Nov. 1940, considering a letter from the PLPC. 
HC Deb. Vol. 367. C-995 11 Dec. 1940, Vol. 367 c. 1238-9, 
18 Dec. 1940. 
3 Cohen, op. cit., p. 111. For the Patria incident see 
ibid., p. 95, Sykes, op. cit., pp. 2 70, Wasserstein, 
op. cit., pp. 67-8,70-3, Bethell, op. cit., pp. 93-6. 
4 'Prof. Namier said that they might tell Mr. Creech 
Jones that the administration had 'taken it out of' the 
Atlantic refugees because Mr. Bevin had obtained 
cancellation of the deportation order against the refugees 
on the Patria', (JA Minutes, 15 Jan. 1941, L. Stein Papers). 
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Bevin's help, through the good offices of Creech Jones, 
continued to be sought over questions of the treatment of 
refugees. 
1 In striking contrast to his later views 
Weizmann now confessed that the had a great belief in Mr. 
Bevin, who was open minded and energetic'. 
2 On 28 January 
1941 Bevin, Creech Jones, Locker and Weizmann dined at the 
Dorchester Hotel. 3 Weizmann took the opportunity to 
explain the Zionist demands more fully, and raised the 
question of further deportation. 'Mr. Bevin seemed to be 
most disturbed 
- 
first by the facts themselves, and 
secondly because he had heard nothing of them: the Cabinet 
had been consulted about the Patria people, why not about 
the other ships. ' Bevin promised to investigate, and to 
invite Churchill to a lunch party Weizmann was arranging. 
The following day Creech Jones reported that Bevin had 
been 'much impressed', and had written a strong letter to 
the Colonial Secretary. According to Creech Jones, the 
latter 'had been very much disturbed because a member of 
the War Cabinet had taken a hand'. 
4 
Yet in the face of the White Paper policy Bevin could 
do little more than make his dissatisfaction known, and 
indeed other Labour ministers sympathised more with Lloyd's 
irritation. In April a telegram from the Histadrut to the 
1 Ibid., 16 Dec. 1940, 'Dugdale Diaries' 15 Jan. 1941. 
2 JA Minutes, 8 Jan. 1941. 
3 Report of dinner in L. Stein Papers op. cit. 
4 JA Minutes, 7 Feb. 1941. On 24 January Weizmann had 
written to Lloyd protesting at the violent removal of 
refugees from the Athlit camp and their deportation to 
Mauritius, see Bethell, o 
. 
cit., p. 98. 
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Labour Party warned that 'it is impossible to expect the 
Jewish community to acquiesce to this treatment'. It 
passed to Attlee, and thence to George Hall, already 
considerably embarrassed by his position as a spokesman on 
Palestine. To Attlee he replied plaintively 'you, I know, 
appreciate our difficulties in this matter'. 
Such developments doubtless helped prompt the Histadrut 
to make a fresh approach to the Labour Party and a letter,, 
considered in April 1941, dwelt on the problems of Jewish 
immigration into Palestine '(on which) the Jewish contribý- 
ution to the war effort depends'. 
2 It told of the plight 
of the Jews in occupied lands, of the obstacles placed in 
the way of Jewish refugees 
- 
the lack of assistance for 
Jews stranded in Balkan countries, the refusal of 
immigration certificates, the expulsion, of illegal immi- 
grants. 'It is only the policy of the Government which 
prevents Jewish refugees being saved for Palestine and 
their service utilised for the common cause'. These 
complaints were repeated by Nathan Jackson, who represented 
Poal Zion at the annual conference in June. 
3 
The following month the International Sub Committee 
interviewed a delegation of Labour Zionists, who dwelt on 
the plight of Jewish refugees both in itself and also as 
intimately bound up with the future development of 
1 Int Sub 1 Apr. 1941, W. Gillies to C. Attlee, 1 Apr. 1941 
LP/Int/5(a), G. Hall to C. Attlee, 3 Apr. 1941 (Attlee Papers). 
2 During 1940 Poale Zion had submitted two memoranda on 
the subject of refugees, ZR 16 Aug. 1940. 
3 LPACR 1941 pp. 160-1. 
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Palestine: 'after the war a great migration problem will 
inevitably arise from masses of Jews in Central and East 
Europe... and Palestine will have to play a decisive part 
in solving this problem'. 
l 
In March the following year the plight of Jewish 
refugees was tragically illustrated by the sinking, with 
great loss of life, of the immigrant boat Struma. 
2 Zionist 
protests quickly reached Transport House, and local Labour 
3 
parties voiced their concern. In Parliament David Adams 
demanded that any further refugees in a similar plight be 
admitted into Palestinek whilst Tribune condemned the 'blind 
stupidity of the Colonial Office' and asked: 'who then is 
responsible for doing Goebbels' work at the Colonial Office 
or inside the Palestine administration? 
5 When the NEC met 
a week later, following renewed protests, further action 
was felt necessary, and as a result a deputation was sent 
to Lord Cranborne, the new Colonial Secretary,, to press for 
freer immigration into Palestine 'with particular reference 
to the refugees from Nazism'. 
6 
Armw1wg ntal-- 
With the annual conference, Nathan Jackson wrote to 
1 Int Sub 11 July 1941, interview with Locker, Levenberg, 
Jackson and Kollek. See also Poale Zion memorandum 'The 
Jewish People and Palestine', para. 11, in NEC minutes. 
2 The Struma, whose refugees had been refused entry to 
Palestine, sank in the Black Sea. See esp. Bethell, op. cit., 
pp. 113-20, Wasserstein, op. cit., pp. 143-57. 
3 Int Sub 16 Mar. 1942. ' For example, the Leeds Labour 
Party, at the instigation of a Poale Zion delegate, unani- 
mously passed a resolution demanding 'a public enquiry and 
possible change of personnel', ZR 26 Mar. 1942. 
4 HC Deb. Vol. 378 c. 1219,12 Mar. 1942. 
5 Tribune 6 Mar. 1942. 
6 NEC 25 Mar. 1942. 
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Middleton arguing that in the worsening conditions there 
was now a pressing need for a definite resolution on the 
subject from the NEC. 1 To this the International Sub 
Committee agreed, and a resolution was presented by Noel 
Baker on 28 May which, although modified somewhat by Hugh 
Dalton, clearly summarised the Zionist view of the problem: 
'The Conference records its detestation of the 
sufferings inflicted upon the Jewish people. It 
reaffirms its determination that, in the new inter- 
national order after the war, Jews shall enjoy civil, 
religious and economic equality with all other 
citizens, and that international assistance shall be 
given, to promote immigration and settlement in the 
Jewish National Home in Palestine'. 2 
Two days earlier, replying to Jackson's short speech, 
George Dallas had commented that 'we feel as deeply as Mr. 
Nathan Jackson on the sinking of the Struma. We have kept 
the matter very much to the front, and Mr. Jackson may rest 
assured we are continuing to watch the whole situation in 
Palestine very closely'. 
3 
Indeed as definite reports of Jewish massacres reached 
the outside world to watch and protest was all that the 
party could do. On 4 December, as part of the growing wave 
of protests, the Foreign Secretary received an NEC deputa- 
tion which 'examined the problem with him in all its 
aspects, and shortly afterwards a resolution was adopted 
4 
1 N. Jackson to J. Middleton 20 May 1942 LP/Int/5 a)),. -Lint 
Sub 22 Apr. & 21 May 1942. 
2 LPACR 1942, p. 151. For Poale Zion's draft see N. Jackson 
to J. Middleton böp. cit.., The resolution was curiously similar 
to Webb's draft some 25 years earlier, but although it was 
the very least the party could be expected to say Jackson 
stressed that its adoption 'would constitute a great 
encouragement to the Jewish people in"all countries and 
especially to our work and situation in Palestine'. 
3 LPACR 1942, p. 128- 
4 Ibid., p. 39. 
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and published entitled 'The Massacre of the Jews', which 
'appealed to the conscience of civilised mankind to arise 
in passionate protest against the bloodiest crime in 
history'. The language of the declaration underlining the 
hopelessness of the situation 
- 
'at least make an effort to 
save the children'. 
1 
Though no mention was made of Palestine, Zionist 
organisations expressed gratitude for the declaration and 
suggested further proposals that the party could press on 
the Government. 2 Poale Zion also published a pamphlet 
Under Sentence of Death, with an introduction by Middleton, 
which the Labour Party helped distribute. 
3 
In answer to a Private Notice question from Sidney 
Silverman4 Eden had reported to the House of Commons the 
facts of the genocide being organised by the Nazis. This 
had led a Labour MP, Will Cluse, successfully to urge the 
House 'to rise in their places and stand in silence in 
support of this protest against disgusting barbarism'. 
5 
1 NEC 15 Dec. 1942, see also T. D. Burridge, British Labour 
and Hitler's War (London, 1976) p. 67. 
2 NEC 20 Dec. 1942 considering communications from Poale 
Zion, the Jewish Agency and the World Jewish Congress. 
3 Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Poale Zion, Under Sentence 
of Death (London, 1942). The pamphlet, with a black border, 
contained details of the massacres, Labour Party statements, 
and a plan of action which included the opening of the doors 
of Palestine, shelter for refugees in the British Empire and 
in neutral countries, and the formation of a Jewish Fighting 
Force. 
4 In Parliament many Jewish Labour MPs and peers 
- 
including Silverman, Silkin, Frankel, Mack and Nathan. 
- 
were active in attempting to help organise and co-ordinate 
relief for Jewry (see correspondence in Board of Deputies, 
C 10/2/8), Brodetsky, op. cit., p. 228. 
5 HC Deb. Vol. 385 c. 32,17 Dec. 1942 (Cluse was PPS to 
Stafford Cripps). For the effect of the gesture see 
Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 173, but for a sceptical 
contemporary reaction see Tribune 25 Dec. 1942. 
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Yet appeals from Labour MPs, including Arthur Greenwood, 
that urgent relief for Jewish refugees should include the 
lifting of immigration restrictions into Palestine were 
unavailing. 
1 It fell to Clement Attlee, on 19 January, to 
outline the Government's policy, and to Cluse's interject- 
ion that 'as we are, after all, in control of Palestine, 
cannot we ease the immigration arrangements for the quota 
so that a larger number (of refugees) can go to Palestine'. 
Attlee could give no positive reply. 
2 
Zionists felt that statement to be totally inadequate, 
and from Locker and the Histadrut came further suggestions 
and a demand for $the most active intervention for rescue 
action of a material character'. The NEC was clearly in 
sympathy with these appeals and issued a further resolution 
which urged that new measures be adopted 'with the minimum 
of delay and the maximum of co-operation and the maximum of 
effectiveness'. 
3 On 29 January Labour MPs joined an all 
party delegation which pressed on Attlee, Eden, Morrison 
and Stanley the need for further action. 
4 
Many Labour Ministers were concerned about the continu- 
ing operation of the Palestine White Paper, 
5 but on the 
other hand there is little sign of any bold or compassion- 
ate intervention on behalf of Jewish refugees. On the 
1 eg. HC Deb. Vol. 386 c. 32,19 Jan. 1943. 
2 Ibid., c. 32-3,102. 
3 NEC 26 Jan. 1943. Tee NCL issued a similar statement 
two days later. 
4 The Times 30 Jan. 1943. The delegation was led by 
Greenwood, and included Sidney Silverman. 
5 See below pp. 275-6. 
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question of the entry of such refugees into Palestine the 
intervention of Bevin appears to have been unique; in 
contrast was the apparent attitude of Attlee whom Weizmann 
described as behaving 'very much in the manner of Lord 
Passfield'. 1 
Most Labour Ministers evidently concurred with the 
Government's belief that refugees would best be served by 
a speedy victory, which therefore precluded any diversion 
of efforts or resources. But the attitude of such 
Ministers to the admission of Jewish refugees into Britain 
was depressingly negative. Herbert Morrison, the Home 
Secretary, shared with many of his colleagues a fear of the 
growth of anti semitism in Britain, and felt that the entry 
of large numbers of Jewish refugees could not therefore be 
contemplated. On 31 December 1942 he told a Cabinet 
Committee that the number must be as low as 2,000.2 To 
Churchill Laski wrote in disillusion that 'what hurts me so 
deeply is the realisation that among my own colleagues in 
your Government Dr. Goebbels has induced a spirit of 
caution (on the Jewish refugee problem) when you have so 
amply shown that audacity is the road to victory'. 
3 
It is nevertheless significant that Morrison, though 
1 Quoted in Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 70. 
2 Ibid., pp. 114-5, see also pp. 130-63. According to 
Wasserstein 'there was a definite Government tendency, 
exemplified most notably by Herbert Morrison in his 
attitude to wartime refugee immigration, to bend with the 
wind of hostility to refugees, Father than give a lead or 
build upon the more generous elements in public opinion' (ibid., p. 351). For Cripps' fear of anti semitism see 
Meinertzhagen, op. cit., p. 194. 
3 H. Laski to W. Churchill, 1 July 1943, cited in 
Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 33. 
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playing a leading part in Jewish immigration into Britain, 
remained a friend of the Zionists and supporter within the 
Cabinet. On the question of immigration into Palestine he, 
unlike many of his colleagues, was far from unsympathetic; 
such was his friendliness to a deputation from his 
constituency that he left the impression that, although 
shipping could not be provided, free immigration would be 
allowed into Palestine. 
1 In fact the restrictions on 
immigration into Britain and the meagre help offered to 
refugees served only to give greater weight to the Zionists' 
demands and stimulate further support within the Labour 
Party. 
The party's protests continued in Parliament2 and 
culminated at the Annual Conference in June in a debate on 
'The Jewish People'. The tone was set by A. J. Dobbs in the 
Chairman's address: 'language fails me when I recall the 
foul assault upon the helpless Jewish people'. 
3 Ten 
resolutions had been submitted which dealt with anti 
semitism and the Jewish problem, and again that of Poale 
Zion formed the basis for the main resolution submitted to 
Conference. It urged Governments of the United Nations and 
of neutral countries to admit as many Jews as possible, and 
reaffirmed party policy of building Palestine as the Jewish 
National Home. The Jewish Agency should be given 
'authority to make the fullest use of the economic capacity 
I M. Rosette to S. Brodetsky, 29 Jan. 1943 (Board of Deputies 
op. cit. ). 
2 See especially the debate on 19th May, with contributions 
from Mack, Silverman, Grenfell (New Judea May 1943, 
Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 203). On 30 June Grenfell joined 
a delegation which visited the Foreign Office. 
3. LPACR 1943, p. 117. 
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of the country to absorb immigrants', and the Jewish people 
granted 'an equal status among the free nations of the 
world. 
' 
Although the Zionist Review particularly welcomed the 
reference to the Jewish Agency as 'an act of great states- 
manship and vision', 
Z there had been some significant 
alterations made by the NEC to Poale Zion's resolution. 
This had called for 'the gates of Palestine (to) be thrown 
open to Jews escaping from annihilation' and for the 
establishment of Palestine as a'Jewish Commonwealth'. The 
former omission certainly indicated a lingering official 
disinclination at this stage to link the plight of Jewish 
refugees squarely with the future of Palestine, but this 
was certainly influenced both by the fact of Labour partici- 
pation in the Government and because the process of formu- 
lating a post war policy for Palestine had begun within the 
party machine. 
It was nevertheless noticeable that in the debate on 
the resolution, although delegates 
- 
including James Walker 
and Harold Laski for the NEC 
- 
spoke passionately of the 
massacres and the need for action, Maurice Rosette of Poale 
Zion was the only one to stress the role of Palestine. 3 
1 Ibid., pp. 188-9. 
2 ZR 18 June 19L. 3. 
3A resolution calling for unrestricted right of entry for 
refugees to any country under British control, and for a 
Ministry of Refugees, was moved by Hackney North but 
defeated. The successful resolution and speeches were 
published in Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Poale Zion 
Labour and the Jewish People (London, 1943). The introduc- 
tion. was by George Ridley, Chairman of the NEC, who 
commented: 'few speeches have more impressed me than'the 
speech you will read here by Mr. Maurice Rosette'. 
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Though the Zionist Review praised the quality of the debate 
not all readers agreed. One noted that 'all speakers showed 
an embarrassing and distressing preoccupation with the 
Nazi persecution, emphasising almost exclusively the 
punishment to be meeted out oii the day of retribution'. 
Zionists should seek more than atrocity mongering, and tell 
their friends that their aims lay elsewhere. 
1 
Labour Zionists in Britain were well aware of this 
necessity. The horror of the Jewish massacres and the 
miserable treatment of the dwindling stream of refugees 
created a powerful sense of outrage and horror within the 
Labour movement. It was for Labour Zionists to ensure that 
this phenomenum was fully channelled into support for 
Zionist aims. At the following annual conference the NEC 
was able to present its own proposals, whose nature and 
reception indicated the influence the massacres had had on 
thinking within the party. Any remaining hesitation in 
linking the atrocities with the future development of 
Palestine had passed. One reason for this was the notably 
successful attempt by Poale Zion to mobilise, co-ordinate 
and channel the support of sections of the Labour movement, 
both at local and national levels. 
C. Poale Zion in Wartime 
Although Poale Zion had played an important role in 
promoting the cause of Zionism within the Labour Party 
between the two world wars, membership had fallen from 
3,000 in 1920 to a mere 450 in the late 1930s, and its 
1 ZR 25 June 1943. 
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influence increasingly depended on its role as a spokesman 
for Palestine Labour. However, with the outbreak of the 
war and the growing realisation of the fate awaiting 
European Jewry the party showed a considerable increase in 
membership and a dramatic increase in educative and 
propagandising activity. These developments can be traced 
chiefly through the pages of the Zionist Review. 
1 
Membership, initially slow to increase, showed a con- 
siderable growth as the war developed. Affiliated member- 
ship to the Labour Party rose from 450 in 1942 to 600 in 
1943) and reached 1,000 in 1944, and 1,500 in 1945.2 War 
time conditions caused some disruption, but a membership 
drive began in 1941, and was accompanied by a new system of 
centralised personal membership. 
3 Many new branches were 
formed during the war and by 1944 there were at least 16 
branches in London and the provinces, and a number of youth 
sections. 
' The numbers attending annual and regional 
conferences further illustrated the growing vitality of the 
party. 
During the war a renewed effort was made to mobilise 
the support of working class Jews. In August 1941 the 
Zionist Review, commenting that 'it has long been felt 
among Zionists in this country that more attention should 
be paid to educative and propaganda work among the masses', 
1 From 1941 the editor of the paper was Dr. Levenberg, 
Secretary of Poale Zion from 1939 to 1942 and thereafter 
Chairman. 
2 LPACR 1942-45.3 ZR 19 Sept. 1941. 
4 ZR 28 Jan. 1944. By 1945 there were branches in 
Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, Birmingham, Glasgow, Oxford (and possibly Edinburgh), and in London North West, North, 
West Central, East, Wembley, Dalston, Willesden and Bow. 
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was able to report the creation by Poale Zion of a'People's 
Department' of the Jewish National Fund. 
1 At an inaugural 
conference in Caxton Hall 'to express the solidarity of 
Jewish Labour with workers in Palestine and to give 
practical support to activities of the Jewish National Fund' 
James Middleton joined Ben Gurion and Berl Locker in 
addressing the meeting. 
2 
Prompted by the tragedy of the Struma a number of 
Jewish Labour leaders in the East End also took the 
initiative and formed a new organisation: 'Friends of 
Jewish Labour in Palestine' to support the work of the 
Histadrut and began a membership drive in the workshops and 
factories of Whitechapel and the surrounding area. 
3 The 
first public meeting in Toynbee Hall was a great success, 
and among the speakers were Wedgwood and Middleton. 
4 Yet 
it seems that the following year a further initiative was 
felt necessary, for another special meeting of Poale Zion, 
Trade Unions and Workers' Circle groups was called 'to 
discuss ways and means of helping the Histadrut'. A United 
Jewish Labour Committee was set up, and its second 
conference in March 1945 was attended by delegates from 
Youth sections included those in Leeds, Manchester, North and 
North West London. There were also three kibbutzim. 
Sources: ZR passim, Jewish Yearbook (London, 1945) p. 73. 
1 ZR 22 Aug., 19 Sept. 1941. Between 1936 and 1941 
Rosette had been General Secretary of the Jewish National 
Fund. 
2 Ibid., 17 & 24 Oct. 1942. 
3 Ibid., 6 Feb. 1942.4 Ibid., 1 May 1942. 
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over 30 Labour organisations. 1 
In May 1943 the Zionist Review could nevertheless still 
note that 'there is a strong pro-Palestine sentiment in 
Whitechapel which no one has taken the trouble to organise 
in an efficient manner'. 
2 To revive the enthusiasm shown 
in the East End after the Balfour Declaration was evidently 
no easy task, though a branch of Poale Zion was established 
in East London, with the veteran Sam Dreen as Secretary, 
and later branches reappeared in Whitechapel and Bethnal 
Green. 
Poale Zion's relations with the wider British Zionist 
movement underwent a significant change when in 1942 it was 
announced that the party had successfully applied for 
membership of the Zionist Federation: 'the agreement thus 
reached is an important event in British Zionism. At this 
period of crisis in World and Jewish history the Executive 
of Poale Zion are confident that it will help to rally the 
Jewish masses in this country around the banner of 
Zionism'. 3 Despite a history of uneasy relations between 
the two organisations Poale Zion members quickly achieved 
positions of prominence within the Federation4 and the 
party participated fully in the various Zionist fund 
raising activities. 
To the 1945 Poale Zion Annual Conference the Chairman, 
1 Ibid., 12 Dec. 1943,23 Mar. 1945. 
2 Ibid.,, 12 May 1943. 
3 Ibid., 9 Jan. 1942. 
4 In the 1944 elections to the Zionist Federation Berl 
Locker joined Barnet Janner as a Vice President, whilst Levenberg and Jackson joined the London Executive. 
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Dr. Levenberg, outlined the various fields in which the 
party operated: 
'In the general political field they were an integral 
part of the British Labour Party; in the Zionist 
political field they worked through the Palestine 
Labour Political Committee; in regular Zionist work 
they closely co-operated with the Zionist Federation,, 
of which Poale Zion form an important part; in the 
communal sphere some of their members are closely 
associated with the work of the Boad of Deputies 
and its most important committees. ' 
Our concern, however, is with the Zionist activity of 
Poale Zion within the British Labour movement. Many 
members of the Labour Party expressed their sympathy for 
the plight of Jewish refugees, or support for the Jewish 
National Home through organisations other than Poale Zion, 
or through no organisation at all. But Poale Zion deserves 
special attention as the chief agent of Zionist activity 
within the Labour Party. 
One important part of Poale Zion's work was the dis- 
tribution of literature. Some 20,000 copies of Under 
Sentence of Death were produced, of which 13,000 were 
distributed to 'key men' in the Labour Party, trade union 
and co-operative organisations. Several other pamphlets 
were produced during the war including Jews, Arabs and the 
Middle East, which the Labour Party distributed to 5,000 
affiliated organisations, and 7,000 copies of The Jewish 
Co-operative Movement in Palestine were circulated within 
the Co-operative organisation. Labour and the Jewish People 
containing the speeches from the 194.3 conference was also 
printed in large numbers, 15,000 reaching non Jewish 
1 Ibid., 15 June 1945. 
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organisations) At Labour conferences Zionist delegates 
were able to distribute pamphlets and policy statements 
describing Jewish activity in Palestine. 
In the winter of 1941 Poale Zion set up a Labour Press 
Service, in the form of a newsletter entitled Jewish Labour 
News which by 1943 was being sent regularly to over 200 
Labour publications.? The following year Jewish Labour 
appeared, 'the organ of Poale Zion'. 
3 A film of Jewish 
work in Palestine, entitled 'Land of Promise' was shown 
some thirty times in the later half of 1943 and 'A Day at 
Degania' was shown at the Labour conference. 
4 In the 
summer of 1944 an exhibition entitled 'Jewish Palestine at 
War' visited several cities, including Manchester, Leeds, 
Liverpool and Glasgow, being opened on each occasion by a 
prominent local dignitary. 
5 
Personal contacts and propaganda work within the Labour 
movement were equally important and leading roles were 
played by Dr. Levenberg, Maurice Rosette and Berl Locker. 
The latter had particularly friendly relations with many 
Labour Party figures, 
6 but cordial informal links between 
1 Ibid., 20 Aug. 1943,28 Jan. 1944,26 Jan. 1945. 
2 N. Jackson to W. Gillies, 11 Nov. 1941 giving news of the 
service (LP/Int/5(f)). 
3 ZR 26 Jan. 1945.4 Ibid., 20 Aug. 1943,28 Jan. 1945. 
5 Ibid., 13 May, 30 June, 21 July, 18 Aug. 1944. 
6 Locker also developed close links with the Fabian 
Society, from which had developed in 1940 the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau, with Creech Jones, as Chairman. Rita 
Hinden, the Secretary, had lived in Palestine for three 
years and gained a doctorate for her thesis 'Palestine: An 
Experiment in Colonisation'. Her Zionist beliefs declined 
with the growing emphasis on militant nationalism, though 




Labour Zionists and their gentile colleagues existed at 
every level, and provided the essential counterpart to the 
official Zionist links with the Labour Party. 
At the apex of the Labour Party Poale Zion delegates to 
annual conferences were often accompanied by fraternal 
delegates representing Palestine Labour organisations, and 
at Trade Union, Congresses, Conferences of Labour Women and 
even Co-operative Executive meetings Zionist delegates were 
able to present their views and distribute literature. 
1 
These contacts were extended to the international Labour 
organisation,, such as the International Federation of Trade 
Unions and the International Co-operative Alliance. 
2 In 
1942 Locker joined two committees of foreign Socialists in 
Britain, and when the International Labour and Socialist 
Committee was established in 1944 Berl Locker represented 
'Palestine'. 3 
Such formal contacts were supplemented in a variety of 
ways. For example, in the autumn of 1941 Poale Zion 
organised a series of luncheons at which leading Labour 
figures were invited to speak. These included Creech Jones, 
James Middleton, George Ridley, James Walker and the 
1 ZR 22 Aug. 1941,3 July & 11 Sept. 1942,28 Jan. 1944. 
For a deputation of the PLPC to the Co-operative Executive 
see ibid., 19 Mar. 1943: 'Mr. Berl Locker... reported on 
the achievements of Palestine Labour... the Chairman 
expressed warm sympathy and suggested collaboration... to 
this end it was agreed that a memorandum should be drawn up 
and submitted by the deputation indicating the line of 
common action'. 
2 Ibid., 28 Jan. 1944,14 Apr. 1944,5 Mar. 1945. See 
Levenberg, op. cit., p. 120 for resolution of IFTU demanding that Jewish refugees be allowed to enter Palestine. 
3 Ibid., 11 Sept. 1942,22 Sept. 1944. 
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political correspondent of the Daily Herald. 
1 
At a local level - particularly in London, Manchester, 
Liverpool and Leeds 
- 
Poale Zion groups co-operated fully 
with Labour organisations and often instigated or assisted 
in the passing of resolutions in favour of the opening of 
the doors of Palestine and its development as the National 
Home. Poale Zion also organised a series of conferences to 
mobilise full support for Zionist aims. The first of these 
took place in Leeds on 29 April, and was attended by 150 
delegates from Yorkshire Labour, Trade Union and Co-operat- 
ive bodies. A resolution was passed which demanded the 
formation of a Jewish Fighting Force and noted 'with indig- 
nation that in spite of the horrible conditions the doors of 
the Jewish National Home in Palestine are not kept open for 
Jewish refugees from Nazi persecution'. Among the speakers 
were Locker, Brodetsky and A. L. Williams, the Secretary of 
the Labour Party in Yorkshire. A mass meeting was held in 
the evening, presided over by Alice Bacon, a member of the 
NEC. Messages were read from Middleton and Strabolgi, and 
the evening concluded with a showing of the film 
'Collective Adventure 2 
At a similar conference in Liverpool Silverman and 
Bessie Braddock spoke, and the Zionist Review reported that 
'much enthusiasm was shown by the audience, mainly non- 
Jewish, and it was suggested that a chain of similar 
meetings should be organised throughout the country'. 
3 
1 Ibid., 18 Sept., 17 Oct., 7 Nov. 1941. 
2 Ibid., 1 May 1942. 
3 Ibid., 23 Oct. 1942,6 Nov. 1942. 
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In the following months further conferences were held in 
Glasgow and Manchester, and the pattern was followed on 
several occasions later in the war. 
' 
The conferences revealed what there could have been 
little cause to doubt 
- 
that there existed inside the 
Labour movement overwhelming support and sympathy for the 
Jewish position, considerable admiration for Jewish 
achievements in Palestine, and a strong desire to do right 
by the Jews after the war. These feelings, encouraged and 
channelled by Poale Zion, were a major reason why this 
apparently minor organisation could win such support within 
the Labour Party, and why their requests were met by the 
NEC with such consideration. 
This was underlined by the large number of Labour MPs 
and members who spoke at Zionist meetings, or on behalf 
of Zionists, or sent messages of support. Some, like 
Silverman, Mack, Frankel and Mikardo were Jews and Zionists, 
others such as Morgan Jones, Rhys Davies and-Creech Jones 
were Zionist supporters of long standing, but many more, 
like Will Cluse2 had until then shown little interest in 
Zionism or Palestine. 
It may be argued that this was not an indication of 
support for Zionism and the Jewish National Home, but 
simply of outrage and horror at the extermination of Jewry. 
But it is quite clear that for many in the Labour Party the 
case for a Jewish National Home, or even for a Jewish 
1 Ibid., 23 Oct. 1942 (Glasgow), 6 Nov. 1942 (Manchester), 
24 Sept. 1943 (North East and London), 26 Nov. 1943 and 22 Sept. 1944 (Liverpool), 2 June 1944,8 Sept. 1944 (Leedc1 
2 Ibid., 29 Jan. 1943. 
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Palestine, had been conclusively demonstrated by the 
massacres, and felt that Zionism provided the only 
practical plan of action for a problem that otherwise 
showed little sign of being tackled in any effective manner. 
Large numbers of Labour MPs went well beyond vague messages 
of sympathy, and gave their full support to Zionist 
aspirations. A typical example was William Leach, MP for 
Bradford, 'who traced the development of British policy 
since the Balfour Declaration and went on to identify him- 
self completely with Zionist aspirations and the policy for 
Palestine as a Jewish State'. 
1 
One of the most active speakers was J. S. Middleton, 
Secretary of the Labour Party. Though his position 
precluded his making definite promises, time and again he 
assured Zionist audiences that 'when the call came for aid, 
as far as the British Labour movement was concerned, it 
would not come in vain'. 
2 In his farewell speech to the 
1944. Annual Conference he spoke emotionally of his work 
with the Jewish Community, and 'Ruth' in the Zionist Review 
wrote of 'this remarkable man (who) has placed himself in 
the irreparable debt of the Jewish people. He has a warm 
sympathy for our cause, born of his great humanity and 
fortified by his conviction that Zionism is compatible with 
all his party stands for'. 
3 His sympathies were also an 
advantage to the Zionists when the Labour Party came to 
1 Ibid., 2 June 1944. 
2 Ibid., 24 Jan. 1941. See also 7 May 1943 for his speech 
to a May Day Rally of Poale Zion which also, rather 
inappropriately, stood in honour of the late Beatrice Webb. 
3 Ibid., 22 Dec. 1944. 
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formulate its policy for the future of Palestine. 
D. Policy Making: As an Opposition Party 
(1) Early Moves by Zionists and the Advisory Committee 
The Labour Party's plans for the post war world were 
finally presented in the summer of 1944 in a document 
entitled The International Post War Settlement. 
' This 
included a paragraph on Palestine. But the development and 
adoption of a general policy for the party may be thought to 
have begun in July 1941 when, in a memorandum and a 
subsequent meeting with the International Sub Committee, 
members of the Palestine Labour Political Committee 
presented their thoughts on the future of Palestine. 
2 
The Zionists had been prompted by the speech of the 
Foreign Secretary at the Mansion House on 29 May in which 
he promised Arab. countries a greater degree of independence 
after the war, and the full support of the Government for 
'any solution (of unity) which commands general approval'. 
To the Labour Party the Zionists outlined their objection: 
'Palestine lies in the very heart of the Middle East. 
It is the most vital interest of the Jewish people. 
Yet so far the Jewish people and its internationally 
recognised representatives, the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine, have neither been consulted nor mentioned. 
In Mr. Eden's speech there is not a word about the 
special position of Palestine and the rights and 
interests of the Jewish people in it. ' 
Although a statement that 'general approval in that 
speech covers the rights of the Jews with regard to 
1 LPACR 1944 Pp. 173-4. For the programme as a whole see 
Burridge, op. cit., pp. 114-25, C. R. Rose, The Relation of 
Socialist Principles to British Labour Foreign Policy 
1945-51, Unpublished thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford, 
1959, pp. 74-6. 
2 See above p. 226. 
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Palestine' had been extracted from the Colonial Secretary, 
the Zionists believed that 'these new advantages (for the 
Arabs)... cannot be given to them at the expense of the 
vital interests of the Jewish people'. The situation was 
clear: 
'the Jewish people will need after the war a 
territory large enough to receive the bulk of the 
Jewish immigration which must be expected, and to 
form a foundation for a sound Jewish Commonwealth. 
This state or Commonwealth must be given the 
sovereignty necessary to secure it against attacks 
from without, and against domination by neighbouring 
states. The Jewish people can never agree to being 
a permanent minority in an Arab state... or a com- 
bination of Arab states so far as the vital 
interests are concerned'. 
Following discussions with Locker, Levenberg, Jackson 
and Kollek the Zionists were invited to suggest immediate 
steps to be taken by the Labour Party. 
' They answered that 
the Government should be reminded of the party's interest 
in the National Home, and the need to treat it as an aspect 
of the larger Jewish problem. It must also be told to avoid 
a situation 'in which the Arabs could claim... to have 
acquired a new status possidenti before the problem is duly 
considered at the future Peace Conference'. The Jewish 
Agency should also participate in any discussions on the 
future of the Middle East. 
The ensuring resolution adopted by the Sub Committee 
went a long way to meeting the requests of the Zionists: 
'no pledge should be given to one side or the other with 
respect to the future of Palestine in the course of any 
negotiations which might take place upon the situation in 
the Near East, until the representatives of the Jewish 
Agency have been given every opportunity for consultation, 
1 B. Locker to W. Gillies, n. d., represented in NEC minutes. 
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unfettered by any previous commitment'. The declaration, 
which could also be taken as applying with equal' weight to 
the formulation of party policy, was sent to Attlee. 
' 
Zionist links with the Labour Party policy makers were 
clearly secure, the more so since, with the outbreak of war, 
Arab representations to the party had ceased. 
Perhaps prompted by the Zionist representations, 
consideration of the Palestine problem was reopened within 
the Advisory Committee. 2 The first to submit his 
suggestions was Creech Jones, whose views followed familiar 
Zionist lines. On the premise that in the post war years a 
major refugee problem would exist, to which Palestine alone 
could substantially contribute, he recommended that: 
'the White Paper policy should be abandoned and the 
Government should move to the establishment of an 
independent Jewish State (inside the agreed 
Mandated territohy), an associate nation in the 
British Commonwealth, but collaborating with 
neighbouring states. It should be able to defend 
itself and prove a valuable strategic state in the 
British Commonwealth of Nations'. 3 
Norman Bentwich concurred with Creech Jones' survey of 
developments in Palestine and with his belief that the White 
Paper must be abandoned. But although a Zionist he dis- 
agreed with his colleague's proposals. He did not envisage 
a large scale refugee influx into Palestine after the war, 
and the demand for a Jewish State would, he felt, reopen 
'the old troubles with the Arabs and the Moslem world'. He 
1 Int Sub 18 July 1941, W. Gillies to C. Attlee, 1 Aug-1941 (Attlee Papers) 
2 Minutes and agenda for the war years have not survived, 
but many memoranda can be located. 
3 'Palestine' by A. Creech Jones (LP/ImpAC/2/238 in FCB 
176/1/14). 
247 
still hoped for a bi-national Palestine as part of a larger 
Middle East Confederation. Jewish immigration would 
continue but into the wider area, particularly Transjordan, 
with which Palestine would unite. 
1 
The following month a memorandum was submitted by 
Thomas Reid, a stern opponent of Zionism. He too firmly 
opposed partition, and believed that 'although neither 
Jewish nor other immigration should be completely stopped... 
it is just to impose a reasonable restriction on Jewish 
immigration if the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine 
is to be a guide to the policy of British rule or of the 
Palestine rule which is to succeed it'. Furthermore 'there 
should be adequate restrictions on the sale of land to Jews 
to protect the Arabs from economic domination'. But he 
agreed with Bentwich that a Federated State - to be called 
the Holy Land 
- 
should be set up. 2 
The views of Leonard Woolf, the Secretary, were not dis- 
similar. Partition, he felt 'is a policy of despair and, 
under existing circumstances, is so desperate as to be 
almost disasteroust. He too saw a larger federation as part 
of the solution and believed that Jewish immigration and 
land purchase should continue 'but subject to reasonable 
1 'Supplementary Note by Professor N. Bentwich on a 
Memorandum on Palestine by A. Creech Jones, MP', Dec. 1941 (LP/ImpAC/2/238(a). 
For the Jewish Agency Bentwich's presence on the 
Committee was a very mixed blessing, see eg B. Locker to 
W. Gillies, 15 May 1944 (Dalton Papers 7/10 p. 83) warning 
him of their disagreements. Above all, see Locker's 
comment to the 1944 Poale Zion conference that 'bi-nation- 
alism is a wonderful formula. But it has one disadvantage; 
it is unworkable' (ZR 7 Apr. 1944). 




Creech Jones was clearly in a minority, but his critics 
were scarcely of one voice. Bentwich noted that, although 
Creech Jones' draft was partial on the Jewish side 'Reid's 
draft is more partial and more coloured on the other side'. 
To Woolf he sent a refutation of Reid's memorandum. Reid 
hastened to reply: 'my draft is not partial... it is an 
attempt to put salient facts in their proper perspective, 
not in that of Zionist propaganda or Arab propaganda. I 
fear that my critic's notes are prejudiced and one sided'. 2 
Once again the Advisory Committee accurately reflected 
the multiplicity of opinion on the subject of Palestine, and 
as a result found it impossible to present unanimous 
recommendations. But not for the first time its deliber- 
ations did not long remain a secret, and once again Poale 
Zion was quick to intervene. To Middleton Nathan Jackson 
complained that 'as an official organisation clearly 
interested in this issue we should be obliged to receive 
copies of the documents so that, if necessary, we should be 
in a position to submit our criticism of them'. 
3 
Again the speed in which details of private discussion 
reached Zionist ears caused a stir within the party. 
Gillies complained to Woolf that 'this letter places me in 
an embarrassing position. I have reason to believe that 
1 'Draft Report on Palestine' by L. A. Woolf LP/ImpAC 
a1238(d)). 
2 'Letter from N. Bentwich on Memo. 238(b) Draft Report on 
Palestine', 16 Jan. 1942 (FCB 176/1/17), 'Reply to Norman 
Bentwich's letter regarding Memo. 238(b)', (FCB 176/1/19). 
3 N. Jackson to J. Middleton, 26 Jan. 1942 (LP/Int/5(a)). 
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Poale Zion refers in particular to a memorandum by Mr. Reid 
Woolf felt strongly that documents should not be shown to 
'outside interested parties', and the Committee unanimously 
rejected the request. Poale Zion were accordingly fended 
off with the pledge that their request would be considered 
if any such documents reached the NEC or its Sub 
Committees. 2 
Poale Zion was not to be put off so easily, and a 
further request was received in April and considered by the 
full. NEC. 3 Since various memoranda had now been submitted 
to a new body, the Committee on International Relations, 
Middleton now did the Zionists the potentially important 
service of successfully suggesting that a representative of 
Poale Zion should be invited to take part in any discussion 
on Palestine within the new Committee. 
4 
The stage appeared to be set for confrontation between 
Poale Zion and the predominantly critical members of the 
Advisory Committee. During 1941 a Central Committee on Post 
War Reconstruction was set up and on 6 August the 
composition of a Sub Committee on International Relation- 
ships was decided on, for which Leonard Woolf became 
Secretary. 5 
However when the NEC invited Hugh Dalton to prepare a 
1 W. Gillies to L. Woolf, 3 Feb. 1942 (ibid. ). 
2 L. Woolf to W. Gillies, 4 July 1942, W. Gillies to N. Jackson, 
17 Mar. 1942 (ibid. ), Int Sub 16 Feb. 1942. 
3 N. Jackson to J. Middleton, 16 Apr. 1942 (ibid. ), NEC 
22 Apr. 1942. 
4 J. Middleton to N. Jackson, 23 Apr. 1942 (ibid. ). 
5 LPACR 1944, p. 21. Special Sub Committee Minutes, 6 Aug. 
1941 (Dalton Papers 7/10),, Dalton Diaries 3 Oct. &3 Nov. 
1941. 
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draft on post war foreign policy it was to the old Inter- 
national Sub Committee that he reported, and not the new 
Committee. It seems therefore that the traditional policy 
making system of Executive Committee, Sub Committee and 
Advisory Committee continued as before. In fact party 
policy on Palestine was to emerge in a very different 
manner to that suggested by the events of 1941 
- 
42. 
(2) Hugh Dalton Takes Charge 
On 22 September 1943 Dalton noted in his diary: 'I 
pledge myself to make the first draft of my heads of 
proposals for a post war settlement in time for the next 
meeting of (the International Sub Committee)'. 
1 From his 
diaries it is clear that he was eager to undertake the task. 
On the question of Palestine he could be guided both by the 
long tradition of pro Zionist sympathy and by recent confer- 
ence resolutions. 
With the decision to begin framing post war policy, 
members of the Advisory Committee hastened to submit their 
views. Creech Jones recirculated his memorandum,, and Reid 
both redrafted his own and submitted a further memorandum 
criticising his colleague's draft in detail. His own views 
were couched in forthright language. 'It is Britain', he 
wrote, 'which has created the Palestine problem by forcing 
in Jews against the wishes of the people of Palestine. 
Britain must resolve the problem'. Again he condemned 
suggestions of partition and proposed a 'reasonable' 
1 Dalton Diaries 22 Sept. 1942. Hugh Dalton kept full 
diaries during the war years, and they give a revealing 
account of his part in the formulation of party policy. 
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restriction on immigration and land purchase. Ho believed 
that the policy of political Zionists was opposed to the 
wishes of most Jews and Palestine and described how 'during 
the last war the British Government in a time of stress and 
emergency were inveigled by the political Zionists into a 
plan to rob the people of Palestine of the sovereignty of 
their country'. His hope was that 'the Labour Party 
Executive will frame the Party policy in this matter with a 
complete knowledge of the relevant facts, only a few of 
which have been set out by me'. 
1 
Though Reid was clearly swimming against the strongest 
of tides his views were not wholly without support. 
Philips,., Price, for example, believed that the Government 
should affirm that 'we do not threaten (the Arabs! )-existence 
in Palestine and that we stand by the principle of the White 
Paper'. 2 With this Richard Stokes agreed, and continued his 
efforts on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs: 'whether we 
like it or not the persistent tendency in Britain to ignore 
MacMahon's promises lends colour to the contention that we 
are more influenced by rich Jews in London and New York 
than by our pledges to the Arabs'. 
3 
There is no sign however that Dalton took any notice of 
Reid's suggestions, or indeed of any others. On 13 October, 
following a party, Dalton returned to his office and 
dictated until 1.20 am his first draft. There was no 
mention of Palestine, but the bottom of the draft he later 
1 See 'Comment on 235(a)' by T. Reid, Sept. 1943, 'The 
Palestine Problem' by T. Reid, Sept. 1943 (LP/ImpAC/2/238(d) 
& (e)). 
2 ZR 12 Sept. 1941. 
3 Daily Herald 23 Oct. 1943. 
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noted 'add on... Palestine'. 
' 
Dalton returned to his task early the next month, 
during a weekend spent at his country home, West Leaze. He 
was clearly pleased with his progress: 'spend a lot of 
time on my LP draft on Post War Settlement. Each time I 
spend time with it, I think I improve it a good deal'. 
2 
The first draft on Palestine was probably written at this 
time. 
Dalton, unlike many of his colleagues, had never been 
to Palestine. Nor, as he later recounted, was he then in 
close touch with the Zionists 'though over a long period I 
used to see Weizmann from time to time and Lewis Namier 
occasionally,, and some of my pupils in the LSE had been and 
still were, keen Zionists'. He was determined, in tackling 
the Palestine problem, to start again from scratch. On 
Dalton, as on many others, the Jewish massacres had a 
profound effect. 'I had been trying to think out this 
whole problem afresh, in the light of its urgency and the 
horror of the Hitlerite atrocities'. His later claims that 
the policy was his alone 
- 
apart from modifications later 
made by the Sub Committee 
- 
and that he did not seek or 
receive the advice of Zionists seem to be accurate. In May 
1944, for example, he noted in his diary: 'Locker to see 
me. He is, naturally, very pleased with our Palestine 
paragraph as we put it in, as he says, without pressure 
from the Jewish Agency'. 4 
1 Dalton Diaries 13 Sept. 1943, 'Post War Settlement', n. d. (Dalton Papers, 7/10 pp. 36-41). 
2 Dalton Diaries, 6&7 Nov. 1943. 
3 H. Dcaton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs 1931 
- 
1945 (London, 
1957) p. 425. 
4 Dalton Diaries 25 May 1944. 
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Dalton, as he later wrote, believed that 'we were at a 
point of sharp discontinuity in world history'. Many old 
arguments were therefore irrelevant. Most importantly, he 
felt that the massacres of the Jews had 'destroyed the case 
for any limitations, by the Mandatory power, on Jewish 
immigration into Palestine'. The concept of 'economic 
absorbtive capacity' now had no meaning. Dalton had great 
faith in the potential of Palestine, and saw his goal 
clearly: 
'given sufficient capital expenditure on developments, 
given intelligent planning on the spot, and given 
the diverse and distinguished talents, driving 
energy and fanatical faith of the Jews, I was sure 
. 
Palestine could become a most successful, popular 
and predominantly Jewish State'. 
His optimism was as great as ever: 'this', as he later 
wrote ; would be a unique moment, I judged, when the pulse 
of history would quicken, and a determined and imaginative 
leadership could telescope into a few years changed which 
otherwise would drag along, slowly and painfully, through 
centuries'. But what of the Arabs in this predominantly 
Jewish state? 'An Arab minority might wish to remain in 
Palestine... '. l 
By November Dalton's first draft was ready for 
circulation. In a covering note Dalton stressed that it 
was simply 'a sketch, a rough outline and in simple terms 
for the preliminary consideration of my colleagues'. 
Furthermore 'to help provoke discussion and to test how far 
we really disagree among ourselves I have stated my own 
1 Dalton, 'Fateful Years' op. cit., pp. 425-7. 
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views very frankly. The paragraph on Palestine read: 
'Here we have halted half way. I see neither hope 
nor meaning in a 'Jewish National Home' unless we 
are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter this 
tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority. 
Here too surely is a case for the transfer of 
population. Let the Arabs be encouraged to move 
out, as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated 
handsomely and let their settlement elsewhere be 
carefully attended to. The Arabs have not done very 
well since the war, either for themselves or for us. 
We should not give in to their policy of Dog in the 
Holy Manger. They have many wide territories of 
their own, compared with poor little Palestine. 
Indeed, I would like to extend the Palestinian 
boundaries either into Egypt or Transjordan. There 
is also something to be said for throwing open 
Libya or Eritrea to Jewish settlement, as satellites 
or colonies of Palestine. In any case, we must seek 
to remove Russian dislike of the Palestine 
experiment and efcourage American interest and 
support for it'. 
This remarkable paragraph owed nothing to the views of 
Advisory Committee members or to direct representations of 
Zionists, but much to Dalton's interpretation of recent 
events, and perhaps something to the views of Winston 
Churchill. 
Dalton was a recipient not only of party documents on 
Palestine but also, as a member of the Cabinet, of Govern- 
mental papers. On 28 April Churchill, seeking to reopen 
consideration of Palestine, circulated a memorandum of his 
thoughts. A comparison with those of Dalton is interesting. 
'Churchill' expected full American support for a new policy 
in Palestine... he advocated an investigation into the 
possibility of making Eritrea and Tripolitania into Jewish 
colonies that might be affiliated to the Jewish National 
1 Dalton Papers 7%10 pp. 42-9. 
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Home'. 1 As for Arab claims, Churchill considered that, 
apart from Ibn Saud and Emir Abdullah, the Arabs had been 
virtually no use to the allies in the present war. The only 
fighting they had done was against the British. Unlike 
after the First War, the Arabs could have no claims on the 
victorious allies. At the very least, it seems that 
Churchill's views chimed in with Dalton's. 
Dalton later reacted strongly against what he saw as 
the absurd suggestion that German refugees should be given 
the same help as 'allied' refugees. There is something of 
this in his belief that"'the Arabs' have not done very well 
in the war', and its unhappy inclusion as a partial justi- 
fication for the encouragement of their departure from 
Palestine. Furthermore, as the Foreign office commented on 
Churchill's memorandum 'the question is... not whether we owe 
the Arabs a debt of gratitude, but whether we have important 
interests centring in the Arab world. The answer must be 
emphatically that we have'. 
Dalton's call for freer immigration was clear enough, 
but much else was vague. Partition was seemingly rejected 
since Palestine, with a Jewish majority, was to be given 
the chance to extend its boundaries. As a member of the 
Labour Government Dalton was to criticise Bevin's attempt 
1 Cohen, op. cit., p. 162. The idea of additional 
territories was given much consideration within the Foreign 
and Colonial Offices. The two insuperable objections to 
the idea were, as an official pointed out, 'the disasterous 
reaction of Arab opinion' and the fact that the great 
majority of Jews would be unlikely to consider it, W. R. Louis, 
Imperialism at Ba : The United States and Decolonisation of 
the British Empire 1941-1945 (Oxford 1977) pp. 58-62. 
2 Cohen, op. cit., p. 163. 
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'to make a synthetic glue of all the Arab states'l but in 
1943 he apparently regarded the 'Arabs' as an homogenous 
people whose lands could easily absorb their brothers who 
happened to live in Palestine. It was not a particularly 
impressive paragraph. 
2 
Dalton introduced his document on 16 November. He was 
pleased with the reaction. 'It is extremely well received, 
much better in some quarters than I had expected'. 
3 At 
least one member of the Sub Committee welcomed the 
Palestine section warmly: '... the most surprising case is 
little Laski... who is deeply touched by my Palestine 
paragraph'. Laski was indeed moved. Writing of a later 
meeting Dalton noted that 'HJL was again most friendly and 
wrote afterwards a letter, very emotional, thanking me for 
my paragraph on Palestine'. 
4 
Laski's beliefs had certainly undergone a transformation. 
Although he had raised matters of concern to Zionists on the 
NEC5 and had joined the Committee for a Jewish Fighting 
Force, in November 1911 he could still write that 'I am not, 
and never have been a Zionist, and I think them mistaken 
who believe Palestine the solution of the Jewish problem'. 
6 
For Laski the Jewish massacres led to a profound reorient- 
1 H. Dalton, Hi Rh Tide and After: Memoirs 1945 
- 
1960 
(London, 1962) p. 160. 
2 It was noticeable that Dalton made no comment on the 
current ideas concerning a Middle East Federation. 
3 Int Sub 16 Nov. 1943, Dalton Diaries 16 Nov. 1943. 
4 Ibid., 5 Apr. 1944. 
5 eg NEC 23 Apr. 1941. 
6 Writing in Reynolds's News, quoted in ZR 21 Nov. 1941. 
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ation. He accepted an invitation from the Poale Zion 
Executive to attend a meeting, and 'to those present it 
represented the return of Harold Laski both as a Socialist 
and as a Jew, to his people'. 
' Though in opposition to 
Poale Zion orthodoxy he embraced the cause of bi-national- 
ism, by 1944 he believed that in 'Jewish settlement in 
Palestine, as a homeland, open to every Jew from every- 
where, there is the basis, and there can be no other basis, 
upon which a permanent freedom for Jewry may in the end be 
built'. 2 
The one piece of adverse criticism of the entire draft 
that Dalton recorded concerned Palestine, though he was 
little concerned by it. This came from Gillies who,, as 
Secretary of the International Department was well aware of 
the state of the Palestine debate within the party, and 
also able to appreciate the enormity of Dalton's suggest- 
ions. 'Poor little Gillies', wrote Dalton 'is terrified of 
my Palestine paragraph and thinks this should be referred 
to a separate committee'. But Gillies was a mild man, and 
no match for Dalton. 'I say this is all nonsense. ' 
Gillies' suggestion was ignored. 
This was a significant incident. Since the program 
was not, after all, being considered by a special Inter- 
national Relations Sub Committee Gillies' defeat finally 
ruled out the possibility of any party 'experts', whether 
from Poale Zion or the Advisory Committee, participating 
1 Yaakov Morris, quoted in G. Eastwood, Harold Laski (London, 1977) p. 97 Morris comments that 'some bitterness (had) existed because he, in the past, had ignored his 
Jewishness and had been indifferent to the Socialist 
Zionist group of the Labour Party'. 
2 Speaking at a mass meeting of the Jewish National Fund (ZR 10 Mar. 1944). 
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in the policy making process at an early stage. Dalton's 
proposals seemed likely to have an easy passage. 
Moreover, lest any member of the Sub Committee should 
be influenced by Reid's anti Zionist submission Middleton 
again took the initiative and circulated a copy of a letter 
from James Malcolm to the Manchester Guardian. A barrister 
of Armenian descent, Malcolm had played a small part in the 
events leading up to the Balfour Declaration. His letter 
was concerned to minimise Arab usefulness in the First War, 
and maximise Arab wickedness in the Second 
- 
support, if it 
were needed, for Hugh Dalton's assessment. ' 
Dalton was satisfied with the progress made. 'It is 
all going along quite nicely and I have got things pretty 
comfortably in my own hands. ' 
2 Discussion continued in the 
Ne r -'Yestr &t' meetings on l8.. J*anuary. 
_: and' 8. -Februaryý... By now 
Dalton had a new draft to lay before his colleagues. 
Section 18 now read: 
'Here we have halted, half way, irresolute between 
conflicting policies. But there is surely neither 
hope nor meaning in a 'Jewish National Home' unless 
we are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter 
this tiny land in such numbers as to become a 
majority. There was a strong case for this before 
the war. There is an irresistible case now, after 
the unspeakable atrocities of the cold and 
calculated German plan to kill all the Jews in 
Europe. Here too surely in Palestine is a case, on 
human, grounds and to promote a stable settlement, 
for transfer of population. Let the Arabs be 
encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. Let 
them be compensated handsomely for their land and let their settlement elsewhere be carefully 
organised and generously financed. The Arabs have 
many wide territories of their own; they must not 
claim to exclude the Jews from this small area of Palestine, less than the size of Wales. Indeed, we 
should re-examine also the possibility of extending 
1 'The Future of Palestine' 4 Oct. 1943, NEC minutes, J. Middleton to W. Gillies 11 Dec 19£(LP/Int/5(a)). For Malcolm see Stein, op. cit., p. 3''4, 
he 
Times 8 Apr. 1938 for the 'Malcolm Plan'. 
2 Dalton Diaries 16 Nov. 1943. 
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the present Palestine boundaries, by agreement with 
Egypt or Transjordan. Nor should we close our minds 
to another possibility, namely of throwing open 
Libya or Eritrea to Jewish settlement. But we 
should seek to win the full sympathy and support of 
the American and Russian Governments for the 
execution of the Palestine policy. 11 
The opening two sentences had been only slightly 
altered but now the Nazi atrocities are explicitly named 
as justification. The reason for population transfers is 
now Jewish need rather than Arab wickedness and also, some- 
what baldly, on. the grounds that this would help 'to promote 
a stable settlement'. The re-settlement of displaced Arabs 
is now to be 'carefully organised and generously financed', 
but now the 'Arabs' are reminded that they have 'wide 
territories' and are warned that they must )Wt. seek to 
exclude Jews from Palestine. Such changes represented 
nothing more than minor tinkerings. 
The two meetings did nothing to shake Dalton's hold on 
developments: 'it all goes wonderfully well and there is 
hardly any opposition. I an amazed at the facility with 
which it has practically all gone through'. 
2 In March he 
framed his final redraft for submission to the NEC and, 
with Noel Baker dined with Wei zmann and Bakstansky. 
Typically he almost revealed to them his efforts on their 
behalf: 'I all but tell them that I have drafted a very 
hot paragraph for the Labour Party on post war Palestine. 
I hint as much on leaving'. 
3 
1 Dalton Papers 7/10 pp. 53-68. 
2 Dalton Diaries 22 Mar. 1944. 
3 Ibid., 22 Mar. 1944. Noel Baker had continued to voice his support for Zionism, see eg ZR 5 Feb. 1943. 
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On 14 March Dalton's draft was finally passed by the 
Sub Committee. Once again discussion does not seem to have 
been too rigorous: 'Phil and Harold Clay, the two likeliest 
critics, came in late when we have finished this item'. 
l 
When the printers preparing proofs of the document were 
bombed, thus necessitating a delay of two weeks before the 
NEC could meet, Dalton commented revealingly that 'this is 
rather a pity for it is likely to be more closely examined 
than it might have been today, run through with other 
items'. 2 
The special meeting of the NEC finally took place on 
5 April. To Dalton's disgust there was a good deal of 
criticism from 'pro Germans' 
- 
'obviously (a) pre-arranged 
attempt at sabotage'. 
3 A lengthy discussion took place, 
and each paragraph was considered in turn. This may have 
resulted in the two small changes made in the Palestine 
section. The sentence suggesting Jewish colonisation on 
Eritrea and Libya was finally deleted. Secondly, Syria was 
added as a country to be approached to revise its 
boundaries. Again Dalton recalled Laski's initial pleasure 
on reading the paragraph: 'indeed HJL had embarrassed and 
surprised me at the first meeting by saying how wonderful 
he thought it all was, and nearly weeping over my Palestine 
paragraph'. Laski was nevertheless among those who pressed 
for a redrafting of the document, but Dalton drew the 
1 Int Sub 14 Mar. 1944, Dalton Diaries 14 Mar. 1944. 
2 Ibid., 22 Mar. 1944. 
3 NEC 5 Apr. 1944, Dalton Diaries 8 Apr. 1944" 
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consolation that 'one result of this further delay is that 
it will not now be possible to get this document out much 
more than a month before the Conference. This I think will 
suit me all right'. 
The document therefore returned to the Sub Committee 
and finally, on Dalton's insistence, was passed unanimously. 
'It has been a long struggle of successive reviews, 
compromises and consultations, but it is not such a bad 
document in the end'. The International Post War Settlement 
was published at the end of April. 
1 As amended, the 
Palestine section now read: 
'Here we have halted half way, irresolute between 
conflicting policies. But there is surely neither 
hope nor meaning in a 'Jewish National Home' unless 
we are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter 
this tiny land in such numbers as to become a 
majority. There was a strong case for this before 
the war. There is an irresistible case now, after 
the unspeakable atrocities of the cold and calculated 
German Nazi plan to kill all the Jews in Europe. 
Here too in Palestine surely is a case, on human 
grounds and to promote a stable settlement, for 
transfer of population. Lot the Arabs be encouraged 
to move out as the Jews move in. Let them be 
compensated handsomely for their land and let their 
settlement elsewhere be carefully organised and 
generously financed. The Arabs have very wide 
territories of their own; they must not claim to 
exclude the Jews from this small part of Palestine, 
less than the size of Wales. Indeed, we should 
examine also the possibility of extending the 
boundaries by agreement with Egypt, Syria and 
Transjordan. Moreover, we should seek to win the 
full sympathy and support both of the American and 
Russian Governments for the execution of this 
Palestine policy. ' 
1 see The Times 24 Apr. 1944. 
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(3) Reactions to the Policy 
The 1944 Annual Conference was scheduled for May but,, 
doubtless to the great annoyance of Hugh Dalton, rocket 
attacks on London caused postponement until December. There 
was therefore a considerable time for comment and criticism 
of the NEC's proposals. 
One of the first to react was Oliver Stanley, the 
Colonial Secretary. As Dalton later recounted to Morrison, 
Stanley found the Palestine paragraph particularly disturb- 
ing, and visited Dalton on 26 April to tell him so. It 
seemed to Stanley to be 'Zionism plus plus'. 
1 His chief 
criticism was unsurprising, but very relevant. 'He is 
afraid that it may do harm in Palestine, both by encouraging 
the Jews to believe that the next British Government, which 
they think may well be a Labour Government, will do every- 
thing for them, and equally be unsettling to the Arabs'. 
He very much hoped that it would not be greatly played upon 
in Labour Party propaganda; Dalton assured him that this 
was unlikely= and tried to convince Stanley that it was 
simply a natural expression of Labour Party opinion, both 
inside and outside Parliament. He at least seems to have 
enjoyed the meeting. As he told Morrison 'I tried to look 
innocent and admitted no personal responsibility'. 2 
Stanley's visit anticipated a storm of protests from 
Arab organisations. Early the next month the party 
received telegrams from the Palestine Arab Party and the 
1 Dalton Diaries 26 Apr. 1944. 
2 H. Dalton to H. Morrison, 28 Oct. 1944 (Dalton Papers 8/1 
p. 99). 
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Palestine Arab Workers Society, ' the first communications 
from Arab representations since 1939. Their harsh language 
and quaint phrasing made little impression on Middleton and 
Gillies, and were not referred to the Sub Committee. 
Most Arab protests were directly towards the Colonial 
and Foreign Offices. They mainly came from Palestinian 
organisations, though later protests included one from 
Nahas Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, which was given 
some publicity. 
2 Colonial Office officials echoed 
Stanley's forebodings but were forced to restrain their 
irritation: 'I do not however see how we can prevent the 
discussion from taking place, ill advised though it be'. 
3 
There were also disturbing reports on the reaction in 
Palestine. A telegram from the High Commissioners reported 
that: 
'feeling among the Arabs has been sharply stimulated 
during the past months by various manifestations of 
Jewish political activity and in particular the 
reported resolution of the British Labour Party... 
the Arab population, which had been inclined to, 
regard Zionist propaganda abroad with little more 
than irritation, are now thoroughly alarmed at what 
they read as this new manifestation of its effective- 
ness. They are genuinely shocked at the disregard 
that the chosen representatives of a large section 
of the British public could show in contemplating 
the removal of Arabs from their homes in Palestine 
in favour of the Jews'. 4 
Robin Hankey at the Foreign Office could at least draw 
a shred of comfort from the uproar: 'it is in a way a 
relief to see that the Eastern Department and the War 
1 Telegrams 3 Apr. 1944,11 Apr. 1944 LP/Int 5d. 
2 Communications in CO 733/463 75872 and FO 371/40136 
E3117, E3554, E 3780, The Times 11 Aug. 1944. 
3 Minute, 12 May 1944 in CO 733/463 75872/120. 
4 Telegram 695 of 29 May 1944 (ibid. ). 
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Office are not left to be the only voices crying in the 
Labour wilderness and that there is an Arab case over 
Palestine, and that we may run into big trouble if we 
completely disregard it'. 
1 
The Times had voiced some disapproval of the Palestine 
proposals but Tribune and the New Statesman although full of 
criticism for the general program, were silent on this 
issue. 2 The Zionist Review, on the other hand welcomed 'a 
bold and courageous plan for the solution of the Palestine 
problem'. 
3 Nevertheless in stressing that 'transfer (of 
population) is not a pre-requisite of large scale Jewish 
immigration though no doubt it is true that it might 
simplify Arab-Jewish relations' the paper did give an 
indication of the considerable concern the proposal had 
caused amongst Labour Zionists, and one correspondent 
commented on the newspaper's obvious reticence on the 
subject. 4 This drew further comment from the editor, Dr. 
Levenberg, who stressed the voluntary nature of the 
proposals and noted that Ben Gurion had expressed himself 
'deeply grateful to the Labour Party's vigorous stand'. 
The Advisory Committee was naturally far from happy at 
the proposals. Barred from participation in the policy 
making process, and faced with a virtual fait accompli, a 
special meeting was hurriedly arranged in the House of 
1 Minute, 12 May 1944 in FO 371/40136 E3117- 
2 The Times (24 Apr. 1944) felt the proposal for population 
transfers was 'altogether too light hearted'. Tribune 
28 Apr. 1944, New Statesman and Nation 29 Apr. T-6 May 1944. 
3 ZR 28 Apr. 1944, see also New Judea Apr. 1944. 
4 Letter Hans Cappel, ibid., 5 May 1944. Other correspon- dents had fewer doubts, see eg N. Goldenberg, ibid., 12 May 1944. 
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Commons for 10 May. ' Bentwich opened the meeting, which 
resolved to draw the attention of the NEC to the unfortun- 
ate implications' of the policy. The suggestion causing 
most concern was that of population transfers which Leonard 
Woolf, in a pamphlet published later that year, described 
as an example 'of the folly of believing that spectacular 
settlements are desirable and feasible I. 
2 
On 16 May the NEC agreed to refer the matter back to 
the Sub Committee. 3 But once again the Zionists' contacts 
inside the party had not let them down, and by 15 May 
Locker had written to Gillies arguing that 'it would be 
wrong to take out the transfer clause now that it has 
appeared; its removal might be interpreted as an admission 
that the Labour Party's proposals involved an injustice to 
the Arabs'. 4 He explained that in the opinion of the Jewish 
Agency such transfers might take place but were not a pre- 
requisite for large scale Jewish immigration. He shrewdly 
quoted the views of Bentwich, who had recently written that 
under certain circumstances 'transfer of population might 
1 Imperial Advisory Committee Minutes, 10 May 1944. Among 
those present were Ben Riley, Bentwich, Reid and Rita Hinden. 
2 Woolf, with some perspicacity, saw the Palestine problem 
as a test case for the United Nations, see L. S. Woolf, The 
International Post War Settlement (Fabian Publications, 
Sept. 1944) p. 19. 
The Committee also asked Bentwich to prepare a memorandum 
on social and economic developments. This was finally 
published in October, when its usefulness in the conflict 
with the Sub Committee was long passed. See 'Economic 
Approach to Palestine' by N. Bentwich (LP/ImpAC/2/276(a)). 
3 NEC 16 May 1944. 
4 B. Locker to W. Gillies, 15 may 1940 (Dalton Papers 7/10 
p. 83). 
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be a means of solving the conflict'. 
Thus, wrote Locker, the operative words were 'should be 
encouraged'. The solution was not an amending of the 
paragraph, but that a spokesman should, in the name of the 
NEC clarify the statement to conference. He was also able 
to point to the public support given by Greenwood who, 
although suggesting that 'the Arabs themselves may find a 
strengthening of their sparse population in, say, Iraq by 
an influx of their kinsfolk from Palestine advantageous to 
their own areas', had stressed that this was a matter for 
full agreement. New Judea hoped that any 'misapprehension' 
had thereby been dispersed and that there would be no 
further attempt to make 'anti Zionist capital out of the 
imaginary desire on the part of the Zionists, or of the 
Labour Party, to carry out a policy of enforced emigration 
of Arabs from Palestine'. 
1 
Locker's letter evoked a useful response from Gillies, 
who circulated notes to Dalton and Dallas which clearly 
indicated the unease of Labour Zionists: 
'I understand that the recommendation (of the 
Advisory Committee)... was strongly influenced by 
the criticism of Prof. N. Bentwich... be that as it may, 
I think that the paragraph cannot be redrafted at 
this stage. This is also the opinion of Berl Locker, 
who as far as we are concerned, expressed the views 
of the TU and Socialist movement in Palestine. 
Locker thinks the phrase 'let the Arabs be 
encouraged to move out as the Jews move in' is 
unfortunate. He calls for an emphatic, clear state- 
ment that no measures of compulsion will be used 
under any circumstances. AG has, he says, already 
given this explanation at one of their meetings'. z 
Locker continued his campaign by visiting Dalton, by 
1 Speech at May Day meeting of Poale Zion, see Jewish Labour June and New Judea June-July 1945. 
2 Memorandum in LP/Int/5(d). 
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now well known as the author of the document. Again he 
insisted that encouragement did not mean compulsion. 'He 
argues against our giving way - which we have no intention 
of doing. I ask him to send me further points. '1 
It was therefore not surprising that when the Sub 
Committee met on 20 June it decided to let the paragraph 
stand. As Dalton noted in his diary 'we decide to ignore 
the suggestions from various quarters that we should go 
back on our proposal for voluntary emigration of Arabs from 
Palestine'. 2 For Dalton and his colleagues 'the terms of 
the paragraph as drafted makes it clear... that no compulsion 
was contemplated'. But no mention appears to have been made 
of the need for a clarifying statement to Conference. 
Once the offending sentence had been accepted by the 
Sub Committee and published the Advisory Committee, or 
anyone else, stood little chance of altering it. Once the 
paragraph appeared the Zionists had no choice but to 
attempt to block any threat of alteration. Weizmann never- 
theless later noted that 'my Labour Zionist friends were 
like myself greatly concerned about this proposal. We had 
never contemplated the removal of the Arabs, and the 
British Labourites, in their pro Zionist enthusiasm, went 
far beyond our intentions'. 
3 In Palestine 'the quasi 
Government was embarrassed by the suggestion that the Arabs 
k 
be encouraged to move out of the country', though most 
Palestine Jews nevertheless welcomed the statement most 
1 Dalton Diaries 25 May 1944, B. Locker to H. Dalton, 7 June 
1944. 
2 Int Sub 20 June 1944, Dalton Diaries 20 June 1944. 
3 C. Weizmann, op. cit., p. 535. 
4 Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 216. 
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warmly, with the exception of the bi-nationalists) But 
although the call for freer immigration, and the spirit 
behind the declaration was applauded, most Zionists would 
certainly have preferred a less idiosyncratic declaration 
on the lines of the Biltmore Declaration. 
2 
In July came further criticism of the policy from 
within the Labour Party with the publication of a pamphlet 
of the Parliamentary Peace Aims Group. 
3 The analysis of 
the Palestine problem was a clear indication that its 
author was the Group's Secretary, Richard Stokes: 
'It is difficult to understand why Palestine has 
found a prominent place in Party policy. The 
policy outlined is a contradiction of the principles 
enumerated for the benefit of the occupant of the 
Colonial Empire. Zionism is a controversial matter 
even among Jews. Is the Labour Party as a whole to 
be committed to being pro Zionist and anti Arab? 
The suggestion that the Arabs should be cleared out 
of Palestine is a dangerous one, and will be 
resisted by the teeming millions of India and the 
Middle East'. 
The one undoubted result of Stokes' comments was the 
resignation of a leading member of the Group, Sidney 
Silverman. The passage, he believed, was 'so thoroughly 
irresponsible in its approach as to discredit the serious- 
ness of any other matter with which (the pamphlet) deals'. 
1 eg Tribune 5 May 1944 for a critical letter from a member 
of Hashomer Hatzair. Other correspondents disagreed; one 
saw the resolution as 'not only the first but the sole act 
of real practical help offered to the Jewish and to the 
Zionist cause since 1933' (ibid., 19 May 1944)" 
2 The program, adopted at a Zionist Conference at the 
Biltmore Hotel, New York, in May 1942 demanded free 
immigration, authority to the Jewish Agency to develop the 
country, and the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish 
Commonwealth. 
3 Parliamentary Peace Aims Group, Labour and the Post War 
Settlement (London, July 1944). For the Group see Burridge, 
ep`", pp. 30-1,41,55,120,168. 
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He claimed that the group had received no notice of the 
passage and suspected that it 'was initiated by a single 
member to cover his own personal view with the Group's 
authority'. 
With the annual conference drawing near Locker (with 
Shertok) again visited Dalton, who advised them to back up 
his declaration by urging a variety of organisations to 
submit resolutions. 
2 Four affiliated bodies did so and 
one, from the City of Leeds Labour Party, was chosen as 
suitable for NEC support, provided that the phrase 'Free 
Jewish Commonwealth' was replaced by the conventional 
'National Home for the Jewish People'. 3 Though the NEC 
still hesitated to give official support for a Jewish 
State, it had nevertheless approved a resolution which 
spoke 'free choice' of the 'existing population' 
- 
'of 
remaining and sharing in the benefits which Jewish 
colonisation brings in its wake, or be assisted to partici- 
pate in the development of the vast reserves of underdevel- 
oped land in the neighbouring Arab countries'. 
Following the postponment of the annual conference the 
policy had once more to be approved for presentation. At 
the meeting of the Sub Committee on 14 November Dalton 
found that 'no one else has done anything and my draft 
1 ZR 13 Oct. 1944. It is certainly unlikely that the pro 
Zionist Chairman Rhys Davies would have given his approval 
to the passage. 
In the latter half of 1944 came the resurrection of the 
Jewish Dominion of Palestine League, led by Lord Strabolgi. 
Allegations in the Zionist Review that the League had links 
with the Revisionists led to an acrimonious correspondence in the paper, though Ian Mikardo, a member of Poale Zion, 
came to the League's defence, see The Times 7 Nov. 1944, 
zR 1,8,15, Dec. 1944,5 & 19 Jan. 1945,2 Feb. 1945. 
2 Dalton Diariep 1 Nov 19 cý. Se ZR 1 Dec. 1944 for a w°e comrfngethegpröpö 
ais. 
ýlas dw La ýour-party 
and Poale Zion 
3 Policy and International Sub Committees, 14 Nov. 1944. 
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holds the field. Moreover, as we go through it, my 
colleagues swallow it whole'. Of his two likeliest critics. 
Clay did not attend and Noel Baker ('as usual') arrived 
late. Noel Baker did nevertheless suggest that in relation 
to Palestine there should be some reference to the Mandate. 
This might at least have given the paragraph greater 
balance, but Dalton successfully resisted the suggestion. 
l 
The document was passed by the NEC on 22 November. 
Conference began in London on 11 December. The Inter- 
national Post War Settlement was adopted by an overwhelming 
majority but there was, to the chagrin of the Zionists, no 
consideration of the Leeds resolution, and no official 
statement emphasising that population transfers would be 
entirely voluntary. 
2 
Arthur Creech Jones later noted that, though he had 
supported the principles of the Biltmore program, he had 
opposed that of the Labour Party 'because it was too 
extravagant, unjust and impracticable'. 
3 In a draft of a 
book on Palestine 
- 
left incomplete at his death 
- 
he was 
concerned to explain the nature of Labour Conference 
decisions concerning Palestine 'whose significance cannot 
be overrated'. In his view: 
'delegates too often cast their votes in ignorance of 
many of the facts concerning the matter on which 
Resolutions, all of which called for a Jewish Commonwealth, 
came from Poale Zion, City of Leeds LP, Central Leeds DLP 
and Liverpool LP. A covering note from the City of Leeds 
had in fact referred to the 'uselessness of the IPWS'. 
1 Dalton Diaries 14 Nov. 1944. 
2 LPACR 1944, p. 139, see 'Ruth' in ZR 22 Dec. 1944" 
3 Creech Jones to E. Monroe, n. d. (CJ 32/6/34). 
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they are making policy. Conference is not consti- 
tuted for careful study, deliberation and 
consideration. Delegates are often subject to 
pressure groups and propaganda, often they are not 
'delegates' in the proper sense of the word. In 
the case of Palestine, Zionist activity among 
constituency parties, affiliated organisations and 
delegates did not contribute to calm reflection. 
The Arab case was never understood or discussed or 
publicised'"1 
But this was the view of the former Labour Colonial 
Secretary responsible for Palestine. During the war Creech 
Jones, a member of the British Association for a Jewish 
National Home, Z was active, both in Britain and America, in 
support of Zionist aspirations. There is little indication 
that he made an effort to ensure that the Palestinian Arab 
case was fairly stated. A speech in 1941 to the Anglo 
Palestine Club indicates that, whatever his knowledge of 
the subject, his feelings and prejudices were precisely 
those which underlay Dalton's declaration: 
'the Arabs had a vast territory over which they could 
roam and it occurred to him that they had not made 
particularly good use of the areas in which they had 
roamed. After all, with such a vast territory, it 
seemed to him no small advantage to the Arabs that 
a portion of that territory should be given to an 
energetic people in order that they might bring 
about the economic changes on which the general well 
being of the Arab people would depend. He was a 
firm believer in the Zionist cause and was convinced 
by what he had seen and by talks he had had with Jews 
and Arab alike that a national home founded by the 
Jews was not only a blessing to the Jewish people 
themselves but a colossal blessing to the Arab 
people and a contribution to the stability and peace 
of the world'. 3 
The following year two international labour organisa- 
tions passed pro Zionist declarations, moderately worded. 
1 CJ 32/2/50. 
2 In 1945 he added his name to a strongly pro Zionist 
pamphlet published by the Association, see British Assoc- iation for a Jewish National Home in Palestine, Palestine 
1917/1944 (London, 1945). 
3 Speech by Creech Jones at the Anglo Palestine Club, ZR 30 May 1941. 
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The Conference of European Socialists despite the partici- 
pation of the Bund urged 'the civilised world (to)... 
guarantee to the Jewish people the full opportunity for 
the achievement of their national home'. 
1 At the World 
Trade Union Conference the view of Asfour, representing the 
Arab Workers Society, found little support, and the skill 
of Locker helped ensure the passing of a similar resolution 
Harold Laski was now in the forefront of Zionist 
activity within the Labour Party. Concerned that the party 
should reaffirm its policy on immigration into Palestine, 
in April he persuaded the NEC to publish a declaration 
urging the Government 'to reverse present unjustified 
barriers on immigration and to announce, without delay, 
proposals for the future of Palestine in which it has the 
full sympathy and support of the American and Russian 
Government'. 3 Addressing a May Day rally organised by 
Manchester Poale Zion Laski admitted that 'he was now 
firmly and utterly convinced of the need for the rebirth of 
the Jewish nation in Palestine'. He felt, he said 'like a 
prodigal son returning home'. 
4 Greenwood was also forth- 
right in his opinions, and, unusually for a senior Labour 
1 The Times 3 May 1945, New Judea Feb-Mar. 1945" For the 
analysis of the Bund see London Delegation of the Central 
Committee of the Jewish Workers' Union Bund in Poland, Some 
Jewish Problems, (London, 1945). 
2 'Report of the World Trade Union Conference, 1945' P. 238 
Pre. uss, op. cit., p. 143. The resolution did speak of 
'respecting the legitimate interests of other national 
groups and giving equality of rights and opportunities to all its inhabitants'. 
3 Int Sub 18 Apr. 1945, NEC 25 Apr. 1945. Laski was doubtless prompted by the changes in the climate of 
opinion since the assassination of Lord Moyne. 
42 11 May 1945. 
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politician, wrote of the building by the Jewish people of a 
'Commonwealth' in Palestine. 
1 
On 21 May Conference assembled for the last time during 
the war. From the Histadrut came thanks for the party's 
efforts throughout the war. On 22 May Rosette spoke 
briefly on the Jewish tragedy. 
2 Dalton wound up the 
debate on 'Let us Face the Future'. 'I begin by picking up 
small points... but make an impromptu peroration 10 minutes 
long. The Conference rises at this anti I have to rise and 
bow and make the V sign'. His speech included a short 
defence and reiteration of his views on Palestine. It was, 
he said 'morally wrong and politically indefensible to 
impose obstacles to the entry into Palestine now of Jews 
who desire to go there... If we are to get an agreement 
(there should be) consultation with those two Governments 
(of the USA and USSR) to see whether we cannot get that 
common support for a policy which will give us a happy, 
free and prosperous Jewish State in Palestine'. 
3 It could 
not have been put more clearly. 
Labour and Liberal4 pronouncements on Palestine 
prompted Hammersley, the Conservative Chairman of the 
1 May Day message to the Palestine Labour Movement, ZR 
4 May 1945. 
2 LPACR 1945, P. 100. 
3 Ibid., p. 104. Dalton Diaries 22 May 1945. 
4A Liberal resolution had called for the reversal of the 
White Paper policy and the carrying out of the Mandate 
obligation. Moved by Geoffrey le Mander and opposed by 
Dingle Foot, the resolution was overwhelmingly carried, 
Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 214, ZR 23 Feb. 1945. 
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Parliamentary Palestine Committee, to write to the Colonial 
Office asking for suggestions on something definite to say 
on the subject. After some discussion a draft was prepared: 
'the new Government will clearly have to review the whole 
problem in the light of the conditions which will exist in 
the new phase into which we are entering'. In striking 
contrast to the stance adopted by the Labour Party was the 
opinion voiced in a minute of 9 June: 'I cannot help 
thinking that for many Parliamentary candidates complete 
ignorance, provided they do not commit themselves, is the 
best safeguard. They can always express the utmost zeal in 
studying the question when they are returned'. 
1 
E. Policy Making: As Participants in Government 
The process of policy making resulting in the adoption 
of The International Post War Settlement was the public 
side of the Labour Party's involvement in planning for the 
future of Palestine. But the Labour Party was also a party 
of Government, and for five years its leaders, in their role 
as Cabinet Ministers, had been involved with the Palestine 
problem from a wholly different perspective. In discussions 
of the post war Labour Government's handling of the 
Palestine problem the crucial influence of Labour Minister's 
wartime experience is often forgotten, and indeed several 
striking divergences from declared party policy began to 
emerge well before the arrival of Ernest Bevin at the 
Foreign Office. 
As has already been noted, with the entry of the Labour 
1 CO 733/463 75872. 
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Party into the Coalition Government Labour ministers were 
quick to assure their Zionist friends that the balance of 
opinion within the Government had tilted significantly in 
their favour. When the Foreign Office proposed a statement 
pledging the continuation of the White Paper policy after 
the war Attlee affirmed in Cabinet his opposition to the 
White Paper, and that he was 'not yet satisfied that it 
would be desirable to reaffirm that policy at present'. 
l 
The following year Churchill noted that the Labour Party 
would 'never agree to the pro-Arab solutions which are the 
commonplace of British Service circles'. 
2 
Nevertheless, as Cohen has written 'the White Paper 
remained the basis of British rule in Palestine during the 
first three years of the war 
- 
if only because Britain 
could not be certain that it would still be in their hands 
at the end of the war'. 
3 Consideration of a fresh policy 
effectively began with Churchill's minutes of 18 April 1943 
and a surprisingly large number of ministers hastened to 
submit memoranda. 
A typically terse submission came from Clement Attlee, 
4 
who felt strongly that 'we cannot afford to leave our 
position where it is'. In Cabinet he argued that 'it (is) 
important to begin consideration of a long term policy 
without delay, in order to be in a position to implement it 
immediately after the war's and urged that a Cabinet 
1 CAB 65/7,15 Oct. 1940. 
2 Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 32. 
3 Cohen, op. cit., p. 160- 
4 VIP(43)266 of 23 June 1943 in CAB 66(38). 
5 CAB 65/39,2 July 1943 cited in Cohen, op. cit., p. 165. 
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Committee be set up to consider the Palestine problem and 
the 'international Jewish and Arab problems'. 
Attlee nevertheless had nothing of Dalton's breezy 





predicted that 'there is every 
possibility of our being faced with violent action by 
either or both Jews and Arabs. We should have then the 
thankless task of keeping order and will be blamed by both 
sides'. Significantly the Deputy Prime Minister now 
believed that the Zionist movement in Palestine had fallen 
under the control of 'reckless fanatics'. He contended 
that after the war millions of Jews would 'desire and be 
obliged' to live in gentile lands, and commented disparag- 
ingly that 'none but a visionary imagines that Palestine 
can absorb all the Jews, even if they are willing to got. 
Attlee's attitude was clearly not that of the vocal 
majority of his party. The views of Stafford Cripps were 
no more representative of party opinion. He also dwelt on 
the 'unbalanced and emotional attitude of American (and to 
some extent British) Zionists towards Palestine'. He 
called for a United Nations Conference on Jews in the post 
war world and though he urged that Palestine be treated as 
part of the wider Jewish problem felt that the longer the 
conference lasted the less interest Jewry would have in 
'irreconcilable Zionism' and the greater would be the 
attractions of post Nazi Europe. Indeed he felt there was 
a chance that 'the economic and social prospects in Europe 
will compare so favourably with the prospects in an over- 
crowded Palestine that there might well be a net outward 
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balance of immigration from that country'. His views 
constituted a profound misreading of the attitude of the 
Zionist movement and the mood of world Jewry. 
1 Furthermore, 
although in his memorandum he advocated a bi-national state 
in a larger federal grouping, the following year a pro 
Zionist visitor noted that Cripps, whilst dismissing the 
idea of mass Jewish immigration, now advocated some form of 
partition 'which would give the Jews a focal point, and at 
least a spiritual home'. 
2 
The Cabinet agreed to set up a Cabinet Committee. 
Churchill was left to choose its personnel which, when 
announced, caused considerable gloom in the Foreign Office, 
for all except the Colonial Secretary had voted against the 
White Paper in 1939. As Chairman The Prime Minister 
selected Herbert Morrison, who had led the attack of the 
Labour Party in Parliament. 3 Of equal significance was the 
fact that the Committee was directed to take as its 
starting point the proposals of the Peel Commission for a 
scheme of partition. 
The Committee met for the first time on 4 August. 
4 It 
was at once clear that partition, strongly advocated by 
Amery, would find considerable support. Morrison seemed 
less enthusiastic: 'the Chairman... said that Palestine was 
1 ViP(43)265 of 1 July 1943 in CAB 6 6(38). 
2 Meinertzhagen, op. cit., p. 192 entry for 25 May 1944. A 
relation of Cripps, he erroneously believed him to be a 
member of Cabinet Committee. 
3 On 17 July the Zionist Review paid tribute to the late 
J. Jagger, MP 'a true friend of Zionism' who had been 
Morrison's Parliamentary Private Secretary. 
4 CAB 95/14,14 Aug. 1943. 
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already a small country and to partition it as it stood 
would create two States even smaller'. He suggested 
'readjustments' over a larger area, including Transjordan 
- 
a view being expounded within the Labour Party by Hugh 
Dalton. 
But from this point Morrison seems to have confined his 
role to that of a neutral Chairman. Though as Chairman and 
representative of Labour he took his full share of 
responsibility for the decisions of the Committee, he did 
not seek to impose his views as party spokesman and friend 
of Zionism. From this point onwards the views of the 
Committee and of the Labour Party began to diverge. 
With the divergence came a certain confusion. On 25 
October Attlee and Churchill met Weizmann. 
1 When the Prime 
Minister asserted that Attlee and his party were committed 
to partition the Labour leader nodded in approval. Attlee 
certainly could not speak for his party. There was a 
commitment to overturn the White Paper. But there was no 
commitment on partition, and the feeling within the party 
still remained overwhelmingly hostile to the idea. 
In the month that followed the Cabinet Committee met on 
four further occasions. Thus, whilst the Labour Party Sub 
Committee considered and accepted a plan for territorial 
expansion and a possible transfer of population, a Cabinet 
Committee with a Labour Chairman overruled the objections 
of the Foreign Office and passed a scheme of partition. 
2 
1 Cohen, op. cit., pp. 166-7. 
2 CAB 95/1L., 10 Dec. 1943. 
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Churchill approved the plan, despite the opposition of the 
Chiefs of Staff, but there was a general agreement that no 
announcement would be made until the end of the European 
War. 
There was now a growing realisation that the future of 
Palestine was again coming under official consideration, 
and interested MPs began to stir themselves accordingly. 
The Parliamentary Palestine Committee was re-established 
and among the new officers were Barnett. Janner and Creech 
Jones. 1 Weizmann told MPs that partition was unacceptable, 
as it would not be final and could only lead to further 
difficulties. 2 In March the Colonial Secretary received a 
delegation from the Parliamentary Arab Committee, and later 
in the year from a group of MPs representing Zionist views. 
Only the latter included Labour MPs. 
3 
In March 4Weizmann dined with Dalton and Noel Baker, and 
Dalton hinted of his draft on Palestine. 
k Churchill had 
told Weizmann that 'we agree so completely that there is 
nothing to discuss. I am on your side. The Labour Party 
is on your side. What more do you want? ' What the Zionist 
did want was confirmation of the rumours that the Cabinet 
had discussed the question of Palestine. Dalton advised him 
1 The Times 13 Nov. 1943, ZR 19 Nov. 1943. Creech Jones 
became Vice Chairman and Janner Secretary. The changes were 
necessitated by the deaths of Wedgwood and Cazalet. See 
'Dugdale Diaries' 27 Oct. 1945 for a dinner which attracted 
30 MPs and Peers. 
2 Notes of meeting, 8 Feb. 1944 in CO 733/463 75872/90. 
3 Meetings 23 Mar. & 19 Oct. 1943 in CO 733/463 75872/129 
& 190. See ZR 16 May 1945 for the formation of a 'Middle East Committee' under the Chairmanship of Sir Edward Spears. 
4 Dalton Diaries 8 Mar. 1944, see above p. 259. 
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not to take these rumours too seriously. 'Much of this was 
only a desultory five or ten minutes exchange of banalities, 
resulting in nothing even faintly approaching a 'decision'. ' 
The reverse was the case. On 25 January the Cabinet had 
given its general approval to the scheme of partition as 
the best that could be devised, and resolved not to be 
moved by the inevitable opposition the scheme would arouse 
1 
In August the Cabinet decided to reopen consideration 
of Palestine. On 19 September the Committee reassembled 
and considered a Memorandum from Eden entitled 'The Case 
Against Partition'. A week later Eden attended the 
Committee to put the case in person, but to no avail. 
2 
Morrison summed up: partition was the lesser of two evils, 
and the Committee would not depart from the principles of 
its first report. That afternoon his colleague Dalton was 
visited by Locker and Shertok, who were worried that the 
Government might be contemplating some new form of 
partition. 'I say I don't think this at all likely'. 
3 
A month later Weizmann visited Dalton and made further 
enquiries about the rumours of partition. Dalton had 
finally ceased denying their veracity, but he reassured the 
Zionist that the Labour Party would certainly oppose 
partition. This at least was true. Many important Labour 
figures had publicly stated their party's opposition, in 
1 CAB 65/45,25 Jan. 1944. 
2 CAB 95/14,19 & 26 Sept. 1944. 
3 Dalton Diaries 26 Sept. 1944. 
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particular Arthur Greenwood. 
1 
Dalton advised Weizmann to visit Herbert Morrison, and 
himself wrote to his colleague urging him to arrange a 
meeting. 2 He recounted how he had been 'pushing (the 
Zionists') barrow for them through the NEC and into a 
paragraph, with which they were delighted... '. 
Dalton repeated his belief that there was a real chance 
of 'doing the right- thing by the Jews' and of beginning a 
real economic revival in the Middle East. 'But, if so, it 
is essential there should be no backsliding in the meantime. ' 
Dalton explained that Weizmann was now entirely opposed to 
partition, but feared that some friends of the Jews might 
now be considering the idea. In Dalton's opinion 'it would 
be in direct conflict with the Labour Party's recent 
declaration. I wanted to expand and not contract the 
boundaries of the Jewish National Home'. 
This was probably a rather unsubtle attempt - with the 
reference to 'friends of Jews over here, who in the past 
have opposed it (who) might now be leaning towards it' - to 
shift Morrison from his position as a spokesman for 
partition within the Cabinet. Although Morrison's 
Secretary reported that an appointment had been fixed with 
Weizmann, there is no record of the meeting. 
3 But by now 
1 In Jewish Labour he had recently written 'we certainly 
will not favour the diminution of the area of Jewish devel- 
opment in Palestine by partitioning the country', ZR 
16 June, 1944. 
2 H. Dalton to H. Morrison, 28 Oct. 1944 (Dalton Papers 
8/1 P. 99). 
3 Letter dated 2 Nov. 1944 in ibid., p. 101. 
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the two Labour Ministers could have no doubts that the 
policies of Government and Party were in complete 
contradiction. By the autumn, despite Dalton's obfusca- 
tions, the Zionists must have realised this. There was in 
fact no certainty that a General Election would follow the 
defeat of Germany. Attlee and Dalton, for example, were 
prepared to consider prolonging the coalition after VE Day. 
The Labour Party might therefore have found itself 
committed as participants in the Government to a scheme of 
partition whilst equally committed as a party, to opposing 
it. 
Zionists helped ensure that this would not happen. On 
6 November the Minister Resident in the Middle East, Lord 
Moyne, was assassinated by Jewish terrorists. On 
Churchill's orders Cabinet discussion of the Committee 
report was postponed. But the problem of the White Paper 
remained, and the immigration quota steadily neared 
completion. Stanley urged Morrison to reconvene the 
Committee, but the tide was now running against partition. 
The new Minister Resident produced a fresh plan, a 
modification of the existing position, but before the 
Cabinet could consider the matter further the war in Europe 
ended, and shortly afterwards a General Election was 
called. 
1 Burridge, op. cit., p. 114. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The Reckoning 1945 
- 
1949 
A. Labour Triumph and Zionist Disappointment 
Following the election of 1945 it was noted that the 




though Liberal and Common- 
wealth Parties cautiously supported Zionist aims - on the 
question of Palestine there was an obvious difference of 
opinion between the main protagonists. 
Soundings by Jewish organisations did reveal that not 
all on the left were in agreement. Ellen Wilkinson, for 
the Labour Party, naturally answered that the party was 
strongly in favour of the National Home. But James McNair 
of the ILP gave a very circumscribed message of support, 
whilst the spokesmen of the Communist Party referred 
inquirers to a publication which included a violent attack 
on the Zionist movement. 
2 
The election was fought overwhelmingly on matters of 
domestic policy. Blanche Dugdale noted that Eleanor 
Rathbone was the only candidate to mention the plight of 
refugees in her election address. 
3 Sir Edward Spears was 
nevertheless moved to assure his electors that 130 million 
Arabs will be watching with keen interest and even anxiety 
the result of the election in Carlisle', an idea suitably 
I R. B. McCallum & A. Readman, The British General Election 
of 1945 (London, 1947) p. 49. 
2 ZR 6 July 1945. 
3 Ibid., McCallum & Readman, op. cit., p. 228. 
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ridiculed in the Zionist Review. 
1 
Several letters in the paper echoed the advice of a 
correspondent who urged Jews to vote 'in favour of the 
candidate whose party most unequivocably advocates the 
abrogation of the White Paper and the creation of a Jewish 
State in Palestine'. 2 An editorial on 29 June, whilst 
admitting that 'there are friends of Zionism in all parties' 
made a similar plea. 
Poale Zion naturally threw itself into the campaign 
with gusto, Nathan Jackson, the party secretary, leading 
the fight as Labour candidate for Glasgow Cathcart. An 
election fund was apparently well supported. At the Annual 
Conference in June all members were urged to campaign for 
the Labour Party 
- 
'but such work should not be done 
anonymously; each candidate must be made to understand the 
Jewish question and the place of Poale Zion in the movement 
as a whole'. 
3 One absentee from the campaign was Abba Eban. 
He had been urged by Laski to stand as Labour candidate in 
Farnborough, but preferred fully to devote his energy to 
4 
the Zionist cause. 
Poale Zion's manifesto quoted not the relevant section 
of the Labour Party's program, about which Poale Zion had 
certain reservations, 
5 but Dalton's speech to the 1945 
I ZR 20 July 1945. The paper replied with a burst of 
doggerel: 'Millions of Arabs will be dejected, if 
Brigadier Spears isn't elected. So come on Carlisle 
- 
face 
the problem. Dare we upset a single Moslem? ' 
2 Ibid., 15 June 1945. 
3 Ibid. 4 Eban, op. cit., p. 56. 
5 Before the Anglo American Committee of Enquiry Jackson 
took some care to distance himself from the proposals (PRO 30/78 9). 
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Conference in which he declared for a Jewish State. But 
the Labour Party did not shy away from its own pronounce- 
tents. The Handbook for Speakers included an abridged 
version of the declaration and retained reference to 
population transfers. During the campaign Poale Zion 
members worked hard for Labour candidates, who were in turn 
quick to speak at meetings arranged by Zionists. 
1 Poale 
Zion also published a book on Labour Zionism, which included 
a wide selection of pro Zionist declarations and speeches 
emanating from the Labour Party. 
2 
The election results were announced on 26 July, and by 
11.00 it was becoming clear that the Labour Party had won 
an overwhelming victory. In 1929 six Labour MPs had been 
Jews, and in 1935 five. Now, of the 393 Labour MPs, no 
fewer than 26 were Jews. There remained not one Jewish MP 
in either the Conservative or Liberal Parties, merely the 
anti Zionist Independent Daniel Lipson and the Communist 
Phil Piratin. 3 
This was largely a sign of the political times. The 
new PLP experienced a large influx from the middle class 
professions, and in this area Jews were relatively 
numerous. The Jewish contingent within the PLP included 
1 For example, a meeting organised by East London Poale 
Zion, with speeches from Dreen, Rosette, W. J. Edwards (Whitechapel) and Frankel (Mile End), ZR 29 June 1945. 
2 Levenberg (ed), op. cit. Middleton provided the intro- 
duction. Several leaflets, in English and Yiddish, were 
also produced. 
3 The full list was H. Austin, L. Comyns, J. Diamond, M. Edelman, 
B. Janner, G. Jeger, S. Jeger, H. Lever, B. Levy, J. Lewis, J. Mack, 
M. Lipton, I. Mikardo, H. Morris, M. Orbach,. S. Segal, E. Shinwell, 
L. Silkin, J. Silverman, S. Silverman, L. Solley, G. Strauss, 
B. Stross, M. Turner-Samuels, D. Wei zmann, L. Wilkes. 
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four doctors, three journalists and eleven lawyers. Many 
were young first generation British Jews, whose political 
views had been shaped by the events of the 1930s. Six 
represented Lancashire constituencies, and a further nine 
won seats in or near London. Several held seats in the 
East End, but more recent areas of Jewish concentration, 
such as Willesden and Stoke Newington now returned Jewish 
MPs. At Willesden David Weizmann had defeated the 
Conservative pro Zionist, S. S. Hammersley. 
1 
It is nonetheless unlikely that any Jewish MP owed his 
election either to his Jewishness or his Zionism. The 
majority of Jewish electors had doubtless given their 
support to the Labour Party, but as a factor influencing 
the party's victory its Zionist pledges were of negligible 
importance. Indeed, in one of the few areas in which Jews 
still formed a significant minority - Mile End - the 
Zionist Dan Frankel had been defeated by Piratin, the 
Communist candidate. 
The PLP now included two leading Zionists in Sidney 
Silverman, Chairman of the British Section of the World 
Jewish Congress, and BarnettJanner. Poale Zion in 
particular could take much satisfaction in the membership 
of the new Parliament. Although Nathan Jackson had been 
defeated five party members had been successful 
- 
Harold 
Lever, J. D. Mack, Ian Mikardo, Maurice Orbach and Sidney 
Silverman. Of these Mikardo was the brother in law of 
Maurice Rosette, Silverman the founder of Liverpool Poale 
Zion and Lever the brother of the Chairman of the Manchester 
1 Wedgwood's seat at Newcastle under Lyme had passed, on his death in 1943, to a committed Zionist, J. D. Mack. 
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branch. 1 Orbach and Mikardo were subsequently to join the 
Executive of the VJJC British Section. But it is perhaps 
surprising to note that even in 1945 not more than half of 
the Jewish MPs could be accounted Zionists. 
More important was the evident sympathy of the great 
majority of Labour MPs for the Zionist cause. An election 
questionnaire circulated by Poale Zion and the Zionist 
Federation had drawn a large number of statements of 
support from Labour candidates. The Zionist Review printed 
the names of 72 Labour MPs who had expressed support for 
their party's Palestine policy and claimed that 'among the 
large number of replies received from Labour candidates 
there were only a few whose statements are vague and 
unsatisfactory'. A sign of the times was the presence on 
the list of Lester Hutchinson, who before the war had on 
two occasions attacked Zionism at party conferences. The 
composition of the new House of Commons could give the 
Zionists nothing but confidence. 
2 
Although Silverman believed his Jewish activities had 
been a factor in his failure to achieve office3 the compos- 
ition of the new Government gave the Zionists grounds for 
cautious optimism. As expected three leading Zionist 
supporters, Greenwood, Morrison and Dalton took important 
posts though all were to deal with domestic matters. For 
1 ZR 27 July 1945. Herbert Butler, MP for Hackney South, 
was not Jewish but 'could converse readily in Yiddish... an 
asset in (hi) constituency', Bellamy and Saville (eds), 
op. cit., Vol. IV, (London, 1977) pp. 49-50. 
2 ZR 3 July 1945. Several anti Zionist Conservatives had 
been defeated; most remaining Conservatives 'expressed 
their preparedness to follow the lead of Mr. Churchill'. 
3 E. Hughes, Sidney Silverman: Rebel in Parliament (London, 
1969) p. 90. Three Jews 
- 
Shinwell, Silkin and Strauss 
- joined the Government. 
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some the choice of George Hall as Colonial Secretary was 
less propitious; Blanche Dugdale referred to him in 
disgust as 'that old fool'. 
1 Certainly he had not been 
found particularly sympathetic during the war. In a 
report of an interview with Professor Coupland, it was 
noted that Hall had 'made some hostile remarks about the 
Jews and said that they were 'grasping' 
.2 On the other 
hand Creech Jones, a proven friend of Zionism, 'who became 
Hall's Under Secretary, apparently informed Locker that he 
had 'stipulated that he should be consulted on all 
Palestine matters'. 
3 
To many people the choice of Ernest Bevin as Foreign 
Secretary came as a surprise. Dalton had confidently 
expected the post, and Bevin apparently hoped for the 
Treasury. Zionists optimistically recalled certain favour- 
able comments Bevin had made and his intervention on their 
behalf in November 1930, even though he had acted with an 
eye to the fortunes of the Labour Party and his own Union. 
Of more significance were the efforts of Bevin on behalf of 
Zionists during the war. Weizmann later wrote that 'my 
personal contacts with Mr. Bevin had been unfortunate; 
that is where Jewish matters had been concerned' but in 
1940 Bevin had been 'the only man who understands (our) 
problems and is willing to take action'. 
4 Bevin had 
apparently known little of the Palestine problem 
- 
he had 
1 'Dugdale Diaries' 3 Aug. 1945. 
2 Interview, Prof. Coupland and Nainier, 30 Aug. 1942 (L. Stein Papers Box 123). 
3 'Dugdale Diaries' 3 Aug. 1945. 
4 Weizmann, op. cit., p. 540. JA Executive Minutes, 30 Dec. 1940. 
289 
never seen the White Paper of 1939 
- 
but was more than 
willing to offer novel suggestions: that all land in 
Palestine should be nationalised, or that an Indian Moslem 
be made High Commissioner 'as a pleasing compliment for the 
Arabs'. 1 In March 1944 Bevin discussed the Palestine 
problem with Dr. Goldstein, President of the Zionist 
Organisation of America. The record of the interview 
gives an important insight into his opinions before he 
became personally embroiled in the problem. 
2 
For Bevin Zionism was a good thing 'because it gave the 
Jews status'. He vowed that 'if he should be in office 
when the time came he would see that justice should be done 
to the Jewish people'. He added, after a pause, 'and the 
Arabs'. 
Further comments were less encouraging. Bevin 
regretted that the problem of the Balfour Declaration had 
not been settled during the last war. It was not, he felt, 
the time to make 'declarations which cause trouble' - 
which was exactly what his party was then about to do. 
Though he would like to 'settle the question' he was 
'damned' if he would allow British blood to be shed for 
either Jew or Arab. This was to remain uppermost in 
Bevin's thoughts. To Weizmann he was to insist that 'I 
cannot bear English Tommies being killed. They are 
innocent... I do not want any Jews killed either, but I love 
the British soldiers. They belong to my class. They are 
1 Interview, Coupland and Hamler, op. cit. 
2 Notes of meeting, 16 Mar. 1944, ibid. 
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working people... '. 
l 
Bevin also resented that the Jews were only concerned 
with their own problems, for he himself was an internation- 
alist. Moreover he felt worried about the question of the 
dual loyalty of Jews, to a Jewish Palestine and to their 
native land. Gluckstein attempted to reassure Bevin, and 
to explain the Zionist case more fully, but Bevin's views 
were clearly strongly held. That such opinions were voiced 
eighteen months before he became Foreign Secretary suggests 
that his reaction then was not simply that of a pugnacious 
politician suddenly confronted with a new problem and over- 
whelmed with professional advice. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to examine in 
detail the nature and formation of British policy towards 
Palestine during the next four years. This has been done 
by a number of authors, and the recent opening of Cabinet 
papers has allowed a more detailed and accurate description 
to be made. 
2 The intention is to consider the reaction of 
groups within the Labour Party, and of groups associated 
with it, to the Palestine policies of the Labour Government. 
This will entail some consideration of Government policy, 
and an attempt will be made to indicate the reaction of 
individuals within the Government to the course to which 
they were committed. Critically important were the devel- 
opments of the early months when, as Zionists saw it, the 
Government took its first steps towards turmoil and 
1 Bethell, op. cit., pp. 215-6. 
2 More recent works include Bethell, Gilbert and Cohen 
op. cit., see also M. J. Cohen, 'Why Britain Left: The End of 
the Mandate', in The Weiner Library Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, 
1978 pp. 74-86. 
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betrayal. 
On 22 August Attlee reconstituted the Palestine 
Committee of the Cabinet. Some writers have suggested 
that the situation was now one of inexperienced Labour 
Ministers confronting a novel problem with no knowledge or 
previous guidance other than the stream of party declara- 
tions. 1 Thereupon, it is argued, they were bombarded with 
detailed memoranda from departments and embassies stressing 
that Britain's entire position in the Middle East rested 
on the maintenarjce of the White Paper policy, advice which 
decisively shaped the Government's course of action. 
This picture is overdrawn. In many ways the emphasis 
should be on continuity rather than novelty. Though 
Dalton's role in forming party policy might suggest other- 
wise, senior Labour Ministers had already considerable 
involvement with the Palestine problem. George Hall and 
Herbert Morrison had been particularly concerned during the 
war and several other leaders, through their work in 
Cabinet and War Cabinet, were now aware of many of the 
issues involved. Though M. J. Cohen may be correct to 
question 'whether the Labour ministers in Churchill's 
Coalition felt the full responsibility for the decisions 
of the Cabinet in which they sat'2 it is less in doubt that 
wartime experience was the basis from which Labour 
Ministers approached their task. 
The new Committee first met on 6 September and Morrison 
began by summarising the work done by the Committee during 
1 Especially J. Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars (London, 1950) 
pp. 156-7. 
2 Cohen, op. cit., p. 183. 
29 2 
the war. 
l Hall then concentrated on the problem of Jewish 
immigration. A decision would soon be needed as only 3,000 
of the 75,000 immigration certificates allowed under the 
White Paper still remained, and these would be exhausted by 
November. Hall blandly proposed that the White Paper quota 
be adhered to whilst a long term policy was being 
formulated, although the Arabs would be approached to allow 
further immigration. 
The Labour Party had opposed the White Paper for six 
years, and had promised to remove it at the first opportun- 
ity, yet the committee had remarkably few qualms in 
endorsing Hall's proposal - Bevin merely questioned the 
terminology used. Dalton's contribution was significant. 
In expressing great sympathy for the Jews, and regret that 
settlement should be held up by the 'intransigence of a 
backward local population' he was voicing beliefs which 
had inspired the party declaration. He also suggested, 
somewhat disingenuously, that in his view pressure of 
opinion and party statements 'that had from time to time 
been made' should not be overlooked. But his retreat was 
immediate. 'He quite recognised', he said - apparently for 
the first time 
- 
'the need for taking into account Arab 
feeling and the importance of avoiding civil outbreaks in 
Palestine'. 
The recommendations of the Committee were reported to 
the Cabinet on 11 September. 
2 Morrison stressed the need 
1 CAS, 95/14,6 Sept. 1945. 
2 CP(45)156,11 Sept. 1945 in CAB 129. At the second 
meeting of the Committee Morrison commented that he did not believe the problem of European Jewry to be 'fundamentally 
less troublesome than it was before the German persecution', CAB 95/14,10 Sept. 1945. 
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for the tightest security: 'we were unlikely to escape 
criticism whatever policy we adopted'. The Cabinet there- 
upon adopted the Committee's suggestions with only a few 
minor alterations. The approved memorandum bluntly 
recommended that party policy should for the present be 
waived: 'we consider that the balance of advantage lies in 
the temporary maintenance of the White Paper policy'. 
By the time the Cabinet next came to discuss Palestine, 
early in October1 agitation for a relaxation of the White 
Paper policy had risen sharply, not least in America where 
President Truman had made a much publicised request for the 
immediate entry of 100,000 refugees into Palestine. With 
Parliament shortly to reassemble some announcement would 
soon be needed. Truman's request evidently provoked dis- 
agreement within the Cabinet, some members feeling that it 
would lead to an 'explosion' in Palestine, others that 
immediate relief for Jewish refugees was needed. Now, at 
last, some members strongly urged that any statement of 
policy should at least be dissociated from the White Paper. 
It was at this point that Bevin asked leave to intro- 
duce some 'revised proposals', based on the immediate 
establishment of an Anglo American Commission to examine 
both the steps which could be taken to alleviate the 
plight of Jewish refugees and 'how much immigration into 
Palestine could reasonably be allowed in the immediate 
future'. Bevin presented detailed recommendations the 
following week and on 13 November, following American 
agreement to participate, the Cabinet approved a statement 
which Bevin presented to the House of Commons that 
1 CAB 128,4 Oct. 19k5. 
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afternoon. 
The appointment of the Commission gave Britain both a 
much needed breathing space and the opportunity of 
involving the United States in the Palestine problem. 
Cabinet records for this period indicate how great was 
Benin's desire for America to behave 'responsibly', and to 
become an active partner rather than a critical bystander. 
This was not a new wish of Bevin's. In 1944 he had 
enquired of Dr. Goldstein 'whether the United States would 
like to take over the Mandate; the British have had 
enough of such things'. He hoped that the United States 
would 'go with Britain' to solve the problems of peace, but 
feared she might 'do the same as in 1918'. At the first 
meeting of the Palestine Committee Bevin argued that it 
should be the long term policy of the Government to 
associate the United States with policy in Palestine. In 
later years Creech Jones claimed that the idea of involving 
America 'was probably never absent from Labour thoughts'. 
' 
Certainly the party declaration had stressed the need for 
the sympathy and support of the United States. 
The period before Bevin's announcement was a time of 
considerable apprehension for Zionists and their supporters 
in the Labour Party. Ben Gurion had been quick to warn 
against undue optimism2 and there had been some concern 
that Bevin's statement on Foreign Affairs on 24 August had 
contained no reference to Palestine. As early as 24 August 
the Histadrut was complaining to the Labour Party that a 
decision limiting immigration within the framework of the 
1 Creech Jones to E. Monroe, n. d. (CJ 32/6/31). 
2 Speech reported in ZR 10 Aug. 1945. 
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White Paper appeared to be imminent. 
l 
In the Zionist Review a visiting American union leader 
opined that 'the partition of Palestine is in the making' 
and as rumours of an impending announcement grew the paper 
urged Ministers to remember their own pledges, and warned 
them not to underestimate the strength of the Yishuv. A 
selection of party resolutions and declarations were 
published, and the editor asked if it was 'conceivable that 
this unhappy people should receive a mortal blow from the 
Labour Government'. 2 
In an effort to persuage the Government to revoke the 
White Paper Zionists contacted individual ministers known 
to be sympathetic3 and a fresh campaign was mounted within 
the Labour Party. Poale Zion urged members to protest to 
Minister, the Government and Transport House; it also 
brought its case before the NEC, now chaired by Harold 
Laski. In a move which reflected that growing unease 
within the party at the lack of Government action the NEC 
decided to appoint a delegation to interview the Zionists 
and a meeting took place on 5 October with Locker, Shertok 
and Jackson. 
4 The Zionists naturally recalled party 
pledges and stressed, as a first step, the need for the 
immediate admission of 100,000 refugees. When Ayrton Gould 
asked what the consequences would be if the White Paper 
1 Telegram 28 Aug. 1945 in LP/Int 5 b). 
2 ZR 14,21 7 28 Sept. 1945. Three weeks later the 
editorial was entitled 'A New Munich? '. 
3 For example, see notes of the delegation to Noel Baker 
in FO 371/45419 E9009,28 Sept. 1945. 
4 Poale Zion appeal in LP/Int/5(b), Jewish Labour News 
27 Sept. 1945 for resolution of Poale Zion Executive, NEC 
26 Sept. 1945. 
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policy were maintained she was answered by Laski: 'the 
position is that there are no circumstances in which the 
Jewish people will accept the White Paper. In the event of 
the continuation, all means will be taken to avoid its 
consequences'. 
The NEC delegation were clearly sympathetic, but some- 
what embarrassed. Clay argued that 'resolutions are not 
always drafted in precisely the same way as policy that has 
got to be worked out. It is the broad principles and spirit 
that must be kept in mind'. One measure of the NEC's 
concern was their decision to seek an interview with 
Government Ministers. According to Kingsley Martin Laski 
now believed that the Government had decided to repudiate 
party promises. To Frankfurter he described his meeting 
with Ministers as part of an attempt to organise 'an 
internal opposition to fight the Attlee-Bevin betrayal'. 
He spoke of 'having it out' with the Cabinet, to find 
Cripps a supporter of Bevin, Morrison 'uneasily neutral' 
and only Dalton and Bevan 'really helpful'. 
1 In fact what 
evidence there is suggests something less than the major 
confrontation Laski so gleefully described. 
On 22 October the delegation met Attlee, Bevin and Hall 
for a two hour discussion. 
2 Ayrton Gould and Alice Bacon 
gave their view 'as Labour members who had given pledges to 
their constituents in the light of declarations of policy 
made by Party Conferences and by members of the Executive'. 
1 Martin, op. cit., p. 214, 'Dugdale Diaries' 20 Oct. 1945: 
'Dalton is chief among our friends'. 
2 Notes (taken by Laski) in NEC minutes. 
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Laski outlined the NEC's wishes: to carry out party 
policy of abandoning the White Paper, to relieve Jewish 
suffering in Europe, and to promote the economic develop- 
ment of Palestine and the Middle East in general. 
All three Ministers replied at length, but did not 
reveal details of the Government's proposals. Laski warned 
that he would, if necessary, call a special meeting of the 
NEC to consider their plan but assured them, somewhat dis- 
ingenuously, that this 'implied no criticism of the Govern- 
ment but was merely a fulfillment of our obvious duty to 
consider the relation of the proposals to our policy'. 
This, according to Laski, the Prime Minister accepted. 
Attlee for his part pledged that the proposals would be 
built upon the party policy of abrogation of the White 
Paper and the fulfillment of the Mandate. 
The Prime Minister's promise was aimed at more than 
just the NEC. In a clear attempt to still the rising tide 
of criticism and speculation Attlee offered a verbatim note 
of the conversation, and a press statement. Yet this was 
turned down by Laski, who gave the diplomatic explanation 
that 'this was a 'family' discussion and it would be 
unfortunate if we were to give the impression that the 
Government was under examination by the Party at a stage 
when no proposals were before it for discussion'. 
In fact had details of Attlee's statement been 
released they would doubtless have been received by Zionists 
with scepticism rather than relief. One month before 
Greenwood had unofficially informed Locker of the recommend- 
ations of the Palestine Committee' and there was still a 
1 'Dugdale Diaries' 20 Sept. 1945. 
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profound conviction that betrayal was imminent. 
Throughout October messages and resolutions flooded 
into the Government protesting against any continuation of 
the White Paper. Zionist organisations in Britain and 
Palestine protested both to the TUG and the Labour Party. 
The Histadrut implored the party to refrain from 'implement- 
ing anti semitic policy pregnant with the gravest consequen- 
ces', and warned of determined resistance. Jewish organis- 
ations throughout Britain made their protests known and, 
urged by Poale Zion, a number of local Labour Parties 
condemned any 'breach of faith'. 
1 
When Parliament reassembled Weizmann addressed a large 
gathering of Labour MPs, chaired by David Grenfell, and the 
Manchester Guardian noted that the meeting had drained the 
Chamber of all but a dozen Labour back benchers. 
2 The 
Times reported that the meeting was likely to encourage 
further representations to the Government. A number of MPs 
hoped to raise the question at a meeting of the PLP before 
any Government announcement. Tribune argued that such 
consultation was essential, since 'the deepest concern 
exists within the PLP about the rumours of changed policy 
which have reached it'. It saw the issue as epitomising 
the need to keep the Government on course. 
3 In the House 
of Commons Labour MPs condemned the Government's 
procrastination. k 
1 Communications in LP/Int 5b, including those from 
Brixton, South Hackney and South Islington DLPs, ZR 5 Oct. 1945. 
2 Manchester Guardian 12 Oct. 1945, The Times 10 Oct. 1945 
estimated 130 MPs were present, ZR 12 Oct. 1945 guessed at 150. See also Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 232, Brodetsky, op. cit., 
p. 259. 
3 Tribune 12 Oct. 1945. 
4 eg Silverman and McGovern in HC Deb. Vol. c. 785-9,2 Nov. 1945. 
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Labour MPs were much in evidence at public meetings 
organised by Zionists and their sympathisers. Members 
sought both to urge the Government immediately to abrogate 
the White Paper, and to assure the Zionists that this would 
be done. Ian Mikardo, for example, told his audience that 
'the Government is ruled by the authority of the rank and 
file, and would fulfil its pledges'. Early in November a 
large public demonstration marked the anniversary of the 
Balfour Declaration where speakers included Barnet Janner, 
Berl Locker, David Grenfell and Barbara Ayrton Gould. 
1 
It is likely that opinion within the Labour Party was 
an influential factor propelling Bevin towards his 'revised 
proposals'. For many Cabinet Ministers, as the meeting of 
4 October revealed, the prospect of any continuation of the 
White Paper was highly embarrassing, and after the stark 
recommendations. of the Palestine Committee Bevin's 
suggestion did provide a welcome alternative and a reason- 
able answer to parliamentary and party criticism. The 
change also enabled Attlee to mollify the NEC and claim 
that party pledges would be honoured. 
When Bevin announced his plan in Parliament the thrust 
of his thinking was quickly apparent. He asserted that 'we 
cannot accept the view that the Jews should be driven out 
of Europe, and should not be permitted to live again in 
these countries without discrimination and contribute their 
ability and their talent towards rebuilding the prosperity 
of Europe'. He was convinced that 'Palestine, while it may 
make a contribution, does not by itself provide sufficient 
1 ZR 12 Oct., 9 Nov. 1945. 
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opportunity for grappling with the whole problem'. 
1 
Some care had been taken to ensure that the plan 
received a friendly reception from the Opposition. Bevim's 
private secretary had explained the Government's plan to 
Eden four days earlier, but in the event the plan mis- 
carried and the Conservative spokesman, Oliver Stanley, 
'instead of giving the statement general support, as AE 
asked him to do, reserved his position and asked for a 
debate'. 2 Nonetheless Bevin was apparently 'elated by the 
reception of a very full house', and this may have 
encouraged him to reply to Janner's intervention with the 
words 'I will stake my political future on solving the 
problem'. But those who later used this claim to ridicule 
the Foreign Secretary tended to ignore his qualification: 
'but not in the limited sphere presented to me now'. His 
attempt to involve the United States was clearly an attempt 
to break free from this 'limited sphere'. 
It has been claimed that much of the goodwill Bevin 
generated in the Commons was dissipated during his press 
conferences that evening. To the American press he was 
'truculent and defensive'3 whilst two comments to British 
correspondents aroused anger among Zionists: he felt that 
certain schemes for developing Palestine seemed to combine 
'80% propaganda with 20% of fact' and he used the language 
of war time Britain to urge the Jews not to try to get 'to 
the head of the queue'. Yet according to Jon Kimche, then 
1 HC Deb, Vol. 415 c. 1927,13 Nov. 1945. 
2 P. Dixon, Double Di loma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon (London, 1968) pp. 197-8. 
3 Ibid., p. 1980 
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joint editor of Tribune, 'eighty experienced and therefore 
cynical newspapermen listened to him, nearly all of them 
deeply moved, and convinced that here was a man who meant 
business and would bring a new refreshing touch to the 
handling of the Palestine problem'. 
1 
Though according to one report Jewish Agency members 
felt that 'it might have been worse'2 for most Zionists 
Bevin's statement came as a great disappointment. The 
Zionist Review argued that 'if the complete reversal by the 
Government of the official Labour policy in regard to 
Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine is not a 
breach of faith, what is? '. 
3 The Zionist Federation 
published an Open Letter to Mr. Bevin from Berl Locker 
enumerating Labour pledges and Zionist grievances and 
ridiculing Bevin's reported claim that the declaration of 
1944 was simply the result of 'enthusiasm'. 
4 
Although many within the Labour Party felt that much 
more could have been done 
Bevin's statement friends 
tended to rally round the 
proposals. In Parliament 
gratulate Bevin on his st 
for the refugees' following 
of Zionism within the party 
leadership and to defend the 
Silverman's reaction was to con- 
atement and 'for the spirit in 
1 The Times 14 Nov. 1945. Again his words were taken out 
of context. Kimche, op. cit., p. 158. 
2 'Dugdale Diaries' 12 Nov. 1945. 
3 ZR 16 Nov. 1945. 
4 B. Locker, An Open Letter to Mr. Sevin (London, 1945). 
5 See Tribune 23 Nov. 1945 and ZR 21 Dec. 1945 for a 
resolution of Manchester City Labour Party proposed by the 
secretary of the local Poale Zion. 
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which it was made I, and to welcome the co-operation of the 
United States. 1 At meetings and demonstrations demands 
were still made for the entry of Jewish refugees, but now 
Labour spokesmen professed the belief that a breakthrough 
had been achieved. 
Notable among these was the Chairman of the party, 
Harold Laski. In an article for the American press he 
insisted that Jewish condemnation of Bevin's statement was 
misguided. The wiser path was to await the Commission's 
report. 
2 Middleton counselled caution and a careful 
reading of Bevin's statement. To a large rally in Stoke 
Newington he claimed that 'the great bulk of the Labour 
Party adhered to the party's declared policy, and he firmly 
believed that the gates of Palestine would be opened'. 'The 
Labour Government' he said 'could not do away with a 
situation which had developed in Palestine by 25 years mal- 
administration'. 
3 Taking a somewhat different line Mikardo 
conceded that the statement had been a bitter blow, but 
claimed that there were real hopes for a reversion of 
Government policy'. ' 
In correspondence to Palestinian friends Rita Hinden, 
the Secretary of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, sought in the 
same way to give reassurance. She described the 'endless 
goodwill' on the part of many Labour Ministers: 'but they 
seem to have found themselves in an infinitely more 
ticklish position than they anticipated'. Labour leaders, 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 415 c. 1934,13 Nov. 1945. 
2 ZR 7 Dec. 1945. 
3 Ibid., 14 Dec. 1945. 
4 Ibid., 21 Dec. 1945. 
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she claimed, had found it 'literally impossible' to adopt 
a Zionist policy at once, but swore 'until they are blue in 
the face' that the only way they could move towards the 
goal was the roundabout way chosen'. 
1 To Judah L. Magnis 
she wrote that 'at the same time I am not at all dissatis- 
fied with this statement as a general approach, and most of 
the progressive and thinking socialists here feel that it 
is absolutely right that the problem should be recognised 
as a world problem and the Americans brought in'. 
2 Early 
the following year she assured Magnes that 'all my friends 
in the Labour movement here... assure me that it would 
present just the opportunity we want - not to get a Jewish 
State, but to secure a Jewish National Home and continued 
immigration'. 3 
The party organisation swung dutifully behind the 
Government. To an impassioned telegram from the Histadrut 
the new Secretary, Morgan Phillips, replied that his party 
understood and sympathised with the Zionists' disappoint- 
ment but believed that the new approach was the best way to 
find a solution which would be fair to both parties. 
4 
Poale Zion received a similar rebuff when Locker requested 
a further meeting with the NEC to discuss Bevin's state- 
ment. At a meeting of the International Sub Committee, at 
which more than half of the members were Cabinet Ministers, 
the Secretary was instructed to inform Locker that the 
1 R. Hinden to B. Torcker, 13 Nov., 12 Dec. 1945 (FCB 176/6/ 
36&7). 
2 R. Hinden to J. Magnes, 30 Nov. 1945 (FCB 176/6/74). 
3 R. Hinden to J. Magnas, 10 Jan. 1946 (FCB 176/6/79). 
4 M. Phillips to Histadrut 30 Nov. 1945 (LP/Int/5(b). Similar replies were send-to other Jewish organisations. See also GC 28 Nov. 1945. 
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Committee was 'generally in agreement' with Bevin's 
statement, and that no useful purpose could be served by 
further discussion before the Commission began work. 
1 
Ben Gurion was clearly correct in considering the 
Government's proposals to be 'a very clever document, from 
the point of view of keeping the Labour Party quiet'. 
2 
The announcement was sufficient to silence, for a time, 
the criticism of Zionist supporters within the Parliament- 
ary Party, and to answer the many party members who hoped 
for a reasonable settlement for the Jewish survivors in 
Europe. Many shared Bevin's annoyance with the interven- 
tion of President Truman: 'as unhelpful as all such lofty 
moral gestures made by people who refrain from accepting 
responsibility'. 
3 Amidst the excitement of the first 
months of a majority Labour Government and the beginnings 
of the important domestic program, it was enough that some- 
thing constructive was seen to be done, and that members 
could argue that party pledges were being honoured. 
Inside the Cabinet, as within the party at large, there 
was a willingness to let Bevin have his head, and to tackle 
the problem in his own way whilst others got on with their 
own important tasks. As Dalton later admitted 'I would 
like to be able to assert that when President Truman made 
his original request I supported it, and urged it on my 
colleagues in the Cabinet. But I confess I did not do 
this nor, if I remember rightly, did any of my colleagues. 
1 Int Sub 20 Nov. 1945. Dalton, Morrison, Bevan and Shinwell were present. 
2 'Dugdale Diaries' 13 Nov. 1945. 
3 Tribune 28 Sept. 1945. 
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We were all greatly preoccupied with a multitude of other 
problems. And we wished to give Bevin's method, of the 
negotiators approach, a fair chance'. Dalton, whom the 
Zionists looked to as a leading friend in the Cabinet, 
positively welcomed Bevin's new proposal: 'I was myself 
attracted by the proposal of an Anglo American Committee 
of Enquiry'. 
l 
Furthermore, as well as the presence of a large minority 
of keen Zionist supporters within the PLP, and the over- 
whelming sympathy that existed for Zionist aspirations, 
there existed a small minority who could be identified as 
anti Zionists. Chief among this group was Richard Stokes, 
who continued his efforts in Parliament and in the press to 
counter what he saw as the malignant influence of Zionism 
within the party. 
2 In the Debate on the Address he had 
clashed with Barnett Janner and warned of the danger of 
civil war in the Near East if any attempt were made to 
modify the White Paper. 3 
Stokes was joined in Parliament by Thomas Reid, elected 
MP for Swindon. On 17 October the Secretary General of the 
Arab League met Labour MPs in the House of Commons4 and an 
attempt had been made the previous month to mobilise anti 
Zionist feeling within the PLP. Over the names of five 
MPs an appeal was made to all Labour members who were 
1 H. Dalton, 'High Tide', op. cit., p. 186. 
2 eg '100,000 Homeless Jews for Palestine? No says Richard Stokes MP', Daily Herald. 18 Oct. 1945. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 412 c. 299-300,20 Aug. 1945. 
4 The Times 18 Oct. 1945. 
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invited to form a Palestine Committee 'to go much deeper 
into the subject'. 1 George Mansur, once more active in 
London, appears to have had a hand in circulating the 
appeal, and the memorandum which accompanied it. 
2 
Once again Stokes argued that Palestine had been 
promised to the Arabs during the First World War and, more 
saliently, that large scale Jewish immigration must 
prejudice the Arab position. The White Paper, he believed,, 
should remain. 'No responsible official known to any of 
the signatories of the document in any of these (Arab 
League) countries now considers any serious deviation from 
the White Paper practical politics'. Stokes also attacked 
various 'misconceptions': that anti Zionism could be 
equated with anti semitism, and that the Balfour 
Declaration had implied anything more than a cultural home. 
He claimed that by 1944 35,000 Jews in Palestine had 
applied to the authorities to be allowed to return to 
Europe after the war. Above all the solution to the 
Jewish problem was not to be found in Palestine. 
The Zionist Review poured scorn on the appeal, 
3 
and 
certainly the time was not as yet propitious for a campaign 
of this sort, though it did not escape the notice of the 
Government that not all Labour MPs lent a friendly ear to 
Zionist demands. But after 13 November all sides had 
perforce to await the findings of the Anglo American 
Commission. 
1 The signatories were Harry McGhee, Philips Price, Thomas 
Reid, Richard Stokes and Ernest Thurtle (Stokes Papers, 
Box 51). 
2 See Mansur's secretary to M. Phillips, 29 Sept. 1945 (LP/Int/5(d). The Zionist Review (11 May 1945) reported 
the reopening of the Arab Bureau in May 1945. 
325 Oct. 1945. 
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B. 'Our Worst Headache 
Among the Labour MPs considered for membership of the 
Anglo American Commission were Patrick Gordon Walker and 
Thomas Reid. Bevin proposed that a Trades Council represen- 
tative be appointed, but one of his first choices was 
Richard Crossman. From Hector McNeal Crossman gathered 
that a major consideration was that he had no known 
commitment to Zionism. It was made clear that this was to 
be his chance to impress the leadership and stake his claim 
to junior office. 1 
When the Commission arrived in London an early witness 
was Nathan Jackson of Poale Zion. He argued that Jewish 
needs demanded a Jewish State 'whether you call it that or 
not'. He was pressed by Crossman on the question of Jewish 
'double nationality', but could parry queries about future 
of the Arab population by quoting Cripp's remark that 
'there are wide dominions in which the Arabs can live in 
safety and happiness; not so the Jews'. This was however 
the voice of Sir Stafford in 1938.2 
Perhaps surprisingly a hearing was granted to Thomas 
Reid. Though he stressed that he spoke as an individual at 
least one committee member believed that he represented his 
party. Reid believed Jews should be offered refuge in 
countries other than Palestine, which should become an 
independent state in the near future. He dismissed his 
party's pledges as 'highly overplayed' and hurried through 
party conferences: 'I think the average member who 
attended these conferences had about as much knowledge of 
1 FO 371/45354 E8801, Crossman, o p_Cit., pp. 11-12. 
2 See above p. 199 PRO 30/78 9. 
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the Palestine problem as I have of the moon. These 
resolutions were put forward and accepted because nobody 
objected, as far as I can remember'. ' 
In private conversation Laski naturally offered a 
different interpretation. The decisions, he insisted, 
were the result of careful study and represented 'the 
mature opinion of Labour Party members. He regarded them 
as absolutely binding. t2 He himself submitted a 
memorandum rejecting both partition and a Jewish State. Bi 
nationalism under continued Mandatory or Trustee 
supervision was the only solution. He was thus in dis- 
agreement with the Government, the Commission - which 
rejected his ideas 
- 
and the majority of the Zionist move- 
ment. 
3 
Sidney Silverman, as Chairman of the WJC British 
Section also addressed the Commission, as did a witness 
from the reformed Jewish Dominion of Palestine League, 
whose Chairman was the Labour peer Lord Strabolgi. For the 
Communist Party Phil Piratin and Jack Gaster called for 
independence for Palestine and equal rights for its 
inhabitants. 4 
On 28 January Bevin entertained members of Commission 
at the Dorchester Hotel. Several members of the Commission 
were to claim that Bevin, in an impromptu speech, vowed to 
1 PRO 30/78 10. 
2 B. C. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain (New York, 1947) 
pp. 54-5. 
3 Martin, op. cit., p. 215, Eastwood, OP-cit., p. 97. He did gain some support from Brailsford, in his introduction 
to the Fabian Colonial Bureau's publication The Palestine 
Controversy: A Symposium (London, 1945). James Parker gave 
the Jewish case, but since Reid declined to put the Arab 
view this, rather strangely, was left to Sir Edward Spears. 
4 PRO 30/78 7,12,13. For the resolution of the Communist Party the previous year see Arab News Bulletin 20 Dec. 1945" 
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do all he could to implement a unanimous report. 
1 But 
according to Creech Jones 
'a doubt lingered however in the minds of some of us 
present at the lunch whether EB had slipped into 
some polite pleasantries. Would he really accept a 
report which would further inflame the passions 
already aroused in the Middle East? Would he be 
party to opening the gates of P5lestine to solve the 
problem of European refugees? '. 
Benin had joked with the Commission that they were 
removing responsibility for Palestine from his shoulders 
for 120 days and most Labour MPs were equally willing to 
devote their energies to other matters. 
3 Some did 
continue their efforts through the medium of Parliamentary 
Questions and whilst this often took the form of a tit for 
tat between Labour pro and anti Zionists members of various 
points of view could unite to demand the chance of a full 
debate. But when Eleanor Rathbone sought to organise 
'members believed to be sympathetic to the Jewish side of 
the Palestine problem' and conduct a systematic campaign of 
questions she evoked little response. 
4 
When the House reassembled after Christmas Silverman 
complained that the postponement of a debate amounted to a 
breach of faiths but there was considerable annoyance that 
the subject was finally tacked on to the end of a long 
debate on Foreign Affairs and 'most members showed their 
1 The Times 28 Jan. 1946, Grossman, op. cit., p. 66, Crum 
op. cit., p. 61, J. G. MacDonald, My Mission to Israel 1948- 
1951 (London, 1951) p. 21. 
2 Notes in CJ 33/2/59/ 
3 In December Silverman had elicited from Bevin a public 
statement explaining his reference to 'Jewish Home' in his 
speech of 13 November, The Times 17 Dec. 1945" 
4 M. D. Stocks, Eleanor Rathbone (London, 1949) P. 328. 
5 HC Deb. vol. 418 c. 308-9,24 Jan. 1946. 
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sense of the uselessness of the discussion by staying 
away' 
Silverman, who opened the- debate, was concerned that 
the Government should give a sympathetic reception to any 
interim recommendations the Commission might make. Both he 
and Ayrton Gould concentrated on the need for swift relief 
for Jewish refugees. Three Labour back benchers made 
maiden speeches. From Reid came a long historical 
exposition designed to show that the setting up of a Jewish 
state would be contrary to the Mandate. Harry Morris and 
Squadron Leader Segal on the other hand reflected the 
bitter disappointment of British Zionists at Bevin's 
statement. 
2 
Apart from this inconclusive debate the Palestine 
problem claimed little attention until May 1946. Poale 
Zion continued to organise protests and demonstrations but 
at a large meeting of the PLP on 28 March at which the 
Government's critics raised many questions of foreign 
policy the subject of Palestine was ignored. 
3 
The Commission's report reached the Government at the 
end of April. 
' It rejected the idea that Palestine alone 
could solve the refugee problem or that the country should 
become either an Arab or a Jewish State. Of the ten recom- 
mendations one urged the entry of 100,000 refugees into 
Palestine. This was not, as most British delegates 
- 
and 
1 New Judea Mar-Apr. 1946. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 419 c. 1366-1429,21 Feb. 1946. 
3 The Times 28 Mar. 1946, ZR 5 Apr. 1946. 
4 Cmd. 6808, Report of the Anglo American Committee of Enquiry Regarding the Problem of European Jewry and Palestine (London, 1946). 
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the British Government 
- 
had wished, made conditional on 
Jewish disarmament, though there was an appeal to the 
Jewish Agency to co-operate in the suppression of terrorism. 
The report 
-a clear compromise - was signed by all members. 
A committee of senior officials immediately began to 
examine the report and within two days had reported that 
'the adoption of the policy... would have disastrous 
effects on our position in the Middle East and might have 
unfortunate repercussions in India'. 
1 
But Bevin's attitude was evidently not that of a an 
guided entirely by his officials. In Cabinet he declared 
his belief that the threat of violence in the Middle East 
had been exaggerated and that 'if the situation were skil- 
fully handled in consultation with the US Government it 
might be possible to bring about a reasonable settlement on 
the basis of the Committee's recommendations'. 
2 
On 1 May Attlee announced to the Commons that the 
Government intended to co-operate with the United States in 
finding a solution. But relations between the two Govern- 
ments were becoming strained. The previous day news had 
reached the Government of a fresh demand by President 
Truman for the immediate entry of 100,000 refugees. Attlee, 
by way of reply, now linked such a step with the surrender 
of arms by the Jewish community and the assistance of the 
Jewish Agency in combating terrorism, 
3 
a condition which, 
despite considerable pressure from the British Government, 
1 CAB 128 27 Apr. 1946. 
2 Ibid. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 422 c. 195-9,1 May 1946. 
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had been rejected by the Committee. 
On 8 May Truman urged, that talks with Jews and Arabs on 
the basis of the report should begin immediately. Two days 
later the Cabinet agreed that such consultations might lead 
to an 'uproar' in the Middle East and must therefore be 
proceeded by a consideration by British and American 
officials of the financial and military implications of 
allowing 100,000 Jews to enter Palestine. A week later 
Bevin reported optimistically that the United States 'now 
seemed to be willing to remove this question from the realm 
of propaganda and to study its practical implications on a 
businesslike footing'. 
1 
The following month, as official talks continued, the 
Government continued to hope that the practical co-operation 
of the United States could be secured. On 11 July a joint 
committee of experts began work in London, the British team 
being led by Herbert Morrison, and after a fortnight 
reached agreement on a scheme of provincial autonomy which 
would divide a Federal Palestine into Zionist, Arab and 
Central Government districts 
-a scheme which had in fact 
been rejected by the Cabinet Committee in 1944. The plan 
allowed for the immediate transfer of 100,000 refugees. 
But events in Palestine were now increasingly over- 
shadowing the talks. On the night of 16 June the Haganah2 
damaged or destroyed eight bridges on the frontiers of 
Palestine. Four days later the Cabinet gdve its approval to 
an attempt 'to break up the illegal organisations', and on 
1 CAB 128 16 May 1946. 
2 The unofficial Jewish defence force, largely controlled by Labour Zionists. 
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29 June a massive military and police operation resulted in 
the temporary detention of over 2,500 people, including 
many leaders of official Jewish organisations. Though the 
complicity of certain Jewish leaders in terrorist activity 
Was by now clearly established as an attempt to curtail 
terrorist outrages 'Operation Agatha' was a failure, 
brought home in terrible fashion by the destruction of part 
of the King David Hotel on 22 July with the loss of 91 
lives. The two day debate in the Commons at the end of 
July, when Morrison outlined the recommendations of the 
'Experts' Report was overshadowed by the news of the out- 
rage, and the Government was now bitterly aware that 
Zionist pressure had brought about the rejection of the 
report by President Truman. As Dalton noted in his diary 
'our worst headache in these last days has been 
Palestine'. 1 
During this period, as the prospect of a negotiated 
settlement retreated and violence in Palestine escalated 
certain changes became apparent in attitudes within the 
Labour Party. On the one hand came the first signs of 
serious disquiet within the Parliamentary Party which 
reflected the bitter disappointment of British Zionists and 
soon took the form of an acrimonious conflict between 
Zionist supporters and the Government. At the same time 
there developed a more general feeling of irritation and 
disgust within the party at the demands of the Zionists, 
the increasing terrorist outrages, and the role of the 
American Government. Though the gulf between the two 
1 'Dalton Diaries' 1 Aug. 1946. 
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groups gradually widened there were those 
- 
including a 
number of Ministers 
- 
who shared both concern at the course 
of Government policy and anger at the pressures to which it 
was subjected. Finally, Zionists within the party found 
themselves both in growing opposition to the Government's 
policies and subject to considerable criticism from their 
fellow Zionists. 
There had been considerable criticism within the party 
at the Government's reception of the Committee's report. 
Tribune condemned Attlee's statement as 'equivocal and 
obscure' and doubted whether British strategy in the Middle 
East would be threatened by the admission of 100,000 
refugees. 
I David Grenfell and James Middleton, the former 
party secretary, represented a widespread feeling within 
the party when they joined with several former Conservative 
Ministers to urge acceptance of the report and swift action 
to relieve the sufferings of the Jewish survivors. 
2 
Labour Zionists were able to press their case at the 
International Socialist Conference, held at the end of May, 
and in numerous contacts with party members, which included 
a well attended meeting with Labour MPs in the House of 
Commons. 3 At this stage Poale Zion was still able to 
1 Tribune 3& 10 May 1946. From 1945 to 1948 Jon Kimche, 
a moderate Zionist, was joint editor of the paper. He con- 
tributed many pieces on Palestine and helped break the news 
of General Barker's infamous order of the day, see D. Hill (ed. ), Tribune 40 The First Forty Years of a Socialist 
Newspaper London, 1977) p. 58, Eban, op. cit., p. 63. The 
Foreign Office naturally disliked his activity; in 1948 
one official minuted 'Kimche... now seems not only to be 
anti British but pro Communist', 8 Oct. 1948 FO 371/68525 
E13107. 
2 The Times 20 May 1946. 
ZR 25 May 1946 for meeting addressed by Shertok and 
ocr. For the extensive Jewish lobbying see The Times 
9 June 1946. 
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mobilise considerable popular support within the Labour 
Party for their cause, and a joint Poale Zion/Labour Party 
Conference in Liverpool attracted 300 delegates from 60 
Divisional Labour Parties. 1 On 8 July a large demonstration 
took place in Trafalgar Square2 to protest against the 
arrest of Jewish leaders in Palestine, and at a conference 
that evening presided over by Barnet Janner speakers 
included Sidney Silverman and Barbara Ayrton Gould. 
To the conference Ayrton Gould declared that 'she had 
always believed in a Labour Government, but on the Jewish 
issue she was bitterly disillusioned. They of the PLP were 
not going to stop until justice was done for the Jewish 
people'. Already the External Affairs Group had urged the 
acceptance of the Commission's report3 and following 
Operation Agatha efforts were made to express pro Zionist 
concern within the PLP more forcibly. When Attlee 
announced details of the operation Sidney Silverman 
demanded an adjournment debate on the subject that evening, 
and having gained the support of 41 members his request was 
granted. 
1 ZR 21 May 1946, speakers included Mikardo and Braddock. 
See ibid., 19 Apr., 10 May 1946 for May Day Rally and 
demonstration in East London, 22 & 29 Mar. 1946 for earlier 
joint meetings in Leeds and Manchester. 
2 Organised by the Zionist Federation, The Times 8 June 
1946, Brodetsky, op. cit., p. 265. 
3 Crossman, op. cit., p. 203. 
4 HC Deb. Vol. 424 c. 1801,1 July 1946. Crossman claims 
that 'we had no time to warn those who were likely to 
support us of our intention. We had to reckon on the 
spontaneous support of whoever happened to be in the House', Crossman, op. cit., p. 202. Pickthorne was the only Conservative, and only Member not 'more or less Zionist in 
sympathy, to support the demand, c. 1886. 
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Silverman opened the debate by denouncing the operation 
as 'plain naked war upon the Jewish National Home'. 
1 From 
the Labour back benches he was joined in his attack by 
Ayrton Gould, Michael Foot, Barnett) anner and Richard 
Crossman, who seconded the motion. Crossman, whose 
experiences on the Committee of Enquiry now drew him 
rapidly towards the Zionist camp, pleaded for a swift 
implementation of the recommendations, and he warned that 
'the policy now being prosecuted by the Government is 
decidedly dangerous and can lead this country into some- 
thing approaching disaster'. The Government was in effect 
seeking to reimpose the White Paper upon the Jewish 
community and in a futile attempt to disarm the Haganah was 
undermining the position of moderate Zionists. 'There is 
only one way of smashing the resistance movement. That is 
to liberate it by smashing the conditions out of which it 
has grown'. 
Z 
Though the debate had no effect on Government policy it 
served notice that the silent acquiescence from its back- 
bench supporters could no longer be counted upon. Shortly 
after the debate a number of pro Zionists joined together 
as an informal group 'to keep a watch on the crisis'. 
3 
Similarly the Government could no longer expect annual 
conferences to be the scene of such friendly unanimity as 
for so many years had been the case. But it came as an 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 422 c. 1860,1 July 1946. 
2 Ibid., c. 1867,1871-2, 'see also New Statesman and Nation 11 
3 Grossman, op. cit., p. 203. Among its members were 
ay 46 
Grossman, Silverman, Foot, Ayrton Gould, Janner, Grenfell 
and Lang. 
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unpleasant surprise in June to hear Harold Laski, in his 
Chairman's address, demand that Jewish refugees should not 
become 'the victims of hesitancy or timidity in Downing 
Street' but should immediately be permitted to enter 
Palestine. One remark was particularly pointed: 'A 
British statesman who sacrifices the Jews who escaped from 
the tortures of Hitler to the Arab leaders does not under- 
stand the elementary principles of the socialism he 
professes'. 
1 
Two days later a composite resolution was moved by 
Nathan Jackson of Poale Zion which called for immediate 
action to remove barriers to immigration and land purchase, 
and which quoted once again the party's war time declara- 
tions. Jackson urged the party to 'stand firm by a 30 
year tradition' and his seconder pleaded with Bevin to take 
action: 'you have risen to your exalted position upon a 
reputation in the movement of integrity and fairness. Do 
not hesitate to do what is right now'. 
2 
Though Crossman, who made what Tribune considered to be 
the most impressive speech heard from the floor3 echoed 
demands for immediate implementation of the report, the 
last word was left to Ernest Bevin. In a typically 
rambling but aggressive contribution which caused wide- 
spread anger in Zionist circles and considerable diplomatic 
embarrassment in America4 he warned that the admission of 
1 LPACR 1946, p. 107. 
2 Ibid., pp. 153-5. 
3 Tribune 16 June 1946. 
4 LPACR 1946, pp. 165-6. There was particular anger at 
his remark 'I Yýpe I will not be misunderstood 
... 
if I say 
that... they did`, ýwant too many Jews in New York'. 'Dugdale 
Diaries', 12 June 1946, New Judea June 1946. 
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100,000 Jews into Palestine would necessitate the sending 
of a further division of troops. This, he declared, he 
would not do, nor could he countenance an 'exclusively 
racial state' in Palestine. He still saw as his goal the 
reintegration of the Jewish survivors into the European 
communities. 
Poale Zion, bowing to reality, withdrew the resolution 
rather than face overwhelming defeat. 
1 Whatever the anger 
and dismay his remarks had caused amongst Zionist 
supporters within the party it was clear that nothing had 
been done to shake Bevin's confidence or shift his 
attitude in any way. From the conference as a whole the 
Foreign Secretary, secure in his position and with the 
block votes of the trade unions to call upon, had in 
practical terms 'emerged triumphant'. 
2 Furthermore there 
was now developing within the party a body of opinion 
which reflected many of Bevin's own opinions and which 
served as a counter to the mounting criticism of his 
opponents. 
Within the House of Commons the small group of anti 
Zionist Labour MPs now made a further attempt to rally 
support. Following publication of the Anglo American 
Report Stokes and Price had circulated to certain members 
details of a plan proposed by Thomas Reid whereby Britain 
and America would accept 60,000 refugees and summon a Round 
Table Conference. A meeting held on 28 May to promote the 
1 The resolution might have been successful had it not 
- albeit quoting Dalton in 1945 
- 
referred to a Jewish State. 
2 E. J. Meehan, The British 'Left' and Foreign Policy 1945 
- 1951, Unpublished thesis, University of London 19,54. 
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scheme was poorly attended and the campaign was evidently 
abandoned, 
' but its leaders took every opportunity in the 
Chamber to indicate that party opinion was not unanimous and 
that the Government was not without active friends on its 
backbenches. In the debate on 1 July PhilipsPrice inter- 
vened 'to show that I am a backbencher who is going to give 
the fullest possible support to the Government in the 
action which has been taken'. For Thomas Reid Palestinian 
Jews were not fighting for liberty but to impose 
. 
policy 
by force: 'If, as has been stated my hon Friend the Member 
for Nelson and Colne (Silverman) this is a war, I ask hon 
members who started the war? '. 
2 
Of great significance was the growing anger at Zionist 
violence and American 'interference, among members who 
until then had shown little interest in the Palestine 
problem. James Glanville, for example, had interrupted 
Silverman's defence of the Jewish Agency with the comment 
'they kill British soldiers'3 and when the Labour Zionist 
Teddy Kollek spoke at the House of Commons shortly after 
the explosion at the King David Hotel he found the meeting 
crowded with members who subjected him to 'a very tough 
griiling'. 
4 Labour MPs now reflected the mounting concern 
of their constituents at the casualties being inflicted on 
1 'Stokes Papers op. cit. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 474 C. 1895,1903,1 July 1946. M. Philips 
Price, My Three Revolutions (London, 1969) pp. 284-6. For 
Reid see speech reprinted in T. Reid, 'Should a Jewish State 
be Established in Palestine? ', Journal of the Royal Central 
Asian Society 1946, Vol. 332 pp. 161-177. 
3 HC Deb op. cit., c. 1861. 
4 Kollek, op. cit., p. 64. 
i 
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the British army. On 31 July S. N. Evans warned the House 
that 'for the first time in my experience ordinary, decent 
working men are talking in their pubs and clubs, at the 
barber's and at work, about the lot to which our lads are 
being subjdcted in Palestine at this moment'. 
' 
It was becoming clear that the party's pro Zionist 
spokesmen no longer spoke with the tacit approval of the 
majority of their colleagues. Whatever the bitterness of 
the Zionists and their supporters and the volume of protest 
generated they were more than balanced by the mood of anger 
and irritation within the PLP, which fortified a natural 
inclination to close ranks and support a Labour Government 
in its difficulties. 
It was also evident that the Government could rely upon 
the support of the NEC and the party organisation, despite 
an understandable concern at the course of events. A 
resolution from Poale Zion condemning the arrests in 
Palestine drew no response, and Harold Laski failed to 
persuade the National Council of Labour to register a 
protest. Though there was sufficient concern to prompt the 
holding of unofficial discussions with the Government when 
Hall appeared before the NCL he was evidently able to 
assure members that progress was being made in the negotia- 
tions and after some discussion it was decided simply to 
await publication of the Government's proposals. 
2 
The attitudes now developing within the Labour Party as 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 426 c. 1056,31 July 1946, see Tribune 
5 July 1946. 
2 NCL Minutes 3& 25 July 1946. The Labour Party Liaison 
Sub Committee had earlier held talks with Attlee. 
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a whole were reflected in the reactions of Government 
Ministers to the growing difficulties. In Cabinet Bevin's 
policies were invariably approved, though the more pro 
Zionist Ministers made some effort to voice their concern 
and to suggest modifications to the Foreign Secretary's 
proposals. On 29 April, for example, several Ministers 
argued unsuccessfully that the Government should not 
dismiss-the possibility of bringing the matter before the 
Security Council of the United Nations. 
1 
There is also the suggestion during this period that 
certain Ministers were once again changing their ground on 
the idea of partition as e long term solution. In July this 
was raised in Cabinet, though dismissed as 'inexpedient' 
after strong opposition from several Ministers, in partic- 
ular Shinwell, the Minister of Fuel and Power. 
2 The 
proponents of partition, most probably Bevan and Dalton, 
evidently now felt partition to be in the best interests of 
both Britain and the Jews. This had not been their view 
some eighteen months before. The attraction of the scheme 
now was that the Jewish Agency, which it was pointed out 
would thereby 'bear the whole cost', could immediately 
arrange for as much immigration as it wished. Certain 
Labour leaders, we might recall, had undergone a similar 
change of heart in the pre war years as the prospect of a 
pro Zionist solution had grown similarly more remote. 
But the apprehension of the Zionists' friends within 
the Cabinet was of little significance. Neither Dalton nor 
1 CAB 128 29 Apr. 1946. 
2 CAB 128 11 July 1946. 
__m ýý 
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Morrison, for whom 'fishing in Bevin's territorial waters' 
was particularly inexpedientI could, even had they so 
wished, have mounted a serious challenge to Bevin's policy. 
Outside the Cabinet Creech Jones, having earlier been 
promised consultations on all matters concerning Palestine, 
now found that 'I was too preoccupied with the other major 
tasks of the Colonial Office... to follow as closely as I 
would have liked and in any case questions of Palestine 
from the start of the Government were taken at top level'. 
2 
The only Junior Minister decisively to affect develop- 
ments in Palestine was the Under Secretary of State for Air, 
John Strachey. According to his biographer: 
'One day, Crossman... came to see Strachey. He had 
heard from his friends in the Jewish Agency that 
they were contemplating an act of sabotage, not only 
for its own purpose but to demonstrate to the world 
their capabilities. Should this be done, or should 
it not? Few would be killed. But would it help the 
Jews? Crossman asked Strachey for his advice, and 
Strachey, a member of the Defence Committee of the 
Cabinet, undertook to find out. The next day in the 
smoking room of the House of Commons, Strachey gave 
his approval to Crossman. The Haganah went ahead 
and blew up all the bridges over the Jordan... A few 
days later the Foreign Office broke the Jewish 
Agency's codes. Crossman was for several days 3 
alarmed lest he and Strachey might be discovered. ' 
This remarkable incident was an indication of the 
depth of commitment to the Zionist cause which might still 
be felt by members of the Government. It was also an un- 
precedented breach of trust which directly threatened the 
1 Donoughuo & Jones, op. cit., p. 434. 
2 Notes in CJ 33/2/52. Brodetsky (op. cit., p. 168) 
recalled that 'I spoke to Silkin... about helping us 
against the Bevin policy, but the Bevin hold on the Labour 
Party was too strong for him to do anything'. 
3 H. Thomas, John Strachey (London, 1973). Crossnan did 
not subsequently refute the story. 
ýý, ýýý 
323 
lives of servicemen in Palestine. If the story is true 
then Strachey and Grossman must bear an awesome responsi- 
bility for the breakdown of order in Palestine, for the 
Jewish operation was to lead directly to 'Operation Agatha' 
and thence to the attack on the King David Hotel. 
The anger of Ministers at the outrage, brought home by 
the presence of Sir John Shaw at a Cabinet meeting still 
'very shaken after being blown up'1 served only to dampen 
criticism of Bevin's policies and markedly to reduce the 
support Zionists enjoyed within the Cabinet. Though some 
did urge in Cabinet that the 'pathological state of mind' 
among Jewish survivors of the holocaust should not be 
forgotten2 in the words of Jon Kimche 'a deep bitterness 
against all Palestinian Jews' now prevailed, 'even among 
the Ministers who had favoured Zionism. Anyone who was at 
that time in close touch with the Labour movement and with 
its members in the Government could not fail to sense this 
transformation'. 3 This was reinforced by the fact'that 
Bevin's anger with the behaviour of the American Govern- 
ment was increasingly shared by his colleagues, almost 
without exception. On 1 August Dalton noted in his diary 
in disgust: 'just when it seemed that we had got an agreed 
solution... Truman has cold feet and is running out of the 
agreement'. 
4 
There was also an annoyance at the criticism now 
1 Dalton Diaries 1 Aug. 1946. Shaw was Chief Secretary of 
the Palestine Government. 
2 CAB 128 23 July 1946. 
3 Kimche, op. cit., p. 160. 
4 Dalton Diaries 1 Aug. 1946. 
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levelled at the Government from within the Labour Party. 
Whilst the Government consistently' sought to restrict or 
delay debate in the House of Commons the attitude of 
certain Labour backbenchers made this no easy task. 
During July the Chief Whip made efforts to secure agreement 
from all sides to postpone the holding of a debate until 
after the recess. On 22 July he reported that whilst the 
Conservative Party was pressing for a two day debate a 
confidential discussion with Opposition leaders of the 
Government's policies might serve to restrict the scope of 
the debate. But Attlee in reply acknowledged that 'it 
would be extremely difficult to communicate to the 
Opposition in confidence information on a matter of this 
kind on which certain Government supporters might not be in 
agreement'1 and in the event the debate ranged wide over 
the whole Palestine question and the Government's 
performance. 
For Laski and Crossman, two of the Government's most 
irritating critics, the anger of Attlee and Bevin was 
perfectly clear. When Laski, holidaying in Italy, inter- 
vened in the case of the Jewish immigrants at Le Spezia2 
he was able to extract a promise from the Foreign Secretary 
that the refugees would be admitted into Palestine. But 
the British Ambassador reported that Laski's press state- 
ment had been ill received and it is unlikely that, as 
Laski believed, Bevin bore him no ill will for his 
1 CAB 128 22 July 194 6. 
2 1200 young Jews, seeking to reach Palestine illegally, 
were intercepted and placed under guard on the schooner 
Fede, and thereupon began a hunger strike and threatened to 
sink the vessel. 
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intervention. ' There was certainly fury when, as Attlee 
and Bevin saw it, Laski abused his position as Party 
Chairman to mount an insulting personal attack at the 
annual conference. 
When Crossman had complained to Dalton of the attitude 
of the Palestine Government and the reaction to his report 
the Chancellor confessed that he found Grossman's opinions 
'rather refreshing'. This was certainly not the reaction 
of Attlee and Bevin. According to Grossman the Prime 
Minister had berated him for 'letting us down' and 
producing a report 'grossly unfair' to Britain. 
2 
At a meeting with Attlee on 7 April Grossman was 
criticised for failing to involve America in a sufficiently 
constructive manner and for placing new financial and 
economic burdens on the country. In July Crossman, 
together with Michael Foot, published a strong attack on the 
Government's policies entitled A Palestine Munich, 
3 
and he 
was only with difficulty dissuaded from publishing his 
letter of reply to the Prime Minister in his book Palestine 
Mission. Bevin, commiserating with the Prime Minister, 
confessed that 'nothing I can say will make (Crossman) 
alter his ideas about Palestine which derive from his lack 
1 H. Laski to E. Bevin FO 371/52519 E3898, for details see 
The Times 6 Apr. 1946, Bethell, op. cit., pp. 229-30, Martin, 
op. cit., p. 174, J. & D. Kimche, Secret Roads: The 'Illegal' 
Pp. 
2 Dalton Diaries 15 May 1946, R. Crossman, A Nation Reborn 
(London, 1960) p. 69. 
3 R. H. S. Crossman and M. Foot, A Palestine Munich? (London, 
1946). Excerpts were printed in ZR 19 July 1946. 
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of judgement and his intellectual arrogance'. ' 
But if the course of events was causing friction within 
the Labour Party, and between the Government and'its critics, 
the position of British Labour Zionists was also becoming 
increasingly difficult. Though Poale Zion continued to 
expand, 2 though Labour Zionists pleaded, lobbied and organ- 
ised meetings they found themselves both isolated within 
the Labour Party and criticised by their fellow Zionists 
for their alleged ineffectualness. 
Naturally every effort was made by Labour Zionists to 
voice their feelings of disappointment and betrayal, 
epitomised by Silverman's bitter cri de coeur: 
'Your enemies can take your life; your enemies can 
take your property; they can take your house; they 





but only your friends can 
inflict upon you the last refinement of cruelty, of 
raising hopes 3every morning which they disappoint 
every night'. 
Clearly relations between the Labour Zionists and the 
wider British Labour movement were becoming, as Tribune 
warned, increasingly uneasy. It was now a measure of the 
4 
Zionists' isolation that even among their gentile friends 
in the Labour Party their central demand for a Jewish State 
1 E. Bevin to C. Attlee, 27 Sept. 1946 (PREM 8/302). Both 
Bevin and Attlee tried unsuccessfully to persuade Cro ssman 
to moderate his arguments; Bevin reported 'I have no hope 
of anyone persuading Crossman to alter his line of 
arguments or to omit any passages he is bent on inserting, 
however dangerous they may be to HMG'. 
2 Affiliated membership had risen to 2,000; eight new 
branches were formed in the course of the year, see LPACR' 
1946, p. 67, ZR 25 Jan. 1946. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 426 c, 163,1 Aug. 1946. 
4 Tribune 21 June 1946. 
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found little support. Though some, including Crossman, 
were now found giving their support to the idea of 
partition, both Grossman and Laski had opposed at the 
annual conference the demand contained in Poale Zion's 
resolution that Palestine become a Jewish State, and were 
instrumental in the resolution's withdrawal. Tribune 
admitted that such an extreme Jewish demand could no longer 
be justified1 whilst G. D. H. Cole argued that although 
British commitments could not honourably be evaded 'it is 
equally outside our power to help the Jews make Palestine a 
predominantly Jewish country at the cost of a head on 
conflict with the League of Arab States'. 
2 
But as a party whose aspiration had been so firmly tied 
to the Labour Party and the prospect of a sympathetic 
Labour Government Poale Zion was now subjected to consider- 
able criticism from within the Zionist movement. Attacks 
carne from both Revisionists and 'General Zionists'. By 
February one Poale Zionist was complaining 'let us be quite 
clear as to what is the 'crime' that Poale Zion are accused 
of having committed. They obtained a pledge from the 
Labour Party when they were in opposition and now they, 
Poole Zion, are being held responsible for the non honouring 
of the pledge by the Labour Government. This... misrepresen- 
tation would do credit to our enemies, not to our 
1 Ibid., 10 May 1946. 
2 G. D. H. Cole, G. D. H. Cole on Labour's Foreign Policy (London, April 1946) p. 41. The Arab News Bulletin (3 May 
1946) thought it 'unedifying' that the Arabs' only hope lay 




Such criticisms did not diminish. In April what the 
Zionist Review termed 'a demagogic campaign... against Jewish 
members of the Labour Party' took place in the correspond- 
ence columns of the Jewish Chronicle. The contributors 
wholeheartedly condemned the weakness of Zionist political 
efforts in Parliament. Several writers believed it the 
duty of Jewish MPs to withdraw their support from the 
Government on the Palestine issue and this view had already 
been voiced in the paper's editorial column. 2 
The Labour-orientated Zionist Review naturally replied 
in kind: 'it is... incredibly stupid and politically dis- 
honest to blame Zionist members of the Labour Party for the 
failure of the Government, so far, to implement previous 
pledges to the Jewish people'. The fact that, as the paper 
saw it, there could be no return to the White Paper, should 
be seen as a 'token of promises made' which, though small, 
'could hardly have been achieved but for the devoted work 
of enlightenment carried out by pro Zionist members of the 
Labour Party'. The paper suspected Revisionist machina- 
tions lay behind the campaign. 
3 
But even within Labour Zionist circles there was 
criticism of a leadership which, it was claimed, had pinned 
undue hopes on the goodwill of the Labour Party and the 
friendship of its leaders. Much of this was directed at 
1 ZR 8 Feb. 194 6. 
2 Jewish Chronicle 7 Dec. 1945. 
3 ZR 17 May 1946, see M. Leifer, Zionism and Palestine in British Opinion and Policy 1945 
- 
1949, Unpublished thesis, 
University of London, 1959, p. 89. 
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Berl Locker, who had worked for so many years as Zionist 
emissary to the party. Teddy Kollek later explained that 
'my real doubts about Locker, whom I liked personally, were 
precisely because he pinned his hopes on Creech Jones and 
Labour. It was obvious who the real leaders were... Ernest 
Bevin was not our friend and he did not pretend to be. 
Throughout that year in London I found myself in sharp 
conflict with all the naive supporters of the Labour 
Party'. 1 A similar view was later expressed by Abba Eban. 2 
But whatever the recriminations now taking place within the 
British Zionist movement in practice its ability to 
influence either the Labour Government or Party had 
evaporated with disconcerting speed. 
C. 'A Number of Us Have Been Shouting for Partition'. 
On 20 September 1947 the Cabinet resolved to surrender 
the Mandate and to withdraw British troops and administra- 
tion from Palestine. The growing problem of illegal Jewish 
immigration, the breakdown of British rule in Palestine and 
the unremitting pressure from across the Atlantic3 had 
finally created in the minds of Government Ministers an 
overwhelming desire to lay down their responsibilities and 
to extricate British forces at the earliest opportunity. 
But though no voice was raised in Cabinet opposing the plan 
1 Kollek, o 
. 
cit., pp. 62-3. 
2 Eban, op. cit., p. 25 'He was small, perky, cheerful, 
mercurial and idealistic, but unformidable. His private 
virtues were his public defects. He was too aimiable and genial to take politicians by storm'. 
3 Cohen, 'Why Britain Left' op. cit., pp. 74 ff. 
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there had been during the previous year a number of 
attempts by certain Ministers to challenge aspects of 
Bevin's course of action. 
The first phase of the London Conference opened on 9 
September 1946, but without the participation of the Jewish 
Agency. The Morrison-Grady plan was duly rejected by the 
Arabs, who proposed the creation of a Unitary State, and 
the Conference was adjourned at the beginning of October. 
Two days later Creech Jones, 'a Zionist of the pre Biltmore 
mould" replaced Hall as Colonial Secretary. Until then 
'excluded from all Cabinet discussion regarding the 
refugees, Zionism, Palestine and the Arabs', he now found 
'the whole of the internal situation of Palestine put into 
my lap'. 
2 
He immediately opened negotiationswith the Zionists 
with the aim of regaining their co-operation in Palestine, 
and in return for a condemnation of terrorism Jewish 
leaders detained since Operation Agatha were released. But 
now came what for Bevin and Attlee seemed the ultimate 
manifestation of American unreliability and of Truman's 
susceptability to electoral pressure; ignoring Attlee's 
plea for delay Truman released a statement, designed to 
bolster the Democratic Congressional campaign, which again 
called for the admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees. Bevin, 
thrown into one of his 'blackest rages' later made no 
effort to hide his anger and his belief that the inter- 
vention had ruined the prospect of a successful outcome to 
1 Creech Jones, quoted in ibid., p. 77. 
2 Creech Jones to J. Callaghan, 30 Nov. 1961 (CJ 32/3/14). 
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the London Conference? 
The Conference was due to reopen in the New Year, and 
on 14 January the Cabinet discussed the schemes which might 
be submitted by the British Government. 
2 The previous day 
Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, unable to ascertain the 
line Bevin would take, submitted his own memorandum to the 
Prime Minister which succinctly stated the view of the 
Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence: 
'It is an essential requirement of our strategic 
plans for the defence of the British Commonwealth 
that we should retain our present position in the 
Middle East. For this purpose we must be able to 
maintain military forces in Palestine. And, to 
ensure that the forces stationed there can be used to 
full advantage, we must retain the friendship of the 
neighbouring Arab peoples'. 
He therefore urged support for the Arab plan, 'plus 
safeguards for minorities'. This too was Bevin's view, 
though the plan might be amended to permit further Jewish 
immigration. The Morrison-Grady plan, he felt, was no 
longer possible, as it had been rejected by both sides. 
Though he had 'no very violent objection to partition', he 
argued that it would be rejected by the Arabs and would 
necessitate the consent of the United Nations: 'I cannot 
conceive of the British Government, even aided by the 
United States, being able to carry partition with the 
requisite majority'. 4 
For the first time there was significant opposition to 
Bevin's line. Creech Jones later explained how, on 
1 F. 6Jilliams, Ernest Bevin. Portrait 
(London, 1952) p. 260. HC Deb Vol. 43 
1947, LPACR 1947, Pp. 177-8. 
2 CAB 128,15 Jan. 1947. 
3 CAB 21/2243,14 Jan. 1947- 
4 CP(47)30,14 Jan. 1947 in CAB 129. 
fa Great En, lishm 
C. 1907-8.23 Feb. 
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becoming Secretary of State, 'I immediately urged what my 





and he now argued his case in 
Cabinet. Whereas the Arab plan would only perpetuate what 
he termed 'the present state of tension' a scheme of 
partition was the only practical solution. It would 
command more general acceptance, and should the UN reject 
the idea it would fall to them to propose an alternative. 
Indeed the Cabinet, in discussion, felt that 'a combination 
of skilfull debating and tactical manoeuvres' might even 
secure the necessary majority. 
Several senior Ministers now hastened to follow his 
lead. Dalton and Bevan stressed the need for an early 
solution. For Dalton it was now clear that the two sides 
would not work together, and since Zionists insisted on an 
area under their control partition was the only solution. 
Bevan concurred, warning that if the opportunity were lost 
extremists would gain the upper hand. He also took the 
view that a friendly Jewish State would provide a safer 
military base than could be found in any Arab State. With 
this Alexander, Minister of Defence, naturally took issue, 
but he too favoured partition. The final contribution came 
from Shinwell, who confessed that he had now abandoned his 
hope that Jews in Palestine would follow 'a policy of 
assimilation'. The Government should thus do everything to 
ensure that partition would be acceptable to the UN. 
2 
1 Creech Jones to Callaghan, op. cit. 
2 Shinwell had aroused Bevin's anger two months before by 
publicly criticising his policy in Germany and the Middle 
East, see F. Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers (London, 
1961) pp. 179-80. See Shinwell's caustic remarks in E. Shinwell, I've Lived Through it All (London, 1973) 
pp. 185-6. 
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In his diary Dalton summarised the meeting: 
'On Palestine a number of us have been shouting for 
partition 
- 
Creech Jones is very good on this and 
much more decisive than his predecessor. EB and the 
PM try to tangle up the merits of various solutions 
with hypothetical conclusions of who would vote for 
this or that solution at the UN. I have been trying 
to keep these distinguished and have been urging 
that partition is the least objectionable of all 
policies and that, if we decide on this, we should 
then go on to consider how the local and political 
obstacles can be overcome. The present state of 
things cannot be allowed to drag on. There must be 
a Jewish State 
- 
it is no good boggling at this 
- 
and even if it is quite 
, 
small, at least they will be 
able to let lots of Jews into it 
- 
which is what 
they madly and murderously want: 
l 
Creech Jones circulated a memorandum in support of his 
position2 and discussion was resumed on 22 January. Again 
supported by Shinwell, Creech Jones, whom Dalton noted 
approvingly was 'getting much stronger and firmer on all 
this'3 argued for partition, but Bevin skilfully parried 
his colleagues' arguments by securing agreement that a 
final decision on the scheme to be brought before the 
United Nations should await the final round of 
negotiations. 4 
By now the opposition Benin was encountering had become 
common knowledge, 5 but within a fortnight this threatened 
to evaporate. On 7 February, having now participated in 
the negotiations for the first time, Creech Jones reported 
that 'the longer he examined the detailed implications of 
partition, the more he was impressed by the practical 
1 Dalton Diaries 17 Jan. 1947. 
2 CP(47)32,16 Jan. 1947 in CAB 129. 
3 Dalton Diaries 27 Jan. 1947. 
If CAB 128,22 Jan. 1947. 





of delineating the frontiers, of securing 
the assent of the UN, and of maintaining order in 
'conditions of rebellion'. With his support Bevin was now 
able to gain the approval of the Cabinet to put forward one 
further proposal; an independent Unitary State would be 
established after a five year period of Trusteeship, during 
which 96,000 refugees would be admitted. 
1 
Their critics acquiesced with manifest scepticism. In 
Cabinet it was pointed out that the proposals were again 
based on the hope of Jewish-Arab co-operation, of which 
there was not the slightest prospect. In his diary Dalton 
was particularly scathing: 
'EB goes doddering round and round with the Arabs and 
Jews and nothing ever happens except a long and 
rising series of outrages in Palestine... he has now 
discovered, as a result of this long drawn 
conference that the Arabs ant an Arab State and the 
Jews want a Jewish State'. 
The 'Bevin plan' was rejected by both sides. On 14 
February the Cabinet, burdened with the problems of a 
freezing winter and the mounting fuel crisis, resolved to 
refer the problem to the UN, but without making any 
recommendations of their own. It was hoped that the very 
act of referral would produce 'a more reasonable frame of 
mind' among the antagonists. 
3 
Once again Dalton affirmed his belief-in partition: 
the Cabinet was assured that this remained a possibility. 
The most forthright critic was John Strachey, who argued 
1 CAB 128,7 Feb. 1947. 
2 Dalton Diaries, 5& 24 Feb, 1947. 
3 CAB 128,1L. Feb. 1947. 
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that both for strategic and moral reasons the 'just claims' 
of the Zionists should be supported. But this was no more 
than a gesture in the face of the united front of Attlee, 
Bevin and Creech Jones, and Bevan was no more successful 
the following week when he urged that Jewish immigration be 
substantially increased during the interim period whilst 
the UN considered the problem 
1 
It is clear that the Cabinet was now heartily sick of 
the problem, which diverted ever more attention from the 
growing domestic difficulties. The distasteful and 
humiliating interceptions by the Royal Navy of refugee 
ships, the steady loss of life and the seeming ineffectual- 
ness of the large numbers of troops in Palestine produced 
an increasing impatience both with Bevin, whom Dalton 
considered had 'wasted' more than a year, 
2 
and with the 
authorities in Palestine. In March the Cabinet showed 
considerable irritation that the imposition of Martial Law, 
which had been urged by the Chiefs of Staff, had produced 
such meagre results, and demanded a comprehensive plan to 
cope with the situation in the coming months. 
3 
The overwhelming desire was now to be rid of the 
problem at almost any cost. This feeling was shared by 
Bevin. In February, according to Bethell, Bevin was only 
with difficulty dissuaded by his officials from pledging, 
in advance, Britain's acceptance of any UN recommendations. 
In this instance Bevin's officials evidently had their 
way, for when the Cabinet discussed the question in April 
1 Ibid., 18 Feb. 1947. 
2 Dalton Diaries 24 Feb. 1947. 
3 CAB 128,20 Mar. 1947. 
4 Bethell, op. cit,, p. 312. 
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the Minister of State reported that Bevin now considered 
that any commitment in advance was inexpedient. This drew 
criticism from a number of his colleagues who argued that, 
although Britain could not commit herself to carry out 
whatever plan the UN might wish, the initial submission 
carried with it the implication that the Assembly's 
recommendations would be accepted. But these critics were 
once again in a clear minority. 
In May 1947 the United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP) was appointed, to visit Palestine and 
make recommendations; the report was completed at the end 
of August. It recommended that the Mandate be terminated 
and Palestine granted independence, and the majority of 
members supported partition. The initial reaction of 
Creech Jones, despite his earlier second thoughts on the 
subject, was that Britain should accept and implement the 
majority report. In this he was strongly supported by 
Greenwood, who had maintained close links with Locker and 
his colleagues. 
1 But Greenwood was now in the twilight of 
his career; Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were 
resolved that the Mandate should be surrendered and that 
Britain should play no part in implementing the majority 
report. Furthermore the anger of Ministers at Zionist 
atrocities had risen sharply during the summer. 
On 30 July terrorists had hung two British sergeants 
and boobytrapped the ground over which their bodies were 
suspended. The atrocity produced a wave of anger and 
1 A. Greenwood to Creech Jones, 15 Sept. 1947 (CJ 32/3/9). 
See Kimche, o 
. 
cit., p. 165 for the shock felt by Ministers 
at the recommendations of the UNSCOP report. 
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revulsion throughout Britain. 
1 For at least one Cabinet 
Minister this was the final straw. 'After that', Hugh 
Dalton later wrote, 'I went absolutely cold towards the Jews 
in Palestine, and didn't care what happened to them in their 
fight with the Arabs'. 
2 Colleagues undoubtably shared his 
sense of fury and frustration, and the threat the terrorists 
posed to Ministers' own safety brought home the problem in 
a very personal way, as security arrangements impinged ever 
more in their lives. 
3 There was now, according to Kimche, 
'an angry, almost emotional attitude in the Cabinet towards 
the Palestinian Jews and their Zionist supporters who added 
so many difficulties to those which were already besetting 
the Cabinet' 
.4 
The Cabinet decision to surrender the Mandate was taken 
at the end of September. For Attlee there was a close 
parallel with the position in India; both he and Bevin 
felt that 'salutary results would be produced by a clear 
announcement that HMG intended to relinquish the Mandate'. 
5 
The only critics now vocal were Shinwell and Bevan, who 
expressed uncertainty 
- 
real or contrived 
- 
that the 
intention gras genuine. Shinwell hoped that the proposal 
'was being put forward seriously and not merely as a 
1 See below p. 350. 
2 Dalton, 'High Tide', op. cit., p. 190. 
3 eg Dalton Diaries, 26 July 1947, Donoughue & Jones, 
op. cit., p. 420, B. Bell, Terror Out of Zion (Dublin, 1979) 
pp. 178,308-9. 
4 J. & D. Kimche, 'Both Sides', op. cit., p. 28. 
5 CAB 128,20 Sept. 1947. To Creech Jones, Pethick 
Lawrence had drawn a different parallel; 'your job in 
Palestine and mine in India are twins of insolubility', 
Gupta, op. cit., p. 298. 
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threat to induce the contending forces to agree', whilst 
Bevan urged that strenuous efforts be made 'to convince all 
concerned that they did not wish to retain forces in 
Palestine for independent reasons'. Bevin was indeed 
serious. When Noel Baker reported that the Air Staff 
wished to retain bases in Palestine, Bevin's reply was 
'tell them if they want to stay, they'll 'ave to stay up 
in 'elicopter'. 1 
There was a general sense of relief that the end 
appeared to be in sight. Bevin had described as 
'manifestly unjust to the Arabs' the UNSCOP majority 
report. Bevan and Shinwell, having urged acceptance of the 
report inside the party organisation, 
2 
now bowed to the 
inevitable and held their peace. They did make one further 
effort when the question of United Nations enforcement of 
the plan was raised. Shinwell felt that if other countries 
were willing to co-operate in enforcing partition Britain 
should lend its support. Bevan argued on similar lines, 
but was strongly opposed by Dalton and Cripps, both 
particularly aware of the financial burden involved. 
Creech Jones' contribution was now confined to a brief 
endorsement of Bevin's proposals, whilst Morrison evidently 
remained silent, as he had apparently done throughout the 
year. 
Until January 1947, despite occasional reservations, 
Cabinet Ministers had shown a willingness to 'give Bevin's 
method... a fair chance'. 3 After September Bevin's policy 
1 Dalton Diaries 20 Sept. 1947. 
2 See below p. 354- 
3 Dalton, 'High Tide' oop. cit., p. 150. 
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faced no serious challenge until January 1949. Only at 
certain times in 1947, in a period of great uncertainty and 
mounting crisis, was Bevin's direction significantly 
contested but even then his critics were ultimately 
unsuccessful. 
D. Reactions Within The Labour Party. 
In the Zionist Review of August 1947 Leonard James, a 
Labour Party member, outlined the probable reactions within 
the party to the impending UNSCOP report. Partly because, 
as it transpired, his premise was wholly incorrect - that 
Bevin would oppose any call for withdrawal - but also 
because the distinction he drew was between the reactions 
of the PLP and the 'rank and file' his analysis, though not 
without perspicacity, gave a curiously misleading picture 
of the divisions within the party 
1 But divisions undoubt- 
ably existed, and had become markedly more apparent during 
the previous year. It is therefore necessary to examine the 
various strands of opinion, and the effect on Government 
policy. 
The feelings of Zionists within the Labour Party are 
naturally the most easy to assess: profound disappointment 
and bitter suspicion of the Government's intentions. A 
rapid expansion of Poale Zion took place in the final years 
1 ZR 28 Aug. 194? 
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of the Mandate, 
1 but it owed nothing to the policies of the 
Government, little to its links with the Labour Party, and 
almost everything to the growing excitement and concern 
over Jewish prospects in Palestine, where Labour Zionists 
played the leading role. 
The party continued to protest, to lobby and to 
propagandise. At International Socialist Conferences 
Labour Zionists enlisted considerable support, and at the 
Commonwealth Labour Conference in September 1947 Morgan 
Phillips faced much criticism. 
2 But though Poale Zion 
remained a focus for Zionist sympathisers within the 
Labour Party no longer were its protests received with the 
sympathetic concern of previous years. 
3 Partly as a result 
senior Zionists now took some care to distance themselves 
from the Labour Party; for example, Bakstansky, General 
Secretary of the Zionist Federation, withdrew in the course 
of the year from the party's panel of prospective 
parliamentary candidates. 
4 
For Zionist Labour MPs the position was even more 
difficult. In Parliament Silverman and Janner 
- 
'a verit- 
able MP for (Jewish) Palestine's - continued, in their 
1 ZR 2 May 1947, referred to a doubling of membership in 
the previous year, though numbers affiliated to the Labour 
Party rose only to 2,200. By 1949 there were some 8 London 
and 6 provincial branches (Zionist Yearbook 1951 (London, 
1951), the first year of publication, lists 17 and 8 res- 
pectively). By mid 1949 there were also 5 London and 3 
provincial Young Poale Zion branches (Darkenu (organ of YPZ) 
Passim) and ZR 2 July 1948 refers to a Zionist Womens 
Labour Organisation affiliated to the party. 
2 ZR 7 Nov. 1946 for resolution. 'Report of the 
Conference of British Commonwealth Labour Parties, 1947' 
P. 40. 
3 See below p. 347. 
4 Bakstansky, a member of the Fabian Society though not, it seems, of Poale Zion, had been sponsored by Laski and Middleton, NEC 18 Sept. 1947. 
5 Goodman, o 
. 
cit., p. 83. 
341 
different styles, to condemn terrorism but also to plead, 
at the eleventh hour, for a conciliatory policy towards the 
Yishuv and for 'the opening of the doors of Palestine', 
which Janner believed would break the hold of extremists. 
1 
But there was no sign that such a policy would be 
forthcoming. On 18 February Bevin announced in Parliament 
that the problem was to be submitted to the United Nations. 
A week later in debate his tone was anything but friendly 
to the Zionist cause. His remark that the Mandate had 
provided 'for what was virtually an invasion of the 
country by thousands of immigrants'2 and his ill disguised 
bitterness with American and Zionist pressures was partic- 
ularly resented. 
The Foreign Secretary had been subjected to frequent 
interruptions from his own backbenches, and ensuing 
contributions suggested that a number of hitherto non- 
Zionist Jewish MPs now found themselves siding more and 
more with their Zionist colleagues. Bevin was criticised 
by Harold Lever and Marcus Turner-Samuels, whilst Berm Levy, 
congratulating Bevin on 'the best exposition of the Arab 
case that I have ever heard', confessed that, though he had 
never been a Zionist, 'the Foreign Secretary has gone some 
way towards converting me'. 
3 
Outside Parliament Laski now made little effort to 
contain himself. In April he referred to Bevin's handling 
of the problem as 'a betrayal' and 'an outrageous blot on 
the record of the Labour Government'. 4 He continued his 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 432 c. 1313,31 Jan. 1947. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 433 c. 1901,25 Feb. 1947. 
3 Ibid., C-1952. 
4 Speech at a Labour Zionist meeting, New Judea April 1947). 
342 
efforts within the NEC and, not surprisingly, his relations 
with certain Ministers deteriorated still further. In May 
191+7 he referred in a letter to 'angry and futile corres- 
pondence... with CRA; bitter recriminations with EB'1 and 
though the same month he expressed great gratitude for 
Creech Jones' 'helpful frankness', by the 1950 election he 
evidently felt unable to speak on behalf of the Colonial 
Secretary because of his part in the Palestine crisis. 2 
Among the Zionists' gentile supporters a similar 
feeling of anger and disillusion prevailed, though 
opinions differed widely about the means of achieving a 
solution. Ayrton Gould, for example, felt that a Unitary 
State should still be attempted, in which Jews and Arabs 
'could very well solve their differences in the future, as 
they have in the past'3 whereas Crossman continued to urge 
an orderly scheme of partition. 
But when Crossman urged the Government to announce that 
'whatever happens, we will have our troops and administrat- 
ors out by a certain date', 
4 he was now articulating a 
demand which served to unite many Zionist sympathisers with 
the increasingly vocal group of left wing critics who 
opposed the Government's whole approach to foreign policy. 
In October 1946 twenty MPs, in an 'Open Letter' to the 
Prime Minister, had complained that 'in Palestine and the 
Middle East the pledged policy of the Labour Party has been 
1 Martin, op. cit., p. 216. 
2 H. Laski to Creech Jones 13 May 1947,30 May 1950 (CJ 32/2/3&4). 
3 HC Deb, o p. cit., c. 1985- 
4 Ibid., c. 1985, 
1 
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sacrificed to the needs of Imperial defence'. 
I Among the 
signatories were many who had not hitherto expressed strong 
opinions on the subject of Palestine; now what was seen as 
a squandering of resources in a misguided attempt to assert 
Britain's presence in the Middle East became a part of the 
larger demand for a more 'Socialist' foreign policy and for 
an independent 'middle way' between the competing super- 
powers. Thus in May 1947 Keep Left, a pamphlet issued 
over the names of twelve dissident MPs, demanded a time 
table for the withdrawal of British troops from Palestine, 
and this was echoed in the memorandum sent to Attlee in 
July. 3 
The Palestine crisis now impinged on the 'left's' 
conflict with the Government in two ways. On thh one hand, 
as James commented in relation to the UNSCOP report, the 
issue 'served as ammunition in the hands of (those) who are 
not primarily concerned with Palestine but with obtaining a 
change of policy'. 
4 On the other the manifest and bloody 
failure of Bevin's attempt to find a settlement generated 
considerable anger which made inter party disagreements the 
more decisive; these were exacerbated by specific aspects 
of the Government's policy, in particular the imposition of 
Martial Law and the often violent interception of refugee 
ships. As one historian has observed: 'much of the heat 
1 A. Gould and others, Private and Confidential (London,, 
Oct. 1946) p. 2. 
2 For the 'left' and their opposition to Bevin see Rose, 
Meehan, op. cit. 
3 R. Crossman, M. Foot, I. Mikardo and other Keep Left (New 
Statesman Pamphlet, London May 1947) p. 46. All three 
leading signatories were strongly pro Zionists. Gupta, 
op. cit., p. 314. 
4 ZR 29 Aug. 1947. 
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generated against Ernest Bevin on the 'left' stemmed, 
directly or indirectly, from Britain's policy in 
Palestine'. I 
In the leading journals of the 'left', Tribune and the 
New Statesman and Nation the Government's policies provoked 
incessant criticism. The latter carried a number of 
articles by Arabs or their sympathisers, 
2 but the prevail- 
ing voice was undoubtably that of Richard Crossman. 
Tribune still weaved an uncertain course, but had finally 
accepted the necessity of partition. In January it 
condemned the idea of referring the question to the United 
Nations and in a series of front page articles continued to 
castigate the Government. 'Palestine', it believed, 'is 
becoming a dangerous sore to the Labour Government as Spain 
became a fatal sore to Napoleon'. 
3 
But, as Rose has observed 'one of the few things upon 
which Kingsley Martin (editor of the New Statesman) and 
Ernest Bevin would have agreed was that the periodical had 
no influence whatsoever on the Government's foreign policy', 
and Tribune was no more effective. 
4 And, with one 
exception, this assessment is equally true for the 'left's' 
opposition to the Government's Palestine policy during 1947. 
Indeed the growing identification of the 'left' with pro 
1 Meehan, op. cit., p. II, especially when certain members 
of the 'left' suggested that Bevin was antisemitic, see 
Driberg cited in ibid., p. 240, and later Crossman, 'Nation 
Reborn' op. cit., p. 69, Mikardo, quoted in C. Mayhew & 
D. Adams, Publish it Not... The Middle East Coverup (London, 
1975) p. 26. 
2 eg Edward Atiyah, New Statesman and Nation 12 Jan. 1946, 
31 Jan. 1948. 
3 Tribune 25 Apr. 1947. 
4 Rose, op. cit., p- 440. 
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Zionist sentiment within the party was undoubtably one 
reason for the support the Government in its difficulties 
could still rely upon. For many backbenchers the 
criticisms of the 'left', on whatever subject, were viewed 
with impatience and irritation as a mischievous attempt to 
'rock the boat'. Crossman, a leading spokesman both of the 
'left' and of the gentile pro Zionists, was particularly 
suspect. In February 1949 John Mallalieu, himself a critic 
of the Government, admitted that 
'Dick sometimes seems about as much at home in a 
Labour Party meeting as a chronic inebriate would be 
at a Methodist Conference... One moment he will argue 
for. The next moment he will argue against. At 
best, that gives him a reputation of being clever. 
At worst, it gives him a reputation for insincerity. 
Either way he has become 'untrustworthy' and, when 
he rises to speak, the bristles of the party 
meeting rise with hin. Ninety-nine times out of a 
hundred, if it comes to a choice between Bevin and 
Grossman, their colleagues will thumbs down on 
Grossman without raising their eyes from the local 
paper'. 1 
This antipathy occasionally turned to outright 
hostility; Lord Boothby recalls, at the height of the 
Palestine crisis, sitting with Grossman in the Smoking Room 
of the House of Commons, and the pair 'being cut left, 
right and centre'. 
2 
The troubles besetting the Government in February 1947 
induced a further feeling of solidarity with the hard 
pressed Ministers. Barnett J anner well appreciated that the 
fuel crisis could only work against the Zionists' 




2 R. Boothby, Recollections of a Rebel (London, 1978) 
p. 208. 
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by making our friends in the Labour Party more unwilling to 
embarrass the Government'. 1 
Certainly when Bevin and Creech Jones defended their 
decision to refer the problem to the United Nations to a 
packed meeting of the PLP, those that argued party policy 
had been shamefully abandoned were given short shrift; the 
Foreign Secretary, 'after a powerful speech, which was 
reported to have been accepted as completely convincing by 
most of his colleagues', gained 'a great ovation'. 2 The 
decision was overwhelmingly welcome to most MPs 
- 
Tribune 
had noted that Churchill's earlier suggestion had drawn 
loud applause from the Labour benches3 
- 
and the majority 
had no inclination to criticise. 
Just as the crisis pushed a number of Jewish and non 
Jewish MPs further into the pro Zionist camp, so the number 
of actively anti Zionist members increased. For Stokes, a 
pro Arab member of long standing, although the decision was 
to be regretted, Bevin's speech was for the first time 'a 
4 
moderately fair case for the Arabs', but now several MPs 
cane to the fore as impassioned critics of Zionist 
behaviour. Chief among these was Norman Smith, MP for 
Nottingham South. 5 
In November 1946 Rita Hinden warned Magnes that 'this 
tactic of playing off the Americans against the British is 
1 'Dugdale Diaries, 10 Feb. 1947. 
2 The Times 20 Feb. 1947. 
3 Tribune 9 Aug. 1946. 
4 HC Deb. Vol. 433 c. 1977,25 Feb. 1947. Stokes, with Reid, unsuccessfully urged Jamaal Huseini to co-operate with UNSOP (Stokes Papers). 
5 See below pp. 350-1. 
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a thoroughly wrong one. It is alienating an enormous 
amount of public sympathy... '. 
' Among the bulk of Labour 
MPs such sympathy had almost entirely evaporated. In this 
they accurately represented the feelings of the majority of 
party members, now above all 'heartily sick of the whole 
business'. 2 
The attitude of the General Council typified popular 
feeling. When the Histadrut requested an intervention on 
behalf of Jewish refugees it received a striking rebuff. 
The Council took the view that 'the onus of responsibility 
for the situation should be thrown on the Palestine Jews', 
and the Zionists were blandly advised to work for a 
peaceful settlement with the Arab population. 
3 
The NEC, though less forthright, was in practice no 
more receptive to the interventions of Poale Zion. In 
September 1946 a resolution on the question of illegal 
immigration drew no response, and when the following year 
Laski reported that Poale Zion had complained about Bevin's 
remarks in Parliament and was seeking urgent talks between 
the British and Palestinian Labour Parties, the matter was 
first deferred, then dropped. 4 
But if Zionist requests to the NEC could be quietly 
ignored it seemed that there was no chance of avoiding 
sharp criticism at the Annual Conference. Of the six 
resolutions received on the subject, two simply asked that 
1 R. Hinden to J. Magnes, 1 Nov. 1946 (FCB 176/6). 
2 ZR 29 Aug. 1947. 
3 GC 18 Dec. 1946, TUC Report, 1947, p. 205. 
4 Int Sub 17 Sept. 1946, NEC 26 Mar. 1947. 
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responsibility be handed over to the United Nations, but 
three from the traditionally pro Zionists local parties of 
Hackney North, Manchester Exchange and Leeds Central, 
called for the immediate honouring of party pledges on 
immigration and land purchase. This was echoed by Poale 
Zion, which requested action in line with the party's war- 
time promises, several of which were restated in its 
resolution. 
When the NEC discussed the agenda Laski suggested that 
Creech Jones should reply; Laski made it clear that 
should Bevin repeat his 'intolerable' performance of the 
previous year he himself would demand to be heard. Attlee, 
whose irritation with his colleague can well be imagined, 
insisted that Bevin would have to answer, and the NEC 
decided the Poale Zion should be asked to withdraw their 
resolution on the grounds that the matter was now under 
consideration by the United Nations. Laski could only urge 
Creech Jones to suggest to Bevin a moderate line of 
approach which would include a concession to Jewish 
refugees in the Cyprus camps. 
' 
Events did not work out as planned. Poale Zion 
declined to withdraw, whilst Bevin'seems to have made 
little effort to speak on the lines obligingly suggested by 
Creech Jones. 2 To the conference Rosette concentrated on 
the 'scandalous' position of refugees after two and a half 
years of a Labour Government, and urged a message of hope 
1 NEC 23 Mar. 1947, H. Laski to Creech Jones, 9 May 1947 (CJ 32/2/3). 
2 Draft in FO 371/61927 E4743" 
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to rally moderate Jewish opinion. 
I 
But by the time Bevin came to speak the ground had 
already partly been cut from the Zionists' feet by a fellow 
Jew, Henry Solomons of Hammersmith South. His amendment 
had urged further attempts at Jewish-Arab co-operation and 
though unhappy at disagreeing with his co-religionists 
suggested that the United Nations declare that Palestine 
would not come under the control of any one community. 
Bevin, arguing somewhat disingenuously that 'if there had 
been only 100,000 refugees going in, I could have settled 
it', was thus able to support Solomons' line, and his call 
for the withdrawal of the resolution. 
2 
Rosette still declined to withdraw his resolution, only 
to hear Crossman, by the procedural 
moving the 'previous question', pre, 
taken. Better, he later explained, 
be defeated by a friend than by the 
Conference. 
Though Crossman believed that a 
device of successfully 
vent any vote being 
for the resolution to 
overwhelming vote of 
separate debate on the 
subject might have culminated in a vote of more than 
1 million for the resolution and denied that 'the failure 
to approve the resolution meant that the majority of 
delegates favoured Mr. Bevin's policy,, 
3 his action 





no great confidence in the mood of delegates. 
The result of his idiosyncratic behaviour was, against the 
1 LPACR 1947, pp. 153-5. See also ZR 30 May 1947 for 
appeal to delegates from Locker. 
2 LPACR 1947, PP. 155,166. 
3 ZR 6 June 1947. 
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Zionists' wishes and doubtless to their annoyance, to deny 
dissidents any chance to express their feelings, and 
through the action of the Zionists' 'friend' to spare the 
party the indignity, for the first time, of rejecting a 
pro Zionist resolution, the bulk of which was a record of 
its own pledges. It was presumably both to spare the 
party's humiliation and to hide the present isolation of 
the Zionists that Crossman took his unusual step. 
The Zionists' position became increasingly threatened 
when the news broke of the hanging of the two sergeants. 
Already certain Jewish synagogues had been subject to 
attacks; now anti Jewish riots took place in certain 
cities, and one local paper carried a nakedly inflamatory 
anti semitic editorial. 
1 For the first time public opinion 
became of significant importance in the Government's 
thinking; the demand was above all for the evacuation of 
British troops. 
Labour MPs were deeply concerned both by the outrage 
and by the anti semitic reaction it produced. Crossman and 
Edelman had an appeal for the apprehension of the culprits 
broadcast on Palestine radio, 
2 but it was evident that two 
conclusions were being drawn. For Tribune the tragedy was 
the result of 'a breakdown of Social Democracy' through the 
blind and foolish policy of a Labour Government'. For 
Norman Smith 'the fanatical dream of a Jewish National 
State... foisted on refugees by Zionist fanatics' had caused 
1 see D. Leith 'Explosion at the King David's Hotel', in 
M. Sissons and P. French (eds. ), Age of Austerity 1945-1951 (Penguin Edition, London, 1964) pp. 71-2, and reports in 
ZR 10 Jan. 92 May &8 Aug. 1947. 
2 see HC Deb. Vol. 441 c. 2330,12 Aug. 1947. 
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a regrettable but understandable reaction among the British 
people. 
1 And though few would express their feelings in 
such terms, the attitude of the PLP was of bitter dismay 
directed primarily at the Zionists. It was in this 
atmosphere that Locker came to plead to a handful of 
Labour members the case of the Exodus. Not even his 
eloquence could arouse much sympathy'. 
2 
On one aspect all sections of the party could unite - 
the need for a speedy withdrawal from Palestine. For the 
'left' this had long been a strand in their opposition to 
Bevin; with their demand, if not the analysis and motives 
which lay behind it, there was now an overwhelming agree- 
ment. 
When the Conservatives demanded a debate Morrison's 
initial reaction had been that it would do no good. In 
fact it had a profound effect on the Government. From all 
sides speakers stressed the urgent need for withdrawal, the 
most telling speech coming from Harold Lever: 
'I confess also to a measure of surprise that the 
House is allowing the Government on this issue to 
get away so lightly with two years of planless, 
gutless and witless behaviour which has not only 
cost us treasure in terms of money, but uncountable 
treasure in manpower and loss of life, all in order 
to prove that we are master of a situation of which 
we obviously are not a master, and all for some 
obscure reason made plain not to our troops, not t 
the people of Palestine, and certainly not to us. ' 
For Ministers, themselves sickened by the outrage, this 
'unique all party concensus' was seen as 'a clear manifest- 
ation of the national will, 
.4 For almost the first time 
1 Tribune 8 Aug. 1947, letter ibid., 29 Aug. 1947- 
2 ZR 8 Aug. 1947. The Exodus was the most notorious of 
intercepted refugee ships. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 441 c. 2340,12 Aug. 1947. 
4 Cohen, 'End of the Mandate', op. cit., p. 80. 
352 
attitudes within the Labour Party had a clear effect on 
Government policy. 
If party opinion played a part in persuading the 
Government to accept one key recommendation of the UNSCOP 
report, it also helped convince the majority of Ministers 
that British troops (with or without assistance) should 
play no part in enforcing a solution, and thus in their 
resolve not to back the majority recommendation for a 
scheme of partition. As Kimche noted sadly, Creech Jones' 
announcement of the Government's decision was greeted with 
'approval and relief by the entire British Press, with the 
exception of the Manchester Guardian, and was received by 
most Labour MPs in a similar manner. 
1 
A number of critics had already voiced their disapprov- 
al of'Bevin's curious decision to lay the whole issue 
solemnly before the UN without making any British 
proposal'. 
2 There was now a feeling that the UNSCOP report 
demanded a positive reaction from the Government; this, as 
has been noted, was the view of a minority of Cabinet 
Ministers, and for the first time an effort was made to 
further their point of view through the party organisation. 
At a meeting of the International Sub Committee op 16 
September 
- 
chaired by Laski 
- 
members unanimously decided 
to recommend the NEC to declare the report 'the nearest 
approach to party policy on the subject'. 3 The low turnout 
at the meeting 
- 
for whatever reason 
- 
and the presence of 
1 Tribune 3 Oct. 1947. 
2 Ibid., 18 Apr. 1947. 
3 Int Sub 16 Sept. 1947. 
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Bevan and Shinwell, suggests a premiditated plan to 
challenge the Foreign Secretary's anticipated line. The 
decision was communicated to Cabinet Ministers, and Laski 
made every effort to enlist support, urging Dalton that a 
similar decision by the Cabinet would 'lift a heavy load 
off the shoulders of the party'. 
l 
Yet again his efforts were futile. At the Cabinet 
meeting the arguments of Bevan and Shinwell were ignored, 
and four days later the NEC, with the Prime Minister in 
attendance, simply deferred the recommendation. Laski had 
succeeded only in publicising once again a difference of 
opinion within the party. 
2 
E. Backbench Revolt 
On 26 September Creech Jones announced to the United 
Nations Britain's intention to withdraw from Palestine. Two 
months later, to the manifest surprise and anger of certain 
Ministers, 3 the General Assembly voted to approve the UNSCOP 
partition plan. On 14 May - one day earlier than planned - 
the last British High Commissioner left Palestine; the 
State of Israel was proclaimed that day and Arab forces 
from the neighbouring States entered Palestine. 
Between September 1947 and January 1949, when Britain 
recognised, de facto, the State of Israel, the main focus 
of opposition inside the Labour Party to the Government's 
policies lay within the PLP, and this section will 
1 H. Laski to H. Dalton, 19 Sept. 1947 (Dalton Papers, 
9/3 32). 
2 NEC 23 Sept. 1947, see eg report in ZR 26 Sept. 1947. 
3 Creech Jones later complained of 'the scandal of the 
partition vote' (CJ 32/6/35). 
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primarily examine the arguments and actions of the Govern- 
ment's backbench critics. The two day debate in mid 
December 1947 gave a clear indication of the nature of the 
disagreements. 
The main concern of pro Zionist speakers - who 
included Crossman, Silverman, Janner, Mikardo and Austin 
- 
was that the Government should do all in its power to 
assist the United Nations and to facilitate the work of 
the Commission appointed to co-operate in the implementa- 
tion of the decision in the transitional period. For 
William Warbey, MP for Luton, the issue was 'a test case 
for the world, and for this country in particular, of 
whether or not the United Nations is going forward to be 
a genuine and effective world organisation, or whether it 
is going the same way as the League'. 
1 
Warbey also called for a United Nations force - in 
which Britain should if necessary participate - to enforce 
its chosen solution. Though fewer members gave this 
proposal their support, it was to be a second area of dis- 
agreement between the Government and certain backbench 
critics. Crossman had earlier indicated a third: the need 
to prevent 'illegal arms' reaching Palestinian Arabs and to 
ensure that Britain's ally Transjordan remained 'really 
neutral'. 
2 
These comments did not pass unchallenged from backbench 
colleagues 
- 
indeed the debate was chiefly remarkable for 
1 HC Deb Vol. 445 c. 1252,11 Dec. 1947. 
2 Ibid., c. 1242. 
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the disagreements and recriminations on the Labour benches. 
For Stokes, Reid and Philips Price the UN decision was 
violently partisan, and one which seriously discredited 
the organisation; Reid argued that 'purely on legal 
grounds, we are not in the least bound to carry out the 
advice of the UNO'. 
l 
In being able to link their cause squarely with the 
authority and future of the United Nations pro Zionist MPs 
had an undoubted advantage, one which enabled them to 
enlist the support of several colleagues, like Sir Richard 
Acland, hitherto little interested in the question. In 
Parliament and in the press the critics continued to press 
their case2 and their views found some support among 
Ministers. 
On 5 February it was argued in Cabinet that failure to 
contribute to any international force which might be set up 
would be 'inconsistent with our professed support for the 
United Nations' and that the abstention of the British 
delegate might well be 'misconstrued'. But other Ministers 
argued strongly that the main burden would necessarily fall 
on Britain, and the Cabinet agreed that abstention was the 
only possible course. 
3 Furthermore the Government 
continued to baulk at any gradual transfer of authority to 
the United Nations Commission, which was not permitted to 
enter Palestine before 1 May. 
On 16 February, in answer to a question from Warbey, 
the Government again refused to be drawn on the question of 
1 Ibid., C. 1305. 
2 See esp. letter from Warbey and others in The Times 30 
Dec. 1947. 
3 CAB 128 5 Feb. 1948. 
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a United Nations force. 
1 It was now clear that the passing 
of the legislation required to terminate the Mandate would 
be accompanied by considerable backbench criticism, and 
with it the possibility of a revolt in the division lobbies. 
During February the Foreign Affairs Group of the PLP 
held several meetings on the subject, and passed two 
resolutions. The first expressed concern at the Govern- 
ment's refusal to allow the Commission to enter Palestine 
any earlier than a fortnight before the end of the Mandate, 
and disquiet at the export of arms to Arab States pledged 
to resist partition; the latter had continued to arouse 
the concern of backbenchers and also of certain 
Ministers. 2 
The Group had for some time been convinced of the need 
for a 'UN (Armed) Police Force', and it now felt that 
events in Palestine had conclusively proved their case. 
'There was still time, it believed, for the creation of an 
ad hoc force, indeed this would be 'a decisive test for the 
whole future of the UNO', and should be supported by the 
Government. 
The Foreign Affairs Group originated in the decision to 
establish, in October 1945, eleven backbench policy groups 
in order to allow 'initiative and individuality full scope. 
3 
But, as Morrison's biographers comment, Bevin 'resented any 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 447 c. 824,16 Feb. 1948. 
2 C. Johnson to E. Bevin, 24 Feb. 1948 (FO 371/68535 E2930). 
In Cabinet certain Ministers argued that 'it was unfair to 
enforce a rigid control over the import of arms for use by 
the Jews in view of the ease with which the Palestine Arabs 
could obtain arms', (CAB op. cit. ). " 
3 Rose, op. cit., p. 458. 
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interference from the Group, and was never on good terms 
with it'. 
l The first Chairman, Seymour Cocks, now an 
ardent pro Zionist, had resigned in disgust at the futility 
of his job. His successor was John Hynd; 'unlike Cocks he 
was an inconspicuous chairman, like Cocks he was 
politically impotent'. 
2 But in this instance Bevin was 
forced to take some notice of the Group's resolutions, 
since they were expected to come before the full PLP. 
There was now developing what the Manchester Guardian 
termed an 'Order Paper Battle on Palestine'. It also 
referred to a 'cold war' among Labour members. 
3 A motion 
urging co-operation with the United Nations attracted some 
support, but was countered by an amendment expressing full 
support for the Government. When Crossman and five 
colleagues tabled a motion urging that military stores in 
Palestine be handed over to an international force, Price 
and Ernest Thurtle responded by inviting the Government to 
make it plain that conscripts would not be forced to serve 
in any such force, 'bearing in mind that the Government has 
repeatedly declared that it does not believe in the wisdom 
of that policy'. 
4 
Forty of the Government's critics had already sent a 
1 Donoughue & Jones, op. cit., pp. 358-9. 
2 Rose, op. cit., p. 465. In his introduction to S. Rolbant, 
Hierlings of the Desert: Transjordan and the Arab League 
London, 1948) Cocks noted that he was 'a whole-hearted 
supporter of the cause of Israel to which, when I first 
entered the House of Commons, practically every member of 
the PLP was pledged, and rightly so', but see above pp. 82-3,101. 
3 Manchester Guardian 11 Mar. 1948. 
4 Ibid., The Times 23 Feb. 1948. 
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telegram to Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United 
Nations, again expressing the view that Palestine was a 
test case for the organisation. The Security Council 
should take all steps to deal with threatened breaches of 
the peace. '1We on our part are urging the British Govern- 
ment to carry out obligation laid upon it by the General 
Assembly and also to terminate all military assistance to 
the Arab States'. 1 
When the PLP met on 10 March in special session, 
immediately before the second reading of the Palestine Bill, 
the Government's critics were resoundingly defeated. In a 
meeting 'full of good argument on both sides' Creech Jones 
defended the Government's policy which was approved by 97 
votes to 21. The two resolutions from the Foreign Affairs 
Group were then discussed, and they too fell, though the 
second, suggesting an ad hoc UN force, received 40 votes. 
2 
But the critics were not the least deterred from 
continuing their campaign in the House. Sir Richard Acland 
felt that the Government was undermining the authority of 
international law and Benn Levy condemned the Government's 
attitude to the UN Commission and the supply of arms to 
Arab countries. Warbey, now a leading spokesman for the 
dissidents, then moved a reasoned amendment, which declined 
to give the bill a second reading on the grounds that 
'in making provision with respect to the termination 
of His Majesty's jurisdiction in Palestine, (the 
bill) fails to make provision for the independence 
of Jewish and Arab States in Palestine as provided 
by the United Nations decision, for the orderly 
1 Ibid., 28 Feb. 1918. One Liberal MP also signed the 
telegram. 
2 Manchester Guardian op. cit., The Times 11 Mar. 1948. 
The voting was 96/30 and 9U/40- 
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transfer of such jurisdiction to the United Nations 
ComnissiQn, or for consequential and connected 
matter'. 
With the Conservatives happy to abstain, the amendment 
was defeated by 240 votes to 30. The result of the 
division, The Times believed, 'was very nearly in 
accordance with the Government's estimate of the strength 
of the internal opposition'. 
2 
The critics continued their efforts during the 
committee stage, to no greater effect. An amendment to 
ensure jurisdiction for Palestine was transferred to the 
United Nations was negatived by 114 votes to 17, and a 
similar amendment dealing with property transfers fell by 
148 votes to 12.3 
In all thirty seven Labour backbenchers had voted, on 
one or more occasions, against the Government. The list of 
those who opposed the Government, and of those who signed 
the telegram to Trygve Lie, indicates the extent to which 
the revolt was an alliance of Jewish and left wing back- 
bench MPs. Thirteen Jews 
- 
of a backbench total of twenty 
five 
- 
had voted for the second reading amendment, and 
Berrington calculates that of the 30 who entered the lobby 
twelve were drawn from what he terms the 'Left or Ultra 
4 Left' and twelve from the 'Central Left'. 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 448 c. 1363-6,10 Mar. 1948. This was a 
combination of two motions tabled earlier, see Daily Herald 
10 Mar. 1948. 
2 The Times 11 Mar. 1948. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 448 c. 2499-500,2935-8,19 & 23 Mar. 1948. 
There were possibly a number of Labour abstentions. Two 
Conservative amendments were defeated: no Labour back- 
benchers cross voted. 
4 H. Berrington, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 
1945-1955 (Oxford, 1973) pp. 70-1. 
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It has also been noted that the revolt was dominated by 
university educated MPs first elected in 1945.1 The fact 
that few, if any, were in receipt of union sponsorship 
serves as a reminder that the critics, for all their sound 
and fury, remained a small minority opposed both by long 
standing Arab sympathisers but also by the bulk of 
orthodox MPs whose sympathies primarily lay with the 
sufferings of British troops in Palestine and with the 
tribulations of Ernest Bevin and his colleagues. The 
critics had been roundly defeated in the party meeting - 
the continuation of their campaign provoked much anger - 
and for the majority of MPs even the call for support for 
the United Nations (especially if this necessitated the use 
of British troops) did not outweigh their natural loyalty 
to the Government. As Harold Roberts had earlier commented 
'it would take a great deal to goad me into severe 
criticism of the Government' on the question of Palestine. 
2 
For Roberts and most of his colleagues the point had not 
yet been reached. 
Within the NEC there was similarly no desire to add 
further to the-Government's difficulties. On 23 March 
Laski had circulated a note warning of the dangers of anti 
Jewish pogroms in the Middle East and urging 'financial 
magnanimity' and a 'determined moral leadership for peace' 
through cooperation with the United Nations. The only 
result was to prompt the NCL 
- 
with the approval of Bevin 
- 
1 R. J. Jackson, Rebels and Whips (London, 1968) p. 71. 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 445 c. 1297,11 Dec. 1947. 
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to issue a statement reiterating the Government's policy 
and urging upon both sides the need for restraint and 
joint consultations. 1 
On 12 March Tribune noted that the reaction of most 
party members was now to heave a sigh of relief that the 
party's difficulties on this question seemed nearing an end; 
a more appropriate reaction, the paper suggested, was one 
of shame in 'the striking betrayal of our friends'. This 
was certainly the view of their friends in Poale Zion even 
if the Zionists readily acknowledged the help of 
'those members of the PLP and of the Labour 
movement... who have remained firm to their Socialist 
principles and to the pledge of the Party on the 
Palestine question despite the Government's breach 
of faith with the Jewish people'. 2 
A number of MPs replied in kind by sending messages of 
support to Poale Zion and indeed Attlee had to step in to 
dissuade Bevan from doing likewise. 
3 On the other hand 
there remained dissatisfaction in Zionist circles that not 
all Jewish MPs in the Labour Party had actively opposed the 
Government's policy, and that Jewish Ministers felt able to 
remain in the Government; when Lord Nathan left the 
Government in May 1947 it was widely but quite erroneously 
believed that he had resigned as a protest. 
4 Although 
Labour MPs continued to speak at Poale Zion rallies and 
1 Int Sub 16 Mar. 1948, NEC 23 Mar. 1948, LPACR 1948, P. 3. 
Bevin suggested the addition of the words 'and urge both 
sides to stop fighting' (FO 371/68503 E4509). 
2 Resolution adopted at 1948 conference, ZR 12 Mar. 1948. 
3 Correspondence in FO 371/68630 E2884. Attlee had 
earlier prohibited unauthorised Ministerial statements on 
Palestine. 
4 Hyde, op. cit., p. 221. 
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meetings, the only significant opportunity for the Zionists 
to draw attention to their cause came at the Labour Party 
Conference. 
Though Poale Zion's resolution had now been overtaken 
by events and was withdrawn, with the State of Israel only 
five days old Rosette made a notable contribution. 'I have 
waited', he said, 'for two thousand years to make this 
speech'. 
1 The choice of Herbert Morrison to reply prompted 
some speculation that efforts had been made to avoid 
'another Bevin indiscretion'. 2 Certainly Morrison made a 
conciliatory speech, regarding delegates with his pre war 
experiences in Palestine, and promising that 'if our 
Government can do anything... to terminate that unhappy 
bloodshed... you can be sure that Ministers will take every 
opportunity to do so'. 
3 
Of Britain's Palestine policy in the ensuing,: manthz. 
one authority has written 
'the unintentioned effect... (was) to increase Israeli 
territory by about a third, to expose the military 
weakness and political instability of the Arab 
League, and to secure for HMG the distrust and 
suspicion of Israel... and the bitter rancour of the 
Arab States which they had failed effectively to 
assist'. 1+ 
Bevin's general policy was primarily inspired by the 
wish to minimise the harm done by the conflict in Palestine 
to Britain's relations with the Arab States; critics 
1 LPACR 1948, p. 162. 
2 Ian Mikardo in Tribune 28 May 1948. 
3 LPACR 1948, p. 164. 
4 J. Marlowe, The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the 
Palestine Mandate (London, 1959) p. 262. 
363 
within the Labour Party tended to concentrate on two 
aspects of this policy 
- 
British aid to the Arab combatants 
and the failure to recognise the State of Israel. 
Rosette had complained that the Transjordanian Arab 
Legion 'which is now attacking Socialist settlements, is 
officered and commanded by Britons and subsidised by the 
British Government. The British officers should be with- 
drawn immediately and the subsidy discontinued'. 
1 Warbey 
had already criticised the quantity of British arms that 
Palestinian Arabs had managed to acquire2 and now Britain's 
involvement with the Arab legion was the target of 
sustained criticism. The issue had been raised by Warbey 
and Lyall Wilkes in their pamphlet Palestine... The Stark 
Facts and the Way Out,, 
3 
and in a widely quoted letter to 
The Times Wilkes complained that 
'every tank and aeroplane now being used by the 
Arabs has been supplied by the United Kingdom and 
the British Air Mission is still functioning in 
Iraq; British missions are now working, training 
and re-equipping the Arab armies in Saudi Arabia 
and Iraq; the Arab Legion (is) now subsidised by us 
with t2 million a year and is commanded by 38 
British officers'. 4 
In Parliament Cocks pressed for the return of all war 
material supplied to Transjordan. 5 When, facing similar 
1 LPACR 1948, p. 162, see also Histadrut telegram in ZR 
28 May 1948. 
2 Debate on the Adjournment, HC Deb. Vol. 448 c. 168-78, 
1 Mar. 1948. 
3 W. Warbey and L. Wilkes, Palestine... The Stark Facts and 
the Way Out (London, 1918). The pamphlet, 'A Tract for 
Labour MPs and Others', had also urged a swift evacuation 
and support for the United Nations. 
4 The Times 25 May 1949. 
5 HC Deb. Vol. 450 c. 204-5,27 Apr. 1948. 
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criticism from Janner and Levy Bevin, in a typical 
indiscretion, remarked that 'the-Arabs are not in this 
House' he provoked a further torrent of abuse. 
1 But though 
the Foreign Affairs Group also urged the Foreign Secretary 
to seek to restrain the Arab Legion2 Bevin was not without 
supporters. Certain MPs, in particular Philips Price, were 
quick to meet Zionist complaints with counter allegations 
of their own, and Bevin could on occasion appear to hold 
the middle ground between rival extremists: 'pay your 
money and take your choice', he commented at one stage. 
3 
Though the question generated much ill will within the 
PLP nothing Bevin's critics could say or do had any effect 
on the Government's policy. But the second major issue 
during this period 
- 
the failure of Britain to give 
recognition to Israel 
- 
was to culminate in a humiliating 
and mishandled seeming volte face by the Government. 
The United States, in 'a final coup de grace to the 
British'4 had extended de facto recognition on ly May. 
Rosette of Poale Zion, and several local Labour Parties, 
urged the British Government to follow suit. 
5 But when the 
Cabinet met on 27 May, though it was pointed out that 
considerable embarrassment might be caused if, as seemed 
1 Ibid., c. 376,28 Apr. 1948. For example see Austin's 
interjection: 'is there any truth in the report that Glubb 
Pasha and Bevin Pasha are shortly to exchange jobs? ', ibid., 
c. 672,31 Mar. 1948. 
2 Details in FO 371/68562 E7655. 
3 HC Deb. Vol. 451 c. 188,26 May 1948. 
4 H. Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East, 1936 
- 
1954 (London, 1974) p. 526. 
5 LPACR op. cit., eg resolution from Hackney North in 
FO 371/68666 E7686. 
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I 
likely, many Commonwealth Governments granted recognition, 
Bevin made it clear that he did not intend to do likewise 
'at any rate until the picture had become more settled'. 
1 
Bevin continued to oppose recognition during the 
following months on the grounds that to do so would 
jeopardise the efforts of the United Nations to negotiate 
a military truce and a lasting settlement. This was 
certainly not the view of his critics in Parliament, who 
throughout the summer urged Bevin, as they saw it, to 
accept reality by extending recognition and by seeking to 
reduce Arab hostility to play a positive role in the search 
for a permanent peace. On 10 June Harold Lever argued in a 
debate on the adjournment that 
'recognition of the State of Israel is necessary, 
both in the interests of this country and in the 
interests of peace. It is perfectly clear that 
peace in Palestine at the end of the truce is 
possible only on the basis of recognition... it was 
the courage and firmness of the Jewish people in 
Palestine that saved the situation and made possible 
again a United Nations solution of the whole problem. 
Since then the State of IsVael has been recognised 
by half the world. How much longer has Britain to 
lag behind? '. Z 
By September Harold Laski, appealing 'as a Socialist to 
Socialist Ministers' was arguing that 'the key to peace 
lies in Downing Street'. Only the recognition of Israel, 
he believed, could prevent 'the re-birth of Nazism' in the 
Middle East. 3 But if many agreed with Laski that the 
1 CAB 128,27 May 1948- 
2 HC Deb. Vol. 451 c. 2660,4,10 June 1949. Mayhew has 
described answering Lever in a near deserted House faced by 
a 'wide awake, well informed, passionate, attentive and 
aggressive... group of 20 or 30 pro Israeli members', Mayhew 
& Adams, op. cit., p. 16. 
3 zR 3 Sept. 19 48. 
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success of Israel in defeating the combined Arab armies was 
a heroic triumph for the progressive forces in the Middle 
East, for others recognition would only give sanction to 
military conquest. The most bitter reaction was that of 
Norman Smith, who believed that 'the State of Israel is 
obnoxious and odious to most working men'and, answering a 
plea for recognition from Woodrow Wyatt, argued in The 
Times that 
'the new State was conceived in violence and born in 
crime... we cannot forget that justice has never 
overtaken the criminals who bloodily hanged two 
British sergeants... Wyatt's pragmatical arguments 
are odious to many of his parliamentary colleagues'. 
But Bevin's Palestine policy was fast approaching its 
nadir. In December Israeli troops advanced deep into 
Egyptian territory. On 29 December the Security Council 
ordered an immediate cease fire; Britain now issued an 
ultimatum to the Israeli Government and threatened to 
employ her forces in accordance with the Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty, and the Defence Committee of the Cabinet agreed to 
send British troops to the Transjordanian port of Aqaba. 
On 7 January 1949 came what was for many the final manifest- 
ation of the failure of Bevin's policy. Four British 
fighter aircraft flying over the Israeli frontier were shot 
down by the nascent Israeli air force. 
In the British press criticism of the Government's 
handling of the crisis now mounted rapidly. Within the 
Labour Party there were several potentially serious 
repercussions. Early in December certain Labour MPs had 
tabled a motion calling for the recognition of Israel2 and 
1 HC Deb. Vol. 459, c. 9,6 Nov. 1948, The Times 22 Oct. 
1948. 
2 Ibid., 3 Dec. 1948. 
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on. 17 January dissident backbenchers met to discuss their 
tactics. It seemed clear that the meeting of the PLP the 
following day would be the scene of a major assault on the 
Government's policy. 
1 Should the critics continue their 
efforts in the Commons the Government might face a serious 
challenge, for Churchill had given notice that his party 
would, if necessary, enter the division lobbies in 
opposition to the Government's Palestine policy. 
There was also disquiet within the Government. Attlee 
received notice that various Junior Ministers were now 
deeply concerned at the course of events, and were seeking 
an urgent meeting. 
2 Several Cabinet members including 
Cripps, were convinced of the need for a change of course. 
Bevan contemplated resignation; Hugh Dalton, though he 
evidently warned Bevan against such a step3 and wrote to 
Attlee warning him of the danger, also gave notice that he 
would press in Cabinet for a change in policy without 
which, he was now convinced, 'we shall run into very heavy 
trouble soon in Parliament and outside'. 
4 
'Blaming the Jews', Dalton admitted, was 'very easy, 
very natural and very legitimate'. He also gave vent to an 
all embracing bitterness now felt by many Ministers, 
sympathising with Bevin in 
'the difficulties which the conceited, faithless Jews, 
despicable and gutless Egyptians, untrustworthy 
British advisers and long international delays, 
hesitations and evasions of responsibility have 
placed him'. 
1 Ibid., 18 Jan. 1949. 
2 A. Blenkinsop to C. Attlee, 16 Jan. 1949 (Attlee Papers), 
Blenkinsop was Parliamentary Secretary at Bevan's Ministry 
of Health. 
ý. ýOFoot, Aneuran Bevan Vol. II 1945 
- 
1960 (London, 1973) 
4 H. Dalton to C. Attlee, 13 Jan. 1949 (Dalton Papers 9/7). 
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But, he argued, 'the Jews have beaten the Arabs 
- 
contrary to all 'expert' advice we got, both military and 
diplomatic 
- 
and it is no good refusing to face the 
consequences of this'. There was a real danger of another 
Chanak crisis, when Lloyd George fell 'never to rise again'. 
Attlee was not best pleased. In a terse reply, in 
which he placed full responsibility for the debacle on the 
shoulders of President Truman, he pointed out certain 
'omissions' in Dalton's analysis which was, he believed, an 
invitation 'to throw over not only the Arabs, but also the 
UNO'. l 
Nonetheless following a long Cabinet discussion on 17 
January Dalton noted in his diary 'we greatly pushed EB 
towards recognition'. 2 The meeting was dominated by Bevan. 
In the course of a long and indignant outburst he reminded 
his colleagues of his long held doubts about relying on the 
'unstable and reactionary Governments of Arab States'. 
Events had proved that British policy should from the 
first have been based on the friendship of the Jews. 
Furthermore, he argued, the policy persuaded had been 
inconsistent 'with the spirit, if not the letter' of 
traditional party policy. De facto recognition could no 
longer be withheld. 
3 
His comment on party policy touched a nerve, and 
several colleagues hurried to contradict him. Government 
policy had in fact been consistent with the party's support 
1 C. Attlee to H. Dalton, 14 Jan. 1949 ibi d. 
2 Dalton Diaries 17 Jan. 1949. 
3 CAB 128,17 Jan. 1949. 
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for a National Home. The truth was that 'policy must take 
into account the change in circumstances since the war, and 
also the new demands of the Zionists for the recognition of 
a separate Jewish State'. Despite this reservation Bevin 
was instructed to give his policy a 'new impulse' by 
according de facto recognition. To give Bevin time efforts 
were to be made to postpone Parliamentary discussion, but 
the Cabinet hoped that an announcement could be made before 
any debate 'otherwise the impression might be created that 
the Government had changed their policy in response to 
Parliamentary pressure'. 
The following day, in answer to a Private Notice 
Question from Churchill, Bevin addressed the House. There 
had been speculation that his statement would precipitate 
a Conservative Vote of Censure and a major revolt by Labour 
backbenchers, but in the event Bevin, 'with his back to the 
wall and highly suspicious of the bricks', 
l 
was at his most 
conciliatory and included a promise that Jews of military 
age would be released from the Cyprus camps. The House, 
'sensibly but uneasily', agreed to a one week delay before 
debating the subject, though Labour MPs gave Arthur 
Henderson, Secretary of State for Air, a rough time when he 
announced details of the aircraft losses; Henderson's own 
performance was particularly inept. 
2 
The peak of the crisis seemed to have passed. The 
Zionist Review noted that 'the anti Bevin storm is on the 
decline', which it ascribed to party loyalty, fears among 
1 J. P. W. Mallalieu in Tribune 21 Jan. 1949, HC Deb. Vol. 460 
C. 35-42,18 Jan. 1949. 
2 Ibid., c. 164-84 Henderson was the son of the former party 
leader. 
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the critics that Bevin's resignation might lead to an even 
less agreeable Foreign Secretary and, above all, to an 
anticipated change in policy. Most Cabinet Ministers, the 
paper believed, now favoured recognition of Israel. 
1 
Yet no sooner had the crisis successfully been cooled 
than Bevin bade fair to bring it to the boil again. He had 
earlier gained Cabinet support for an initiative designed to 
secure the recognition of Transjordan by the United States 
and to enable him to announce that - finally -a common 
understanding on Middle Eastern policy had been reached. On 
24 January he reported his failure and urged that 'in the 
circumstances (he) thought it would be a serious mistake... 
to proceed forthwith to accord recognition to the Govern- 
ment of Israel'. 
2 He therefore proposed to announce to 
Parliament simply that consultations were taking place. 
At least one Minister was outraged at the decision. 
Gaitskell recorded Bevan's fury that the Foreign Secretary, 
as Bevan saw it, was now seeking to evade the decision of 
the Cabinet to recognise Israel. At a dinner held by 
Cripps, 'Nye came out quite openly against Bevin and seemed 
to be anxious to start an intrigue to get rid of him. 
While nobody else joined in, I think most of us felt fairly 
critical'. 
3 Yet it was certainly an indication of the 
continued authority of Bevin and Attlee that the Foreign 
Secretary's recommendation was agreed to, despite the 
1 ZR 21 Jan. 1949. 
2 CAB 128,24 Jan. 1949. 
3 P. Williams, Hugh Gaitskell: A Political Biography 
(London, 1979) P. 165. 
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hostility or unease of most senior colleagues whor in their 
acquiescence, had ensured that a Parliamentary crisis could 
not now be avoided. 
On 18 January the International Sub Committee had 
recommended the NEC to send a deputation to Bevin 'for 
information on the Palestine situation', and on the morning 
of the debate in Parliament the NEC, showing their concern 
at the course of events, instructed Griffiths, the Chairman, 
to intervene if necessary. 
' The PLP also met prior to the 
debate. At the previous meeting discussion had been 
deferred, but now Bevin was wholly unsuccessful in, as The 
Times put it, persuading 'those Labour members who are 
opposed to him on this issue to change their point of view 
2 
J. P. W. Mallalieu later described Bevin's speech: 
'No one expected Bevin to give an impressive 
Parliamentary performance, and for the most part we 
got the usual chunks of undigested and indigestible 
manuscript. However, we could have hoped that the 
speech would contain some suggestion that a policy 
which had alienated Soviet Russia and the United 
States, both Jew and Arab, needed a little readjust- 
ment. That hope was not fulfilled, and the restive- 
ness in the Chamber showed the Whips that matters 
were going badly. ' 
Though Crawley, Harrison and Norman Smith (who again 
denounced Zionism as 'an inherently wrong thing', repugnant 
to working class Englishmen and espoused only by 'certain 
fanatical Jews')4 gave Bevin some support, the two effective 
1 Int sub 18 Jan. 1949, NEC 26 Jan. 1949. 
2 The Times 27 Jan. 1949. 
3 Tribune 27 Jan. 1949. 
4 HC Deb. Vol. 460 c. 947,26 Jan. 1949. 
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speeches were delivered by Churchill and Crossman. For the 
former, the 'astonishing mishandling' of the problem meant 
that, for the first time, it was the duty of his party to 
oppose the Government in the division lobbies. 
1 His pro 
Zionist sentiments were certainly not those of the majority 
of his supporters, but his colleagues now perceived the 
opportunity severely to embarrass, and perhaps to defeat, 
the Labour Government. 
Crossman then made possibly the best speech of his 
career, 'heavily biased in favour of the Jews, almost 
violently abusive of Bevin, yet pitched on an emotional and 
moral note which rang clean through prejudice and distrust 
into the secret heart of the Labour movement'. 
2 Even for 
his critic Aidan Crawley, it was 'one of the most moving 
and brilliant pieces of partisan advocacy I have ever 
listened to'. 3 
Crossman had made it clear that he could not support 
the Government when the House divided. Attlee, who wound 
up the debate, notably failed to dissuade those whose 
loyalty was also in doubt. In an ill tempered speech he 
sought to defend his Foreign Secretary's reputation, and 
made it clear that he felt the coming division was simply 
an opportunistic manoeuvre by the Conservative Party. 
The Conservatives had prepared for the debate by 
sending out a three line whip; the Government whip, 
1 Ibid., c. 1001. 
2 Tribune op. cit. 
3 HC Deb. op. cit., c. 1014. Silverman and Segal also made 
brief contributions. 
372 
following the usual practice for an adjournment debate, was 
only two line. When the House divided only 283 Labour MPs 
supported the Government, whose majority of 90 was one of 
the lowest it had secured on a major issue of policy. Only 
one backbench Jew (J. Diamond) voted with the Government; 
one, Dr. Segall voted with the Conservatives. But at least 
50 backbenchers ostentatiously abstained, and many others 
who supported the Government did so with reluctance, having 
already written to Attlee to express their disquiet. 
2 
Gaitskell believed that the fall of the Government had 
been at serious risk, 
3 
and The Times reported that 'most of 
those who backed Mr. Bevin in the lobby seemed relieved to 
know that the majority had not been even smaller'. 
4 Relief 
was followed by recrimination. Thomas Hobson, MP for 
Wembley North, wrote to Attlee to convey the 'deep 
resentment' of many of his trade union colleagues. The 
critics, he felt, had put Zionism before Socialism, and had 
shown a contemptuous disregard for party loyalty in an 
attempt to enforce a minority viewpoint. 
5 For Attlee such 
feelings were 'thoroughly justified'. But there could be 
no question of disciplining the large number of rebels; the 
1 Segal had not been one of the more prominent critics, 
though in the course of 1948 he had several disagreements 
with Bevin on the subject of the Cyprus refugees, see 
P0 371/68525 E12804,68563 E7746,68571 E9351. 
2 HC Deb. oop. cit., c. 1059-64, Jackson, op. cit., p. 71. 
3 P. Williams, op. cit. 
4 The Times 27 Jan. 1949. 
5 T. Hobson to C. Attlee, 27 Jan. 1949 (Attlee Papers). 
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Manchester Guardian noted that 'such an action might 
offend a substantial body of Labour supporters'. 
1 
On the other hand the backbench revolt quickly subsided, 
'leaving only the crushed hopes of some MPs who had 
the 
predicted that, King would ask Morrison or Cripps to form a 
Labour Government with Lord Mountbatten as Foreign 
Secretary'. 2 Nonetheless for the Government the episode 
had been a major humiliation; one reason for the collapse 
of the backbench rebellion was the Government's immediate 
retreat. On 30 January de facto recognition was granted 
to Israel; 3 on 4 February Tribune noted that this had 
'already changed the atmosphere to a remarkable extent'. 
But the Government had thus fallen into the very trap it 
had sought to avoid, of seeming to give way because of 
political and parliamentary pressure. The sorry episode 
was an appropriate end to the Labour Government's unhappy 
handling of the Palestine problem. 
1 Jackson, op. cit., p. 402. 
2 Rose, op. cit., p. 402. 
3 De Jure recognition was given in April 1950. 
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Conclusion 
The history of the Labour Party and the question of 
Palestine before 1945 is a history of a growing attachment 
to the cause of Zionism. Laqueur has noted that 'being a 
latecomer among national movements, Zionism was very much 
a movement in a hurry, forever racing against time'. 
' But 
it was the Zionists' good fortune that their breakthrough 
into public and political acceptability came at a time when 
the Labour Party was beginning to assume the posture of a 
major political party and to expand its interests beyond 
those of a small working class pressure group. 
The official attitude of the Labour Party was shaped in 
the immediate post war years. Zionism had gained wide- 
spread approval in liberal circles, and moderate 
Socialists throughout Europe were now revising their 
earlier hostility to Jewish nationalism. For Labour 
politicians, recoiling from the sufferings inflicted upon 
European Jews during and immediately after the First World 
War, Zionist aims now seemed comparable to their own. As 
Wedgwood commented 'Zionism is now doing for the Jews what 
the Labour Party seeks to do for the British working class 
- 
creating self confidence and corporate self respect. 
2 
In seeking to gain the public approval of moderate 
British Socialists left wing Zionists were primarily faced, 
not at this stage by the assertion that Arab rights were in 
jeopardy, but by the ideological analysis which portrayed 
1 Laqueur, op. cit., p. 593. 
2 Wedgwood, 'Seventh Dominion', o___p. cit., p. 123. 
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their movement as misguided distraction from the common 
Socialist struggle. This was met by the argument that, 
whilst bourgeois Zionism would create capitalist exploit- 
ation in Palestine, the real alternative was Socialist 
Zionism, whose adherents had as their aim not only the 
ending of anti semitism and persecution in Europe but also 
the successful prosecution of the class struggle in 
Palestine, and who therefore stood shoulder to shoulder 
with Socialists of all nations, and fully deserved their 
support. This view gained the acceptance of moderate 
European Socialists 
- 
'Palestine', as represented by 
Labour Zionists, taking its place within the LSI 
- 
successfully overcame the doubts which had existed within 
the British ILP, and secured institutional recognition by 
the affiliation of Poale Zion to the Labour Party. 
Though the Labour Zionist analysis of the question of 
Palestine gave British Socialists the tools with which to 
defend their support for Zionism, personal and emotional 
factors were the key to the Labour Party's attachment to 
the Zionist cause. For many party members a memory of the 
plight of Jewish refugees arriving in England and a 
knowledge of the poverty and alienation of large sections 
of the Jewish community complimented their intellectual 
approval of Zionism. For some the potent references of 
the 'New Jerusalem' to be built in Palestine struck a 
religious chord and matched their vision of the Socialist 
transformation to be wrought in Britain. Though Socialist 
Zionists had gained only limited support within the Jewish 
working classes they won the personal friendships of many 
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Labour politicians and their descriptions of the pioneering 
activities of Labour Zionists in Palestine were a decisive 
factor in the winning of interest and approval. 
During the 1930s the visits of Labour politicians to 
Palestine, and the glowing reports they brought back of 
Jewish work and of Jewish Labour organisations, served both 
to dispel any lingering ill will resulting from the 
actions of the Second Labour Government, and to lay the 
foundations for the remarkable closeness which existed 
between Labour Party politicians and Labour Zionist leaders 
during the decase. Renewed Jewish persecution in Europe, 
the rise of Fascism at home and abroad, and even the Arab 
rebellion in Palestine, all had the effect of increasing 
popular support for the Zionist cause, which Labour 
Zionists made every effort effectively to mobilise, whilst 
Government policies enabled the Labour Party to assume the 
role of the defender of the Zionist 
- 
and indeed of the 
Jewish 
- 
cause. Despite the propagandising of Arab spokes- 
men no comparable developments took place to increase 
sympathy or understanding for the cause of the Palestine 
Arabs. 
It is true that during this period the left wing 
analysis of Palestine, having since 1920 found little 
support outside the Communist Party, was now to be heard 
once again within the Labour Party. But it gained few 
converts 
- 
even the links of the ILP were with minor 
Zionist parties 
- 
and was, in fact, no more acceptable to 
Palestinian nationalists than to most Labour Zionists. The 
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only people to argue the 'Arab case' within the party in 
the way in which Arab spokesmen wished it to be argued1 
were the small disparate group of - predominantly right 
wing 
- 
critics in the Imperial Advisory Committee and the 
Parliamentary Party. 
Labour Party leaders, on the other hand, and the 
majority of members closely involved in policy making, 
either ignored or disparaged the idea that natural justice 
or a belief in the self determination of subject peoples 
might lead to support for an independent Arab dominated 
Palestine or for restrictions on Jewish immigration and 
colonisation. Though, they agreed, the Arab standard of 
living was deplorably low, the solution lay in the abjuring 
by the Arab working classes of their reactionary feudal 
leaders and in their co-operation with Jewish Labour 
organisations which, it was argued, were doing everything 
possible to assist Arab workers and promote the Solidarity 
of Labour. 
It was therefore almost inevitable that, as even 
Tribune later guardedly admitted, 'the Labour Party before 
1945 underestimated Arab nationalism', 
2 
and wholly failed 
to appreciate that 'the essential nature of the Arab Jewish 
conflict' was of two contending political movements, on what 
was, from the start, 'a collision course'. 
3 This basic 
misunderstanding lay at the heart of Labour Party attitudes, 
shaped certain party reactions 
- 
for instance towards 
1 Susan Lawrence, for example, believed that the 'real' 
Arab case was the demand for greater public spending on 
welfare services. 
2 Tribune 7 Mar. 1947. 
3 B. Wasserstein, The British in Palestine: The Mandatory 
Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict 191? 
- 
1929 
London, 1978) pp. 7,236. 
378 
partition in the 1930s - underlay most policy statements, 
and explains something of the bitterness and confusion 
within both Government and Party after 1945" 
In fact Labour Party views on Arab nationalism and the 
conflict in Palestine were shaped primarily by Labour 
Zionists. Through personal contacts, in resolutions, 
declarations and political surveys submitted to the party, 
in comments 
- 
often requested by Labour Party officials - 
on Arab submissions, assurances were repeatedly made that 
only through full support for the Palestine Jewish Labour 
movement1 and opposition to reactionary Arab political 
demands could a peaceful settlement to the Palestine 
problem be achieved. 
Though many Zionists similarly ignored and misunder- 
stood the basic conflict of interests in Palestine several 
Labour Zionist leaders had no illusions. But though, for 
instance, Arlosoroff commented in 1921 that 'an Arab 
movement 
... 
really exists' and Ben Gurion warned his 
colleagues that 'it is possible to resolve the conflict 
between Jewish and Arab interests only by sophistry'2 they 
could not afford to disillusion their Labour Party friends, 
lest any resulting reappraisal prove unfavourable to their 
political aims. Thus such comments as that of Morrison that 
'no enduring divergence of interest exists between the 
Jewish and Arab population in Palestine'3 were published 
1 Party officials often tacitly appeared to accept the 
view that the Histadrut spoke for all workers, both Jewish 
and Arab, in Palestine. 
2 Caplan, op. cit., pp. 187,75. 
3 From Morrison's speech to the 1930 Annual Conference, 
quoted in Levenberg & Podro (eds), op. cit., p. 20. 
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with approval. But to encourage so facile an interpret- 
ation was to invite the disillusion and recrimination of 
Labour Ministers when the party took office. 
The influence of Labour Zionists can be most clearly 
observed in the processes of policy making. It was here 
that their uniquely intimate links with the Labour Party 
bore specific fruit. On the one hand Poale Zion, the only 
affiliated group seeking to influence a specific issue of 
foreign policy, was able to submit resolutions to the 
Annual Conference and to gain the attention of the NEC, 
whilst the institutional links of Ma ai and the Histadrut 
ensured that complaints and recommendations were received, 
in marked contrast to those from Arab organisations, with 
much sympathy. This was made the more certain by the 
friendships that existed with numerous NEC members, and 
with Middleton and Gillies. These personal links also 
brought specific advantages, including the chance to 
comment on certain Arab communications, advance warning of 
Arab interventions and, on several occasions, of unfavour- 
able recommendations submitted by the Imperial Advisory 
Committee. 
Though it is unlikely that direct Zionist intervention 
significantly influenced the drafting of Webb's first 
tentative declaration, from thenceforth there was scarcely 
a resolution or statement of policy which was not initiated 
or shaped by Labour Zionists. Before 1945 the majority of 
successful Annual Conference resolutions had either been 
submitted by Poale Zion or had been drafted by the NEC after 
consultation with Labour Zionists. In 1930 the concern of 
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the NEC and of party officials at the possible electoral 
repercussions of the Government's policy was brought to a 
head by Poale Zion pressure; Labour Zionists also largely 
determined many Labour reactions to issues in the 1930s, 
in particular towards the proposed Legislative Council and 
the plan to partition Palestine. 
1 
If during the Second World War the Labour Party drew 
back from including in official statements the demand that 
Palestine become a Jewish State, several prominent party 
members, most noticeable Hugh Dalton, showed no such 
hesitation. Indeed it was perhaps the public declarations 
of party leaders which gave the Zionists most encouragement, 
and made subsequent allegations of betrayal almost 
impossible to refute. 
It is, however, certainly true that Zionists 
- 
despite 
assurances to the contrary 
- 
were excluded from the policy 
process which brought forth the Palestine paragraph 
contained in The International Post War Settlement. It 
proved essantially to be the work of one man, and the 
plethora of meetings belie the extent to which Dalton's 
original draft remained fundamentally unaltered and 
unchallenged. With the support of Harold Laski he could 
easily brush aside suggestions 
- 
that the Mandate be 
mentioned or that a separate Committee be formed 
- 
of which 
he disapproved. Impatient of delay or prolonged discussion, 
Dalton hustled his post war policy through the party 
machine, and with it his paragraph on Palestine. 
Though Dalton's policy, careless and idiosyncratic as it 
1 Though, from the Zionists' point of view, the party 
sometimes overreacted, 
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was, was undoubtably an accurate reflection of the strength 
of pro Zionist sentiment within the party it was not, 
despite the call for free immigration, the declaration the 
Zionists had hoped for. But still less did it please the 
small group of Arab sympathisers or the experts of the 
Imperial Advisory Committee. The influence of the 
Committee in the years between 1930 and 1945 had contrasted 
most unfavourably with that of the Labour Zionists; their 
recommendations, which might at least have served to widen 
the scope of the debate within the party and forced a 
greater consideration of the issues involved, had been 
almost invariably ignored by the pro Zionist NEC, and their 
belated intervention in the summer of 1944 was predictably 
ineffective. 
For much of the Mandate period Labour politicians did 
not hold office. The party played a minor part in 
encouraging the Government to accept the Mandate and to 
honour the Balfour Declaration, and in opposing subsequent 
criticism from within the Conservative Party. During the 
1930s, as successive Governments searched for an acceptable 
solution to the problem of Palestine, the Labour Party had 
the satisfaction of helping to defeat certain specific 
proposals. But when the Government embarked upon the 
course which was to lead to the 1939 White Paper, the party 
was in practice powerless to assist its Zionist friends 
beyond promising that a Labour Government would reverse the 
policy and honour its pro Zionist pledges; this was 
reaffirmed and embellished during the war. 
The policies that were actually pursued by the 1945 
Labour Government are well known; so too is the reaction 
38 2 
of disillusioned Zionists. But the mutual misunderstandings 
and recriminations that ensued, particularly within the 
Labour Party, might in part have been avoided if, firstly, 
some of the lessons of 1930 had been properly understood 
and, secondly, if steps had been taken to bridge the gulf 
that had grown between party expectations and the attitudes, 
prompted by their wartime experiences,, of certain Labour 
Ministers. 
The Second Labour Government's handling of the problem 
of Palestine could give the party little satisfaction. 
Having stumbled into a political crisis largely of their 
own making a combination of the fear of American pressure, 
parliamentary uncertainty, and a strikingly inopportune by 
election provoked a humiliating retreat. Although the 
party had expressed its support for Zionism for more than a 
decade the shallowness of its leaders commitment and under- 
standing of the issues involved could be guaged by the 
speed in which opinions changed when faced with the 
immediate problem. 
The sudden need to deal with a crisis in Palestine as a 
Government, and squarely to face the dual obligations of 
the Mandate came as a profound shock. Passfield, whom his 
nephew had described in September 1939 as 'sympathetic' 
seemed the following month to be 'a tired man and particu- 
larly apathetic to Zionism'. 
1 Though his Under Secretary, 
Drummond Shie18, evidently admitted to Weizmann in March 
1930 that the didn't see why one shouldn't really make 
1 Meinertzhagenr op. cit., p. 140. 
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Palestine a National Home for the Jews and tell it frankly 
to the Arabs'1 by June he was expressing his anger at the 
Zionists' activities and their influence on Mambers of 
Parliament. 2 For MacDonald the Palestine issue soon became 
the source of irritation and a cause of his mounting 
pessimism. 
The influence brought to bear from within the Labour 
Party was overwhelmingly hostile to the Government's policy, 
and the party's traditional support for Zionism rapidly 
became a further source of embarrassment to the Government. 
Though party officials strove to mollify Zionist opinion 
and shared something of Ministers' irritation with Zionist 
methods and motives, by emphasising party political consid- 
erations and helping to channel party discontent they 
played a part in inducing the Government to change course. 
But as the crisis subsided there was little effort 
within the party to analyse the reasons for the Govern- 
ment's alarming performance, other than a tendency to blame 
the Civil Service and the Palestine Administration. Though 
the debacle of 1931 did provoke some reappraisal of the 
functioning of the party and its leaders, it also became 
tempting to ascribe any mistake and failure of the Govern- 
ment to those leaders - MacDonald, Snowden, Thomas - now 
discredited and banished from the party. This reaction 
affected the Palestine issue: MacDonald and Passfield had 
betrayed first the Jews and then the party. In both cases 
1 Flapan, op. cit., p. 140- 
2 Rose, op. cit., p. 13. Gupta, (op. cit., p. 191) notes 
that 'Shiels (was) always sensitive to backbench Labour 
opinion... '. 
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it was left to Henderson to pick up the pieces. 
1 
If for the Arabs events seemed to show that the 
Zionists could determine a Labour Government's policy as 
easily as it could manipulate party sympathies, within the 
Labour Party the belief quickly developed that next time, 
with new leaders and in changed circumstances, things would 
be different, and the Government would not stray from the 
chosen path. The crisis provoked neither an understanding 
of the fundamental cause of the conflict in Palestine nor 
an appreciation of the various considerations which would 
necessarily influence a future Labour Government. Labour 
Zionists for their part soon returned to praising the party 
as the bulwark of Zionist aspirations and as the surest 
friends of Jewish development in Palestine. By common 
consent the upheavals of the past were forgotten and a 
measure of mutual self deception served only to store up 
trouble for the future. 
The Second World War began with the Labour Party in 
almost complete opposition to the White Paper policy; in 
the wake of the Jewish massacres and the ungenerous treat- 
ment of Jewish refugees to consider restrictions on 
immigration into Palestine now for many became unthinkable 
and immoral. Feelings of frustrated anger, and perhaps 
shared guilt, brought a determination that a post war 
Labour Government would make amends. This determination 
1 More recently this argument has been turned on its head: 
'As for MacDonald, his conniving with the Zionists preceded 
his conniving with the leaders of the Tory and Liberal 
parties, and the betrayal of Sidney Webb preceded the 
betrayal of the Labour Party', D. Watkins, Labour and 
Palestine (Labour Middle East Council, London--19-7-55-P. 14. 
385 
was naturally encouraged by Labour Zionists who helped 
direct attention to the role that Palestine might play as 
a solution to the Jewish problem. 
There was, partly as a result, an almost total submer- 
gence of the Arab case. Arab representations to the party 
ceased between 1940 and 1944 and events during the war 
helped damn their case in the eyes of many; they must not 
now act as 'Dog in the Holy Manger'. By taking the 'broad 
view' 
- 
of the extensive Arab lands when compared with 
'poor little Palestine', of the benefits the whole area 
might receive through Jewish investment and initiative - 
particular Palestinian Arab grievances and frustrations 
could be ignored, and population transfers advocated. 
After 1940 the left wing analysis which saw Zionism as 
an agent of British Imperialism was little heard within the 
Labour Party. Indeed the identification of the left wing 
of the party with the cause of Zionism stemmed largely from 
wartime experiences. Thus Tribune now argued that 'those 
who say Palestine offers no solution... must be prepared to 
offer a reasonable alternative'. In a progressive, 
prosperous Middle East, the paper believed, 'Jewish 
colonisation in Palestine could be fitted in without real 
difficulty'. 1 
But the difficulties of pursuing a pro Zionist course 
were now being impressed upon Labour Ministers, on many of 
whom four years in Government had a profound effect. George 
Hall, the future Colonial Secretary, was much involved with 
the problem during the war and fully appreciated the view 
1 Tribune 17 Nov. 1944,25 May 1945. 
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of the Foreign Office, which at one stage he represented 
at a meeting of the Palestine Committee. Both Attlee and 
Cripps in their memoranda to the Cabinet expressed opinions 
born of a perspective far from that of the Zionists or of 
their party. Initial concern for the Jewish plight and 
sympathy for Zionist demands gradually turned to irritation 
and pessimism about the situation in Palestine. In 
particular Ernest Bevin's early helpful interventions on 
the Zionists' behalf later gave way to expressions of 
criticism and some belligerence. When Churchill noted in 
June 1945 that Zionism 'has few supporters. Even the Labour 
Party now seems to have lost its zeal'1 he can have been 
thinking, not of the Labour Party as a whole, but of his 
Labour colleagues in the Government. 
Yet though Hall was evidently perturbed at the policy 
adopted by his party, and made some effort to ensure that 
2 
Arab protests were forwarded, there was remarkably little 
concern about the potential consequences of the divergence 
between party and leaders. Dalton, the author of the 
party's program, seemed if anything amused at the situation, 
of which the confusion he helped spread about the respective 
attitudes of the Labour Party and the Government towards 
partition was only a symptom. That party supporters should 
blame the unsympathetic attitude of the Coalition Govern- 
ment towards Zionist aspirations on the influence of 
1 In a letter, not sent, to Weizmann, cited in Gilbert, 
'Exile', op. cit., p. 273. 
2 Minute 24 May 1944 in CO 733/463.75872. 
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Conservative Ministers was natural. That Labour Ministers, 
whose concern was increasingly with the prospects of chaos 
in Palestine and the erosion of the British position in the 
Middle East, should continue to associate themselves 
without demur with the Labour Party's pro Zionist 
declarations was foolhardy. Having done nothing to contain 
party expectations they had subsequently little 
justification for complaining at the dissatisfaction and 
unrest that their policies caused. 
The Labour Government, in the early months of office, 
came close to approving a continuation of the White Paper 
policy. Indeed, it was only Bevin's last minute suggestion 
of a 'fresh approach' - the appointment of an Anglo 
American Commission 
- 
that enabled criticism from within 
the party to be met and Ministers to argue that party 
pledges were being honoured. But Ministers found it 
difficult to dany that the course of action pursued during 
the following years was not in practice a repudiation of 
traditional party policy. They might argue that the 
necessary American co-operation had not been forthcoming - 
but this had not previously been expressed as a sine qua 
non. The Zionist demand that Palestine become a Jewish 
State was condemned as a significant new factor, irrecon- 
cilable with practical policies - but several Ministers, 
including, Dalton and Greenwood, had earlier supported such 
a call. To claim that post war developments precluded the 
adoption of a pro Zionist policy was disingenuous, since 
the nature of the problem had been fully apparent before 
1945, and served to highlight their own failure to qualify 
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party policy and to moderate party expectations. 
Although this work has concentrated on the reactions 
within the Labour Party, and the various factors shaping 
Government policy have not been analysed in depth, it has 
been argued that the policies pursued must be seen in the 
light of the previous experiences and attitudes of Labour 
Ministers in the Coalition Government. Significantly the 
leading critic within the new Cabinet, Aneurin Bevan, had 
not previously held office and was not involved in the 
making of policy other than as a Cabinet Minister. He, and 
a number of his colleagues, made sporadic efforts to alter 
certain aspects of Bevin's policy but, despite much unease 
within the Cabinet, critics within the Government could 
achieve no significant shift in Government policy. Disgust 
at the upsurge of Jewish terrorism and bitterness at 
American behaviour served to reduce the level of criticism; 
in their unflinching commitment to the Zionist cause Bevan 
and Strachey were very much the exception. 
Though most MPs and party members soon became concerned 
at the course of the Government's policies and at the 
bloody conflict in Palestine, serious criticism was chiefly 
to be heard only from Poale Zion, whose interventions to the 
NEC and at party conferences were now to little effect, 
from certain Jewish Nil's, from a number of constituency 
parties and from a group of, primarily left wing, back- 
benchers. Though certain MPs might have conspicuous 
success in demonstrating their opposition in Parliament it 
soon became clear that there would be no repeat of events 
in 1930, when party pressure played a major part in 
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inducing the Government to change course. 
For most Labour MPs, hitherto sympathetic to the Jewish 
cause, the rising death toll in Palestine and the apparent 
intransigence of the Zionist leaders became powerful factors 
prompting support for the hard pressed Government. Some 
came to manifest bitter hostility towards Zionism,, and in 
general the criticisms of their colleagues aroused not 
sympathy but irritation. The Government was able to gain 
the support of the majority of the PLP for its policies; 
only when MPs of all parties united to demand a speedy 
withdrawal from Palestine and when finally the Conservative 
Party decided to vote against the Government and thus 
facilitated a Labour revolt, did backbench Labour opinion 
significantly influence Government policy. 
The NEC had voiced some concern about the Government's 
intentions in October 1945 but thereafter, despite the 
efforts of Harold Laski, remained largely obedient to the 
wishes of Government Ministers. Though speeches by 
Zionists and their friends at party conferences caused 
embarrassment, and sometimes deep resentment, the Govern- 
ment could not be seriously challenged and - thanks in part 
to Crossman 
- 
it was never necessary to call upon the trade 
union block votes in order to defeat an unwelcome 
resolution. 
According to Leifer, 'the Zionists had been overwhelmed 
and even embarrassed by the Labour Party's declarations. Is 
it any wonder, therefore, that they were disillusioned and 
aggrieved? '. 
' Of Zionist disillusion there can be no doubt. 
1 Leifer, op. cit., p. 269. 
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From Dalton's jovial irresponsibility to Creech Jones' one 
sided enthusiasm, the Labour Party had showered their 
Zionist friends with generous declarations of intent and 
promises of assistance, which had encouraged the belief 
that 'the next (Labour) Government (would) do everything 
for them'1 but which were not fulfilled. In this party 
spokesmen had misled both themselves and their friends. 
Yet perhaps it was the Labour Party which had been over- 
whelmed. For in so successfully presenting their case 
within the Labour Party, in shaping attitudes and 
influencing policy, the Zionists had inevitably encouraged 
the adoption of a partisan and incomplete analysis of the 
Palestine problem, which neither enabled a balanced 
approach to conflict in Palestine to emerge nor adequately 
prepared the Labour Party for the realities of Government. 
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* S. Levenberg (ed. ), The Jews and Palestine: A Study in 
Labour Zionism (London, 1945) 
Jewish Labour's Case (London, 1946) 
Memorandum to the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on 
Palestine London, 194 ) 
S. Rolbrant, The Arabs: People and Politics (London, 1948) 
(b) Palestine Labour Studies 
This complete list of publications includes two previously 
published by Poale Zion. 
S. Levi, An Open Letter to Comrade Gallacher (London, 1937) 
B. Katznelson, Reaction v. Progress in Palestine (London, 1937) 
A. Schwadron, Arab Imperialism (London, 1937) 
Palestine Labour's Case Before the Royal Commission (London, 1937) 
D. Ben Gurion, Towards the 20th Zionist, Congress (London, 1937) 
B. Locker, What is Poale Zionism? (London, 1937) 
Jewish Maritime Revival (London, 1938) 
D. Ben Gurion, Mr Ormsby ore's Despatch Analysed (London, 1938) 
B. Katznelson, The Next Stage in Palestine. (London, 1938) 
D. Ben Gurion, The Peel Report and the Jewish State (London, 1938 
B. Locker, The Jews and Palestine: Historical Connection and 
Historic Right London,, 1938 
S. Levenberg & J. Podro (eds. ), British Labour Policy on 
Palestine: A Collection of Documents, Speeches and 
Articles 1917-1938 (London, 1938) 
(c) Labour Party 
Memorandum on the Issues of the War (London, 1917) 
Memorandum on War Aims approved by a Special Conference of 
Labour Movement, 28th December 1917 (London, 1917) 
Inter Allied Labour and Socialist Conference: Memorandum 
on War Aims (London, 1918 
394 
Short Statement on War Aims (London, 1918) 
A. Henderson, The Aims of Labour (London, 1918) 
Labour and the Peace Treaties: Handbook for Speakers (London, 1918) 
A. Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy (London, 1933) 
C. R. Attlee, Labour's Peace Aims (London, 1939) 
C. R. Attlee, A. Greentivood, H. Dalton and others, Labour's Aims 
in Peace and War (London, 1940) 
A Handbook for Speakers (London, 1945) 
Cards on the Table: An Interpretation of Labour's Foreign 
Policy London, 1947 
(d) Miscellaneous 
Z. Abramovich, Whither Palestine? (London, 1936) 
E. Atiyahv Arab Rights and the British Left (London, 1945) 
H. N. Brailsford, Turkey and the Roads to the East (Union of 
Democratic Control, London, 1916) 
British Association for a Jewish National Home in Palestine, 
Palestine 1917/1944 (London, 1945) 
'British Resident', Who is Prosperous in Palestine? (Labour 
Monthly Pamphlets, London, 1936) 
British Socialist Party, Annual Conference Reports (London, 
1916-1920) 
The Committee of Delegates of the Russian Socialist Groups 
in London and the Jewish Social Dbmocratic Organisation, 
The Rights of Aliens (London, 1917) 
J. L. Cohen, Labour Zionism: Its Principles and Practices 
(Jewish Chroni he Suppi6ment, London 1933) 
G. D. H. Cole, G. D. H. Cole on Labour's Foreign Policy (London, 1946) 
R: H. S. Crossman & M. Foot, A Palestine Munich? (London, 1946) 
R. Crossman, M. Foot, I. Mikardo and others, Keep Left 
(London, 194? ) 
Fabian Colonial Bureau, The Palestine Controvers :A 
Symposium (London, 1945 
A. Gould and others, Private and Confidential (London, 1946) 
The Jewish Labour League, To the Workers of Great Britain 
(London, 1915) 
The Jewish Workers' War Emergency Relief Fund Bulletin 
(London, 1917) 
B. Locker, An Open Letter to Mr Bevin (Zionist Federation 
of Great Britain, London, 1945) 
London Delegation of the Central Committee of Jewish Workers' 
Union Bund in Poland, Some Jewish Problems (London, 1945) 
Parliamentary Peace Aims Group, Labour and the Post War 
Settlement (London, 1944) 
395 
S. Rolbrant, Hierlings of the Desert: Transiordan and the 
Arab Larue (London, 1948) 
G. Sabks, The Jewish Question (Left Book Club) London, 1937) 
W. Warbey & L. Wilkes, Palestine... The Stark Facts and the Way 
Out (London, 1948) 
D. Watkins, Labour and Palestine (Labour Middle East Council, (London, 1975 
L. S. Woolf, The International Post War Settlement (Fabian 
Publications, London, 1944) 
L. S. Ploolf, Foreign Policy: The Labour Party's Dilemma 
(London, 1947) 
Workers' Circle Friendly Society, The Circle: Golden Jubilee 
1909-1959 (London, 1959) 
5. Contemporary Newspapers and Journals 






Jevrish Labour Correspondence 
Jewish Labour News 
Labour 
The Labour Leader 
Manchester Guardian 
New Judea 










6. Autobiographies, Biographies and Memoirs 
E. Atiyah, An Arab Tells His Story (London, 1946) 
C. R. Attlee, As It Happened (London, 1954) 
R. Barclay, Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office (London, 1975) 
G. Barnes, From Workshop to War Cabinet (London, 1924) 
M. Bar Zohar, Ben Gurion: A Biography (London, 1973) 
D. Ben Gurion, Letters to Paula (London, 1971) 
My Talks with Arab Leaders (Jerusalem, 1972) 
N. Bentwich, A Wanderer Between Two Worlds (London, 1941) 
Mandate Memories (London, 1965) 
R. Boothby, Recollections of a Rebel (London, 1978) 
F. Brockway, Towards Tomorrow (London, 1977) 
S. Brodetsky, Memoirs: From Ghetto to Israel (London, 1960) 
A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Vol I, 1881- 
1940 (London, 1960) 
M. Cole (ed. ), The Diaries of Beatrice Webb 1912-1932 (London, 1952-56) 
The Webbs and their Work (London, 1949) 
R. Crossman, Palestine Mission (London, 1947) 
B. C. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain (New York, 1947) 
H. Dalton, Call Back Yesterday: Memoirs 1887-1931 (London, 1953) 
The Fateful Years: Memoiirs 1931: 
-1945 (London, 1957) 
High Tide and After: Memoirs 194511960 (London, 1962) 
P. Dixon, Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon 
London, 1960) 
B. Donoughue & G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a 
of a Politician London, 1975) 
G. Eastwood, Harold Laski (London, 1977) 
A. Eban, An Autobiography (London, 1977) 
M. Edelman, Ben Gurion: A Political Biography (London, 1964) 
M. Foot, Aneurin Bevan, Vol II, 1945-1960 (London, 1973) 
W. Gallacher, Rise Like Lions (London, 1951) 
M. Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold: Portrait of a Diplomat (London, 1973) 
J. Harvey (ed. ), The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey (London, 1978) 
J. B. Hobman (ed. ), David Eder: Memoirs of a Modern Pioneer (London, 1945 
Mode Wolfe Howe (ed. ), The Holmes-Laski Corres ondenc (Cambridge, Mass., 1953 
397 
E. Hughes, Sidney Silverman: Rebel in Parliament (London, 1969) 
M. Hyde, Strong for Service: The Life of Lord Nathan of Churt 
(London, 1968) 
J. J acobs, From the Ghetto: My Youth in the East End (London, 1968) 
R. Rhodes James, Victor Cazalet: A Portrait (London, 1976) 
F. H. Kische, Palestine Diary (London, 1938) 
T. Kollek, For Jerusalem: A Life (London, 1978) 
J. G. MacDonald, My Mission to Israel 1948.1951 (London, 1951) 
J. R. MacDonald, Wanderings and Excursions (London, 1925) 
N. & J. MacKenzie, The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
Vol III, 1912-1947 Pilgrimage (Cambridge, 1978) 
J. Mahon, Haag Pollitt (London, 1976) 
D. Marquand, Ramsey MacDonald (London, 1977) 
K. Martin, Harold Laski (London, 1953) 
R. Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary 1917-1956 (London, 1956) 
G. Meir, My Life (London, 1975) 
H. S. Morrison, An Autobiography (London, 1966) 
M. Philips Price, My Three Revolutions (London, 1969) 
R. Rocker, The London Years (London, 1956) 
N. A. Rose (ed. ), Baffy: The Diaries of Blanche Du dale 1936- 
1947 (London, 1972) 
E. Shinwell, I've Lived Through It All (London, 1973) 
H. Snell, Men, Movements and Myself (London, 1936) 
L. Stein (ed. ), The Letters and Papers of Chaim 17ei zmann 
Series A, Vols I-VII (London, 1968 ff. 
M. D. Stocks, Eleanor Rathbone (London, 1949) 
H. Thomas, John Strachey (London, 1973) 
J. Wedgwood, Memoirs of a Fighting Lifev(London, 1941) 
C. V. Wedgwood, The Last of the Radicals (London, 1951) 
M. Weisgal & J. Carmichael, Chaim Weinmann: A Biography by 
Several Hands (London, 1963) 
C. Weizmann, Trial and Error (London, 1949) 
V. Weizmann, The Impossible Takes Longer (London, 1967) 
F. Williams, Ernest Bevin: Portrait of a Great Englishman 
(London, 1952) 
A Prime Minister Remembers (London, 1961) 
P. M. Williams, Hugh Gaitskell: A Political Biography (London, 1979) 
T. Williams, Digging for Victory (London, 1965) 
398 
D. Wilson & J. Eisenberg, Leonard Woolf: A Political Biograph 
(London, 1978) 
T. Wilson (ed. ), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1928 
(London, 1969) 
L. Woolf, Donwhill All the Way (London) 1969) 
7. General Works 
R. Bassett, Nineteen Thirty One: Political Crisis (London, 1958) 
B. Bell, Terror Out of Zion (Dublin, 1979) 
J. M. Bellamy & J. Saville (eds. ), Dictionary of Labour 
Biography, Vols I-V (London, 1972-79) 
N. Bebhell, The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle Between the 
British, the Jews and the Arabs 1935-1948 (London, 1979) 
C. Bermant, The Cousinhood (London, 1971) 
H. Berrington, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 
1945-1955 (Oxford, 1973) 
C. Brand, A History of the British Labour Party (2nd ed., 
Stanford, Calif., 1974) 
J. Braunthal, A History of the International Vd. II 1914- 
1943 (London, 1967) 
T. D. Burridge, British Labour and Hitler's War (London, 1976) 
N. Caplan, Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question 1917-1925 
(London, 1978) 
D. Carlton, MacDonald versus Henderson: The Foreign Policy of 
Second Labour Government (London, 1970) 
M. J. Cohen, Palestine: Retreat tm the Mandate (London, 1978) 
'Why Britain Left: The End of the Mandate', Weiner 
Library Bulletin, Vol XXXI, 1978 pp. 74-86. 
G. D. H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party Since 1914 (London, 1948) 
C. A. Cline, Recruits to Labour 1914-1931 (New York, 1963) 
R. Crossman, A Nation Reborn (London, 1960) 
J. Degras (ed. ), The Communist International 1919-1943 
Documents, Vol I& II London, 1956 & 1965) 
"V. J. Fishman, East End Jewish Radicals 1875-1914 (London, 1975) 
S. Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians (London, 1979). 
I. Friedman, Germany, Turkey and Zionism 1897-1918 (Cxford, 1977) 
The Question of Palestine 1914-1918 (London, 1973) 
J. A. Garrard, The English and Immigration 1880-1914 
(London, 1971) 
G. T. Garratt, The Mugwumps and the Labour Party (London, 1932) 
399 
L. P. Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870-191 
(London, 1960) 
M. Gilbert, Exile and Return (London, 1978) 
D. Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics 1945-1961 
(Oxford, 1971) 
AM. Gomaa, The Formation of the League of Arab States 
(London, 1977) 
P. Goodman, Zionism in England: A Jubilee Record (London, 1949) 
P, 1Goodman (ed. ), The Jewish National Home 1917-1942 (London, 1943) 
M. R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign 
Policy 1914-1965 (Stanford, Calif., 1969) 
Y. Gorni, 'Beatrice Webb's Views on Judaism and Zionism' 
Jewish Social Studies, Vol XL, 1978, pp. 95-116. 
F. Gottlieb, 'Leonard Woolf's Attitude to his Hewish Background 
and to Judaism', Jewish Historical Society of England 
Vol XXV, 1977, pp. 25-37. 
P. S. Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement 
1914-1964 London, 1975) 
S. Hattis, The Bi National Idea in Palestine (Geneva, 1970) 
H. F. Infield (ed)., Essays in Jewish Sociology, Labour and 
Cooperation in Memory of Dr N. Barou (London, 1962) 
D. Hill (ed. ), Tribune 1+0: The First Forty Years of a Socialist 
Newspaper London, 1977 
J. D. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York, 1950) 
R. J. Jackson, Rebels and Whips (London, 1968) 
B. Jafee, 'The British Press and Zionism in Herzl's Time', 
Jewish Historical Society of England, Vol XXIV, 
1973, pp. 89-100. 
J. M. N. Jeffries, Palestine: The Reality (London, 1939) 
B. Jones, The Russia Complex: The British Labour Party and the 
Soviet Union (Manchester, 1977) 
A. W. Kayyali, Palestine: A Modern History (London, 1978) 
E. Kedourie, In the Anglo Arab Labyrinth (London, 1976) 
J. Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars (London, 1950) 
J. & D. Kimche, Secret Roads: The 'Illegal' Immigration of a 
1938-1948 London, 1954) 
Both Sides of the Hill (London, 1950) 
L. Kochan (ed. ), The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917 (London, 1970) 
W. Laqueur, A History of Zionism (London, 1972) 
G. L. Lebzelter, Political Anti Semitism on England 1918-1939 
(London, 1978) 
400 
S. Levenberg (ed. ), Ber Borochov: Selected Essays in Socialist 
Zionism (London, 1948) 
N. Levin, Jewish Socialist Movements 1871-1917 (London, 1978) 
V. D. Lipman, Social History of the Jews in England 1850-1950 (London, 1954) 
! `J. R. Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the 
Decolonisation of the British Empire 1941-1945 
(OxfOrd, 1977) 
R. B. MacCallum & A. Readman, The British General Election of 
1945 (London, 1947) 
C. Mayhew & D. Adams, Publish It Not... The Middle East Coverup 
(London, 1975) 
N. Mandel,. The Arabs and Zionism in Palestine Before World 
War One Berklmy, Calif., 1976) 
G. Mansur, The Arab Worker Under the Mandate (Jerusalem, 1937) 
J. Marlowe, The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine 
Mandate (London, 1959) 
E. Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East (London, 1963) 
J. F. Naylor, Labour's International Polic : The Labour Party 
in the 1930s London, 1969 
Y. Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National 
Movement, Vol 1 1918-1929 (London, 1977) 
The Palestine Arab National Movement: From Riots to 
to Rebellion, Vol II (London, 1977) 
A. Perlmutter, 'Dov Ber Borochov: A Marxist Zionist Ideologist', 
Middle East Studies, Vol V, 1969, pp. 32-43. 
V7. Preuss, The Labour Movement in Israel (Jerusalem, 1965) 
T. Reid, 'Should a Jewish State Be Eestablished in Palestine? ' 
Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol XXXIII, 
1946, pp. 161-177. 
N. Rose, The Gentile Zionists: A Study in An lo-Zionist Diplomacy 
1929-1939 (London, 1973) 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Palestine 
1914-1939 (London, 1939) 
H. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle. East 1914-1924 (London, 1970 
Europe Leaves the Middle East 1936-1954 (London, 1970) 
A. Shapiro, 'The Ideology and Practice of the Joint Jewish- 
Arab Labour Union in Palestine 1920-1939', Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol XXII, 1977, Pp. '669-92. 
M. Sissons & P. French (eds), Age of Austerity 1945-1951 (Penguin Edition, London, 1964) 
E. Silberner, 'British Socialism and the Jews', Historia 
Judaica, Vol XXIV, 1952 pp. 27-52. 
1+01 
E. Silberner, 'Anti S: enitism and Philp Semitism in the Socialist 
International', Judaism, II1 1953, PP. 117-22. 
'German Social Democracy and the Jewish Problem 
Prior to World 1Nar One', Historia Judaica, Vol XV, 
1953, pp. 3-45 
J. Stevenson & C. Cook, The Slump (London, 1977) 
P. Stansky (ed. ), The Left and the War: The British Labour 
Party and World War One (New York, 1969) 
N. 
,: 
Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics 
During the First World War (Oxford, 1971) 
L. Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London, 1961) 
C. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (London, 1965) 
P. Thompson, Socialists, Liberals and Labour: The Struggle 
for London 188`-1914 (London, 1967) 
D. Vital, TheNcking of British Foreign Policy (London, 1968) 
B. Wasserstein, The British in Palestine: The Mandatory 
Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict 1917-1929 (London, 1978) 
Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (London, 1979) 
J. W7edgwood, The Seventh Dominion (London, 1928) 
R. Wistrich, 'Marxism and Jewish Nationalism: The Theoretical 
Roots of Conflict', Jewish Journal of Sociology, 
Vol XVI, 1974, pp. 43-54. 
b. Unpublished Theses 
M. J. Goldfine, The Growth of Zionism in England 1870-191 
Masters Essay, Columbia University, 1939. 
E. Meelian, The British 'Left' and Foreign Policy 1945-1951 
PhD, University of London, 1954. 
M. Leifer, Zionism and Palestine in British Opinion end Policy 
PhD, University of London, 1959. 
P. Offer, The Role of 
in P 
PhD, 
estine: ohn Chancellc 
niversity of Lohdon, 1971. 
G. "Sheffer, Policy Making and British Politices Towards 
Palestine 1929-1939 PhD, Oxford University, 1970 
C. R. Rose, The Relation- of Socialist Principles to British 





ssioner in Briti 
